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Background: Alcohol use is a major risk factor for ill-health and a contributor to 
health inequalities. Scottish alcohol-related mortality rates are the highest in the UK, 
with the greatest burden of alcohol-related harm falling on people from the most 
deprived areas. The Scottish Government has been ambitious in their policy and 
legislative efforts to address the problem, collectively known as Scotland’s ‘alcohol 
strategy’. Although evaluations exist which focus on population-level outcomes and 
national-level overviews of single aspects of the strategy’s implementation, much 
less is known about how the broad strategy has been implemented at local level. 
The focus of this thesis is the strategy in place from 2009-2018, which has been 
recognised internationally for taking a progressive, ‘whole population approach’ to 
tackling alcohol-related harm. This thesis explores how local implementation of the 
alcohol strategy occurred, investigating how the strategy was implemented in 
practice, and examining challenges facing the local policy actors and partnerships 
tasked with this implementation work. 
 
Methods: To set the scene for data analysis in this thesis, a systematic review of 
empirical studies on alcohol policy implementation in high-income contexts was 
conducted to identify factors affecting local implementation of alcohol policies. The 
substantive part of the thesis then offers a qualitative, embedded case study of 
alcohol policy implementation in three purposefully selected local areas of Scotland. 
Data were generated from semi-structured interviews with nine national-level alcohol 
policy stakeholders and 54 local alcohol policy implementers (63 interviewees in 
total). Local interviewees were recruited from two key bodies: (i) Alcohol and Drug 
Partnerships (ADPs), which are dedicated partnerships tasked with local alcohol 
policy implementation; and (ii) local Licensing Boards, which are independent 
regulatory bodies comprised of elected Local Councillors and which preside over the 
local alcohol licensing system, thus controlling alcohol availability. In order to 
supplement my understanding about the content of the alcohol strategy, aspects of 
context, roles of relevant actors, and representations of policy decisions, I also 
undertook documentary analysis of 16 relevant national policies, legislation, and 
reports. These included documents comprising the alcohol strategy, as well as 




Results: The systematic review identified a range of factors that available research 
suggest influence alcohol policy implementation, and these were grouped into the 
following three themes: accountability and governance; evidence use; and context 
and resources. The first two themes directly informed the research questions, while 
the third is discussed as a cross-cutting theme of the thesis. Multiple accountability 
relationships within and across ADPs and Licensing Boards were explored using 
Hupe and Hill’s (2007) public accountability typology, refined to capture how local 
implementers experience multiple ‘directional’ (vertical top-down, horizontal, and 
vertical bottom-up) accountabilities. The findings show that, for ADPs, these 
accountabilities are characterised by complexity, confusion, and miscommunication, 
with horizontal accountability within ADPs’ partnership structures appearing 
particularly challenging. With regards to Licensing Boards, the findings demonstrate 
that their current accountability system almost exclusively relies on legal 
accountability arrangements. This makes Licensing Boards’ accountability system 
distinct from the system for ADPs; the data suggest that these contrasting 
accountability systems are posing challenges to the implementation of Scotland’s 
alcohol strategy since the system for Licensing Boards does not appear to impose 
sufficient obligations on Licensing Boards to prioritise public health in their decision-
making. 
 
In relation to evidence use, the findings suggest that evidence plays an important 
but complex role in the implementation of Scotland’s alcohol strategy. Drawing on 
Lorenc and colleagues’ (2014) idea of ‘cultures of evidence’, the data demonstrate 
that ADPs and Licensing Boards each have a distinct identifiable ‘culture of 
evidence’, which is characterised by the varying ways in which actors within these 
organisations perceive and use evidence. These two cultures of evidence 
overlapped insofar as members of both organisations reported valuing locally 
contextualised evidence and each culture was characterised by having a diversity of 
perspectives within it, reflecting members’ diverse professional backgrounds. 
However, important differences between these two cultures of evidence were also 
apparent and potentially help explain why ADP members described struggling to 
influence Licensing Board decision-making. In addition, the findings indicate that 
evidence constructed in traditional public health settings (e.g. the NHS and 
universities) was not perceived to be translating well into either ADPs or LBs. Both 
the accountability issues, outlined above, and the application of ‘cultures of 
 
 
evidence’, help explain why seemingly relevant public health evidence may have 
limited traction within Scottish alcohol policy implementation.  
 
Each of the results chapters also demonstrates the significance of context and 
resource constraints in shaping implementation. This included impacting on the 
capacity of ADPs to fulfil national-level expectations, and reinforcing apprehension 
among LB members about potentially costly appeals against their decisions.  
 
Conclusion: This thesis provides important insights into the implementation of 
Scotland’s national alcohol strategy, demonstrating that accountability, evidence 
use, context and resources all shape implementation in important ways. Notably, it 
suggests that effective implementation is being hampered by inadequate 
governance arrangements in a complex context characterised by a commitment to 
multi-sectoral collaboration, in which key challenges to partnership working and 
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1 Introduction to the Thesis 
1.1 Introduction 
Alcohol use in Scotland is a cause of significant population harms and health 
inequalities (Beeston et al., 2011). Scottish policymakers have responded to these 
harms with a policy and legislative approach that has been recognised 
internationally for its innovation and leadership (Hilton et al., 2014; Trueland, 2016), 
and variously described as ‘world-leading’, ‘distinctive’ and ‘globally unique’ in policy 
and research rhetoric (Fitzgerald et al., 2017; Nicholls, 2012; Scottish Government, 
2018a). Collectively, this approach is referred to as Scotland’s ‘alcohol strategy’. As 
will be detailed in Chapter 2, in this thesis the term ‘alcohol strategy’ refers to the 
collection of policy and legislation in place between 2009-2018, the core of which 
was the policy Changing Scotland’s Relationship with Alcohol: A Framework for 
Action (Scottish Government, 2009a). The Framework for Action was published in 
2009 and ‘refreshed’ in 2018 (Scottish Government, 2018a) 1. Outcome evaluations 
of this strategy suggest that some progress has been made towards reducing 
alcohol-related harm in Scotland (Beeston et al., 2016). However, alcohol-related 
harm and demand for services remain high and have recently been rising (Audit 
Scotland, 2019; Giles and Robinson, 2019).  
 
The Scottish Government’s alcohol strategy is intended to be wide-ranging, 
addressing alcohol regulation, treatment and harm prevention. However, the past 
few years have seen substantive policy and political energy directed towards 
particular national level components of the 2009 strategy. In particular, to the 
development and enactment of legislation on minimum unit pricing (MUP) of alcohol 
(arguably the most high profile component of the 2009 strategy) (Katikireddi et al., 
2014; Katikireddi and McLean, 2012). The Scottish Parliament passed MUP 
legislation in 2012, but the Scottish Government was forced to fight a protracted 
legal battle in European and UK courts against challenges brought by the Scotch 
Whisky Association (Scotch Whisky Association and others (Appellants) v The Lord 
Advocate and another (Respondents) (Scotland), 2017). While the Scottish 
 
1 During the writing up of this research, the Scottish Government was ‘refreshing’ the 
Framework for Action. In November 2018, the government published the ‘Alcohol Framework 
2018’, which updated the national prevention aims on alcohol, and a joint alcohol and drugs 
strategy, ‘Rights, respect and recovery’ (Scottish Government, 2018a, 2018b).  
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Government’s case was eventually successful and MUP was implemented in May 
2018, in the meantime the more local processes of alcohol policy implementation 
were facing their own challenges. These included increasing levels of alcohol-
related harm alongside extensive budget cuts at Scottish local authority level 
(discussed below and in Chapter 2). Additionally, while MUP continues to be 
prioritised for policy action2 and evaluation (NHS Health Scotland, 2019)3, and a 
substantial body of research has been undertaken on MUP (e.g. Katikireddi et al., 
2014; Katikireddi and Hilton, 2015; Katikireddi and McLean, 2012; McCambridge et 
al., 2014; O’May et al., 2016; Patterson et al., 2015), a relative dearth of research is 
available to explain more local processes of alcohol policy implementation.  
 
Given the extent of harms still observed in Scotland (Audit Scotland, 2019), alcohol 
remains a key public health policy priority (COSLA and Scottish Government, 2018). 
Since single components of the strategy, such as MUP, are not expected to achieve 
Scotland’s ambitious alcohol-related public health goals, greater understanding of 
how Scotland’s broader alcohol strategy is being implemented locally is required. 
This thesis takes forward this task, aiming to expand what is already known about 
alcohol policy implementation in ways that potentially contribute to enabling future 
alcohol strategies to be more effective in achieving population health goals. 
 
1.2 Alcohol and public health policy in Scotland 
From a public health policy perspective, alcohol use presents a complex set of 
cultural, social, economic, and health characteristics. Globally, while alcohol 
continues to be used in various contexts for socialisation, faith-based rituals, a 
gesture of hospitality, etc. (Babor et al., 2010), alcohol remains a cause of major 
health-related, social, and economic burdens on societies (World Health 
Organization, 2014a). Whereas some research has suggested that alcohol was only 
or more harmful when consumed at certain levels (e.g. Baglietto et al., 2006; 
Zakhari, 1997), or in certain ways (e.g. Mathurin and Deltenre, 2009) the evidence 
 
2 At time of writing, MUP remains a key priority for the Scottish Government following 
publication of the 2018 Alcohol Framework (A Ferguson, personal communication, 13 
February 2020).  
3 A key reason for ongoing evaluation is the ‘sunset clause’ in the legislation that means the 
legislation will expire after six years, unless the Scottish Parliament votes for its continuance 
(NHS Health Scotland, 2019). The evaluation is necessary to assess the impact of MUP and 
inform Ministers’ and Parliament’s ultimate decision (NHS Health Scotland, 2019). 
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base increasingly suggests that any level of consumption can be harmful (Bagnardi 
et al., 2013; Connor, 2017).  Alcohol consumption is a major risk factor for long-term 
conditions and a contributor to health inequalities, leading to high rates of population 
morbidity and mortality (Rehm et al., 2009; World Health Organization, 2014a). For 
example, the health-related consequences of alcohol use include over 200 
conditions, comprising a multitude of non-communicable diseases such as cancer, 
stroke, and liver disease (Parry et al., 2011; World Health Organization, 2014a). 
Further, in 2016 approximately 5.2% of all global deaths (approximately 3 million) 
were attributed to alcohol (GBD 2016 Risk Factors Collaborators, 2017; World 
Health Organization, 2018).  
 
Consistent with global evidence, relatively high alcohol consumption in Scotland has 
led to a correspondingly high rate of alcohol-related harms and costs (Beeston et al., 
2011). A Scottish Government-commissioned report published in 2010, estimated 
that alcohol use cost Scotland £3.6 billion in 2007 because of issues such as lost 
productivity, family breakdown, need for health services, and crime (York Health 
Economics Consortium, 2010). Subsequent work by Johnston and colleagues 
(2012), including more ‘intangible costs’4, estimated the total cost in 2009/2010 to be 
£7.4 billion. To place this in context, Scotland’s GDP5 in 2018 was around £163.6 
billion (National Statistics Scotland, 2019), suggesting that the annual cost of alcohol 
exceeds 4.5% of GDP. Comparatively, tobacco is estimated to cost Scotland £1.1 
billion per year (ASH Scotland, 2010).  
 
In terms of alcohol-related mortality, Scotland suffers from the highest rates in the 
UK (Office for National Statistics, 2015). When comparing 2017 statistics with 
England and Wales, Scottish alcohol-related death rates were twice as high in men 
and 55% higher in women (Giles & Robinson, 2019). From a peak in early 2000s, 
data from 2008-2012 suggest that alcohol-related death rates fell (Giles & Robinson, 
2019). However, these figures need to be viewed in the context of a longer-term rise 
and more recent data suggest rates have begun to rise again. In 2017, Scotland’s 
alcohol-related death rates were still 2.5 times higher than they had been in 1981 
(Giles & Robinson, 2019).  
 
4 Costs which do not yield resources if eliminated, e.g. ‘fear of crime’  





Placed in a broader health and public policy context, alcohol use is also an 
important contributor to health inequalities among the Scottish population (Beeston 
et al., 2011; Katikireddi et al., 2017). Problems related to alcohol use are often 
intertwined with other social determinants of health, such as experiences of 
homelessness (Fazel et al., 2008; Ross-Houle et al., 2017), common mental health 
problems (Conner et al., 2009; Currie et al., 2005; Sullivan et al., 2005); and crime, 
including intimate partner violence (Foran and O’Leary, 2008; Nutt et al., 2010).  
 
In response to the extent of alcohol-related harms and costs in Scotland, the 
Scottish Government has been ambitious in their policy and legislative efforts. 
These efforts include committing to a ‘whole population approach’ in the 2009 
Framework for Action (an approach maintained in the 2018 Framework ‘refresh’), 
and including an innovative ‘public health objective’6 within alcohol licensing (Alcohol 
Focus Scotland and SHAAP, 2011; Scottish Government, 2009a). Parties across 
the political spectrum in Scotland have recognised the issue of alcohol-related 
harms, and have broadly supported the need for policy intervention (Scottish 
Parliament, 2015a). This political context is complicated, however, by the constraints 
of the Scottish devolution settlement. As devolved bodies, the Scottish Parliament 
and Scottish Government can only act on elements of alcohol regulation which have 
been devolved to them by the UK Government (Alcohol Focus Scotland, 2017a). 
Furthermore, some elements of alcohol-related regulation in Scotland take place at 
the local level, in each of Scotland’s 32 local authorities. These various 
arrangements are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2, but it is clear that 
devolution and the localisation of alcohol policy implementation in Scotland create a 
complex policy landscape, and that gaps in knowledge remain, particularly about 
how local implementation has occurred (see Chapter 3).  
 
One of the defining challenges of policy implementation research has been to 
examine why gaps frequently exist between expectations for a policy’s outcomes 
and impact, and what is actually delivered and achieved (Hill and Hupe, 2014; 
Pressman and Wildavsky, 1984). It has long been recognised that, in policy practice, 
 
6 A feature which helps differentiate Scotland from England/Wales, where licensing 
legislation lacks this type of objective (Martineau et al., 2014) (discussed further in Chapters 
2 and 3). 
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if policy implementation is ignored, the desired policy changes will not occur 
(Pressman and Wildavsky, 1984). Effective enactment of policies into practice 
remains an endemic challenge and critical concern for stakeholders seeking to 
improve policy change (Saetren, 2005). If policy implementation is neglected, it 
makes it very difficult for researchers and policymakers to differentiate between 
policies that are ineffective because of how they were developed (i.e. their content), 
or because they have been ineffectively implemented. Indeed, implementation gaps 
can arise regardless of the quality of the policy’s development (Hudson et al., 2019).  
 
The importance of investigating implementation is acknowledged in the field of 
alcohol policy. For example, a 2017 report on the implementation of the World 
Health Organization’s (WHO) Global Strategy to Reduce the Harmful Use of Alcohol 
noted that progress has been skewed to countries with greater resources to 
dedicate to implementation, and that further commitment, investment, and 
coordinated action was required (Jernigan and Trangenstein, 2017). In 2019, WHO 
ran a consultation regarding the implementation of the Global Strategy, asking 
stakeholders to reflect on achievements, challenges, and setbacks, demonstrating 
an international concern with investigating these issues in alcohol policy (WHO, 
2019). Responses from Scottish and UK-based organisations reflected key 
challenges at national levels regarding resources, obstruction from industry, and 
understanding the priorities of policy decision-makers, as well as locally-specific 
challenges such as addressing alcohol availability through licensing (Alcohol Focus 
Scotland, 2019; Institute of Alcohol Studies, 2019).  
 
Although there have been strides towards understanding alcohol use, related harms, 
and initiatives to combat these in Scotland, research has often focused on single 
aspects of the Scottish Government’s alcohol strategy, such as MUP, alcohol brief 
interventions (ABIs) or the public health objective within the Licensing (Scotland) Act 
2005 (e.g. Fitzgerald et al., 2015; Katikireddi et al., 2014; MacGregor et al., 2013; 
Parkes et al., 2011) (see Chapters 2 and 3). However, given the complexity and 
multi-component nature of Scotland’s alcohol strategy, there is a need to investigate 
the strategy’s implementation more broadly. In particular, because local-level actors 
were positioned by the Scottish Government as being key for implementation 
(Scottish Government, 2009a), it is important to focus on the local translation and 




I first identified this gap in knowledge through my initial readings of Scottish alcohol 
policy documents, preliminary engagement with existing research, and by 
undertaking scoping meetings with 11 national and local alcohol policy stakeholders 
in Scotland (see Chapter 4), from which I gained a greater sense of the complexity 
of the strategy. For example, I learned that local policy implementers were rarely 
solely responsible for implementing single components of the strategy but rather 
worked with a range of relevant organisations, brought together in local 
partnerships, to collaboratively implement multiple aspects of the strategy.  This 
initial work also helped identify potential knowledge gaps. For example, although 
existing reports had identified key historical challenges surrounding local 
partnerships (Audit Scotland, 2009; Cameron, 2007), it remained unknown whether 
reforms to address these challenges (Scottish Government, 2009b, 2009c) had 
been successful, suggesting this was an important gap in understanding local 
governance of Scottish alcohol policy. 
 
This project has therefore been designed to help address gaps in understanding 
regarding the local dimensions of Scottish alcohol policy. It also seeks to 
complement an important portfolio of contemporary work, spearheaded by NHS 
Health Scotland. Following publication of the 2009 Framework for Action, the 
Scottish Government commissioned NHS Health Scotland to establish the taskforce 
Monitoring and Evaluating Scotland’s Alcohol Strategy (MESAS) (NHS Health 
Scotland, 2017a). MESAS was intended to “assess the success of the alcohol 
strategy” (Beeston et al., 2011, p. 1); the MESAS work portfolio was composed of 
seven studies, developed collaboratively by stakeholders, which cover a range of 
licensing, treatment, cultural, and economic topics (NHS Health Scotland, 2014, 
2009).  
 
The key objectives of MESAS were to: track implementation progress and reach of 
key actions; assess extent to which intended outcomes were achieved and were 
attributable to Scottish Government actions; and identify any unintended outcomes 
or displacement effects, including those which may impact on health inequalities 
(Beeston et al., 2011). To achieve these objectives MESAS sought to evaluate 
measures such as access to services, changes in knowledge about and attitudes to 
alcohol, economic impacts on the alcohol industry, and changes in alcohol 
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consumption and related harms (Beeston et al., 2011). Additionally, as will be 
discussed further in Chapter 2, two MESAS work-streams undertook 
implementation-related evaluations related to specific components of the strategy - 
alcohol licensing and ABIs (Beeston et al., 2011).  
 
As a national-level evaluation project, however, MESAS did not examine in detail 
how the overall alcohol strategy was implemented among different ADPs and local 
areas in Scotland, leaving a gap in understanding about how the broad national 
alcohol strategy was being translated, interpreted, and enacted by local level alcohol 
policy implementers. Having identified this gap early in my research, I conducted 
informal scoping meetings with members of the MESAS team to ascertain what 
research focus would be most complementary to their substantial work portfolio – 
these discussions helped to inform my research design (Chapter 4).   
 
1.3 What This Thesis Will Do 
Following on from the above, this thesis will examine the local dimension of alcohol 
policy implementation in Scotland. it will investigate how key aspects of policy 
implementation, namely accountability and evidence use, influence the local 
implementation of Scotland’s alcohol strategy, while also paying attention to context 
and resources as cross-cutting factors. In doing so, it focuses on addressing the 
overarching research aim of investigating whether and how factors known to shape 
alcohol policy implementation in high-income settings shaped the local level 
implementation of Scotland’s 2009 alcohol strategy. To achieve this, it answers the 
following research questions:  
1. How was local implementation of Scotland’s 2009 alcohol strategy influenced 
by formal and informal accountability mechanisms in the contexts of: 
a. Alcohol and Drug Partnerships?; and 
b. Licensing Boards? 
 
2. What roles (if any) did evidence appear to play in the implementation of 
Scotland’s 2009 alcohol strategy? 
 
Further, the thesis considers how contextual factors and resources appear to shape 
the local implementation of Scotland’s 2009 alcohol strategy, particularly with 




This thesis will first identify research needs for understanding how alcohol policy 
implementation is undertaken at local-area level. To contribute to addressing these 
needs, it will then take a qualitative, embedded case study approach (Yin, 2009) to 
exploring the overarching case of alcohol policy implementation in Scotland. This 
case will be investigated through (i) analysis of national policy documents which 
constitute, or were directly relevant to, Scotland’s 2009 strategy, (ii) semi-structured 
interviews with national-level alcohol policy stakeholders, and (iii) semi-structured 
interviews with alcohol policy implementers (in ADPs and Licensing Boards [LBs]) in 
three purposely selected ‘embedded’ Scottish local areas (see Chapter 4).  
 
The findings of this thesis seek to contribute knowledge to the field of alcohol policy 
implementation by: mapping and elucidating different accountability regimes 
experienced by local alcohol policy implementers in Scottish ADPs and LBs; 
exploring how these different organisations perceive and use evidence; and 
considering the role of context and resources. In doing so, it enhances alcohol policy 
implementation research by addressing the dearth of research explaining how these 
factors influence implementation.  
 
This research was conducted during 2014-2019, in the final few years of the 2009 
alcohol strategy lifespan. While no claims are made regarding the generalisability of 
this research, the analysis provides insights into alcohol policy implementation in 
Scotland at a time when tackling alcohol-related harm was being prioritised. Since 
concern with alcohol-related harms remains, the findings may be useful for taking 
forward into the implementation of Scotland’s ‘refreshed’ alcohol strategy (Scottish 
Government, 2018a, 2018b).  
 
1.4 Thesis Outline 
In Chapter 2, I map the policy and organisational context of Scottish alcohol policy 
implementation, introducing key policy, legislation and guidance, and key actors’ 
roles and relationships. Chapter 3 then presents a systematic review of empirical 
studies on alcohol policy implementation in high-income contexts. Comprising an 
analysis of 29 studies, the review identifies three key themes which help explain 
how implementation occurs, namely (i) accountability and governance, (ii) evidence 
use, and (iii) context and resources. The results of this chapter help identify 
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research needs in this field, helping to finalise the thesis research questions and set 
up the focus of the empirical chapters. Chapter 4 details the methodological 
approach, providing an explanation for selecting, and reflections on undertaking, a 
qualitative embedded case study approach.  
 
The Preface to the Results describes the development of my research questions in 
light of the systematic review and initial data analysis. Chapter 5 then introduces a 
typology on public accountabilities by Hupe and Hill (2007) and goes on to examine 
experiences of accountability reported by ADP members in the context of their 
implementation work. Chapter 6, again using Hupe and Hill (2007) to organise the 
results, focuses on the different experiences of accountability reported by local LB 
members. Chapter 7 focuses on how evidence is perceived and used within ADPs 
and LBs, identifying that each organisation has a ‘culture of evidence’ (Lorenc et al., 
2014b), and discussing how this appears to influence their work to implement 
Scotland’s alcohol strategy.  
 
Following the empirical chapters, Chapter 8 provides the discussion chapter of the 
thesis as a whole, presenting the principal findings and contributions to relevant 
literature. It also draws together findings from across the three results chapters 
related to how context and resources influence alcohol policy implementation, in 
relation to accountability and evidence use. Ultimately, the chapter highlights 
governance challenges of and multi-sectoral collaboration and partnership and 




2 Mapping the complex and changing landscape of 
alcohol policy implementation in Scotland  
2.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to map the complex and changing landscape in which 
Scotland’s 2009 alcohol strategy was being implemented during my research. While 
historical summaries of Scottish alcohol policy exist (e.g. Butler et al., 2017; 
Nicholls, 2015), it was important for me (and a potential reader) to understand 
different aspects of the contemporary policy, legislative, and organisational contexts, 
so I could be aware of and reflect upon the conditions in which the strategy was 
implemented in the course of my analysis (Weyrauch et al., 2016). This was 
important for helping explain how and why implementation occurred in the Scottish 
environment in the way it did (and recognising that, if similar strategies were 
implemented elsewhere, implementation and outcomes may be different) (Polit and 
Beck, 2010). Analysing this within a specific chapter was important because Scottish 
alcohol policy, and Scottish local policy reform more generally, were in a state of flux 
during my fieldwork. For example, within the overarching context of Scottish 
devolution, there was an ongoing, high-profile legal battle regarding MUP (Gillan, 
2012), significant cuts to alcohol and drug services funding (Scottish Government, 
2015a, 2016a), and challenges interpreting and enacting Scotland’s unique ‘public 
health’ licensing objective at local level (Fitzgerald et al., 2017). To undertake this 
mapping I drew from a range of publications, government websites, policy 
documents and legislation, and informal scoping discussions with 11 stakeholders at 
national and local levels (see Chapter 4). I also drew on my interview data to add 
nuance and clarity to this chapter and checked my mapping work with key 
stakeholders such as Alcohol Focus Scotland. 
 
This chapter first examines Scotland’s alcohol policy and legislative landscapes, and 
introduces the 2009 Framework for Action which was core to Scotland’s alcohol 
strategy in the study period. It then discusses the roles of relevant actors and 
organisations, including a brief analysis of the funding context which was 




2.2 Scottish Alcohol Policy Landscape  
2.2.1 History, Devolution and Alcohol Policy in Scotland 
Alcohol-related legislation and policy has a long history in Scotland, in which a mix 
of politics and culture influenced decision-making (Nicholls, 2012). Scottish 
magistrates began licensing alcohol in 1756 in response to concerns about 
alehouses and gin consumption (Nicholls, 2012). Over the next few hundred years, 
licensing legislation would regulate a variety of issues, including who was permitted 
to enter licensed premises (based on, for example, age or reputation), opening 
times of premises, and distinctions between on-sales and off-sales premises 
(Nicholls, 2012).  
 
More recently, when the Scottish Parliament and Scottish Government7 were 
established in 1999, a number of ‘powers’ were devolved to this new layer of 
Government (Devolution (Further Powers) Committee, 2016; Keating, 2010). 
Several of these powers are relevant to alcohol policy, particularly under the 
categories of health, law (including the criminal justice and prosecution system), 
police and prisons (Keating, 2010). These include, for example, competencies to act 
to regulate alcohol through sales promotions, regulation of the press, printed or 
billboard advertisements, advertising at sporting events, and sponsorship (Alcohol 
Focus Scotland, 2017a). Meanwhile, power to restrict alcohol marketing is 
distributed between the Scottish and UK Parliaments; the UK Parliament retains 
competence over taxation of alcohol, regulating broadcasting, consumer protection, 
and internet services (Alcohol Focus Scotland, 2017a). At time of writing, this 
distribution of powers sits within the broader context of European Union (EU) 
legislation. For example, while EU law prohibits certain actions which would interfere 
in cross-border trade within Europe and thus impact market forces, it also states 
such restrictions can be justified on the grounds of protecting health (Katikireddi and 
McLean, 2012). This higher level of governance beyond the UK has had implications 
for Scottish alcohol policy and legislation, most notably during the court challenge 
against MUP (Katikireddi et al., 2014; Katikireddi and McLean, 2012).  
 
 
7 Up until 2007 the Scottish Government was known as the ‘Scottish Executive’ (Smith and 
Hellowell, 2012). This ‘rebranding’ was done by the new Scottish National Party 




Given the devolved nature of health and social care, however, the Scottish 
Government is generally viewed as responsible for the health and societal costs 
associated with alcohol-related harms in Scotland. Since devolution, successive 
Governments have developed policy and legislative responses to these costs and 
harms8. The decisions of different administrations have led to a complicated context, 
with multiple pieces of legislation and key policies which constitute Scotland’s 
overall ‘alcohol strategy’ and frame the country’s approach to addressing alcohol-
related harm (see Box 2.1). 
 
 
Changing Scotland’s Relationship with Alcohol: A Framework for Action (Scottish 
Government, 2009a) was the central pillar of this strategy during my fieldwork. In 
2007, the new Scottish National Party (SNP) government explicitly prioritised the 
issue of Scotland’s drinking culture and began developing their national alcohol 
policy, which became the Framework (Nicholls, 2012) 9. The overall policy was 
developed with the stated aim of reducing alcohol-related harm and improving the 
health and wellbeing of Scotland’s population (Scottish Government, 2009a)10. It has 
been presented as a response to the strong evidence of harms experienced by 
Scotland’s population (McCartney et al., 2011, 2012; Shelton, 2009; Walsh et al., 
2010). Proposed actions in the Framework reflect an ambitious challenge to the 
boundaries of Scottish devolution. For example, the pursuit of MUP was an 
innovative legislative lever to raise the price of cheap alcohol in Scotland despite the 
 
8 Scottish Labour Party-Liberal Democrat coalition from 1999 to 2007, followed by a minority 
SNP government in 2007- 2011, majority SNP government in 2011-2016, and minority SNP 
government again in 2016-present (Scottish Parliament, n.d.). 
9 Throughout the research period the SNP was in power, however in 2014 Nicola Sturgeon 
became First Minister 
10 This included a new NHS target for the delivery of a certain number of alcohol brief 
interventions in priority areas of primary care, antenatal care, and Accident and Emergency 
Departments (Scottish Government, 2009a, p. 24) 
• Licensing (Scotland) Act 2005 (enacted 2009) 
• Changing Scotland’s Relationship with Alcohol: A Framework for Action (2009)  
• Alcohol etc. (Scotland) Act 2010 
• Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010 
• Alcohol (Minimum Pricing) (Scotland) Act 2012 (enacted 2018) 
• Air Weapons and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2015  
 
 
Box 2.1 Key Policy and Legislative Components of Scotland's Alcohol Strategy for 
the study period (MacGregor et al. (2013); Scottish Parliament (2015c)) 
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UK’s retained power over alcohol taxation (Gillan and Macnaughton, 2007; 
Katikireddi et al., 2014).   
 
2.2.2 The 2009 Framework for Action and Scotland’s ‘Whole Population 
Approach’ 
A key feature of Scotland’s 2009 alcohol strategy was the underlying principle of a 
‘whole population approach’, with accompanying actions targeted at vulnerable 
populations (Beeston et al., 2011). This approach was based on the principles that: 
a) a focus on only heavy drinkers neglects a significant portion of the population who 
are also potentially at risk of alcohol-related harm; and b) an individual’s alcohol-
related behaviour can be changed by modifying the societal norms of their 
community and environment (Beeston et al., 2011). This approach can be observed 
across the strategy’s documents (most clearly in the Framework for Action).  
  
The Framework for Action has been lauded as evidence-informed (Fitzgerald and 
Angus, 2015), a characterisation aligned with rhetoric around (and public health 
pressure to achieve)  ‘evidence-informed policy’ across the UK (Greenhalgh and 
Russell, 2009; Hunter, 2009; Macintyre, 2012). Within the Framework document, the 
whole population approach is presented as reflecting current evidence-informed 
recommendations for alcohol policy (Babor et al., 2010; Scottish Government, 
2009a; World Health Organization, 2010). Comparing evidence-use in alcohol policy 
across the four UK nations, Fitzgerald and Angus (2015) found Scotland to have the 
most ‘evidence-based approach’. The authors advanced several possible 
explanations for this, relating to the interplay of evidence and politics. These include 
the new nationalist SNP government seeking to target a high-profile, national issue 
which could distinguish Scotland from the UK, and the alcohol industry’s relative 
neglect of the SNP, which meant politicians and civil servants had not been 
persuaded of industry’s positions (Fitzgerald and Angus, 2015). In the context of this 
previous research, the focus of my thesis is not to understand how the strategy 
came into being, but to understand how it was implemented.  
 
The Framework comprises four action areas (onto which 41 actions are mapped): (i) 
reduced consumption; (ii) supporting families and communities; (iii) positive attitudes 
and positive choices; and (iv) improved support and treatment. I conducted an 
analysis of the full framework, and developed a table of the 41 actions of the 
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Framework for Action (attached in Appendix 1). In that analysis I interpreted the 
‘level’ at which each action was intended to be implemented (i.e. UK, National 
[Scotland], Local, or unclear), basing my judgement on how the Framework 
presented each action. For example, where the Framework proposed to introduce 
new legislation or modify existing legislation, this was determined to be at ‘national’ 
level. Whereas, where the document states “Work with our partners at national and 
local level to improve substance misuse education in schools” (Scottish 
Government, 2009a, p. 15), this was categorised as occurring across both ‘national’ 
and ‘local’ levels. Table 2.1 shows the number of actions I interpreted to be 
implemented at each level, including those which would need to be acted upon at 
UK-level. 
Table 2.1 Number of policy ‘actions’ analysed for implementation at different levels 
of governance 











8 11 8 3 1 9 
*Total adds to 40, because one ‘action’ was a decision “not to introduce alcohol only 
checkouts” and was therefore not implemented 
 
The actions within the Framework I interpreted as needing to be implemented 
primarily at local level often related to service provision, education, and health 
promotion. This analysis exercise showed me that while certain components of the 
strategy have a relatively clear locus of responsibility, others are more ambiguous 
and require interpretation by stakeholders. This lack of clarity about where 
responsibility lies for policy components has important implications for 
accountability, an issue explored in the empirical chapters11. 
 
Figure 2.1 illustrates this analysis, indicating types of actions that I interpreted from 
the framework as being enacted at each level. For the figure I selected examples 
from across the ‘supporting families and communities’ action area because it 
provided a range of actions across local and national (Scottish) level, particularly 
ones which were later discussed by my interviewees as priorities and were thus 
relevant to my analysis.  
 
11 Note, the ‘refreshed’ Alcohol Framework 2018, in the Summary of Actions (p. 4-7), does 




Figure 2.1 Analysis of Level at which Framework for Action Locates Implementation 
Responsibilities for Proposed Actions (‘Supporting Families and Communities’) 
(Scottish Government, 2009) 
 
 
2.2.3 Broader Policy and Legislative Landscape 
A number of broader policies, legislation, and other government documents helped 
to shape the political and policy context in which the 2009 alcohol strategy was 
implemented. Figure 2.2 provides a timeline which includes: a) policy and legislation 
explicitly focused on alcohol (denoted with green dots), and b) policies and 
legislation which are relevant to alcohol policy (blue dots). This timeline has been 
updated to include the Scottish Government’s newly published, ‘refreshed’ alcohol 
policy strategy documents which were published after the fieldwork and analysis had 
been undertaken for this research. The timeline excludes policies or legislation prior 
to 2005 which are no longer in place and which were not discussed in my data12.  
 
The Scottish Government’s parallel drug misuse strategy, ‘The Road to Recovery: a 
new approach to tackling Scotland’s drug problem’, was published in May 2008 and 
is an example of a related, but not alcohol-specific policy (Scottish Government, 
 
12 For example, Scotland’s first post-devolution alcohol strategy from 2002, the ‘Plan for 
Action on Alcohol Problems’ (Katikireddi et al., 2014). 
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2008a). Given the remit of ADPs to address both drug and alcohol use, this policy is 
a key component of the alcohol policy environment at local level. The drug strategy 
focused primarily on reforming drug services to be ‘recovery-oriented’ and more 
strongly emphasising the achievement of outcomes (Scottish Government, 2008a). 
However, drug policy was not a focus of this research, and at the time of my 
fieldwork this was a separate strategy from the Framework for Action. Therefore, I 
made the decision to not examine the drugs strategy further in this thesis (though, 
since the most recent, ‘refreshed’ alcohol strategy for Scotland has been combined 
with drugs, future research would require a different approach).  
 




The Scottish Government’s National Performance Framework (NPF) sets out a 
common vision for all public services in Scotland (Scottish Government, 2015b). 
Originally published in 2007 and updated regularly (Scottish Government, 2016b, 
2018c), the NPF provides a range of measures to monitor progress in relation to the 
Government’s ‘Purpose’, ‘Values’ and national outcomes, including pursuing a 
Scotland in which ‘we are healthy and active’ (Scottish Government, 2018d). 
Population harms from alcohol present a challenge to the achievement of NPF 
objectives. Previous iterations of the NPF which were relevant to my study period 
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(‘refreshes’ in 2011 and 2016) included an alcohol-specific National Indicator to 
“reduce alcohol-related hospital admissions” (Scottish Government, 2017a)13. The 
NPF has also indicated important linkages can and should be made across 
Scotland’s public service sector in order to achieve identified goals for Scotland 
(Scottish Government, 2014a).  
 
2.3 Legislative Landscape 
2.3.1 Alcohol Legislation 
Multiple laws have been enacted to regulate alcohol licensing in Scotland (see Box 
2.2). The Licensing (Scotland) Act 2005 and its’ statutory objectives have their roots 
in the 1973 ‘Clayson’ Committee on Scottish licensing law, with the resulting report 
calling for major changes to the licensing system (Nicholls, 2012). Overall, the report 
recommended changes which would establish greater accountability, and 
“foreshadowed the principle of licensing objectives enshrined in the 2005 Licensing 
Act” (Nicholls 2012, p.1401). Further, it led to the development of the Licensing 
(Scotland) Act 1976 which established LBs. In 2003, the ‘Nicholson Committee’ 
published a comprehensive review of Scottish licensing legislation (Scottish 
Executive, 2003), the recommendations of which then formed the basis for the 
current Licensing Act 2005 (enacted in 2009). Importantly, this included 
recommending the establishment of licensing objectives, providing greater scope for 
LBs to restrict alcohol availability in the  public interest (MacNaughton and Gillan, 
2011).   
 
Details of the public health objective and Licensing Policy Statements established by 
the Licensing Act 2005 are provided in Section 2.5. The other legislation listed 
makes amendments to the Licensing Act 2005 and other existing legislation. For 
example, the Alcohol etc. (Scotland) Act 2010 restricts certain drinks promotions 
based on the quantity purchased (e.g. buy one, get one free) for off-sales, and 
requires that Health Boards become statutory consultees to the LB. The Air 
 
13 The most recent (2018) version of the NPF identifies ‘health risk behaviours’ as a key 
relevant indicator, which measures the percentage of adults with two or more health risk 




Weapons and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2015 mandates LBs publish annual reports 




Licensing (Scotland) Act 2005 
• Came into full effect in late 2009 after transition period 
• Makes provision for regulating the sale of alcohol, and the premises on which 
alcohol is sold 
• Contains five licensing objectives:  
o Preventing crime and disorder; 
o Securing public safety; 
o Preventing public nuisance;  
o Protecting and improving public health; and 
o Protecting children from harm. 
• Places duty on Licensing Boards to produce a Licensing Policy Statement every 
three years 
Alcohol etc. (Scotland) Act 2010 
• Enacted October 2011, introduced new mandatory licensing conditions. 
• Makes provision for regulating sale of alcohol and licensing of premises, including 
extending ban on quantity discounts for off-sales 
• Introduced requirement for Licensing Boards to consult with relevant Health Board 
when preparing their Licensing Policy Statement and notify Health Board of all 
premises license applications.  
• “Signals a retraction of liberalising trends of previous decades” (MacNaughton & 
Gillan, 2011, p. 23) 
Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010 
• Relevant components aimed to improve enactment of Licensing Act by modifying 
number of provisions and ensuring Licensing Boards have adequate information 
for license decision-making. 
Alcohol (Minimum Pricing) (Scotland) Act 2012 (MUP)* 
• Enacted 1st May 2018  
• Amends aspects of the Licensing (Scotland) Act 2005 and Alcohol etc. (Scotland) 
Act 2010 
• Mandates that alcohol must not be sold below a minimum price per unit, set by the 
Scottish Government at 50p per unit of alcohol 
Air Weapons and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2015 
• Lengthens the lifespan of Licensing Policy Statements to four years;  
• Mandates Licensing Boards submit annual financial and functions reports 
 
Sources: MacGregor et al., 2013; MacNaughton and Gillan, 2011; Scottish Parliament, 
2015b, 2012, 2011, 2010, 2005 
* While MUP had not been enacted at the time of my data collection, and was not a focus 
of the analysis (see Chapter 1) it is included here for completeness.   
Box 2.2 Scottish alcohol licensing legislation 2005-2019 
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In addition to legislation which explicitly regulates alcohol, other legislation has the 
potential to influence alcohol policy implementation. For example, during this 
research alcohol policy implementers were navigating new changes to local 
governance caused by the enactment of the Public Bodies (Joint Working) 
(Scotland) Act 2014 (Scottish Parliament, 2014a). This Act mandated Health Boards 
and local authorities integrate their governance, planning and resourcing of adult 
social care and key health services (Burgess, 2016, p. 5). This was relevant to my 
research because responsibility for local alcohol policy implementation was shared 
across NHS, local authority, and other key actors who were adapting to these new 
requirements of integrated working. 
 
Additionally, the Community Empowerment (Scotland) Act 2015 promotes public 
participation in policy decision-making (Scottish Government, 2017b; Scottish 
Parliament, 2015b) and was in the process of enactment during my fieldwork. It 
served as a relevant part of the alcohol policy implementation context during this 
research. 
 
2.4 Key Stakeholders 
The complexity of alcohol policy implementation in Scotland is also reflected in the 
diversity of organisations and actors involved.  Figure 2.3 provides a quick overview 
guide of key actors involved in alcohol policy implementation and where they are 
‘located’ in terms of local and national governance levels as of 2017. They include 
government, third-sector, private sector, and people in communities, and 
demonstrates the complicated, multi-level landscape in which implementation 
occurs. Although not depicted here, it is important to note the relationships these 
actors have with one another (exploring certain aspects of these is a focus of the 




Figure 2.3 Scottish Alcohol Policy Organisational Landscape (as of 2017) 
 
 
The Scottish Parliament is a unicameral, committee-based legislature - committees 
carry out inquiries and make recommendations to Parliament (Scottish Parliament, 
2014b). The primary committee for Scotland’s alcohol strategy is the Health and 
Sport Parliamentary Committee (Scottish Parliament, n.d.). The Committee’s remit is 
to scrutinise government policy and legislation, therefore they have a role in 
interrogating the content and delivery of alcohol-related policy and legislation. The 
topic of alcohol also cuts across other committees’ remits, however, further 
illustrating the complex context of alcohol policy. These include a Cross-Party Group 
on Drug and Alcohol Misuse (Scottish Parliament, 2019a); a Cross-Party Group on 
‘Improving Scotland’s Health: 2021 and Beyond’ (Scottish Parliament, 2019b); and 
the Local Government and Communities Committee (which has responsibility for 
alcohol licensing, and has led the Parliament’s inquiries into updating the statutory 
guidance for alcohol licensing) (Scottish Parliament, 2019c) .  
 
Within the Scottish Government, the Alcohol Policy Team was responsible for 
developing the Framework for Action in the lead-up to its publication in 2009. 
Following departmental reorganisation in 2016, during my research the Alcohol 
Policy Team and Substance Misuse Unit were both responsible for different 
components of Scotland’s overall strategy towards alcohol use.  For example, while 
the Alcohol Team led the refresh of the Framework for Action, the Substance 
Misuse Unit was responsible for treatment and recovery support for both alcohol and 
drugs, and in undertaking this, ran a support team for local ADPs and has 
responsibility for setting ADP priorities (National Level Interviewee 7). Ministerial 
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responsibility for this portfolio was transferred from Justice to Health during budget 
planning for 2016-17 (Kleinberg, 2016).  
 
2.4.1 Scottish Government Information Organisations 
Linked to the Scottish Government are a number of public organisations which 
provide research on, and data and evaluations for, alcohol-related indicators, this 
helping measure aspects of the extent and outcomes of alcohol policy 
implementation14. While these public organisations work at national level in 
Scotland, they often use data provided by local authorities and health boards, 
providing a local level connection.  
 
Information Services Division (ISD) Scotland provides health information to support 
quality improvement in health care (ISD Scotland, 2010a). It has a ‘Health & Social 
Care Drug & Alcohol Team’ which produces and collates information regarding 
alcohol indicators, for the purposes of supporting monitoring of the national strategy 
and for decision-making about alcohol treatment services (ISD Scotland, 2010b).  
 
The Scottish Public Health Observatory (ScotPHO) is a collaboration between ISD 
Scotland, NHS Health Scotland (discussed below), and a range of other public 
health partners who aim to improve collection and routine use of data on health-
related issues and determinants (Scottish Public Health Observatory, 2017). 
ScotPHO curates a website which provides key data sources, as well as overviews 
and reports. Their work is coordinated by a steering group constituted of 
government, public health, and academic actors (Scottish Public Health 
Observatory, 2017).  
 
NHS Health Scotland is a national health board which provides evidence to support 
the reduction of health inequalities, supports the use of this evidence in practice, 
and evaluates health interventions (NHS Health Scotland, 2017b). NHS Health 
Scotland supports the delivery of the Framework for Action, for example by 
providing guidance for delivering ABIs (NHS Health Scotland, 2017c). ABIs are 
 
14 On 1st April 2020 the Scottish Government and Convention of Scottish Local Authorities 
(COSLA) will establish a new national public health body, Public Health Scotland, which will 
bring together the organisations discussed (COSLA and Scottish Government, 2019) 
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structured, talk-based counselling sessions which seek to help an individual reduce 
their drinking behaviour (Kaner and O’Donnell, 2013). In 2010, NHS Health Scotland 
was also tasked with evaluating Scotland’s alcohol strategy through MESAS. When 
developing my own research, I conducted exploratory, informal ‘scoping’ interviews 
(see Appendix 2 and Chapter 4) with two MESAS researchers to discuss how my 
own research could best complement this work.  
 
The MESAS work portfolio was developed collaboratively by stakeholders (NHS 
Health Scotland, 2014, 2009) and undertaken between 2010-2015. The MESAS 
team published annual reports describing the progress and results of these studies, 
with a final report published in 2016 (Beeston et al., 2016)15. The portfolio includes 
seven separate studies, of which two were particularly relevant to this research: (i) 
MacGregor and colleagues’ (2013) study of the implementation of the Licensing 
(Scotland) Act 2005, in which they assessed whether the Act had been implemented 
as intended; and (ii) Parkes and colleagues’ (2011) study which assessed the 
implementation of ABIs delivered in certain NHS settings in Scotland. Greater detail 
about these studies and their findings are included in the systematic review in 
Chapter 3. 
 
2.4.2 Local Authorities and Community Planning Partnerships 
Actors at local level are relevant to the implementation of Scotland’s 2009 alcohol 
strategy because they influence strategic decision-making about local priorities and 
have a role supporting alcohol policy implementation. There are 32 Local 
Authorities; each is governed by a local Council which is comprised of elected 
Councillors and functions autonomously from central government (but within existing 
legislation and the Government’s NPF) (Scottish Government, 2015c). Local 
Authorities are responsible for providing services such as education, social care, 
and cultural services to their constituency (Scottish Government, 2015c). Local 
Authorities are represented nationally by the Convention of Scottish Local 
Authorities (COSLA), which lobbies the Scottish Government on their behalf 
(COSLA, n.d.).  
 
 
15 Routine monitoring continues, however, and MESAS is currently leading the evaluation of 
MUP (NHS Health Scotland, 2017a). 
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Correspondingly, there are also 32 Community Planning Partnerships (CPPs) in 
Scotland’s local areas, of which the Local Authority is a leading partner. ‘Community 
planning’ is the collaborative working of public services and communities to design 
and deliver services locally, with partnerships between public services and their 
communities to identify and address local needs (Scottish Government, 2019a). 
Community planning was originally established through the Local Government in 
Scotland Act 2003, however this was developed further by the Community 
Empowerment Act 2015 (Scottish Government, 2017c). The Community 
Empowerment Act 2015 increases the number of public sector organisations who 
must be involved in community planning (Scottish Government, 2016c). Despite this 
legislative change, research suggests improvement is still needed to consistently 
prioritise the involvement of communities in planning and delivery of services (Audit 
Scotland, 2018; Weakley and Escobar, 2018). This was relevant to my research 
because I became interested in whether and how communities, through potential 
accountability mechanisms, might influence aspects of local alcohol policy 
implementation.  
 
CPPs are responsible for developing and delivering a Local Outcomes Improvement 
Plan which determines key outcomes for the local area and the strategy for how to 
achieve them (Scottish Government, 2019a). Local Outcomes Improvement Plans 
replaced Single Outcome Agreements; agreements that were made between each 
CPP and the Scottish Government and described how the local area would provide 
public services according to the unique needs of their local contexts. The 
Community Empowerment Act 2015 mandates CPPs contribute resources towards 
securing participation of community bodies throughout community planning (Scottish 
Government, 2019a). Community planning is part of the local framework in which 
alcohol policy implementers are working, and ADPs (discussed below) are formally 
accountable for reporting to CPPs (Scottish Government, 2018f) (see Chapter 5). 
 
Alcohol and Drug Partnerships 
There are currently 30 ADPs in Scotland. They are key local partnerships tasked 
with undertaking the local implementation of Scotland’s alcohol policy, and are a key 
organisation in this thesis. Such partnerships have existed in some form since 1989 
– for example, from the early 2000’s these partnerships were known as ‘Alcohol and 
Drug Action Teams’ (ADATs) (Audit Scotland, 2009) until a Stocktake report of their 
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performance recommended a shift to ‘Alcohol and Drug Partnerships’ (Cameron, 
2007). This Stocktake considered whether partnership was the right approach for 
combating substance misuse in Scotland, evaluated whether ADATs were the best 
model for this, and considered what might work better. The chair of the Stocktake, 
Sandy Cameron CBE, concluded that “a partnership approach was essential” 
(Cameron, 2007, p. 4), but highlighted numerous ways ADATs could be improved. 
Relevant observations included the need for “greater clarity about what is expected 
of them and by whom” (p.5) and that “[ADATs’] lines of accountability are not always 
clear” (p. 32). Further, that “the lines of accountability and reporting were varied”, but 
that “around half [of ADATs] saw their accountability as being three fold: i) to the 
Scottish Executive; ii) collectively through the other ADAT partners and iii) ultimately 
to local citizens and service users.” (p. 32). This three-fold accountability is relevant 
for my analysis in Chapter 5 of ADPs’ reported experiences of multiple 
accountabilities. 
 
A series of recommendations were included in the 2007 Stocktake, which are again 
relevant for this thesis because they speak to issues of accountability and evidence 
use. This includes, for example, that ADATs should be directly accountable to 
Ministers and there should be “better use of analytical expertise at local and national 
levels” (Cameron, 2007, p. 9). 
 
Similar challenges to those observed in the Stocktake were noted by Audit Scotland 
in 2009 (Audit Scotland, 2009). With regards to governance of local partnerships for 
alcohol and drug services, their report noted that “a lack of central guidance has led 
to variation in how local partnerships operate”, and that the “roles and 
responsibilities of drug and alcohol partnerships are still unclear” (Audit Scotland, 
2009, p. 28).  
 
Following publication of the Stocktake and Audit Scotland reports, Scottish Ministers 
established a joint group to consider what reforms may be required, specifically 
considering how to clarify responsibilities and accountability arrangements, develop 
an outcomes toolkit regarding substance misuse services, and recommend how 
national support coordinators could support work to combat substance misuse 
(Scottish Government, 2009b). This was followed in 2009 by the publication of 
Delivering Better Outcomes: An Outcomes Toolkit for Alcohol and Drugs 
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Partnerships (Scottish Government, 2009b) and a New Framework for Local 
Partnerships on Alcohol and Drugs (Scottish Government, 2009c); the latter 
established ADPs16. Having taken forward certain recommendations from the 2007 
Stocktake, these reforms saw ADPs retain the partnership-working structure of 
ADATs, and begin developing Annual Strategic and Delivery Plans, as well as 
Annual Reports to Scottish Government. The critique in the Stocktake and Audit 
Scotland report provide an opportunity to examine continuity and change in the 
policy context in the era of ADPs; these are reflected on in Chapter 8.  
 
In the time-period during which I was undertaking this research, ADPs have been 
expected to “commission evidence-based, person-centred and recovery-focused 
treatment services to meet the needs of their resident populations” (Scottish 
Government, 2017d), and in doing so, act as key organisations for the local 
implementation of Scotland’s alcohol strategy. In fulfilling these expectations, ADPs 
must develop local strategies “based on the identification, pursuit, and achievement 
of agreed local outcomes, and supported by the development of a local outcomes 
framework” (Scottish Government, 2009c, p. 4). These local ADP Strategies are 
agreed on by the ADP members, and are supported by a Delivery Plan (Scottish 
Government, 2009c).  
 
Each ADP is supported by a small administrative team, which is embedded in the 
local health and social care governance arrangements (either as Council or NHS 
employees) and have a rotating Chair from a member organisation. Member 
organisations represent a range of public bodies. These can include, but are not 
limited to, health, police, community justice, social work, and education (Scottish 
Government, 2009c). ADPs also have representation from the third sector, although 
existing guidance does not specify how this should be structured. In the three local 
areas included in this research, just one individual from a third sector organisation 
had been selected to sit on each ADP.  
 
In terms of national-local interactions, the Scottish Government provides support to 
ADPs in the form of funding and guidance (COSLA et al., 2015). ADPs are expected 
to report to the Scottish Government about their activities - they are monitored 
 
16 Note, both documents are included in the empirical analysis in this research, along with 
the Framework for Action, also published that same year - see Chapter 4 
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through the use of national targets, indicators, and outcomes (COSLA et al., 2015). 
Intended ADP core outcomes are listed in Box 2.3 below. Additionally, ADP 
strategies are “subject to scrutiny” from other bodies, including the Care 
Commission (Scottish Government, 2009c).  
  
 
Although the Scottish alcohol strategy is constituted of a range of legislation and 
policy, and responsibility for enacting these may be viewed as diffuse, in terms of 
the local implementation of this national strategy, ADPs are where responsibility for 
local implementation comes together. For example, policy documents (e.g. COSLA 
et al., 2015; Scottish Government, 2009c) suggested the Scottish Government 
expected ADPs to play a key role at the local governance level to plan, organise, 
and ensure delivery of alcohol and drugs services, and my informal scoping 
interviews also suggested ADPs were critical to understanding how Scotland’s 
alcohol strategy was implemented locally.  
 
As a multi-stakeholder partnership, they bring together a variety of organisations, 
service providers, and stakeholders who have responsibility for, or concern with, 
different aspects of the strategy’s ‘whole population approach’. Therefore, the focus 
on ADPs also allowed me to examine perspectives from multiple organisations and 
to appraise how they work together to implement Scottish alcohol policy.  For 
example, although an NHS Health Board may be viewed as a key, local organisation 
responsible for implementing alcohol policy, focusing on this one organisation would 
1. Health: People are healthier and experience fewer risks as a result of alcohol 
and drug use. 
2. Prevalence: Fewer adults and children are drinking or using drugs at levels or 
patterns that are damaging to themselves or others.  
3. Recovery: Individuals are improving their health, well-being and life-chances 
by recovering from problematic drug and alcohol use.  
4. Families: Children and family members of people misusing alcohol and drugs  
are safe, well-supported and have improved life-chances. 
5. Community safety: Communities and individuals are safe from alcohol and 
drug related offending and anti-social behaviour. 
6. Local environment: People live in positive, health-promoting local 
environments where alcohol and drugs are less readily available.  
7. Services: Alcohol and drugs prevention, treatment and support services are 
high-quality, continually improving, efficient, evidence-based and responsive, 
ensuring people move through treatment into sustained recovery.  




neglect other, broader, social determinants of health-related aspects of policy 
implementation.  
 
Funding for Alcohol and Drug Partnerships 
Funding for ADPs’ alcohol policy implementation work is provided to local areas by 
the Scottish Government. To fund the work of ADPs, national-level interviewees in 
this research reported the Scottish Government pays a given amount to the local 
Health Board, who acts as ‘banker’ for the ADP, which as a non-statutory body 
cannot hold funds itself. The Health Board then provides the ADP with these funds 
as needed. This system has implications for implementing alcohol policy initiatives 
locally, an issue discussed in Chapter 5.  
 
The draft Scottish Government budget in December 2015 announced ADP funding 
would be transferred from the Justice Department to Health and Wellbeing (Smith, 
2017). Further, that the combined drug and alcohol funding for ADPs was being cut 
by approximately 22% - a total budget decrease across Scotland from £69.21 million 
to £53.8 million (Scottish Government, 2016a, 2015a). Health Boards across 
Scotland were informed they were expected to make up this difference in funding 
from their own budgets. A Freedom of Information (FOI) request by the Scottish 
Conservatives in early 2016 showed seven of the 14 health boards did not make up 
this shortfall for their ADPs in their geographical catchment area (Scottish 
Conservatives, 2017)17,18. Significant concern over the cuts have been expressed, 
including from ADPs themselves (e.g. Dumfries and Galloway ADP, 2016) and other 
stakeholders such as AFS (Alcohol Focus Scotland, 2017b). 
 
The introduction of these budget cuts was occurring during my fieldwork, and in 
interviews participants remained uncertain as to whether their local Health Boards 
would be covering the shortfall. This aspect of the financial context provided an 
opportunity to explore some of the existing tensions in the financial infrastructure of 
alcohol policy funding in Scotland. During this time it was too early to adequately 
assess the effect of the cuts on service user populations, however media articles 
from 2017 (citing opposition political parties) have been quick to connect the cuts 
 
17 I have chosen not to specify whether the ADPs examined in this research experienced 
budget cuts for reasons of anonymity. 
18 Also confirmed later in an Audit Scotland (2019) report (p. 17). 
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with observations of increased mortality from alcohol and drugs (e.g. Bunting, 2017; 
“Shock over rise in drug deaths,” 2017).  
 
The changes in funding levels were made in parallel to changes in funding 
governance for alcohol services. I developed Figure 2.4 below to depict the funding 
arrangements for ADPs following the changes in 2017, the purpose of which was to 
map, and make sense of, the sources of funding for ADPs. A similar figure had 
previously been published by Audit Scotland (2009) on all spending for alcohol and 
drug services. The need to undertake this exercise became clear during my data 
generation, during which my interviewees reported that they were working in a 
complex and often ambiguous funding context, which had implications for how they 
worked to implement Scotland’s alcohol strategy. For example, a key change which 
is reflected in the figure was the Scottish Government’s transfer of funding for ADPs 
to NHS Boards as part of their ‘baseline budget’, and the delegation of ADP funding 
and functions locally to Integration Authorities (Kleinberg, 2017a). These changes 
have implications for accountability because subsuming addictions budgets within, 
for example, a Health Board’s broader budget, makes it more difficult to trace the 
path of the funding.  
 
I developed the figure using information available from a combination of sources, 
including Government, specific ADPs’ reports or meeting minutes, information from 
research interviews, and feedback from key stakeholders at national and local level. 
The figure excludes funding which is not directed to ADPs. For example, an 
additional investment of £20 million in alcohol and drugs was announced in the 
Scottish Government’s published programme for 2017-18 (Scottish Government, 
2017e), and then provided the next financial year (2018-2019, after my study 
period). However, neither the programme or correspondence with national and local 
level stakeholders during my data generation suggested it would be distributed to 
ADPs19.  
 
19 Since that time, this funding has been specified in the refreshed (and combined) alcohol 
and drugs strategy as a commitment of “£20 million per year until 2021 in treatment and 
support services” (Scottish Government, 2018b, p. 6). The total amount has been split 
between three funding streams - the Local Improvement Fund, National Development 
Project Fund, and Substance Use Challenge Fund, some of which goes to ADPs. However, 
much of the funding is focused specifically on drugs services (A Adams, personal 
communication, 14 February 2020).   
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Figure 2.4 General ADP Funding System as of 2017  
 
 
2.5 Scottish Licensing System 
2.5.1 Licensing Boards 
LBs exist in each Local Authority area of Scotland, and are comprised of locally 
elected Councillors. LBs preside over the local licensing system – they are 
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independent regulatory bodies responsible for decision-making about alcohol 
licensing (Scottish Government, 2017f).  
 
In the context of local government, Councils and their respective Councillors have a 
certain level of autonomy from the Scottish Government. This is grounded in the 
Concordat signed by the Scottish Government in 2007 with COSLA, which removed 
certain controls that Government had over Councils (Scottish Government, 2007). 
This has implications for the role of Councillors in alcohol policy implementation, 
since their status as Councillors means they are not automatically obligated to follow 
Scottish Government-identified priorities (e.g. to commit to a whole population 
approach to tackling alcohol-related harm). However, this autonomy is complicated 
by two further factors. First is the Government’s parallel implementation of the NPF.  
As part of the aforementioned Concordat, local governments have to identify their 
local priorities through community planning and demonstrate how these contribute to 
the NPF (through Local Outcomes Improvement Plans) (Scottish Government, 
2007). Consequently, Councillors involved in alcohol licensing appear to be subject 
to possible tensions between their relative autonomy as locally elected officials and 
the mandate for local areas to contribute to the NPF. Second, as quasi-judicial 
entities, LBs are not accountable to the local Council; distinguishing them from local 
political/policy-making committees which have corresponding scrutiny committees 
and decisions can be referred to the Full Council (Cllr L Young 2018, personal 
communication, 6 May). This effectively makes them separate from community 
planning (although they are meant to have regard to community planning alongside 
other national and local policies/strategies). I return to this issue in Chapter 6 when 
discussing LB accountability.  
 
LBs convene monthly, in a public forum, to decide whether to grant or reject 
personal and premises alcohol license applications. Applicants submit their 
applications in advance; at the meeting LB members may call upon applicants (who 
are often present with a legal representative) to answer questions about their 
application. Decisions to grant or reject the application are often made on the spot, 
although some are deferred if the applicant is not present or if LB members wish to 
make a ‘site visit’ to the proposed premises. A flow-chart of this process, developed 








The Public Health Objective in Scottish Alcohol Licensing 
LBs are required to work towards the licensing objectives as stated in the Licensing 
(Scotland) Act 2005 (see Box 2.1). The Licensing Act 2005 established five licensing 
objectives. Within these, the ‘public health objective’ is particularly important for this 
research; it mandates that LB members be concerned with protecting and improving 
public health. The public health objective gives LBs a duty to assess the number 
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and density of licensed premises in their area. Premises density is a key measure if 
one is concerned with alcohol availability and its impact on health outcomes – a link 
which has been demonstrated in the Scottish context (Richardson et al., 2015). It is 
important to note that the Licensing Act 2005 constituted a significant shift and 
expansion of LBs functions as they had been originally conceptualised 
(MacNaughton and Gillan, 2011). Later legislation has worked towards enabling this 
somewhat, for example the Alcohol etc. (Scotland) Act 2010 established Health 
Boards as a statutory consultee. It has been recommended by Alcohol Focus 
Scotland, however, that this set of legislation be synthesised into one 
comprehensive Act (MacNaughton and Gillan, 2011). 
 
The public health objective responds to international evidence suggesting easier 
availability of alcohol (e.g. as measured by the number of licensed premises for on- 
or off-sales) in a given local area leads to higher levels of harm (e.g. World Health 
Organization, 2014a). This objective also distinguishes Scotland from the rest of the 
UK20 and countries globally, in that it enshrines into legislation that reducing alcohol 
availability is a key component of the Scottish Government’s strategy to reduce 
alcohol-related harm (Fitzgerald et al., 2017; Scottish Government, 2008a). It is also 
consistent with the aims of other components of Scotland’s alcohol strategy. For 
example, the Framework for Action (Scottish Government, 2009a) included a stated 
intention to monitor the effectiveness of measures meant to control the availability of 
alcohol. As another example, the Scottish Government states that alcohol 
availability is an influencing factor for alcohol-related hospital admissions (a key 
national performance indicator) (Scottish Government, 2016d). The importance of 
reducing availability of alcohol to achieve national policy goals, and the mandate for 
LBs to consider public health, means LBs and their members are key actors for 
alcohol policy implementation in Scotland. Based on the powerful position LBs hold 
locally, from a public health perspective, licensing is important for reducing alcohol-
related harm via the public health objective. 
 
 
20 Alcohol licensing legislation in England and Wales does not have a ‘public health 
objective’ to mandate that licensing decisions be made with consideration of public health 
(Martineau et al., 2014). It has been argued that this lack of a public health objective 
constrains the ability of public health advocates to influence licensing decisions, forcing them 
to pursue their goals by making arguments that links alcohol outlet density to issues like 
alcohol-related crime and anti-social behaviour (Martineau et al., 2014). 
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Licensing Policy Statements and “Overprovision” 
The primary way the public health objective is embedded in LBs’ regular decision-
making is through Licensing Policy Statements. LBs are required to publish Policy 
Statements every four years, aligned with local election cycles (Scottish Parliament, 
2015c). When making their licensing decisions, LBs must make them in 
consideration of the content of their Policy Statement (Alcohol Focus Scotland, 
2014a). As per the Licensing (Scotland) Act 2005, each LB must develop and 
publish a Licensing Policy Statement that has regard to relevant legislation and 
statutory guidance. This includes stating how the LB will progress towards each of 
the five licensing objectives. However, it has been noted that LBs do have significant 
discretion surrounding the details and substance of the Policy Statement (Alcohol 
Focus Scotland, 2014a; Scottish Executive, 2007). MacNaughton and Gillan (2011) 
assessed that the introduction of Policy Statements, 
“represent[ed] a sea change in the way Licensing Boards operate, 
shifting licensing from being an application-driven process to a 
policy-driven one. Licensing decisions are now obliged to have a 
policy context and a stated policy position can be used as grounds 
to refuse an application for a licence.” (p.23) 
 
Within their Policy Statement and with respect to the public health objective, the LB 
must also lay out their ‘overprovision statement’ for the local area. The term 
‘overprovision’ refers to an “assessment that there are too many licensed premises 
in a particular locality either in terms of the number of premises, the capacity of 
premises, the type of premises, or the size of a display area” (MacGregor et al., 
2013, p. vi). The Licensing (Scotland) Act 2005 mandates that the LB “include a 
statement [within their Policy Statement] as to the extent to which the LB considers 
there to be overprovision” of licensed premises in their area (Scottish Executive, 
2007, p. 5). This is labelled as their “duty to assess overprovision” (Scottish 
Executive, 2007, p. 5). By distinguishing a given area as overprovided for, LBs have 
policy grounds to refuse new license applications in this area.  
 
Despite the articulation of the concept of ‘overprovision’, existing evidence suggests 
the public health objective has been very difficult to enact (Fitzgerald et al., 2017; 
MacGregor et al., 2013). In their evaluation of the implementation of the Licensing 
Act 2005, MacGregor and colleagues (2013) found that full implementation of the 
public health objective was problematic for numerous reasons. This included that it 
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lacked an adequate working definition or guidance for enacting it, and links between 
the health and licensing sectors continue to be fraught with misunderstandings 
about each other’s agendas. In response to these challenges, MacGregor and 
colleagues (2013) emphasised the need for more, and better, guidance for LBs 
about how to address this objective. These challenges are discussed further in 
Chapters 3 and 6.  
 
2.5.2 Other Licensing Stakeholders 
Licensing Standards Officers are locally-appointed individuals who work to liaise 
between the LB, Local Licensing Forum (discussed below) and licensees. They 
support the enactment of the Licensing Act 2005, providing licensees with 
information and guidance about their responsibilities and monitoring compliance with 
these responsibilities (MacGregor et al., 2013). Licensing Standards Officers attend 
the meetings of their local LB (as a consultee), but are not a key focus of this thesis 
because their remit is about supporting licensing legislation only and they do not 
have policy decision-making authority.  
 
Local Licensing Forums are locally formed groups which are mandated by the 
Licensing Act 2005 to “keep under review the operation of the licensing system in 
their area and to give advice and recommendations to the Licensing Board.” 
(Scottish Executive, 2007, p. 73). In turn, the LB must “have regard” to the 
recommendations of the Local Licensing Forum, and where it decides not to act on 
those recommendations, must provide reasons for not doing so (Scottish Executive, 
2007, p. 73). Their members must include a Licensing Standards Officer and a 
representative from the local Health Board. Other members are likely to include 
representatives from a range of other stakeholders, e.g. holders of alcohol licenses 
or residents of the local area (Alcohol Focus Scotland, n.d.; Scottish Executive, 
2007). The relationship between Local Licensing Forums and LBs is discussed in 
Chapter 6 from an accountability perspective.  
 
2.6 Other Stakeholders 
Beyond national and local government, a range of other stakeholders are involved in 
the governance surrounding Scotland’s alcohol strategy. For example, it has been 
shown that representatives of the public health community in Scotland were highly 
36 
 
influential in the prioritisation of alcohol on the political agenda and the subsequent 
development and implementation of the strategy itself (Holden and Hawkins, 2012).  
 
2.6.1 Voluntary Sector 
Alcohol Focus Scotland 
Alcohol Focus Scotland (AFS) is a national charity, with a stated mission of 
supporting the prevention and reduction of alcohol-related harm (Alcohol Focus 
Scotland, 2017c). Through their work, AFS seeks to promote “effective and cost-
effective action to reduce consumption” (Alcohol Focus Scotland, n.d., p. 2). 
Established in the 1970s to support Local Councils, AFS is funded by the Scottish 
Government, grants, and self-generated income, and does not accept funding from 
industry (Alcohol Focus Scotland, 2017c). AFS is a key public health stakeholder; 
they were mentioned frequently in my interviews with both local and national alcohol 
policy stakeholders. AFS also frequently partners with other public health 
organisations such as Scottish Health Action on Alcohol Problems and BMA 
Scotland (Alcohol Focus Scotland, 2017c).   
 
AFS has conducted extensive work related to alcohol licensing in Scotland. This 
includes hosting licensing-related events (Alcohol Focus Scotland, 2016a), 
publishing a review of Licensing Policy Statements (Alcohol Focus Scotland, 
2014a), and developing a Community Licensing Toolkit to support members of the 
public to engage with the licensing system (Alcohol Focus Scotland, 2016a). AFS is 
also a key provider of mandatory training for new LB members, the content of which 
is determined by the Scottish Government (Alcohol Focus Scotland, 2017d).   
 
Scottish Health Action on Alcohol Problems  
In 2006 the Scottish Medical Royal Colleges created Scottish Health Action on 
Alcohol Problems (SHAAP), for the purpose of providing medical and clinical 
advocacy about evidence-informed approaches to reducing alcohol-related harm 
(SHAAP, n.d.). SHAAP is funded through a Scottish Government grant, and their 
stated aims are to: raise awareness and understanding of alcohol-related health 
problems; evaluate current research and identify evidence-based strategies to 





2.6.2 Alcohol Industry 
In contrast to the individual organisations highlighted in the subsection above, the 
alcohol industry is a broad group of actors who share profit-related concerns. 
Alcohol industry stakeholders include global, national and local alcohol producers 
(Casswell, 2013), collective organisations established and funded by these 
producers (e.g. the Scotch Whisky Association21), importers of alcohol, and on- and 
off-sale retailers such as pubs and supermarkets, respectively (Alcohol and Public 
Policy Group, 2010). This diverse group of actors is sometimes divided in their 
perspective on certain issues – for example, while the Scotch Whisky Association 
led the court challenge against MUP legislation, other industry actors such as a pub 
retailer and brewers supported the legislation, citing concerns about the availability 
of strong, cheap alcohol (O’Leary, 2017).  
 
Estimated public sector revenue from alcohol duties in Scotland was £1,038 million 
for 2016-17, accounting for 2.0% of total revenue for Scotland (Scottish 
Government, 2017g). Alcohol production and sales contribute to the Scottish 
economy and employment (Holden and Hawkins, 2012). In the Framework for 
Action, the Scottish Government notes the integral role of alcohol in Scottish life and 
industry, and “welcomes this positive aspect of [Scotland’s] relationship with alcohol” 
(Scottish Government, 2009a, p. 6). This suggests a potential conflict of interest; it is 
clear that the Government wishes to maintain the revenues and jobs that result from 
the alcohol industry, while also implementing a strategy to reduce alcohol-related 
harms.  
 
The actions of industry and resultant revenue for Scotland are linked to the 
Government’s overarching purpose and aims. During my study period, the NPF 
stated the Government’s overarching ’Purpose’ was to create a flourishing Scotland 
“through increasing sustainable economic growth”, while health was included as a 
 
21 The Scotch Whisky Association is the trade body for the Scotch whisky industry (Scotch 
Whisky Association, n.d.). It has over 70 member companies, and is governed by an elected 
Council of its members (Scotch Whisky Association, n.d.). seeks to support “the best 
possible global business environment for Scotch Whisky”, which includes challenging 
regulation and taxes, as well as maintaining “constructive relationships” with governments 
(Scotch Whisky Association, n.d.).  
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lower ‘Strategic Objective’ (Scottish Government, 2017h). The composition of this 
critical policy may have signalled the prioritisation of economic concerns over public 
health ones22.  
 
In her ministerial foreword of the Framework for Action, Nicola Sturgeon stated that 
the industry has “crucial parts to play in helping to develop and implement what will 
be a rolling programme of work over the coming months and years” (Scottish 
Government, 2009a, p. 4)23. Thus the role of industry during the period studied in 
this thesis was enshrined in existing Scottish alcohol policy. This is relevant for this 
thesis because it helps perpetuate pervasive discourses about the importance of the 
economy which, as will be discussed in Chapter 6, prioritise economic growth over 
concerns about costs from alcohol-related harm.  Additionally, there remains 
evidence of industry presence in policy spaces in Scotland. For example, the 
Scottish Parliament convenes a Cross-Party Group on Scotch Whisky24, in which 
the alcohol industry, as per the description of the group, continues to pursue status 




This chapter has mapped and briefly analysed the complex and changing policy, 
legislative, organisational, and economic landscapes in which Scotland’s 2009 
alcohol strategy was implemented. This exercise was crucial for my understanding 
of the contexts in which I was conducting my research, and for orienting readers to 
the relevant strategy and organisations discussed in my analysis (Chapters 5-8).  
 
 
22 As of 2019, the current Government Purpose appears to place these concerns on more 
equal footing, stated as: “To focus on creating a more successful country with opportunities 
for all of Scotland to flourish through increased wellbeing, and sustainable and inclusive 
economic growth” (Scottish Government, 2018d). 
23 The new Alcohol Framework 2018 takes a stronger stance, stating: “The Scottish 
Government will not work with the alcohol industry on health policy development…” (Scottish 
Government, 2018a, p. 9). 
24 The UK Parliament in Westminster also convenes an All-Party Parliamentary Group on 
Scotch Whisky, with the Scotch Whisky Association again acting as the group’s secretariat. 
At time of writing, the Chair and Secretary of the Group are both Members of Parliament for 
the Scottish National Party (House of Commons, 2019).   
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In this chapter I have also begun to identify potential ambiguities and challenges 
(e.g. with interpreting and enacting legislation, and resource constraints) in Scottish 
alcohol policy implementation. In particular, this chapter has identified ADPs as 
multi-sectoral partnerships embedded in complex, dynamic local governance 
contexts, and that LBs are important quasi-judicial actors whose decisions have 
implications for alcohol availability and, consequently, related harms. These actors 
and their implementation work will be the focus of my analysis in this thesis.  
 
The next chapter turns to the relevant academic literature, presenting a systematic 
review of empirical studies about local implementation of alcohol policy – this serves 
to further situate my research in the field of alcohol policy implementation and helps 







3 Alcohol Policy Implementation in High-Income 
Countries: A Systematic Review of Empirical 
Studies 
3.1 Introduction  
This chapter aims to provide insights into how national alcohol policies have been 
implemented locally and identify key factors which help shape implementation. It 
presents a systematic review of relevant qualitative, quantitative, and mixed-
methods literature in high-income settings, examining two key issues: 
1. What is currently known from empirical studies about how national-level 
alcohol policies in high-income settings have been implemented, and why 
implementation occurred as it did? 
2. Are there any identifiable gaps, tensions or uncertainties in knowledge 
regarding the above?  
In addressing these questions, the overarching purpose of this chapter is to inform 
the empirical work of this thesis and position the thesis within the alcohol policy 
implementation literature. 
 
Alcohol policies are developed and implemented at a variety of policy levels (Babor 
et al., 2010; Hadfield et al., 2009a; World Health Organization, 2010), and their 
impact has been variable (Hadfield et al., 2009b; Mooney et al., 2017; Parkes et al., 
2011). Available literature draws attention to some of the challenges of 
implementing national alcohol policy (Butler, 2009) but I am not aware of any 
reviews explicitly and systematically assessing what is known about how national 
alcohol policies are implemented locally and why implementation occurs the way it 
does25. This underlines the value of this chapter, the findings from which inform the 
resulting analytical work in this thesis26.  
 
For the purposes of this review and my empirical analysis across the thesis, I have 
drawn upon O’Toole’s definition of policy implementation:  
“Policy implementation is what develops between the 
establishment of an apparent intention on the part of government 
 
25 And none were found during the current systematic review  
26 The systematic review was undertaken after initial analysis and presentation of my 
empirical data. See Preface to Results for more detail.  
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to do something, or to stop something, and the ultimate impact in 
the world of action.” (O’Toole, 2000, p. 266). 
 
This definition was useful because, in the broader thesis I sought to analyse how 
Scottish alcohol policy implementation was being enacted between the 
Government’s establishment of its’ 2009 alcohol strategy and the resultant policy 
outcomes27. It meant I did not look at the way the policy was developed nor did I 
seek to evaluate its outcomes – I wanted to know what happened between these. 
This also helped me focus the present systematic review – I excluded studies which 
exclusively examined how a policy was developed or evaluated policy outcomes, 
instead focusing on the dynamic aspects of how policies were being interpreted, 
translated, and implemented. Given the flexibility of this definition, it also allowed me 
to conceptualise policy implementation broadly, including incorporating the more 
contemporary understanding of implementation as ‘governance’, and I included 
‘governance’ as a keyword in my search strings (see section 3.2.1).  
 
This review was informed by a literature review on health policy implementation I 
conducted for an earlier version of this chapter (undertaken prior to data 
generation). The earlier chapter version enabled me to identify potential themes for 
data extraction in this systematic review (and helped inform my data generation, e.g. 
interview questions). The earlier chapter version, and this current systematic review, 
were also informed by a review I conducted for the Scottish Parliament as part of a 
placement during my PhD (Wright, 2017; Appendix 3). The review for Parliament 
attempted to identify key messages about health policy implementation which would 
be useful for Parliamentarians who develop and scrutinise legislation. In contrast, 
this chapter takes a systematic review approach to reviewing studies specifically 
focused on alcohol policy implementation, to understand key factors which influence 
implementation.  
 
The next section describes the methods I used to conduct this review. I then present 
the findings, which are organised into topic categories. Finally, the discussion 
 
27 A common difficulty in developing a definition of policy implementation is deciding whether 
it should describe outcomes (i.e. examining an end-state to assess whether policy 
implementation has occurred, and to what extent the outcomes match the expectations), or 
should describe the continuing process of implementation (deLeon, 1999; Lane, 1987; 
O’Toole, 1995). Given that this thesis seeks to contribute knowledge about how Scottish 
alcohol policy implementation was occurring, it subscribes to the latter approach. 
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outlines the key themes generated from this review and their implications for my 
analysis (in particular the focus of my results chapters) and broader alcohol policy 
research.  
 
3.2 Systematic Review Methods 
This systematic review was informed by relevant methodological literature on 
systematic reviewing (e.g. Boaz et al., 2002; Lavis et al., 2005; Misra and Agarwal, 
2018; Papaioannou et al., 2010; Petticrew and Roberts, 2006), and was guided by 
the PRISMA systematic review checklist (Liberati et al., 2009; Moher et al., 2009), 
the completed version of which is in Appendix 4. This review was registered in 
March 2019 with PROSPERO: CRD42019124477.  
 
3.2.1 Search Strategy 
Relevant databases were identified by: (i) utilising the list of Social Science 
databases on the University of Edinburgh’s Library website, (ii) reviewing the 
academic databases employed in existing alcohol-related literature reviews (e.g. 
Fitzgerald et al., 2016; Martineau et al., 2013; Savell, et al., 2016), and (iii) reading 
about social sciences databases (Aghaei Chadegani et al., 2013). I also discussed 
and confirmed my chosen databases with the social sciences librarians at the 
University of Edinburgh.  
 
I ultimately included: IBSS, Social Science Database (ProQuest), PsycInfo (Ovid), 
PubMed, ScienceDirect, Scopus, and Web of Science. I chose these databases 
because they effectively captured public health policy research, but also provided 
the opportunity to capture potentially relevant research from other social science 
disciplines (for example, Scopus and Web of Science are two of the largest 
interdisciplinary, relevant databases (Aghaei Chadegani et al., 2013)). I considered 
and decided to exclude additional ‘child databases’ from Ovid, namely Embase and 
MEDLINE (whose searches resulted in multiple pharmacological and biomedical 
publications of limited relevance), and Global Health. This latter database was 
excluded because its limited results (n=127) were mainly duplicates of those 
returned from PsycInfo, and by scanning titles I assessed that non-duplicate results 




The search strings were developed iteratively, and searches were conducted in two 
rounds (Table 3.1). Round 1 sought to identify publications with a focus on alcohol 
policy implementation, using keywords (and their variants) including ‘alcohol’, 
‘policy’, ‘implementation’, and ‘governance’. Round 2 sought to identify publications 
focused on implementation of particular, common approaches within alcohol policy 
for tackling alcohol-related harm, which included marketing, pricing, and 
licensing/availability of alcohol - those which are also captured by WHO’s ‘Best 
Buys’ (World Economic Forum and World Health Organization, 2011) and which are 
commonly discussed in literature and policy documents (Chisholm et al., 2018). This 
additional round seemed necessary after importing results, removing duplicates and 
commencing screening from Round 1. In the course of this work, I reflected that I 
had potentially not captured publications that discuss specific components of 
national strategies, e.g. ‘licensing’ or ‘marketing’, and which may not have used 
‘policy’ in their title or abstract. To address this risk, and avoiding the need to rerun 
full searching and screening again, I decided to run a second round of searches and 
combine the two. 
 
Search strings were tailored to each database to cast a sufficiently wide net while 
reducing the possibility of attaining biomedical-focused results. Searches were 
conducted in November 2018 and did not include any date restrictions. As per 
PRISMA guidelines (Moher et al., 2009), I have below reported on the full search 
string for one database (PubMed – selected to show the types of restrictions I 
included in databases that had greater topical breadth). The full searches for all 




Table 3.1 Round 1 and 2 Search Strings 
Database Search String 
(* indicates a truncation of the word to include all forms of that word) 
PubMed Round 1  
 
(((((alcohol[Title/Abstract]) AND (policy[Title/Abstract] OR 
policies[Title/Abstract] OR regulat*[Title/Abstract] OR 
legislat*[Title/Abstract])) AND (implementation OR governance)) AND 
Humans[Mesh])) NOT (medicine[Title] OR oncology[Title] OR 
cancer[Title] OR pharmacology[Title] OR biotechnology[Title] OR 
forensic[Title] OR transplant*[Title] OR diagnostic[Title] OR 
genetic*[Title] OR dental[Title] OR dentist*[Title] OR infection[Title] OR 
agricultur*[Title] OR neurolog*[Title] OR surgery[Title] OR 
pediatric*[Title] OR pharmaceut*[Title] OR laboratory[Title]) 
Round 2 
 
(((((((alcohol[Title/Abstract]) AND (availability[Title/Abstract] OR 
licens*[Title/Abstract] OR marketing[Title/Abstract] OR 
price[Title/Abstract] OR affordability[Title/Abstract]) AND 
(implementing[All Fields] OR implementation[All Fields]) NOT 
(medicine[Title] OR oncology[Title] OR cancer[Title] OR 
pharmacology[Title] OR biotechnology[Title] OR forensic[Title] OR 
transplant*[Title] OR diagnostic[Title] OR genetic*[Title] OR 
dental[Title] OR dentist*[Title] OR infection[Title] OR agricultur*[Title] 
OR neurolog*[Title] OR surgery[Title] OR pediatric*[Title] OR 
pharmaceut*[Title] OR laboratory[Title])) AND Humans[Mesh])))  
 
Systematic reviews seek to take a comprehensive approach in their capture of 
relevant literature (Boaz et al., 2002), and grey literature is often an important 
source of knowledge to contextualise or fill gaps in peer-reviewed research (Adams 
et al., 2017). In this review, I searched three grey literature databases: (i) OpenGrey 
(includes grey literature from social science and other potentially relevant areas of 
scholarship), (ii) Grey Literature Report (includes literature in health services 
research and other selected health topics), and (iii) National Bureau of Economic 
Research (NBER) Working Papers. For these searches I adapted the search strings 
for the peer-reviewed databases. However, given the limited returned results I also 
widened my searches in these databases (e.g. searching for ‘alcohol’ AND ‘policy’, 
without any other restrictions), to check whether I needed to use different keywords. 
This did not result in any additional relevant results. Finally, I conducted a Google 
Scholar search for the same period, again using keywords ‘alcohol policy’ and 
‘implementation’. While no relevant results were returned from the grey literature 
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databases, Google searches and pre-existing knowledge of relevant publications 
(e.g. MacGregor et al., 2013) led to three inclusions.  
 
3.2.2 Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria 
Included publications were limited to empirical studies (either peer-reviewed or grey 
literature), excluding purely theory or discussion-based studies. This decision was 
informed by the focus of the research on understanding  alcohol policy 
implementation in practice. The inclusion and exclusion criteria are listed in Box 3.1.  
 
Box 3.1 Systematic Review Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria 
 
 
This review was intended to investigate current understanding of whether and how 
alcohol policies have been implemented. I therefore wanted to exclude publications 
Publications were included if they: 
• Reported on the process of implementing a national or regional alcohol policy, 
including if:  
o a regional alcohol policy is examined within a context where regions 
have devolved responsibility for developing and implementing alcohol 
policy [e.g. Scotland within the UK, or provinces in Canada]; 
o alcohol is discussed in combination with drug, mental health, or wider 
non-communicable disease policy (as long as alcohol is given a primary 
role in the discussion); AND 
• were empirical, published studies (peer-reviewed journal article or grey 
literature); AND 
• discussed a high-income context; AND 
• were written in English. 
Publications were excluded if they met any of the following: 
• Focused on: 
o Implementation of alcohol interventions intended to change behaviour; 
o Development or design of an alcohol policy; 
o Measurement/counting of whether a given alcohol policy had been 
implemented in a particular context, and/or focused solely on the 
measured ‘strength’ of the alcohol policy; 
o Effectiveness or outcomes of alcohol interventions or single 
programmes; 
o Health effects of alcohol consumption;  
o Non-governmental alcohol policies (e.g. policies developed and/or 
implemented by schools, universities, workplaces, sports clubs, etc.); 
OR 
• were not empirical; OR 
• did not discuss a high-income context; OR 
• were written in a language other than English. 
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that focused on, for example, the development or design of an alcohol policy, or the 
implementation of a more individual-level intervention, project, or clinical treatment 
(e.g. for individuals already experiencing alcohol-related harm). I sought to include 
empirical studies regarding policies or legislation which had been developed at 
national or (devolved) regional level. I characterised these as being intended to have 
population-level effects, and which, to be implemented, required public officials to 
translate, interpret, and enact the policies locally, within the context of the existing 
policy system. For example, a significant body of work regarding ABIs exists which 
primarily relates to their clinical delivery to individuals in primary care settings by 
practitioners (NICE, 2010), but this type of study was excluded because the current 
review seeks to capture implementation of population-level policies. Studies which 
were concerned with ABIs as a component of a national alcohol policy or strategy, 
for example how they might be effectively coordinated, funded, or monitored (e.g. 
Fitzgerald et al., 2015; Parkes et al., 2011) were included in this review. Accordingly, 
I excluded publications concerned with: the health effects of alcohol consumption 
and alcohol interventions that were intended to change behaviour; policies that did 
not originate in a government setting (e.g. policies developed and/or implemented 
by schools, universities, workplaces, sports clubs, etc.); or measuring the outcomes 
of alcohol interventions or single programmes.  
 
Publications were also limited to high-income countries (or studies which included at 
least one high-income country), because the purpose of this review was to inform 
my research in the (high-income) Scottish context. I felt it was appropriate to 
exclude low- and middle-income settings because they typically operate within 
radically different policy contexts from high-income ones (Court and Cotterrell, 2006; 
Gilson et al., 2018). I acknowledge, of course, that there can be meaningful 
contextual differences across high-income contexts.   
 
3.2.3 Screening and Decision-making 
After searching each database, I imported all resultant citations into Endnote X9 
reference manager and then removed any duplicates. Titles, abstracts, and full texts 
were screened for relevance in a stepped manner. 
 
I acknowledge that decisions were necessarily somewhat subjective. When 
uncertain about whether to include a particular study on the basis of my defined 
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criteria, I discussed this with my supervisors until a consensus was reached. This 
happened for three publications: Hadfield and Measham (2015), which I had 
reservations about due to a combination of public and industry funding28, was 
ultimately included but the funding source is highlighted in the analysis. I was 
cautious about including industry-funded research because of concerns about 
industry’s vested interests in outcomes of research (McCambridge and Mialon, 
2018) and the conflict of interest this introduces to the research process (Babor, 
2009; Dyer, 2018). Two other articles (Jones-Webb et al., 2014; Mosher and 
Treffers, 2013) were excluded because I assessed they did not report on the 
implementation of a national- (or otherwise centrally-developed) alcohol policy. 
 
Where multiple publications appeared to report on the same dataset, I decided to 
treat each as individual studies, since their foci were sufficiently different to 
contribute distinct insights to the problem of alcohol policy implementation. However, 
where a grey literature and a peer-reviewed study reported on the same analysis, 
only the peer-reviewed study was included. This was to avoid including multiple 
versions of the same study, which could exaggerate the evidence supporting a 
particular finding. This occurred in two instances, leading to the exclusion of a report 
by Thom and colleagues (2011) on partnerships (which was covered by Thom et al.,  
2013) and a report by Hadfield, Lister, & Traynor (2009a) on integration of local and 
national alcohol policy (covered by Hadfield et al., 2009b). Among the included 
journal articles, it appeared that two sets of articles drew from the same, or partially 
the same, data corpus (1. Fitzgerald et al., 2017 and 2018; and 2. Lloyd et al., 2014; 
Thom et al., 2013; Toner et al., 2014). 
 
I reviewed reference lists of included texts and identified three further studies 
(Foster, 2016; Foster et al., 2007; Hadfield et al., 2009b). The Foster (2016) and 
Foster et al. (2007) publications appear not to have been picked up by the search 
strings because they are grey literature publications (while I did search three grey 
literature databases, such databases are known not to be comprehensive). The 
Hadfield et al. (2009b) publication did not include the keyword ‘implementation’ in its 
 
28 The article was partly funded by Portman Group, which is an organisation established by 
the alcohol industry (Portman Group, 2017) and has been critiqued for its role in maintaining 
self-regulation of industry (Alcohol Concern, 2018). 
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title or abstract and therefore would have also been missed by the search string, 
despite having a clear implementation focus in the main text.   
 
The final list of studies was discussed with my PhD supervisors and an external 
researcher (Dr Joanna Reynolds, Sheffield Hallam University) who was leading an 
NIHR-funded research project on ‘exploring community engagement in local alcohol 
decision-making’ and has expertise in the area of local alcohol policy. No additional 
publications were identified via these discussions.  
 
3.2.4 Analysis 
Included studies were imported into a data extraction matrix in Microsoft Excel. The 
categories for data extraction combined standard systematic review fields (e.g. 
publication, funding source, aims, context, methods and data sources) with 
categories that I had identified in earlier scoping work. These included: resources, 
actors/institutions, partnerships, processes/practices, networks, multi-level 
communication, accountability, community engagement, uses of evidence, and 
‘other barriers’ and ‘other facilitators’ to implementation. After data extraction, on 
weight of evidence I analysed that five factors were important for reporting in the 
results: performance measurement, partnership or collaborative working, public 
involvement, resources, and evidence use. I report these in a narrative way (Grant 
and Booth, 2009) in Section 3.3.2. From these results, key explanatory were 
generated and are discussed in Section 3.4. 
 
Quality Assessment 
Reflecting standard practice in systematic reviews, I appraised included studies for 
quality (Siegfried and Parry, 2019). I drew on the framework developed by Hawker 
and colleagues (2002), which I selected for its flexibility in guiding the appraisal of 
studies with varied methodologies (including qualitative approaches) and because a 
structured approach has been acknowledged as increasing transparency in 
assessments (Dixon-Woods et al., 2007). The framework includes nine categories 
for which an assessment is made: abstract and title; introduction and aim; method 
and data; sampling; data analysis; ethics and bias; results; transferability or 
generalizability; implications and usefulness). Each is rated from ‘Good’ (4 points) to 
‘Very Poor’ (1 point), with Hawker and colleagues (2002) providing descriptions for 
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each rating. Following Hawker and colleagues’ guidance, and other reviews utilising 
this approach (e.g. Lorenc et al., 2014), I used these ratings to report a single 
summary score: High Quality [30-36]; Intermediate Quality [24-29]; or Low Quality 
[9-23]. I recorded the ratings for each included study in an Excel spreadsheet, and 
report the summary score in Table 3.2 (see Appendix 6 for full breakdown for each 
study). 
 
Reflecting on my use of this framework, one limitation was its omission of 
considerations of theory within the articles, which is used in some other frameworks 
for assessing the quality of qualitative studies (Harden et al., 1999; Noyes and 
Popay, 2007). Another consideration was that certain categories had some overlap 
(e.g. methods/data and sampling). Additionally, while the framework is discussed by 
the authors as appropriate for assessing both qualitative and quantitative research, 
the inclusion of ‘transferability or generalisability’ as a criterion is in contrast with an 
interpretive understanding of the purpose and contextuality of qualitative research. I 
therefore modified my interpretation of this criterion to assess qualitative research 
studies in terms of whether they had plausible ‘lessons’ which could be potentially 
considered for other contexts, so as not to automatically penalise these articles with 
a low generalisability score. Inevitably, these ‘ratings’ remain subjective.  
 
Consistent with the approach applied in my previously published systematic review 
of public health taxes (Wright, Smith, & Hellowell, 2017), I did not exclude studies on 
the basis of quality. I took this approach because of the diversity of included studies 
and the difficulty in setting clear criteria and thresholds by which I would exclude 
qualitative research (Reynolds et al., 2011), combined with my concern about 
excluding potentially useful studies. Instead, as a basis for inclusion, I made my own 
assessment (guided by my chosen framework) as to the quality of the findings and 
their relevance to my topic. Consequently, I have chosen to discuss the quality 
appraisal within the interpretation of the results.    
 
3.3 Results 
This section first discusses the bibliographic results of the literature search, and then 
presents the results generated from data extraction, analysis and synthesis. As 
noted above, these results are presented for categories that were discussed most 
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often (and in greatest depth) in the included studies as factors that influence alcohol 
policy implementation.  
 
3.3.1 Bibliographic results of literature search 
A total of 25 peer-reviewed journal articles and four grey literature studies (for a total 
of 29 studies) were included and analysed. Figure 3.1 below depicts the study flow 
diagram for this review, while Table 3.2 summarises the full list of included studies. 
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Figure 3.1 Study flow diagram for literature search, article screening and article 
inclusion/exclusion 
 
Results from Round 1: 
general alcohol policy 
implementation search: 
3925 
Results from Round 2: 
specific alcohol policy 
search: 1377 





Full texts screened: 155 
Excluded articles: 3171 
Full texts included: 24 
Additional publications 
from reference mining: 3 
Final texts included: 29 
Additional results from 
grey literature searches: 
2 
Excluded articles: 131 
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Table 3.2 List of Included Studies 
 Author Year Title Country Focus Funder  Journal/Publisher Quality Score 
1 Berends et al 2016 Collaborative Governance in the Reform of Western 
Australia's Alcohol and Other Drug Sector 
Australia Not stated Australian Journal of 
Public Administration 
Intermediate 
2 Casswell et al 2018 The Alcohol Environment Protocol: A new tool for 
alcohol policy 
Scotland, New 
Zealand, St Kitts and 
Nevis, Thailand, South 
Africa, Vietnam 
Multiple public funding 
sources within included 
countries 
Drug and Alcohol 
Review 
Intermediate 
3 Chalmers et al 2016 Following the money: Mapping the sources and 





Department of Health 
Drug and Alcohol 
Review 
Intermediate 
4 Fitzgerald et al 2015 Large-scale implementation of alcohol brief 
interventions in new settings in Scotland: a 





BMC Public Health High 
5 Fitzgerald et al 2017 Implementing a Public Health Objective for Alcohol 
Premises Licensing in Scotland: A Qualitative Study 
of Strategies, Values, and Perceptions of Evidence 
Scotland Lanarkshire Alcohol and 
Drug Partnership and 
NHS Health Scotland 
International Journal 
of Environmental 
Research and Public 
Health 
High 
6 Fitzgerald et al 2018 Democracy and power in alcohol premises licensing: 
A qualitative interview study of the Scottish public 
health objective 
Scotland Lanarkshire Alcohol and 
Drug Partnership and 
NHS Health Scotland 
Drug and Alcohol 
Review 
High 
7 Foster et al 2007 Implementation of the Licensing Act 2003: A national 
survey 
England Alcohol Education and 
Research Council, UK 
Alcohol Education and 
Research Council, UK 
Intermediate 
8 Foster 2016 The Licensing Act (2003): its uses and abuses 10 
years on 
England and Wales Institute for Alcohol 
Studies 
Institute for Alcohol 
Studies 
High 
9 Grace et al 2016 Examining local processes when applying a 
cumulative impact policy to address harms of alcohol 
outlet density 
England NIHR Health & Place Intermediate 
10 Hadfield et al 2015 The outsourcing of control: alcohol law enforcement, 
private-sector governance and the evening and 
night-time economy 
England and Wales Portman Group; Home 
Office 
Urban studies Intermediate 
11 Hadfield et al 2009 ‘This town's a different town today': Policing and 
regulating the night-time economy 





12 Haggard et al 2014 Implementation of a multicomponent Responsible 
Beverage Service programme in Sweden - a 
qualitative study of promoting and hindering factors 
Sweden Not stated Nordic Studies on 
Alcohol and Drugs 
High 
13 Hawkins et al 2014 'Water dripping on stone'? Industry lobbying and UK 
alcohol policy 
United Kingdom Alcohol Education and 
Research Council, UK 
Policy and Politics Intermediate 
14 Herring et al 2008 Local responses to the Alcohol Licensing Act 2003: 
The case of Greater London 
England Middlesex University Drugs: Education, 




15 Humphreys et al 2010 Evaluating a natural experiment in alcohol policy: 
The Licensing Act (2003) and the requirement for 
attention to implementation 
England Not stated Criminology & Public 
Policy 
Intermediate 
16 Lloyd et al 2014 Soft methods, hard targets: regional alcohol 
managers as a policy network 
England Policy Research 
Programme in the 
Department of Health 
Journal of Substance 
Use 
Intermediate 
17 MacGregor et al 2013 An evaluation of the implementation of, and 
compliance with, the objectives of the Licensing 
(Scotland) Act 2005. Final Report 
Scotland NHS Health Scotland NHS Health Scotland High 
18 Martineau et al 2014 Responsibility without legal authority? Tackling 
alcohol-related health harms through licensing and 
planning policy in local government 
England and Wales NIHR Journal of Public 
Health 
Intermediate 
19 Mooney et al 2017 Investigating local policy drivers for alcohol harm 
prevention: a comparative case study of two local 
authorities in England 
England NIHR School for Public 
Health Research 
BMC Public Health High 
20 Muhunthan et al 2017 Judicial intervention in alcohol regulation: an 
empirical legal analysis 
Australia Not stated Australian and New 
Zealand Journal of 
Public Health 
Intermediate 
21 Parkes et al 2011 An evaluation to assess the implementation of NHS 
delivered Alcohol Brief Interventions: Final Report 
Scotland NHS Health Scotland NHs Health Scotland High 
22 Randerson et al 2018 Changes in New Zealand’s alcohol environment 
following implementation of the Sale and Supply of 
Alcohol Act (2012) 
New Zealand Health Research 
Council of New Zealand 
New Zealand Medical 
Journal 
Intermediate 
23 Rieckmann et al 2009 Implementation of evidence-based practices for 
treatment of alcohol and drug disorders: The role of 
the state authority 
United States Robert Wood Johnson 
Foundation 
The Journal of 
Behavioral Health 
Services & Research 
High 
24 Rod et al 2016 A case of standardization? Implementing health 
promotion guidelines in Denmark 
Denmark Danish Cancer Society Health Promotion 
International 
Intermediate 
25 Thom et al 2013a Partnerships: survey respondents' perceptions of 
inter-professional collaboration to address alcohol-
related harms in England 
England Alcohol Research UK Critical Public Health Intermediate 
26 Thom et al 2013b The alcohol improvement programme: Evaluation of 
an initiative to address alcohol-related health harm in 
England 
England Policy Research 
Programme in the 




27 Thompson et al 2017 Minimum alcohol pricing policies in practice: A 
critical examination of implementation in Canada 
Canada Not stated Journal of Public 
Health Policy 
High 
28 Toner et al 2014 Perceptions on the role of evidence: an English 
alcohol policy case study 
England Policy Research 
Programme in the 
Department of Health 
Evidence & Policy Intermediate 
29 Zahnow et al 2018 Lessons from Queensland’s last-drinks legislation: 
The use of extended trading permits 
Australia ARC Linkage grant, 
Queensland 
Government, and others 









Included publications came from a limited number of high-income countries, with the 
majority focusing on the UK context (19/29, 65%), particularly England (Figure 3.2). 
Publications labelled ‘multiple’ focused on a number of countries (e.g. Casswell et 
al., [2018] focused on Scotland, New Zealand, St Kitts and Nevis, Thailand, South 
Africa, and Vietnam). Additionally, despite no date restrictions on the search strings, 
most included publications were published in or after 2013 (Figure 3.3). 
 
Figure 3.2 Included Publications by Country 
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Funding sources for the included publications varied. Of those articles that reported 
their funding source(s), most were from public sources (e.g. government or 
charities). However, as noted earlier, one article, by Hadfield and Measham (2015), 
reported a mix of public and private funding. Six studies did not report the source of 
funding for their research.  
 
Table 3.3 below highlights the aim, methods, and key findings of each included 
article. Methodologically, the majority of primary studies reported in the articles 
(n=19) took a qualitative approach to analysing alcohol policy implementation. 
These primarily included semi-structured interviews and document analysis. This is 
unsurprising given the focus of this review, which specifically sought empirical 
research surrounding processes and experiences of alcohol policy implementation.  
It has been recognised that ‘how’-type research questions lend themselves more 
readily to qualitative rather than quantitative approaches (Agee, 2009; Braun and 
Clarke, 2013). Nonetheless, four publications reported using quantitative methods  
(Foster et al., 2007; Humphreys and Eisner, 2010; Thompson et al., 2017; Zahnow 
et al., 2018); five used mixed methods (Casswell et al., 2018; Parkes et al., 2011; 
Randerson et al., 2018; Rieckmann et al., 2009a; Thom et al., 2013b); and one 
publication used legal analyses of case law (Muhunthan et al., 2017).  
 
A minority of studies (n=6) reported using a theoretical framework to inform or 
structure their study. Those that did refer to a theoretical framework drew from a 
range of areas of social science, including sociology, public policy, and 
implementation science. Additional articles drew from ideas concerning, for 
example, good governance and accountability (Chalmers et al., 2016); partnership 
working (Thom et al., 2013a); and evidence use in policy (Fitzgerald et al., 2017; 
Toner et al., 2014). 
 
The alcohol policy topic discussed most often was licensing (e.g. discussion of the 
England/Wales Licensing Act 2003 or Scotland’s Licensing (Scotland) Act 2005). Of 
29 studies included, 10 specifically discussed some aspect of the England/Wales 
Licensing Act 2003 and five discussed the Licensing (Scotland) Act 2005. Another 
policy studied by multiple included publications was the UK Department of Health’s 
Alcohol Improvement Programme, which was a time-limited, multi-component policy 
programme implemented between 2008-2011 (Toner et al., 2014). The Programme 
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aimed to reduce the rate of alcohol-related hospital admissions, and created 
Regional Alcohol Manager posts in each region to support implementation (Lloyd et 




Table 3.3 Aim, Methods, and Key Findings of Included Studies 
 Author Aim Methods Key Findings 
1 Berends et al 
(2016) 
Examine collaborative governance in 
alcohol sector reform, and assess extent 
to which collaborative governance 
process has been applied in this reform 
process. 
Qualitative case study approach. Document 
review and group interviews; applied Emerson 
et al (2012) integrative framework on 
collaborative governance. 
In context of increased service funding and a partnership 
approach, drivers for collaboration involve leadership and financial 
incentives for policy implementation. Approach to alcohol and drug 
sector reform in Western Australia has engaged stakeholders from 
government and services in collaborative governance approach, 
fostering mutually supportive and constructive relationships. 
However, service user participation was lacking. 
2 Casswell et al 
(2018) 
Report data on the implementation and 
enforcement of alcohol policies regarding 
availability, marketing, and drink driving. 
Mixed methods study, used Alcohol 
Environment Protocol, which collects data on 
legislative and regulatory aspects of alcohol 
policy. Specified time period: 2013-2015. Data 
collection included review of policy and 
legislation documents, literature searches, 
observational surveys, administrative and 
commercial data sets and key informant 
interviews 
Countries showed different extents of adoption of policy 
approaches, including variation in restrictions on outlet density and 
location, trading hours, marketing and sponsorship. All countries 
had a minimum purchase age and drink driving legislation. 
Rankings of enforcement of regulations also varied between 
countries. In countries with fewer resources, alcohol policies are 
less effective because of consequent lack of implementation and 
enforcement.  
3 Chalmers et al 
(2016) 
Develop and analyse mapping of funding 
for alcohol and other drug treatment. 
Qualitative study. Conducted literature review 
of treatment financing and 190 key informant 
interviews in governmental and civil society 
sectors. Validated flow diagrams of funding 
with stakeholders (who and how many not 
clear).  
Funding sources for alcohol and other drug treatment are complex, 
however this diversity is both beneficial (for mitigating the risk of 
shortfalls) and disadvantageous (adds to administrative burden). 
4 Fitzgerald et al 
(2015) 
Explore experiences of implementation of 
ABIs in settings outside primary 
healthcare in Scotland’s national 
programme. 
Qualitative study. Telephone interviews with 
14 purposely selected public health 
practitioners, in antenatal, A&E and wider 
settings, representing all 11 mainland Health 
Boards in Scotland. Interview data analysed 
inductively, using framework matrix and 
‘implementation science’ lens.  
Achieving large-scale, routine implementation of ABIs is 
challenging in settings outside primary care, despite significant 
national support, funding, and a delivery target.  
5 Fitzgerald et al 
(2017) 
Explore how public health practitioners 
engaged with the licensing system 
following establishment of public health 
objective in Scottish licensing. 
Qualitative study. Conducted 13 semi-
structured interviews with public health actors 
(including representatives from the NHS, 
ADPs, and national or third sector 
organisations). Used inductive framework 
approach for analysis.  
Introduction of public health objective did not quickly transform the 
goals and decisions of local alcohol licensing officials; public health 
practitioners surprised public health evidence was not always 
valued or understood. It will take time to embed public health as a 
routine consideration in the licensing environment. Relationships 
between public health and licensing actors may be vital to making 
progress. 
  
6 Fitzgerald et al 
(2018) 
Explore the experiences of public health 
actors engaging with licensing, in terms of 
Qualitative study. In-depth, semi-structured 
interviews with 13 public health actors who 
Changes to Scottish licensing meant to enhance democratic 
engagement and promote public health have been insufficient to 
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their perceptions of the distribution of 
power and constraints on their influence 
within licensing. 
had recent and extensive experience of 
involvement in local licensing in 20 licensing 
jurisdictions; analysed using inductive 
framework approach.  
(note: appears to be same data corpus as 
used in Fitzgerald et al 2017 above) 
change the system or empower stakeholders to fully achieve those 
goals. Challenges include disproportionate influence of certain 
individuals, intimidating practices within licensing system, and 
limited accountability or meaningful public involvement. 
7 Foster et al 
(2007) 
Obtain views on the implementation and 
impact of the Licensing Act 2003. 
Quantitative study. Conducted structured 
survey (with some open questions) with either 
Chair of Licensing Committee or head of 
alcohol licensing team in English local 
authorities. Sampled all 356 local authorities, 
response rate of 63%. Publication reports main 
descriptive analyses. Open questions used to 
extract themes.  
Inconsistent picture across UK regarding effects of licensing 
changes on alcohol-related harms. Cost and availability of 
resources will be crucial influence on future responses to policing 
implementation of Licensing Act 2003. In future, issues of 
management and enforcement will continue to be important. 
8 Foster (2016) Assess the impact of the Licensing Act 
2003 on the wider public sector 10 years 
after its implementation. 
Qualitative study. Conducted 36 interviews 
with licensing stakeholders, including police, 
licensing officers, licensing lawyers, trade 
associations, academics, civil servants, and 
others. Held three additional workshops with 
35 licensing stakeholders. Identified key 
themes within stakeholder responses, which 
were discussed with expert advisors.  
Appears to be significant mismatch between written detail of the 
Licensing Act 2003 and its practical application; many consider Act 
to have been interpreted to the advantage of licenced trade. Act 
has not had impact on levels of crime and disorder, overall alcohol 
consumption, or diversity of night-time economy.  
9 Grace et al 
(2016) 
Examine local licence decision-making in 
the context of implementing Cumulative 
Impact Policies (CIPs). 
Qualitative study. Conducted institutional 
ethnography to consider Cumulative Impact 
Policies (CIPs) in England, which are policies 
local authorities can implement under 
Licensing Act 2003 to try to tackle alcohol-
related harms stemming from alcohol outlet 
density (similarities here with Scotland’s 
‘overprovision statements’). Conducted 24 
interviews and observed 21 licensing 
meetings.  
CIPs are example of multi-level governance in which national and 
local interests, legal powers, and alcohol licensing priorities 
interact. However, CIPs have been contested on multiple grounds 
in practice, and are fluid in their objectives and framings; different 
stakeholders interpret CIPs differently.  
10 Hadfield et al 
(2015) 
Provide insights into changes which are 
entrenching private governance of the 
night-time economy, and investigate 
legislative and Corporate Social 
Responsibility implementation as applied 
to public drinking spaces and the 
operation of licensed premises. 
Data drawn from two qualitative studies. Study 
1: conducted 32 interviews with 40 participants 
(licensing officers, police, licensed premises 
managers, Department of health, resident’s 
association, and drinks manufacturer) and 
analysed policy documents. Study 2: 
conducted observation of alcohol retail 
industry across eight English regions to assess 
how Social Responsibility Standards were 
working in practice.  
A vacuum in traditional law enforcement is being filled by the 
Corporate Social Responsibility Agenda, with alcohol industries 
promoting ‘voluntary alternatives’ to the statutory roles and 
enforcement powers of city authorities and police. This 
replacement of traditional enforcement with self-regulation unlikely 




11 Hadfield et al 
(2009) 
Consider recent policing and regulatory 
responses to the nigh-time economy in 
England and Wales. 
Qualitative study. Two city case study sites 
(large and medium size English cities), 
conducted 70 qualitative interviews with 
alcohol policy implementation stakeholders 
(e.g. central and local government, police, 
licensing departments, social services, health 
and treatment services, and drinks retailers), 
as well as a focus group with seven local 
residents in one of the case study sites.  
Enforcement powers were used sparingly in police interactions 
with premises, with their main utility being as levers or incentives 
for change which encouraged compliance with regulations. 
However, implementation of these powers varied across places 
and social contexts (despite central government attempting to 
standardise their use), as they are reinterpreted by local criminal 
justice practitioners and administrative bodies who are dealing with 
issues of resources, capacity building, and skills development 
12 Haggard et al 
(2014) 
Identify factors that promote or hinder the 
implementation of a multicomponent 
Responsible Beverage Service 
Programme in Swedish municipalities. 
Qualitative study. Conducted 40 semi-
structured interviews in six purposely selected 
municipalities. Undertook content analysis.  
Local adaptation of the Programme may have resulted in less 
progress towards intended outcomes than expected. For 
successful implementation, argue potential users need to have 
positive sense of Programme, with core Programme components 
seen as logical and aligned with previous work and organisational 
structure. Evaluation and sufficient information about Programme 
also required.  
13 Hawkins et al 
(2014) 
Investigate means by which alcohol 
industry actors gain access to 
policymakers and strategies used to 
influence policy. 
Qualitative study. Conducted 35 semi-
structured interviews with a cross-section of 
alcohol policy stakeholders (elected 
parliamentarians, civil servants, public health 
advocates, and UK industry representatives). 
Interviews analysed thematically. Also 
undertook documentary analysis.  
Strategies of alcohol industry actors focused on long-term 
relationship building with policymakers, involving provision and 
interpretation of information and promotion of self-regulation (e.g. 
through partnerships with government). 
14 Herring et al 
(2008) 
Study the local implementation of the 
Licensing Act 2003. 
Qualitative study. Analysed licensing policies 
of 33 London Boroughs and undertook 11 in-
depth interviews in five Boroughs (with 
licensing officers and chairs of licensing 
committees).  
There is local diversity in the nature of licensing and in 
engagement of Councils in licensing across Boroughs. New 
partnerships working in licensing are emerging. Problems are 
observed in gathering adequate / appropriate data to monitor 
alcohol-related harm at local level; this evidence is needed to 
inform decision-making process. 
15 Humphreys et 
al (2010) 
Examine effects of change in licensing 
policy on practice of liquor retailing, and 
investigates application of natural 
experiment in crime prevention policy. 
Quantitative study. Utilised licensing data 
(opening and closing times) from sample of 
611 on-license premises. Data collected from 
before and after Licensing Act 2003 
implementation. Analysed whether Act 
succeeded in cultivating staggered closing 
times.   
Licensed premises differed in extent they adopted retailing 
changes under Licensing Act 2003’s new regulatory framework. 
Suggest understanding and monitoring variation in policy 
implementation is a prerequisite to evaluating outcomes.  
16 Lloyd et al 
(2014) 
Explore how Regional Alcohol Manager 
(RAM) role developed (in context of 
implementing the Alcohol Improvement 
Programme), and explain the structure, 
role and impact of RAMs within 
conceptual frameworks of policy networks 
and government at a distance.  
Qualitative study. Conducted unstructured 
interviews with all RAMs, semi-structured 
interviews with additional 31 national, regional 
and local policy contacts, and in-depth 
interviews with six national-level policymakers. 
Thematic analysis used deductively- and 
inductively-identified themes.  
Government created new network of RAMs, who were expected to 
support progress on reducing alcohol-related hospital admissions. 
RAMs expected to impact local decision-making through 
partnership and persuasion. Observed clear division between 
those tasked with the central policy brief to deliver on a new policy 
and those who had to juggle central policy directives with local 
priorities; this resulted in tensions concerning work programmes 
RAMs developed.  
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17 MacGregor et 
al (2013) 
Analyse the implementation of the 
Licensing (Scotland) Act 2005. Study 
objectives included: understand whether 
and how Licensing Boards address the 
five licensing objectives (including the 
public health objective); and understand 
how Licensing Boards interpret and enact 
key requirements of the Licensing Act 
2005. 
Qualitative study. Study conducted in three 
phases: (i) scoping documentary review (e.g. 
of licensing board policy statements and 
coping interviews (with trade and policy 
representatives); (ii) semi-structured telephone 
interview surveys with 30 Licensing Standards 
Officers and 20 Licensing Board members; 
and (iii) case study using focus groups and 
interviews with Licensing Board and Local 
Licensing Forum members. Interviewees did 
not include public health or police 
representatives.  
Licensing (Scotland) Act 2005 has had positive impact on Scottish 
licensing system. Challenges implementing public health objective 
persist. In response to Act’s implementation challenges, need for 
more, and better, guidance for Licensing Boards.  
18 Martineau et al 
(2014) 
Analyse implications for local alcohol 
control of changes to alcohol licensing 
laws and practice in England and Wales. 
Qualitative study. Documentary analysis of 
current legislation governing local alcohol 
control in England and Wales. Documents 
collected through literature searching, hand-
searching websites, and contacting key 
experts within and outside government.  
England/Wales do not have statutory health licensing objective; 
public health stakeholders need to find ways to highlight 
considerable burden of alcohol harms in licensing processes. 
Health concerns can be addressed within current alcohol control 
framework by utilising potential for cross-sector collaboration within 
local government.   
19 Mooney et al 
(2017) 
Identify major characteristics and drivers 
of differences in patterns of local alcohol 
policies. 
Qualitative study. Undertook case study in two 
contrasting Local Authorities in England, using 
semi- structured interviews with13 key 
informants (from public health, licensing, and 
trading standards) and documentary analysis 
(of harm reduction strategies and statements 
of licensing policy). Carried out two-stage 
thematic analysis, resulting in seven inductive 
themes.  
New powers over alcohol policy for English Local Authorities can 
produce different policies; differences are rooted in economic, 
opportunistic and personnel factors particular to each Local 
Authority. These differences in local circumstances can lead to 
varied prioritisation of alcohol-related harm prevention across 
Local Authorities. 
20 Muhunthan et 
al (2017) 
Examine role of court judgements on 
efforts in Australia to regulate harmful use 
of alcohol. 
Legal analysis of case law. Analysed 
Australian case law (2010-June 2015) 
involving judicial review of administrative 
decisions relating to development applications 
or liquor licences for retail outlets, hotels and 
other on-licence premises. Forty-four cases 
identified using case law database, data 
extracted using systematic review techniques.  
Majority of appeals were by industry against government decisions 
to reject a licence application. Public health research evidence had 
limited / no influence on cases, as there is no requirement in 
legislation to consider public health. Poor weighting of public 
health evidence resulted in high rates of industry success in these 
appeals. 
21 Parkes et al 
(2011) 
Assess implementation of NHS-delivered 
ABIs in Scotland. 
Mixed-methods study. Used NHS Board 
progress reports and supplementary data. 
Additionally, undertook 26 semi-structured 
interviews with 17 key informants at national 
levels, and 13 interviews with health board 
strategic leads (representing 13 of 14 health 
boards). Identified three health boards as 
‘case studies’, using board-level monitoring 
data and interviews.  
Reach and impact of ABIs in Scotland was varied across Health 
Board areas. Variation in implementation may have resulted from, 
for example, different Health Board payment structures which 
result in primary care practices emphasising different aspects of 
ABI delivery. Developing more universal systems and standards 




22 Randerson et 
al (2018) 
Assess the impact (including 
enforcement) of the Sale and Supply of 
Alcohol Act 2012 (SSAA) in New Zealand 
on the alcohol environment from 2013-
2015. 
Mixed-methods. Employed the Alcohol 
Environment Protocol, with aim to document 
policy, enforcement, and compliance. 
Conducted 36 key informant interviews with 
police, liquor licensing inspectors, and public 
health officers (26 of whom were interviewed 
before and after Act implementation). 
Additional five interviews conducted with drink-
drive enforcement officers. Interviewees asked 
to provide rankings and qualitative comments 
on aspects of alcohol environment. Analysis 
used ordinal logistic regression and thematic 
analysis.  
SSAA led to slight reduction in alcohol availability during late night 
in urban centres. Development of Local Alcohol Policies deterred 
or delayed by appeals from alcohol industry. Slight increase in 
difficulty to obtain a premises licence, reportedly due to increased 
public opposition. However, need more support for public wishing 
to participate in licensing process, and more pragmatic approach 
to District Licensing Committees’ consideration of evidence.  
23 Rieckmann et 
al (2009) 
Present findings from study of state 
substance abuse authority activities used 
to promote evidence-based practices for 
substance abuse treatment. 
Mixed-methods. Used structured telephone 
interviews with 49 representatives of state 
substance use authorities to obtain 
quantitative and qualitative data about efforts 
to facilitate evidence-based practice adoption 
in US states.  
Each state had unique approach to service delivery and funding for 
treatment services. Of four strategies used to adopt evidence-
based practices, the highest emphasis was on infrastructure and 
development. Problems with options for financial support and 
accreditation could help to explain variation in actual adoption of 
evidence-based practices.  
24 Rod and 
Hoybye (2016) 
Examine process of implementation of 
Danish health promotion guidelines. 
Qualitative study. Undertook ethnographic 
study using qualitative interviews and 
participant observation in four local 
governments. Focused on the work of health 
promotion officers. Analysis identified four 
emergent themes.  
In absence of legislation regarding health promotion, guidelines 
served to regulate activities of local governments in subtle manner. 
Health promotion guidelines represented pragmatic approach to 
evidence by national authority, who used ‘best available 
knowledge’. While guidelines critiqued for being vague, evidence 
of widespread attitude that recommendations were taken as 
evidence-based and therefore somewhat ‘beyond discussion’. 
Evidence of local actors facing challenges in interpreting wording 
of recommendations and how they fit with actors’ existing 
departments.  
25 Thom, Herring 
et al (2013a)  
Chart emergence of new forms of 
partnership working as pragmatic 
response to implementing alcohol policy 
at local levels, in context of UK 
Government’s Alcohol Strategy (enacted 
in 2012). Examine assumptions 
underpinning efforts to promote 
partnership work and associated ongoing 
challenges. 
Qualitative study. Employed open-discussion 
interviews with key informants (n=17) at 
national or regional level, and semi-structured 
interviews with 90 professionals with roles in 
local alcohol partnerships. Interviewed a 
further 20 people in two case study areas, 
using open-ended interview schedules. While 
study was strengthened by its discussion of 
theoretical partnership literature, a description 
of the data analysis was largely missing from 




Partnership working has proliferated in recent years; often 
constituted of combination of health and criminal justice. Further 
development of partnership model for policy implementation needs 
consideration of incompatibility between institutional and 
professional cultures. Need clearer analysis of which aspects of 
partnership working provide ‘added value’. Contextual and process 





al (2013b)  
Assess the Alcohol Improvement 
Programme (AIP), including its impact, the 
process of implementation, and which 
elements might serve as a ‘legacy’ in 
future.  
Mixed methods. Employed interviews with: six 
national level policymakers; 25 regional level 
informants (e.g. Regional Alcohol Managers). 
Analysis used thematic content analysis. Also 
conducted structured telephone interviews with 
44 Primary Care Trust alcohol leads and 
examined trend data for alcohol-related 
hospital admissions. Quantitative analysis 
utilised descriptive statistics.  
Four case studies conducted aimed at 
understanding the complexity and dynamics of 
implementing AIP. 
No evidence the AIP had intended impact on alcohol-related 
hospital admissions. AIP was successfully delivered, and 
increased priority given to alcohol-related harm on local policy 
agendas. Factors influencing impact of AIP included nature of local 
context, extent of good partnership, availability of resources, and 
existence of focused objectives.  
27 Thompson et 
al (2017) 
Describe degree to which minimum 
alcohol prices in Canada are effective 
public health policy, and document 
approaches used for setting minimum 
prices across Canada’s 13 jurisdictions. 
Quantitative study. Collected data on minimum 
prices of alcohol for February 2014, from each 
jurisdiction’s governing liquor control authority, 
and acquired on-premise prices from 
regulatory documents found online. Off-
premise prices collected from liquor 
authorities.  
Decisions on minimum price levels are made on 
financial/economic rather than public health grounds. Legislating 
regular inflation-adjusted minimum prices would protect value of 
alcohol products falling over time.  
28 Toner et al 
(2014) 
Explore competing influences which 
inform public health policy, using Alcohol 
Improvement Programme in England as 
case study. Sought to examine the ways 
research evidence informed decisions 
about High Impact Changes within 
England’s Alcohol Improvement 
Programme. Study results 
Qualitative study. Conducted structured 
telephone interviews with 44 Primary Care 
Trust alcohol leads. Conducted interviews with 
20 local policy contacts (including Directors of 
Public Health) in four case study areas. 
Undertook 25 semi-structured interviews with 
regional level informants, including all 
Regional Alcohol Managers. At national level, 
all 10 members of Department of Health 
Alcohol Policy and Alcohol National Support 
Teams interviewed. Thematic analysis 
employed. Additional analysis of relevant 
documents (which documents, and how they 
were analysed, was not reported). 
(note: appears to be overlap of data corpus as 
used in Thom, MacGregor et al [2013] above) 
Perception of High Impact Changes in England’s Alcohol 
Improvement Programme as being evidence-informed allowed 
local implementers to support and legitimise their spending 
decisions about these Changes. 
29 Zahnow et al 
(2018) 
Explore patterns of extended trading 
permit use across Queensland, Australia, 
pre-and post-July 2016 following 
legislation change (Tackling Alcohol-
fuelled Violence Amendment Act 2016) to 
reduce ordinary liquor trading hours.  
Quantitative study. Utilised 24 months of 
licensing data to observe whether legislation 
had been under-inclusive and if licensees were 
utilising loophole of extended trading permits 
to keep licensing hours as usual. Used 
descriptive statistics an, difference-in-
differences modelling approach, and Poisson 
regression models. 
Article demonstrates under-inclusive nature of amendment led to 
licensed venues using extended trading permits to subvert 
intentions of legislation. Authors argue legislative loopholes are 
difficult to anticipate, therefore legislative evolution is required to 
‘patch’ them after they are observed to arise. Tension also 
observed between responsibility for community safety given to 
community board, which is constituted by same venue owners as 




3.3.2 Factors Influencing Alcohol Policy Implementation   
Context and Variation in Implementation  
The included literature suggested that alcohol policy implementation is influenced by 
context, and is often characterised by variation across local sites (e.g. Fitzgerald et 
al., 2018; Hadfield et al., 2009b; Humphreys and Eisner, 2010; Mooney et al., 2017; 
Parkes et al., 2011). The included studies suggested this variation was at least 
partially explained by the way local alcohol policy implementers undertake 
‘translation’ work to implement a centrally-developed policy or strategy in their own 
contexts (e.g. Mooney et al., 2017) or by the governance of local implementation 
(e.g. Lloyd et al., 2014). 
 
Examples of variation were most often observed in studies from the UK, but were 
reported across a range of alcohol policy topics. A clear example was in relation to 
delivery of ABIs across Scottish local areas, where a key finding from Parkes and 
colleagues (2011) was that “the extent of reach and impact of the ABI initiative was 
mixed across Scotland” (p. iii). The authors further reported that some Health 
Boards had tried to address these gaps, but that participants noted the need for a 
pragmatic approach to improving ABI ‘reach’. For example, Heath Board participants 
reported sometimes having to work opportunistically with primary care practices who 
expressed higher interest in the initiative (Parkes et al., 2011).  
 
In relation to Scottish alcohol licensing, Fitzgerald and colleagues (2018) observed 
that while licensing objectives in Scotland are intended to bring consistency to the 
licensing system, LB members have discretion in decision-making, leading the 
system to remain characterised by variation within and between LBs. The authors 
reflect that “greater accountability may increase consistency to some degree” 
(p.613), and point to a changing legislative context which requires LBs to report on 
how they have had regard to the licensing objectives. However, the authors warned 
against using accountability alone as a mechanism to enforce the licensing 
objectives. Further studies by Fitzgerald and colleagues (2017) and MacGregor and 
colleagues (2013) have also identified substantive variation in how licensing 




Considerations related to variation also appeared linked to other aspects of the local 
governance context in which implementation occurred, including the relationship of 
implementers to central government (Haggard et al., 2010; Herring et al., 2008; 
Lloyd et al., 2014). For example, Haggard and colleagues (2010) examined the 
implementation of a Responsible Beverage Service programme in Sweden. In their 
study, some participants reported the top-down approach of central government was 
problematic because it did not permit municipalities to contextualise the programme 
to their needs, meaning smaller municipalities ended up with programme priorities 
(e.g. reducing violence) that were better suited to large municipalities.  
 
Studies of the Alcohol Improvement Programme within the UK provided a more 
detailed exploration of central-local relationships and local contextualisation. For 
example, Lloyd and colleagues (2014) were critical of the Department of Health’s 
‘hands off’ approach to their relationship with Regional Alcohol Managers, reporting 
the consequence that there was “considerable variability in the staffing and working 
environments associated with the role”(pp. 321). In other studies about the same 
Programme, the perceived levels of success of Regional Alcohol Managers varied 
(Thom et al., 2013b; Toner et al., 2014), with one study finding that initiatives within 
the Programme were adopted and developed variably across local areas, in ways to 
fit the local context (Thom et al., 2013b). However, the authors noted this arose from 
how “the ethos underpinning the [Programme] was to allow local areas flexibility in 
implementing change” (p.589). Finally, variation in alcohol policy implementation 
was also observed in relation to other aspects of the local governance context such 
as local areas’ capacity and motivation to engage in effective partnership working 
and inclusive public involvement (Foster, 2016; Thom et al., 2013a). For example, in 
a study of how the Licensing Act (Scotland) 2005 has been implemented, variation 
was observed in levels of public involvement in Scottish alcohol licensing 
(MacGregor et al., 2013).  
 
Overall, the review results suggested that study authors sometimes appeared to find 
variation in implementation worrisome, in that it meant in certain sites policy went 
‘unimplemented’ or there were gaps in coverage (Fitzgerald et al., 2018; Parkes et 
al., 2011). However, included studies also seemed to frame this local flexibility as 
being important for the purposes of contextualising the policy (e.g. Fitzgerald et al., 
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201829; Thom et al., 2013b). This suggests that balancing the needs of local 
contextualisation against implementation consistency can be challenging and may 
be a useful dimension to explore in alcohol policy implementation research.  
 
Factors Influencing Implementation 
Many of the included publications identified more specific factors which were 
reported to influence implementation. These included: performance measurement 
for assessing, monitoring, or enforcing alcohol policy implementation (including use 
of targets); partnership or other collaborative working; availability of sufficient 
resources (monetary or otherwise); public involvement in decision-making; and 
availability of high quality, relevant evidence to inform decisions. Table 3.4 below 
shows which included publications consider each of these factors, and provides a 
reader with an overview of how often each topic arose in the included literature 
(including, strikingly, how often publications discussed multiple topics). The 
subsections below then discuss each factor in order of how frequently they arose in 
the literature, considering the ways each influences (i.e. may facilitate and/or 
challenge) implementation. Given that I quality assessed all but one publication to 
be ‘high’ or ‘intermediate’ quality (see Table 3.2), I will not comment on the quality of 
publications below, except where a particular point rests only on the one study I 
assessed as being of ‘low’ quality (Hadfield et al., 2009b). 
 
 
29 Note Fitzgerald and colleagues (2018) reported both views 
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1 Berends et al (2016) X   X  
2 Casswell et al (2018) X  X   
3 Chalmers et al (2016) X  X   
4 Fitzgerald et al (2015) X X X   
5 Fitzgerald et al (2017)  X  X X 
6 Fitzgerald et al (2018) X  X X X 
7 Foster et al (2007)  X X X X 
8 Foster (2016) X X X X X 
9 Grace et al (2016) X X  X X 
10 Hadfield et al (2015)   X  X 
11 Hadfield et al (2009)  X X X X 
12 Haggard et al (2014) X X    
13 Hawkins et al (2014) X X  X  
14 Herring et al (2008) X X X  X 
15 Humphreys et al (2010)   X   
16 Lloyd et al (2014) X X X X  
17 MacGregor et al (2013) X X X  X 
18 Martineau et al (2014)  X  X  
19 Mooney et al (2017) X X    
20 Muhunthan et al (2017) X X    
21 Parkes et al (2011) X  X X  
22 Randerson et al (2018) X X X  X 
23 Rieckmann et al (2009) X X    
24 Rod et al (2016) X X X X  
25 Thom et al (2013a) X   X  
26 Thom et al (2013b) X X X X  
27 Thompson et al (2017)  X    
28 Toner et al (2014)  X X   
29 Zahnow et al (2018)     X 
 Total 20 20 17 14 11 
 
Resources 
The availability and importance of different types of resources emerged as an 
important factor for alcohol policy implementation in 20 studies. These studies were 
consistent in reporting resources were necessary to enable alcohol policy 
implementation work (e.g. Casswell et al., 2018; Fitzgerald et al., 2015; Foster, 
2016), and that capacity to undertake, or engage in alcohol policy was associated 
with greater resources (e.g. Haggard et al., 2010; Hawkins & Holden, 2014).  
 
Studies most often identified a lack of resources (specifically inadequate or 
unsustainable funding) as being a challenge to alcohol policy implementation. For 
example, the issue of budget cuts or otherwise constrained resources was a 
consistent and direct barrier to implementation (e.g. Hadfield et al., 2009b; Herring 
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et al., 2008; Thom et al., 2013b). The included publications also suggested that 
imbalances in how resources were distributed between given policy initiatives or 
implementation stakeholders could also be problematic. For example, while ABIs 
were noted as being a relative ‘success story’ in Scotland, for having achieved key 
targets, Parkes and colleagues (2011) suggest that the prioritisation of the ABI 
programme may have absorbed energy and resources that were sorely needed for 
other, locally-identified alcohol-related issues.  
 
Additionally, a relative lack of resources among policy implementers compared with 
other alcohol stakeholders was found to be challenging in certain circumstances. 
For example, it was evident that the alcohol industry’s substantial resources allow 
them the capacity and flexibility to engage with alcohol policy, which clearly 
contrasts with the situation of local government actors experiencing budget 
reductions (Hawkins and Holden, 2014). At a local level, Grace and colleagues 
(2016) reported that the licensing process also appeared to “favour well-resourced 
stakeholders who had the time, knowledge and skills to present their own interests 
as commensurate with the requirements of [the local alcohol policy]” (p.82). 
 
From an international perspective, Chalmers and colleagues (2016) were concerned 
with whether implementation arrangements constituted ‘good governance’, 
particularly in terms of what funding relationships could reveal about transparency 
and accountability within the treatment system. By mapping the funding flows for 
alcohol and drug treatment in an Australian context, the researchers found that 
services draw on multiple funding sources. While this helped protect services from 
funding shortfalls, it created challenges for service providers who consequently must 
navigate multiple (and sometimes competing) funding and accountability 
frameworks, ultimately hindering alcohol policy implementation work (Chalmers et 
al., 2016).  
 
It was less common for studies to empirically identify funding as a positive 
contributor to alcohol policy implementation, possibly because the opportunity to 
observe this arose less frequently in resource-constrained contexts. Despite this, 
three studies were able to identify circumstances in which sufficient funding had 
been a positive contributor to implementation. Fitzgerald and colleagues (2015) and 
Parkes and colleagues (2013) both reported that the substantial influx of funding 
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provided to implement the ABI programme in Scotland was crucial for the 
programme’s relatively successful implementation. In England, Thom and 
colleagues (2013b) found local areas which were ‘early implementers’ of the Alcohol 
Improvement Programme were provided sufficient resources to help them support 
key actions, including establishing service delivery infrastructure, supporting new 
relevant initiatives, and strengthening partnerships. However, these same authors 
made the point that the overall programme was given a relatively modest budget 
with respect to what it was intended to accomplish, and they highlight this as one of 
the key sources of failure (Thom et al., 2013b). 
 
Beyond funding, a range of other resources were identified as necessary for 
successful alcohol policy implementation. These included organisational 
infrastructure to deliver services, and human resources such as senior staff buy-in, 
leadership, enthusiastic individuals and strong, communicative teams (Fitzgerald et 
al., 2015; Haggard et al., 2010; Parkes et al., 2011). Parkes and colleagues (2011) 
reported a number of non-monetary resources /sources of support which helped 
facilitate the implementation of Scotland’s ABI programme. For example, they 
reported that national events which were organised to support local areas in 
achieving the ABI delivery targets were well received by their study respondents. 
The study also reported perceived benefits of having coordination resources, for 
example the support provided by the National ABI coordinator situated at the 
Scottish Government. Further, the authors observed that the organisational 
infrastructure (including adequate time and planning) and Scotland-wide training 
programme for ABI delivery was crucial for establishing the programme. However, 
the ABI Delivery Support Team was perceived by participants as being established 
too late in the planning process, and without sufficient connection to frontline 
delivery or with a well-defined remit (Parkes et al., 2011). 
 
Lastly, the included publications suggested that resource considerations impacted 
the administration of local alcohol licensing systems. In particular, licensing 
committees feared having their decisions appealed because of the associated costs 
for the local Council (Fitzgerald et al., 2017; Foster, 2016; Herring et al., 2008). As a 
result, it was observed that local areas tended to develop local licensing policies that 
would not attract litigation or negative publicity. For example, this led many of the 
first local licensing policies in England to be similar and relatively weak (Herring et 
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al., 2008). A lack of resources also appeared to influence the capacity of the 
licensing system to implement relevant legislation. For example, Foster (2016) found 
that cuts to police services had negatively impacted on the capacity of police to 
engage in the administration and enforcement of licensing policy. Further, this study 
noted the lack of funding provided to administer the licensing system - the Act’s 
licensing fee system did not sufficiently cover the cost of running the licensing 
system. Foster reported that this issue was compounded by local administrative 
policy which prevented the licensing system in England from being supported by 
general local government funds.  
 
Evidence Use 
A total of 20 included publications discussed evidence use in alcohol policy 
implementation; interest in this topic seemed to be linked to an assumption that 
better evidence use would improve alcohol policy implementation or outcomes. In 
discussing evidence use, studies made the link to implementation both directly and 
indirectly: Directly, in terms of evidence being used to inform decision-making during 
implementation, and, indirectly, in terms of framing evidence as generally being 
important to use and share in the context of local actors’ implementation work. The 
depth to which studies examined evidence use varied. Some studies mentioned 
evidence quite briefly, and framed general issues about evidence use (such as a 
lack of evidence) as a challenge for implementation (e.g. MacGregor et al., 2013; 
Randerson et al., 2018; Rieckmann et al., 2009b). Others, however, explored 
evidence use in more detail, for example by examining different actors’ perspectives 
on evidence or what evidence is considered relevant in health or non-health 
contexts (e.g. Fitzgerald et al., 2017; Martineau et al., 2013; Muhunthan et al., 2017; 
Toner et al., 2014).  
 
Included publications suggested alcohol policy implementers (at both national and 
local levels) drew upon a range of evidence in their work. This included residents’ 
views and testimonies, health statistics, information from licensees or local 
business, and police statistics and data (Fitzgerald et al., 2017; Foster et al., 2007; 
Grace et al., 2016; Lloyd et al., 2014; Toner et al., 2014). Uses of evidence were 
also represented in multiple ways. This included relatively straightforward, linear use 
to inform policy and practice decisions, such as using locally developed Needs 
Assessments to help justify chosen priorities (Mooney et al., 2017). This also 
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included more complex uses, such as the synthesis of empirical and socio-political 
contextual knowledge (Toner et al., 2014). Additionally, included publications 
suggested that evidence was sometimes used more ‘symbolically’ to support 
effective implementation – this included lending legitimacy or credibility to a 
particular programme, or to protect decisions from critique or appeal. For example, 
certain articles noted that being seen to be ‘evidence-based’ would lend credibility to 
a particular programme, helping to garner stakeholder buy-in (Fitzgerald et al., 2015; 
Haggard et al., 2010; Rod and Hoybye, 2016; Toner et al., 2014). As another 
example, Herring and colleagues (2008) reported UK local licensing decision-
makers sometimes tried protect themselves against expensive appeals by ensuring 
there was a sound evidence base for their decisions.   
 
Challenges with using evidence arose frequently within included studies, particularly 
in terms of generating or accessing relevant and quality evidence, or disagreement 
over what constituted relevant evidence. First, a perceived lack of (relevant) 
evidence to inform implementation was reported in seven studies (Fitzgerald et al., 
2015; Foster, 2016; Hadfield et al., 2009b; Herring et al., 2008; Martineau et al., 
2014; Randerson et al., 2018; Toner et al., 2014). This included concerns about the 
quality of the evidence implementers had available to them – for example whether 
they could rely on available police and hospital statistics (Herring et al., 2008) – and 
whether evidence was appropriate for the setting in which it was needed. For 
example, Fitzgerald and colleagues (2015) reported evidence about ABI 
effectiveness was required for settings beyond primary care. Toner et al. (2014) 
observed that certain implementing organisations (in this case, Primary Care Trusts 
in England) responded to this challenge by undertaking their own local context-
specific research.  
 
Second, the included studies suggested there were contested perceptions of what is 
persuasive and appropriate evidence within alcohol policy implementation 
processes. For example, Toner and colleagues (2014) observed tensions between 
‘scientific’ and ‘experiential’ evidence in local alcohol policy decision-making, as well 
as varied perspectives on what evidence was considered convincing, or persuasive. 
To illustrate, the authors reported mixed perspectives among participants over the 
appropriateness and adequacy of available research evidence for local decision-




Further, in the Scottish alcohol licensing context Fitzgerald and colleagues (2017) 
found that public health practitioners and licensing stakeholders had different values 
and beliefs about evidence. They reported that public health actors perceived 
licensing actors did not always value or understand the public health evidence 
provided. In their study, public health interviewees emphasised that the 
implementation of a public health objective in Scotland required all actors to accept 
the ‘whole population approach’ to alcohol policy. However, they perceived not all 
relevant actors had adopted this perspective, despite the public health evidence 
available to support it. As an example, interviewees reported that, despite being 
presented with evidence of alcohol-related harms, not all licensing stakeholders 
agreed that current Scottish alcohol consumption levels and related harms were 
significant problems. The authors ultimately point to the possibility of different 
“cultures of evidence” between public health and licensing actors (a point which 
Chapter 7 explicitly builds upon), though this conclusion is limited by the study’s 
exclusive focus on the perspectives of public health actors. 
 
Third, the included studies suggested that understandings of legal evidentiary 
requirements to link alcohol availability and harm are contested. From a public 
health perspective, a key problem in both Scotland and England/Wales was the 
requirement within licensing to present specific evidence that established a link 
between a given premises and the potential for alcohol-related harm (Foster, 2016). 
Grace and colleagues (2016) found different licensing stakeholders disagreed about 
the extent to which alcohol-related harms could, or needed to be, linked to a 
particular premise or area in order to be persuasive and credible. The results 
suggest there are differences between public health and licensing perspectives on 
evidence, but also potentially a diversity of perspectives within licensing that are 
worth exploring, particularly in terms of how these differences may impact 
implementation.  
 
This confusion about legal requirements to link alcohol availability and harm was 
particularly evident in publications about the Licensing Act 2003, in which different 
authors came to different conclusions about how the legislation frames the need for 
evidence and what types of evidence are relevant (Foster, 2016; Martineau et al., 
2014). To explain, in a review of the Licensing Act 2003, which incorporated legal 
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input from a licensing barrister, Foster (2016) argues that the Act does not actually 
require a vast amount of ‘factual evidence’ of the link between alcohol-related harms 
and a particular premise/area, or for decision-makers to take a ‘premises by 
premises’ approach. Instead, Foster states that the Court of Appeal has determined 
licensing decisions can involve an ‘evaluative judgement’ about a local area and 
potential harms. Foster further argues that a “rational but nuanced view of causality” 
is sufficient for informing licensing decisions, thus the evidential standard was not as 
high as often perceived (Foster, 2016, p. 178).  
 
However, this analysis is somewhat in contrast with the analysis of the Licensing Act 
2003 by Martineau and colleagues (2014) who, in referencing the Act’s guidance 
from the Home Office, state that “licensing authorities can only consider health-
related evidence that directly links the premises in question to a threat in one of the 
named licensing objectives” (p. 3). This suggests more restrictive evidence 
expectations than that perceived by Foster. Martineau and colleagues go on to 
argue that licensing committees need a combination of data and arguments that are 
in reference to either a specific local area or a particular applicant. By being more 
specific to an area or premises, evidence has more legal weight and is better able to 
protect a licensing committee from appeal. Where Foster (2016) assesses that 
licensing committees are relatively flexible to consider evidence they deem relevant, 
Martineau and colleagues (2014) emphasise that the lack of a public health 
objective in England means health-related data is irrelevant unless it can be linked 
to one of the existing licensing objectives. Overall, it appears from the literature that 
fundamental understandings of legal evidentiary requirements are contested under 
the Licensing Act 2003, with implications for evidence use during the legislation’s 
implementation. 
 
While similar legal-type analyses were not available for the Licensing etc. (Scotland) 
Act 2005, the contested nature of evidence within licensing was also observed in the 
Scottish context, in which challenges were reported about implementing the 
Licensing Act 2005’s public health objective (discussed already in relation to 
Fitzgerald et al., 2017). MacGregor and colleagues (2013) have noted a key barrier 
to implementing Scotland’s public health objective was a lack of understanding 
among implementers about which evidentiary sources should be used during 
implementation. These authors also found that more consistent, robust, and 
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comparable data collection regarding the key provisions of Licensing Act 2005 was 
needed in order to inform licensing decision-making (MacGregor et al., 2013).  
 
From an international perspective, Muhunthan and colleagues (2017) used a 
method unique to the included literature when they examined court judgements 
regarding alcohol licenses in Australia. They reported that judicial discretion 
regarding what counted as persuasive evidence was an important factor in 
understanding why court decisions were most often in favour of industry. For 
example, within these courts, different types of evidence were given different 
‘weight’, and industry-presented evidence was often weighted more heavily than 
public health evidence, partly because public health-related arguments were often 
discounted where population-level evidence could not be supported by locality-
specific evidence (Muhunthan et al., 2017). The authors suggest this may have 
been because (i) the relevant legislation did not include a mandate to consider 
public health, or (ii) because of a narrow definition of ‘causation’ in the relationship 
between alcohol and health which meant public health evidence often could not 
meet the high ‘evidentiary burden’ (Muhunthan et al., 2017). This aligns with what 
was observed in the UK context, and lends empirical support to observed concerns 
within local government about having decisions appealed and the costs associated 
with this. Indeed, Muhunthan et al. (2017) found that local governments (as opposed 
to national governments) were the most frequent government stakeholders to have 
legal actions brought against them within the alcohol licensing system. 
 
While there has been a strong focus in the included literature on evidence use in 
licensing, this has often been from public health actors’ perspectives; empirical 
research with licensing decision-makers about their evidence use, to access their 
perceptions first-hand, is still needed. Further, the results suggest that there is a 
knowledge gap regarding evidence use by alcohol policy implementation 
stakeholders beyond their engagement in the licensing context. Particular gaps 
appear to be in understanding evidence use by non-health stakeholders involved in 
implementation (e.g. police, education, social care, etc.), and in evidence use within 





Seventeen publications reported on different approaches being used to measure, 
monitor, and enforce progress in alcohol policy implementation. This typically 
included the use of key indicators or targets that implementers were expected to 
prioritise and achieve, such as alcohol-related hospital admissions (Lloyd et al., 
2014). Four of the included studies described how targets could help facilitate 
implementation, such as by helping to prioritise alcohol policy locally, or giving a 
valuable focal point for planning related actions (Fitzgerald et al., 2015; Parkes et 
al., 2011; Thom et al., 2013b; Toner et al., 2014). One further study claimed a lack 
of agreed targets or outcomes led to the failing of a social responsibility policy 
(Hadfield and Measham, 2015), however this seemed to be grounded in an 
assumption that establishing a target could address the more general need for 
better enforcement of licensing regulations. 
 
A relative success story within the included literature was the implementation of 
Scotland’s ABI programme (Fitzgerald et al., 2015; Parkes et al., 2011). Included 
studies reported that, by identifying a target number of ABIs to be delivered across 
Scotland and establishing a practical and robust monitoring system, the Scottish 
Government helped to ensure this intervention was prioritised locally (Fitzgerald et 
al., 2015; Parkes et al., 2011).  Notably, however, Fitzgerald and colleagues (2015) 
identified some unintended consequences of the target, such as staff feeling 
“coerced” (p.6) into delivering on it. 
 
Included studies also reported concerns regarding targets, and broader issues 
related to performance measurement of implementation (e.g. monitoring and 
enforcement). Three included publications reported alcohol policy implementers 
were critical of the use of single indicators to measure entire programmes of work 
(Parkes et al., 2011; Thom et al., 2013b; Toner et al., 2014). In a study of the 
Alcohol Improvement Programme, Thom and colleagues (2013b) were critical of the 
programme being measured by a narrow indicator (alcohol-related hospital 
admissions) and argued that a broader range of alcohol-related harm measures 
would be more appropriate. Toner and colleagues (2014), examining the same 
Programme, similarly reported results indicating measures of the Programme were 
too narrow and “failed to embrace the broader range of alcohol-related harm” (pp. 
106).  These results are important from an implementation and accountability 
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perspective, because it appears participants in these studies felt the indicator (an 
accountability mechanism) was not a fair or appropriate measure of their 
implementation work. Further, Parkes and colleagues (2011) reported a concern 
among participants that a simple target becomes a ‘numbers exercise’ for 
implementers without meaningful embeddedness in practice. In terms of other 
unintended consequences, Parkes and colleagues (2011) noted the prioritisation of 
this target could overshadow the need to act on locally-identified issues, and 
Fitzgerald and colleagues (2015) identified the risk of “distortions in recording such 
that reported ABI figures were felt in some cases to be misleading” (p.6). Generally, 
it seemed the target became “important for implementation but creat[ed] perverse 
incentives to maximise reporting of ABI delivery” (Fitzgerald et al., 2015, p.6).  
 
In four studies, performance measurement concerns arose around a perceived lack 
of clarity about who had responsibility for meeting targets (Fitzgerald et al., 2015; 
Parkes et al., 2011), and complications surrounding the reporting (i.e. accountability) 
arrangements (Lloyd et al., 2014; Thom et al., 2013a). These were reported as 
challenges for implementation, with Fitzgerald and colleagues (2015) reporting that, 
where lines of responsibility were unclear, “interviewees tended to report more of a 
struggle with the whole [implementation] process” (p. 6). For example, Lloyd and 
colleagues (2014) reported that Regional Alcohol Managers in England’s Alcohol 
Improvement Programme were pulled in three directions: they reported to Health 
Board managers through line management arrangements; however also felt it 
necessary to prioritise locally identified needs in order to maintain their local 
relationships (and thus effectively support/influence local alcohol policy 
implementation). Finally, they were answerable to the Department of Health. The 
complexity of these obligations and responsibilities led the authors to conclude that 
this need to “juggle central policy directives with local priorities” (p. 325) was a 
challenge to Alcohol Managers’ implementation work. Overall, these particular 
publications suggest that establishing clear lines of accountability is important for 
implementation but do not investigate this in great detail. The complexity that 
partnership working adds to these issues is discussed further in the partnership 
subsection below. 
 
In terms of actually documenting performance or progress towards targets, 
challenges and key concerns in this area were often reported as being linked to 
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issues about attaining and organising data. For example, problems accessing data 
(especially hospital data) were perceived as important barriers to ongoing mapping 
of alcohol-related harm (Herring et al., 2008). In relation to the Alcohol Improvement 
Programme, Toner and colleagues (2014) reported participants’ frustration with how 
alcohol-related hospital admissions were actually recorded and subsequently 
counted against this target. In this circumstance, admissions only partially 
attributable to alcohol were often included, and it appeared the non-standardised 
coding of these admissions across local areas or within hospitals led to ‘wild 
fluctuations’ in the numbers. A related issue of documenting progress for the 
purposes of fulfilling multiple funders’ demands, as discussed by Chalmers and 
colleagues (2016) was discussed above in relation to resources. 
 
Additionally, technical challenges were noted which prevented the use of information 
for monitoring and informing local implementation decision-making. For example, in 
Scotland it was found that local IT systems were sometimes not adequately linked to 
each other (Fitzgerald et al., 2015), or responsibility for developing appropriate IT 
systems had been devolved to Health Boards who struggled because of a lack of 
available resources and expertise (Parkes et al., 2011). This had implications for the 
additional barriers of ensuring data accuracy and the capacity to effectively share 
data within the context of implementation (e.g. to demonstrate implementation 
progress). The challenge of effectively sharing data arose in multiple articles as 
being both a priority (Thom et al., 2013a, 2013b) but also an infrastructure issue 
(Foster, 2016; Hadfield et al., 2009b).  
 
Partnership or Collaborative Working 
Fourteen publications discussed partnership working and collaboration, and 
consistently represented partnership as a supportive factor or facilitator of effective 
alcohol policy implementation.   
 
All but two of the publications in this section were written regarding the UK context, 
where existing guidance around alcohol policy has strongly encouraged partnership 
working (Martineau et al., 2014; Thom et al., 2013a). For example, included 
publications noted the England/Wales Licensing Act 2003 requires a partnership 
approach to implementation (e.g. Foster, 2016; Herring et al., 2008). Authors such 
as Thom et al. (2013a) have identified partnership working as a key factor which 
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influences how policies and programmes are implemented (although not necessarily 
that partnership working is key to success). In light of this, it was unsurprising to find 
the literature suggests there has been a proliferation of partnership working in UK 
alcohol policy, and a reported commitment among research participants to this 
approach (Thom et al., 2013a).  
 
Alcohol policy implementation partnerships were reported as often being multi-
sectoral in their membership, given the relevance of alcohol-related harm to a range 
of policy areas (Lloyd et al., 2014; Martineau et al., 2014). In their study focusing on 
alcohol partnerships in England/Wales, Thom et al. (2013a) observed these 
partnerships were most often comprised of criminal justice and health 
representatives, sometimes also including education, employment, and social 
services. This appeared to lead to a key challenge of partnership working, as 
situations could arise in which partners’ own interests, professional cultures or 
experiences conflicted with those of other partners, or with the overall goals of the 
partnership itself (Martineau et al., 2014; Thom et al., 2013a).  
 
Other challenges were also identified. For example, Thom and colleagues (2013a) 
reported pressures among local implementers to respond to local needs while 
maintaining commitments from senior officials and key institutions. This same study 
highlighted a further challenge, that “working with multiple organisations and 
partnerships within the same area…complicated lines of responsibility and 
accountability” (Thom et al., 2013a, pp. 67–68).  
 
Another accountability-related challenge was illustrated by Lloyd and colleagues 
(2014), who examined the functions of Regional Alcohol Managers within the 
Alcohol Improvement Programme across nine English health regions. The authors 
observed that Managers were intended to work in partnership to help support, 
influence and coordinate alcohol policy initiatives, but they did not have the power to 
actually ‘implement’ action locally. Their ‘soft’ methods of persuasion were intended 
to help them contribute to the achievement of a ‘hard’ target of reducing alcohol-
related hospital admissions, the key indicator by which the Alcohol Improvement 
Programme was measured. This meant Managers were being given responsibility 
for a target they did not have the power to take direct action on, a challenge 
because it “is impossible to carve out the particular impact of the soft influencing 
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skills of the [Managers] on the hard outcome of [alcohol-related hospital 
admissions]” (Lloyd et al., 2014, p. 326).  These challenges suggest that further 
understanding about effectively organising the governance of local alcohol 
partnership working, in order to support policy implementation, is needed (especially 
in contexts, such as the UK, where partnership-based approaches are being 
strongly encouraged [Cook, 2015]). 
 
Despite challenges to working collaboratively and in partnership, included studies 
reported that local alcohol policy implementers subscribed to positive notions of this 
approach (Martineau et al., 2014; Parkes et al., 2011; Thom et al., 2013a). Despite 
the relative lack of empirical data within the included publications demonstrating 
partnership working led to improved outcomes, studies appeared to suggest that 
actors maintained the assumption that partnership working was helpful. However, 
one publication did note that the idea of partnership often goes uncritically accepted 
(Thom et al., 2013a): “despite the widespread belief in partnership working – which 
crosses political and policy divides – there is no good evidence to suggest that 
partnerships work or to indicate which aspects of partnership approaches are 
providing added value” (Thom et al., 2013a, pp. 74–75). The authors ultimately 
advocate for more research into what ‘added value’ partnerships actually provide in 
alcohol policy implementation. 
 
Only one example (Parkes et al., 2011) of where partnership working has been 
demonstrably successful in enabling local actors to implement alcohol policy was 
available in this review. Parkes and colleagues (2011) found that Health Boards’ 
collaborations with voluntary sector organisations helped to deliver ABIs to ‘hard to 
reach’ populations and ensure equitable delivery across different areas. One other 
study, this time of where more informal ‘collaboration’ between stakeholders had a 
positive impact, was in Grace and colleagues' (2016) study in England. The authors 
found that collaboration between licence applicants and local alcohol policy 
stakeholders (e.g. police) could help ensure licence applications included “features 
considered aligned with [Cumulative Impact Policy30] goals” (p. 81).    
 
 




The results suggested partnership working was a central and consistent aspect of 
the local governance of alcohol policy implementation (and is likely to be for the 
foreseeable future in the UK). However, understanding how partnership working 
shapes alcohol policy implementation work remains under-studied and the work that 
does exist provides only limited support for this approach. 
 
Public Involvement 
Eleven publications discussed public involvement in alcohol policy implementation. 
Like partnership working, there seemed to be an assumption by authors and their 
study participants that public involvement is a positive contributor to the general 
work of alcohol policy implementation. The relevant publications most commonly (in 
seven studies) discussed public involvement in relation to local licensing in the UK 
(Fitzgerald et al., 2018; 2017; Foster, 2016; Foster et al., 2007; Grace et al., 2016; 
Herring et al., 2008; MacGregor et al., 2013). In England/Wales this was in the 
context of legislative changes made by the Licensing Act 2003, in which it was 
perceived the Act would give residents a ‘stronger voice’ and the ability to engage 
more easily (Herring et al., 2008). In Scotland this was in relation to enacting the 
public health objective under the Licensing Act 2005  (Fitzgerald et al., 2017, 2018). 
There was limited discussion of public involvement in alcohol policy implementation 
in the UK beyond licensing (exceptions being two night-time economy-focused 
studies by Hadfield and colleagues (2009b, 2015)). 
 
Most of the studies reported that public involvement may be occurring (if somewhat 
variably across areas), often reporting that interviewees perceived public 
involvement ‘might’ or ‘could be’ a powerful influence on implementation decisions 
(e.g. Fitzgerald et al., 2017). Fitzgerald and colleagues (2018) explicitly recognised 
that the link between public involvement and implementation was based more on 
reasoning, noting that while public consultation in Scottish licensing was perceived 
as an important component of the implementation process by their interviewees, the 
authors were not able to presume what the outcomes of more public consultation 
would be. Thus, some uncertainty remains about whether greater public involvement 
in alcohol policy implementation would indeed ‘improve’ implementation processes 
(and, consequently, improve public health outcomes). Indeed, only two studies 
reported empirical evidence that it had had an actual positive influence on 
implementation decision-making: In New Zealand, increased public opposition to 
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new licensed premises was found to have helped to make it harder to obtain a new 
licence (Randerson et al., 2018); and in England, Foster (2016) reported some 
participants felt public involvement had been useful for adding “legitimacy and 
weight” (p.115) to local implementation actions.  
 
Included publications more readily identified challenges to public involvement than 
examples of where it was working well. Challenges included licensing systems 
which were relatively intimidating, inaccessible or opaque, and local authorities 
which did not actively encourage public participation, or even discouraged it (e.g. 
through poor communication about licence applications) (Foster, 2016; Hadfield et 
al., 2009b; MacGregor et al., 2013). For example, Foster’s (2016) evaluation of the 
Licensing Act 2003 suggested that the Act had not actually greatly improved the 
accessibility and transparency of licensing compared with the previous system 
(Foster, 2016). Overall, the study suggested that while the Act may have attempted 
to create more opportunity for residents to be involved in licensing, most local 
authorities did not actively encourage this participation, and the author 
recommended better public engagement in licensing be pursued (Foster, 2016). 
 
Three studies highlighted further issues which arose once the public was involved in 
alcohol policy implementation broadly. Procedurally, in terms of barriers to public 
involvement, residents reported not being clearly told what evidence they could 
present to licensing decision-makers which would be persuasive (Herring et al., 
2008). However, from a licensing stakeholder perspective, one study provided a 
critique that residents sometimes had “unrealistic demands, [and] did not always 
appreciate that an agreed process had to be followed” (MacGregor et al., 2013, 
p.37). In terms of the impact of public involvement, Hadfield et al. (2009b) reported 
that the publics’ concerns may not be adequately taken into account by statutory 
stakeholders such as the police (although note this publication scored low in my 
qualitative appraisal, see Table 3.2). These results highlight potential persistent 
challenges for ensuring the public can effectively participate in licensing, which is a 
key aspect of Scotland’s alcohol strategy (see Chapter 2). This may be an important 
issue for the Scottish context in which there have been calls to support communities 
to participate in licensing (Alcohol Focus Scotland, 2017e) and efforts to support 




Overall, the included publications suggested that while public involvement was often 
assumed by authors to be another positive contributor to alcohol policy 
implementation, the ability or efforts of different local areas to facilitate public 
involvement varied, with many challenges being identified. There appears to be a 
gap in knowledge about public involvement beyond the licensing context of the UK 
or in partnership working contexts. Finally, the included publications did not discuss 
what the implications of public involvement were for issues such as accountability 
(i.e. in relation to targets) or for resourcing.  
 
Interactions between Factors 
The results of the review indicated that the factors discussed can interact and 
influence each other. This was demonstrated by the frequent overlap of factors 
discussed in individual publications. I interpreted that the majority of included 
publications (26) discussed multiple factors, with only three discussing one factor 
exclusively (Humphreys and Eisner, 2010; Thompson et al., 2017; Zahnow et al., 
2018). These were quantitative studies focused on reporting patterns of change, 
with regards to single implementation factors. 
 
Included studies particularly linked financial resources to other themes in this 
review, including partnership working, achieving or monitoring targets, or using 
evidence. For example, Thom and colleagues (2013a) reported that constrained 
resources influenced the governance of partnerships, with funding cuts made to 
partners’ budgets being problematic for that actor’s capacity to contribute to alcohol 
policy implementation. Additionally, Chalmers and colleagues (2016) found that 
complex funding arrangements for alcohol policy implementation hindered 
implementation work, because reporting for performance measurement (i.e. fulfilling 
accountability obligations) to these multiple funding sources required substantial 
time and resources from the recipient. Further, in New Zealand, Randerson and 
colleagues (2018) reported the most common barrier to opposing new alcohol 
licenses in the context of new legislation was the challenge of attaining sufficient 
evidence, in part because local areas sometimes did not have the resources to 
collect or generate it. 
 
Various other interactions were also reported; for example it has already been noted 
in the section on partnership working that this approach to implementation can 
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complicate lines of accountability (Thom et al., 2013a). As a further example, Foster 
(2016) reported participants’ perspectives within their data that development of local 
Statements of Licensing Policy in England should involve consulting the public, but 
also draw upon public health evidence.  
 
The results of this review indicate the importance of remaining aware of, and 
understanding interactions between implementation factors in order to better explain 
and address implementation challenges. Given this, if a researcher wants to provide 
contributions to further explaining alcohol policy implementation, they need to 
accommodate the complexity of alcohol policy in their research design. As will be 
discussed in the following chapters, my research seeks to take forward this task.  
 
3.4 Discussion  
This chapter sought to review what is currently known from empirical studies about 
how national-level alcohol policies in high-income settings have been implemented, 
and why implementation occurred as it did. The results of this systematic review 
demonstrated that empirical literature about alcohol policy implementation in high-
income countries is largely recent (majority of studies published since 2013), 
qualitative, and focused on the UK. The review found 29 relevant studies, often with 
a focus on particular aspects of alcohol policy implementation, for example on 
licensing systems in Scotland and England/Wales, and specific programmes such 
as the Alcohol Improvement Programme in England.  
 
The factors which influence alcohol policy implementation can both facilitate or 
hinder implementation depending on the circumstances. While my analysis of the 
literature included a number of categories in which to organise the data, I generated 
three themes from these results that appeared to most often capture key aspects of 
how and why alcohol policy implementation occurs in high-income countries in the 
manner it does. These are: (i) accountability and governance; (ii) evidence use; and 
(iii) context and resources. I will discuss each of these in turn, explaining my 





To inform my analysis, I will discuss the findings in relation to broader relevant 
literature, including from policy implementation, accountability and evidence use. I 
identified these literatures through iterative engagement with each, often starting 
with reviews of existing research or highly cited texts, in order to get a sense of 
critical contemporary debates in the field. I draw upon these in my discussion below, 
as well as in the results chapters to help inform my empirical analysis. 
 
3.4.1 Accountability and Governance  
I have brought together the categories of performance measurement, partnership 
working, and public involvement within the theme ‘accountability and governance’. I 
did this because exploring these three areas with an accountability lens allows me to 
explore governance dimensions of these topics. Specifically, it gives me the 
opportunity to focus on governance-type questions that arise from these three 
categories, such as how the pervasiveness of partnership working in alcohol policy 
contexts appeared to be related to, and add complexity to, accountability in 
implementation. 
 
Given this, I interpreted accountability and governance challenges to arise across 
the results primarily in implicit ways, signalled by the language used. For example, 
included publications discussed issues related to accountability in a variety of ways, 
including in terms of enforcement of alcohol policy (e.g. Casswell et al., 2018; 
Foster, 2016); responsibility (Fitzgerald et al., 2015; Lloyd et al., 2014; Martineau et 
al., 2014); monitoring and evaluating achievement of key targets or policy delivery 
(Parkes et al., 2011; Thom et al., 2013b; Toner et al., 2014), and using evidence to 
‘protect’ a decision from scrutiny and appeal (Herring et al., 2008). These aspects of 
accountability were typically reported as a component of other implementation 
processes such as regulation and monitoring/evaluation, and did not explicitly link 
these findings to, or demonstrate consideration of, existing accountability literature 
(e.g. Bovens et al., 2014a).  
 
The results identified that alcohol policy implementation is often occurring in 
environments in which there is a discourse around encouraging ‘partnership 
working’ and ‘public involvement’ in policy practice – key issues in contemporary 
governance. In particular, the results suggested that partnership working and public 
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involvement seemed to carry with them an assumption that ‘more’ of this way of 
working would be beneficial to local alcohol policy implementation, without 
necessarily explaining or justifying this assumption. However, results also indicated 
that the ability or efforts of different local areas to facilitate partnership working or 
public involvement had varied, with many challenges identified. For example, with 
the exception of Foster (2016) and Randerson et al. (2018), the included literature 
did not provide empirical examples of the benefits of public involvement. With 
respect to partnership working, the results of this review are aligned with an existing 
UK-based review which reported a lack of clear evidence of partnership working 
impacting on health outcomes (Smith et al., 2009). Developing understanding about 
this is critical given the proliferation of partnership working across the UK. Indeed, 
one of the contemporary challenges for policy implementation research is 
accounting for partnership working contexts. 
 
Engagement with accountability literature may offer some potential to enhance 
understanding of alcohol policy implementation in high-income settings and support 
empirical analyses. For example, Fitzgerald and colleagues (2015) discussed the 
importance of clearly establishing responsibility for implementation interventions. 
They made this argument with regards to their perceptions of the national ABI 
target, determining that the target was useful because Health Boards were 
monitored about their performance against it and thus prioritised meeting it. 
However, there was perceived lack of clarity among interviewees about who had 
responsibility for meeting the target, which the authors found problematic. Lloyd et 
al. (2014) observed challenges experienced by Regional Alcohol Managers in 
England, who had to support the achievement of a ‘hard’ target (alcohol-related 
hospital admissions), without commensurate measures and resources to achieve 
this – these implementers had to rely on ‘soft’ methods of persuasion in their 
relationships with stakeholders such as Health Boards. This type of tension might be 
usefully examined analytically by drawing on concepts and ideas surrounding formal 
and informal accountability, and accountability in partnership contexts, which 
recognise these complex policy work environments (Romzek et al., 2013, 2012; 
Steets, 2010).  
 
Further, given the results demonstrating that local alcohol policy implementers are 
often simultaneously navigating performance measurement, partnership working, 
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and public involvement responsibilities, contemporary literature on ‘meaningful 
accountability’ may be useful here (Bovens and Schillemans, 2014). The notion of 
meaningful accountability responds to critiques of the assumption about 
accountability that “there can never be too much of it” (Thomas, 2012, p. 673). This 
assumption is reflected in practice, in which one can observe examples of multiple, 
simultaneous, overlapping sets of expectations and accountabilities being applied to 
single organisations or policy programmes (Schillemans and Bovens, 2011). A focus 
on ‘meaningful accountability’ guides a researcher to investigate “questions about 
types of accountability and the conditions and contexts in which they are effective” 
(Bovens and Schillemans, 2014, p. 673). This is similar to Romzek and Dubnick's 
(1987) notion of ‘appropriate’ accountability, in which accountability systems are 
chosen and developed to fit with an organisation’s tasks, strategy, and institutional 
context.  
 
Reflecting on the results of this review in light of the above literature, there is an 
apparent need for research into the accountability ‘regimes’ of local alcohol policy 
implementers. An accountability regime is the “sum of all accountability relationships 
[actors] are required to manage” (Bovens et al., 2008, p. 226) and is useful for 
guiding the researcher to consider the multiple, and potentially overlapping 
accountability relationships borne from the need to meet performance 
measurements, work in partnership, and involve the public in decision-making. This 
literature also supports critical analysis of implementers’ accountability regimes, in 
particular questioning whether a given regime is built on the assumption that ‘more 
is better’ or is reflective of knowledge about ‘meaningful’ accountability.  
 
I acknowledge, however, that there are concerns about the analytical value of 
‘accountability’ due to its ‘chameleon-like’ nature (Dubnick, 2005, p. 379; Flinders, 
2014). I would argue that alcohol policy implementation researchers may find the 
concept analytically useful as long as it is clearly conceptualised and defined, 
because it otherwise risks being subject to existing critiques of being an amorphous, 
continuously widening, and imprecise concept. The definition I use, and how I 




3.4.2 Evidence Use  
Included literature appeared concerned with evidence use because of an underlying 
assumption that better use would improve the implementation work being studied. 
Included studies discussed evidence with varying depth and linked evidence use to 
implementation in both direct and indirect ways.  
 
Analysis of included publications showed that, within alcohol policy implementation 
in high-income contexts, there are a range of types of evidence used and different 
approaches to evidence use. This appears partially explained by contextual factors, 
such as whether implementation was occurring in a licensing context in which 
licensing decision-makers had different perceptions of health-related evidence than 
public health actors. This creates a key challenge for alcohol policy implementation. 
If alcohol policy is considered intrinsically linked to alcohol-related harm, and this 
link has been established on the basis of existing public health evidence, it is 
problematic if a set of influential decision-makers do not agree with, give weight to, 
or otherwise ‘believe’ this evidence. This issue might be usefully explored through 
research which accesses licensing actors’ perspectives first-hand, examining their 
patterns of evidence use and why public heath evidence is apparently often not 
persuasive to them.  
 
While included publications in this review have found that alcohol policy 
stakeholders use a range of evidence, these studies have either been focused on 
the English/Welsh context (e.g. in a specific setting of the Alcohol Improvement 
Programme, or a quantitative survey in England’s licensing system), or based on a 
limited number of interviews with public health stakeholders who are discussing their 
perspectives on licensing actors’ uses of evidence  (Fitzgerald et al., 2017; 
MacGregor et al., 2013; Toner et al., 2014). Additionally, while the Scottish alcohol 
strategy itself has been lauded for being ‘evidence-informed’ (Fitzgerald and Angus, 
2015), in-depth understanding of evidence-informed alcohol policy implementation in 
relation to this strategy is still required.  
 
Indeed, while evidence use been identified in this review as playing a role in 
informing local actors’ decision-making, this review highlights a need for further 
empirical work which analyses evidence use in alcohol policy implementation 
contexts. Included studies often examined how actors as individuals tended to use 
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or perceive evidence, more rarely attempting to empirically show how and whether 
patterns of evidence use emerge within or across organisations. Fitzgerald and 
colleagues (2017) have made a contribution here by pointing to potential ‘cultures of 
evidence’ among public health and licensing stakeholders.  
 
Following this, in Scotland, the perceptions and uses of evidence by ADPs (and their 
diverse members) for alcohol policy implementation purposes requires greater 
empirical understanding. In particular, there appears to be a knowledge gap 
regarding how ADPs, in their structure as partnerships, are using evidence. Further, 
the literature has thus far provided limited explanation of, or ideas for how to 
address differences in perceptions of health-related evidence across public health 
and licensing contexts in Scotland. The existing literature does not yet seem to be 
able to explain why there appears to be such ‘epistemological discord’ (Nicholls, 
2015) between public health and licensing actors in their approaches to evidence, 
what the role of other actors (e.g. in ADPs) is in all this, or how this tension might be 
overcome.  
 
This knowledge gap is important because (assuming evidence use improves policy 
and processes) while a policy might be evidence-informed, if implementation is not 
then challenges may arise. Future studies in this area might be usefully informed by 
the much larger existing literature on the interplay between evidence and policy. 
This literature suggests, for example, that policy actors use a range of types of 
evidence in their work (Lorenc et al., 2014b; Oliver and de Vocht, 2015) and that 
there are a range of facilitators to evidence use (e.g. improving the timeliness or 
accessibility of research [Cairney, 2016; Hawkins and Parkhurst, 2016; Orton et al., 
2011]). Further, the legitimacy and credibility that using evidence gives to decision-
making (even if only symbolically) may also stimulate evidence use (Boswell, 2009). 
 
3.4.3 Context and Resources  
Context and resources were shown to influence the implementation of alcohol policy 
in high-income settings, with constrained resources being an important challenge to 
implementation. The results showed that alcohol policy is itself embedded in wider 
public health and social policy concerns, and is thus inextricably linked to social, 




The issue of context spanned the different results categories and appeared to 
influence how local actors approached alcohol policy implementation. To illustrate, 
the initial results subsection highlighted the role of context in how implementers 
undertake the work required to ‘translate’ policy to their local area. Further, some 
studies reported that implementers perceived performance measurement targets 
were not fit for purpose, suggesting potential incongruence between the 
responsibilities of local implementers and the performance measurement structures 
they were embedded within. Additionally, a proliferation of partnership working 
across the UK, which requires implementers to engage in complex multi-sectoral 
collaboration, was an integral component of the alcohol policy context. The literature 
reported this went so far as to be embedded into the England/Wales licensing 
legislation (Foster, 2016; Herring et al., 2008), and it is broadly known similar 
emphasis on partnership working is present in the Scottish context (Cook, 2015). 
 
Likewise, the issue of resources was relevant across my results although, in this 
case, it was still organisationally feasible to discuss them in a discrete subsection. 
The results indicated that sufficient, sustainable resources were critical for 
facilitating implementation, while a lack of resources, or reliance on multiple funding 
streams, presented important challenges. As a reminder, this problem was evident 
in the budget cuts and multiple funding sources for ADPs discussed and mapped in 
Chapter 2, suggesting it will be important for this thesis to pay attention to the role of 
resources in the implementation of Scotland’s alcohol strategy.  
 
As the first review on this topic, there are no comparable syntheses for alcohol 
policy implementation. These aspects of my findings are unsurprising, given existing 
knowledge about the importance of context and resources for policy implementation 
(Hill and Hupe, 2014). However it is worth noting that only a minority of included 
studies explicitly referred to this broader policy implementation literature (Fitzgerald 
et al., 2017; Lloyd et al., 2014). This suggests that learning from policy 
implementation literature may be useful for better understanding issues being 
identified specifically in alcohol policy implementation. For example, writing within 
the UK context, Sausman and colleagues (2016) note the translation process that 
national policies undergo while being put into practice in distinct local contexts, 
stating, “policy is not implemented on a blank slate in a de novo context, but into an 
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existing network of practices and infrastructure which work to adapt and translate 
the policy” (p. 564). This observation appears to be aligned with what is currently 
known about the complex ways local implementers will be influenced by their local 
context when working to translate and ultimately enact alcohol policy.   
 
The significance of contextual factors also suggested that alcohol policy 
implementers are navigating a balance between trying to effectively contextualise 
alcohol policy to local needs while meeting national expectations surrounding a 
centrally-developed policy, all while constrained by the (monetary and non-
monetary) resources available to them. Again, this has been a persistent, complex 
situation in policy implementation research, which speaks to traditional debates in 
broader policy implementation literature about ‘top down’ control and enforcement of 
implementation, ‘bottom up’ discretion and contextualisation of policy directives, and 
synthesised perspectives (Gilson et al., 2018; Hill and Hupe, 2014; Hjern and Hull, 
1982; Hjern and Porter, 1981; Nilsen et al., 2013; Owens and Bressers, 2013; 
Sabatier, 1986; Schofield, 2001).   
 
These results suggest issues surrounding context and resources remain important 
considerations in empirical work on alcohol policy implementation. Given what is 
known about budget cuts experienced by Scottish ADPs, the influence of context 
and resources on implementation work, this thesis will pay attention to how context 
and resources interact with implementers’ (both ADPs and LBs) experiences of 
accountability and evidence use (explained further in Preface to Results). 
 
3.4.4 Implications for Alcohol Policy Implementation Research: This Thesis 
The findings of this review have identified research needs within alcohol policy 
implementation in Scotland, particularly with respect to accountability, evidence use, 
and the contexts in which implementation occurs. They also suggest my research 
would be usefully informed by knowledge from other literatures, and that drawing 
upon this knowledge would allow my research to demonstrate the potential added 
value of these literatures to alcohol policy implementation. 
 
Specifically, this review identified that key areas requiring empirical consideration 
were accountability and governance, evidence use, and context and resources. The 
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important research gaps particularly related to: (i) how accountability relationships 
(e.g. between local and national government) are situated in the context of multiple 
other, overlapping accountability relationships; and (ii) how evidence is perceived 
and used at organisational-level and in partnership contexts. Issues related to 
context and resources were oft-discussed, appearing intertwined with other aspects 
of implementation. As such, these factors can be taken forward as a cross-cutting 
theme warranting careful consideration. This thesis will seek to contribute to 
understanding on these topics, and through a synthesis of key findings, contribute 
knowledge about local governance of Scottish alcohol policy implementation. How 
these themes help inform my research questions and empirical analysis will be 
detailed in the Preface to the Results (p. 139). 
 
3.4.5 Limitations of Systematic Review 
To my knowledge this was the first systematic review on alcohol policy 
implementation in high income settings – an important topic given what is known 
about the need for effective policy implementation to achieve outcomes. 
 
Limitations of this review included its completion by a sole researcher; a 
collaborative team effort which provides greater strength to systematic reviews (e.g. 
for double screening or quality appraisal) was not feasible in this doctoral research 
project. Additionally, while search strategies were developed to try to be 
comprehensive while also feasible to screen, it is possible that publications 
discussing niche, specific areas of alcohol policy implementation were not captured 
by the searches.  My screening of the reference lists of included studies, and my 
checks with others in the field, were intended to mitigate this as far as possible. 
Further, other exclusion criteria (such as requiring articles be written in English) may 
have led to the exclusion of relevant empirical work.  
 
Certainly, the results of this review appear to be very UK-centric. This may have 
been a result of the keywords used in the search strings – it is possible I was not 
aware of certain terminology more readily used in other high-income contexts which 
would have resulted in more articles from outside the UK. Although I did check my 
search strings with others working in this field, they were also UK based and so may 
not be aware of terms used elsewhere. Additionally, my own preconceptions may 
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have influenced some of the more subjective decision-making regarding inclusion 
and exclusion of publications, including that I intended to carry out my own research 
on alcohol policy implementation in a Scottish context.  
 
3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has presented a systematic review of alcohol policy implementation 
literature and positioned the thesis within this defined area of public health policy 
research. In doing so, this chapter has provided a systematic review of what is 
currently known about how alcohol policy implementation occurs in high-income 
contexts, and identified gaps, tensions and uncertainties in the included literature. 
The review synthesised available evidence to discuss the various factors that 
existing studies have identified as important to understanding alcohol policy 
implementation. I have argued that it is analytically useful to group these factors into 
three broader themes, each of which are revisited in the remainder of the thesis: (i) 
accountability and governance, (ii) evidence use, and (iii) context and resources. I 
discussed these in relation to relevant broader literature. The Preface to the Results  
(p. 139), which follows the methods chapter, will explain how the themes identified 






4 Research Design and Data Analysis 
4.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe and explain my research design and 
approach to analysis (beyond the systematic review, the approach for which was set 
out in Chapter 3 (p. 43-50). This chapter first situates the thesis within a particular 
research approach. Second, I provide a reflexive account of how my position and 
background (e.g. as a public health-trained researcher, student, and project 
manager) informed key aspects of the design and conduct of this research. Third, I 
detail my decision to use a qualitative, embedded case study approach as the 
overarching framework for examining the implementation of Scotland’s alcohol 
strategy. This includes some discussion of how I selected and recruited the three 
local areas which acted as my ‘embedded sub-units’ in this case study. Fourth, I 
discuss my decisions to use documentary analysis and semi-structured interviews 
as my methods of generating empirical data. For each, I provide a description and 
explanation of why I used the particular method, my approach to data generation, 
and the means by which I undertook data analysis. Additionally, I provide brief 
remarks about conducting observations of relevant meetings and events, which, 
while not used as formal empirical data, provided me with further contextual 
information about how Scotland’s alcohol strategy was being implemented. Fifth, I 
discuss my research ethics and reflect upon enacting ethical research. Finally, I 
discuss considerations related to quality control of my research, including my efforts 
to undertake ‘member-checking’ of my preliminary findings with participants and the 
limitations of my chosen research approach. 
 
4.2 Research Philosophy and Inspiration for Research 
4.2.1 Interpretivist approach and Policy ‘Practice’ 
This research is grounded in an interpretivist approach, which perceives humans to 
make, interpret, and communicate meaning as they navigate the world and its 
innumerable contexts (Yanow, 1996). Put simply, as a researcher, I perceived 
participants to be interpreters of their own experiences, and my role was then to 
interpret and report their interpretations (Yanow, 2007). I was therefore guided in 
this research to continuously emphasise the importance of mine and my 
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participants’ “own interpretations of the issue researched” as “[our] varying vantage 
points will yield different types of understanding” (Ritchie et al., 2013, p.21). This 
approach was evident in my decisions about how knowledge and meaning could be 
accessed, generated, understood and explained. This distinguishes my approach 
from more objectivist approaches to knowledge which suggest the possibility of 
accessing a singular, verifiable, and generalisable truth about an external reality 
(Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 2012). 
 
For example, as I undertook this research, I explicitly incorporated attention to 
context and I used research methods which encouraged engagement with 
subjective representations of participant experiences (Yanow, 2007). I was 
particularly cognisant of Yanow’s articulation of interpretive policy analysis of 
national social policy implementation as being concerned not with the success of a 
policy, but with understanding how a policy ‘means’ (Yanow, 1996) – essentially how 
someone makes sense of and generates meaning from a policy when they engage 
with it. In other words, a policy, and its implementation, is understood and enacted 
“according to the meanings it takes on when it is interpreted by actors who are 
involved” (Papanastasiou, 2015, p. 58). In light of the above, I view my analysis as 
interpretive.  
 
Within this approach, I situated my research in the (diverse) tradition of policy 
studies which conceptualise policy (and its administration, or more broadly, 
governance) as ‘practice’ or ‘work’ (Clarke, 2012; Colebatch, 2006; Freeman et al., 
2011; Wagenaar, 2004; Wagenaar and Cook, 2003). Because my interest was in 
empirically exploring what alcohol policy implementers do to enact alcohol policy, I 
was aiming to make explicit and generate meaning from the everyday policy practice 
of local alcohol policy implementers. Therefore, I subscribed to Wagenaar’s view of 
policy practice as “the everyday, taken-for-granted routines and practices, the 
explicit and tacit knowledge that is brought to bear on concrete situations” 
(Wagenaar, 2004, p. 644). This perspective was useful for its integration of practice, 
corresponding knowledge (conceptualised broadly) and context (Cook and 
Wagenaar, 2012). For example, throughout this thesis I refer to alcohol policy 
implementation carried out by local policy actors (e.g. ADP members) as ‘practice’ 
or ‘work’. I conceptualise this work as addressing policy problems which are 
“constituted in the complex detail of local situations, endowed with meaning…and 
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continuously unfolding in the enactment of concrete practices” (Wagenaar and 
Cook, 2003, p. 170). 
 
4.2.2 Reflexivity and my approach to studying alcohol policy implementation 
in Scotland 
Reflexivity is an ongoing process in which the researcher undergoes ‘critical self-
evaluation’ of their positionality and “active acknowledgement and explicit 
recognition that this position may affect the research process and outcome” (Berger, 
2015, p. 220). It requires the researcher to make a constant commitment to critically 
considering and making explicit how their own knowledge, experiences, and self are 
situated within the research (i.e. the researcher is part of, not separate from the 
research) and then how these may be impacting the research as a whole (Berger, 
2015). This is intended to help enhance the transparency of qualitative research and 
ultimately its credibility or trustworthiness (Cutcliffe, 2003). In committing to being 
reflexive, the researcher acknowledges that research is contextual, and that their 
production of knowledge through their research is not neutral or independent of 
them (i.e. is not ‘objective’) (Berger, 2015; Buckner, 2005). Important to note, 
however, is the difficulty presented by the fact that the researcher undertakes this 
commitment but cannot fully know all aspects of their self and how this may shape 
the research (Rose, 1997).  
 
Making a commitment to reflexivity in my own research was important because it is 
a “central feature of [interpretive] methodological checks on sense-making” 
(Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 2012, p. 98). In light of this, I recognise that my 
research plans, aim, and design were necessarily influenced by my professional 
(and other) experiences, values, preconceived notions, educational training (etc.) 
which I brought to this research. Further, the interviewees within my research were 
interpreting the world in which they work, as was I, and together we co-generated 
the evidence I discuss in this thesis. Thus, reflecting on my own positionality and 
assumptions which may have influenced my decisions, actions, and interpretations 
was crucial.  
 
My journey to an interpretivist approach happened over time. Having come to the 
University of Edinburgh directly from WHO, I arrived with a viewpoint shaped by how 
I observed WHO to be seemingly ‘hovering’ above or around the work of Member 
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States with whom WHO worked, aiming to support the development and 
implementation of policies and guidance. This shaped my initial perceptions about 
the problem of alcohol policy implementation and ‘implementation failure’ – 
essentially as one situated in hierarchical bureaucracies, in which policy and 
legislative ‘artefacts’ and ideas are developed near the ‘top’ and are implemented by 
officials at sub-national or local levels. For example, to begin learning about alcohol 
policy implementation in Scotland, I started by accessing the problem through the 
formal, governmental institutions I perceived to be most relevant to the problem (i.e. 
Scottish Government and NHS Health Scotland). I did this through multiple, informal 
‘scoping’ meetings mostly with national-level stakeholders (discussed further below). 
I also engaged with literatures which explained alcohol policy implementation in 
terms which, at the time, resonated with my professional observations and 
experiences – for example, literature which debated ‘top down’ and ‘bottom up’ 
approaches to policy implementation. As I progressed with my research, however, 
my thinking began to change. For instance, I began to appreciate the need to 
interview local stakeholders beyond public health who could offer different 
perspectives on Scottish alcohol policy implementation. I also noticed that, as I 
engaged more with critical public health policy, accountability, and evidence use 
literature, publications  which seemed to take an interpretivist approach were 
particularly interesting, and consequently influenced my research design and 
analysis (e.g. Bacchi, 2015; Baum, 1995; Baum and Fisher, 2014; Katikireddi et al., 
2014; Smith, 2013). I took similar inspiration from methodological literature which 
was positioned within an interpretivist tradition (e.g. Braun and Clarke, 2013; Ritchie 
et al., 2013), finding that their approaches to undertaking research strongly 
resonated with how I was seeking to make sense of and explore my research 
problem. 
 
When I developed this research project, my initial aim was to study a national health 
policy that was a) intended to prevent and address non-communicable disease, and 
b) related to health inequalities. I wanted to use this type of policy as a vehicle 
through which to study how national health policies are implemented in local areas 
because I was interested in why policies often did not have their intended impact. 
This interest stemmed from my academic and professional background, which had 
often been focused on policies developed to support vulnerable populations, such 
as those experiencing mental health problems or addiction. I had observed, 
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however, that these policies were often not successful in achieving their stated 
goals, resulting in their target populations continuing to suffer. Having by then 
undertaken studies during which I learned about policy development, I questioned 
how useful it would be to focus primarily on how policies were made, to the 
exclusion of  their implementation. I was keen to explore this issue in a policy area 
with which I was already familiar and passionate about. 
 
At a critical moment in my planning, I spoke with Dr Erica Wimbush (at the time 
Head of Evaluation for NHS Health Scotland) who suggested that the Scottish 
Government’s response to alcohol-related health problems could be suitable. 
Having worked on the topic of alcohol previously, and after familiarising myself with 
the multi-faceted Scottish alcohol strategy, I decided that this government strategy 
was a viable focus for this research.  
 
Similar to my interest in implementation discussed above, my interest in alcohol 
policy was also shaped by my previous work and research in mental health and 
substance abuse. This included work at WHO to support a project developing online 
ABIs, and earlier research studies related to alcohol use and public policy for my 
undergraduate and master’s degrees. During these experiences I observed not only 
the public health impact of alcohol but also the way the topic of alcohol and related 
harms was relevant to other policy areas (for example, economy or justice). Noticing 
the ways people from different policy perspectives approached the topic of alcohol 
helped me realise it would be important to understand how different actors 
interpreted and implemented alcohol policies.  
 
My previous work and studies influenced the normative assumptions I held during 
my research, such as assuming that health impacts of alcohol use should be 
prioritised over the economic case for alcohol production and sales. For example, 
this became evident in my research design, when I started by framing the research 
‘problem’ of implementation as one which explores how Scottish alcohol policy can 
better mitigate alcohol-related harms. It was also apparent in my interactions with 
stakeholders and analysis. Trying to establish myself as part of the public health 
community in Scotland, I developed connections with key advocacy groups such as 
AFS, and academics and other stakeholders who approached alcohol policy from a 
public health perspective. In my analysis, I was more likely to question economic 
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arguments related to alcohol licensing than health-related ones, and to interrogate 
government-industry collaborations than government-civil society ones.  
 
I also came to realise I had brought a government-centric understanding of 
governance to my research. Alcohol policy implementation, conceptualised broadly, 
could be explored by studying a range of actors’ roles and perceptions. However, I 
conducted my study with a focus on local and national government (or other public 
service) actors and my data generation shows only limited direct engagement with 
third sector or private sector actors. Despite this, I did engage with Alcohol Focus 
Scotland at national level, and interviewed local third sector actors when they were 
members of ADPs. Additionally, my operationalisation of what a ‘policy’ was in this 
research was quite state-centric – my decision to focus on Scottish Government’s 
strategy illustrates this, as does my systematic review (Chapter 3) which focused on 
government-developed policies. This approach was again likely influenced by my 
own perceptions and experiences. For example, as a public health and social policy 
graduate, my educational training had often focused on governments’ 
responsibilities for providing health services to their populations (within the context 
of the broader welfare state). At WHO I observed our work had often considered 
Member States’ governments to be primarily responsible for population health. 
 
Reflecting the assumptions discussed above, early developments in my research 
design were influenced by my interactions with government actors and health 
advocates. Early in this project I worked to ensure my research design was informed 
by 11 informal ‘scoping’ meetings with national- and local-level stakeholders in early 
2015 (see Appendix 2). The purpose of these meetings was information gathering 
so they were not recorded or analysed; each conversation served to inform my 
thinking about this research project, familiarising me with relevant contexts, actors, 
institutions, and processes. I particularly wanted to understand how this PhD 
research could complement the existing evaluation work carried out by MESAS (see 
Chapter 2), and speaking with MESAS representatives proved particularly useful in 
my planning.  
 
A reflection from these meetings was the perceived variation in local implementation 
of Scotland’s alcohol strategy across different local areas. This variation included, 
for example, the interpretation of policy and legislation, the uses of resources, and 
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local needs and outcomes. To capture potentially rich understanding resulting from 
this variation, I perceived my research design would be strengthened by generating 
data in multiple local areas (see Section 4.3.2). 
 
My research was also likely shaped by the specific context of its funding. For 
example, the fact that my doctoral studies were funded via What Works Scotland 
was undoubtedly relevant to both the geographical and analytical foci of the project. 
While this could have felt like a constraint, I perceived this as an opportunity for 
pragmatic and strategic reasons. For example, doing fieldwork in the country in 
which I was living was more feasible and flexible than fieldwork overseas, and I 
anticipated opportunities for connecting with the What Works Scotland team and 
broader network – connections which could potentially facilitate my research (e.g. in 
relation to choosing local areas with which to work, see Section 4.3.2). Further, 
What Works Scotland focused on helping to improve local policy and public services 
(What Works Scotland, 2019) and this study of alcohol policy seemed an 
appropriate contribution to make as a student funded by this programme.  
 
Saying this, however, my research proceeded quite independently from What 
Works. For example, What Works Scotland took a ‘collaborative action research’ 
approach which prioritises the collaboration of researchers and public services 
practitioners in conducting (and then acting upon) the research (What Works 
Scotland, 2020). Given the independent nature of doctoral research I did not 
perceive this approach to be suitable for my purposes, but my connection with What 
Works Scotland did help shape my thinking in terms of appreciating the importance 
of local actors’ perspectives on policy and the usefulness of academic research.  
 
Reflecting overall on this thesis and the academic process, this research developed 
out of my personal interest in how national policies become local realities. It involved 
bringing my own research and public health policy experience to my data generation 
and analysis, and was designed so I could engage directly with national and local 
policy decision-makers to investigate my identified research problem on alcohol 
policy implementation. This design provided the opportunity to undertake research 
which consistently remained grounded in policy and policy stakeholders’ 
experiences. However, it also gave rise to important challenges. Researching the 
topic of alcohol policy implementation meant I had to straddle multiple academic 
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disciplines, including public health, public policy and administration, and evidence 
and policy, which often bring different lenses to a health policy problem. I needed to 
consider the different process-related domains which intersected and helped me 
explain the empirical phenomena I analysed, including policy implementation and 
other policy work, public administration/bureaucracy, and politics. The delicate 
balancing of these academic and practical policy influences made for a challenging, 
but rich and interesting research project.  
 
4.3 Planning and Using a Qualitative Embedded Case Study Approach 
4.3.1 Selecting an Embedded Case Study 
I decided to pursue my research questions through qualitative methods. This was 
because they reflected my motivation to deeply explore stakeholders’ perspectives 
about how Scotland’s 2009 alcohol strategy was implemented and why 
implementation occurred the way it did. I selected a case study as the overarching 
methodological approach, the full rationale for which is explained below. I rejected 
more intensive approaches, such as ethnography, because the process of alcohol 
policy implementation in ADPs occurred across too many organisational locations 
for this to seem feasible without sacrificing the chance to study multiple local 
contexts.  
 
The embedded case study approach permitted in-depth inquiry into the 2009 alcohol 
strategy, and explicitly encouraged that the research be conducted within the 
policy’s context (Yin, 2009). This was important because, to understand how the 
strategy was implemented, I needed to interact with officials conducting this 
implementation work in their contexts. It also provided a way to attain the ‘thick’ 
description necessary to contribute in-depth, nuanced knowledge about the 
complexity of alcohol policy implementation (Gerring, 2004; Yin, 2009). Further, it 
was suited to the ‘how’-oriented research questions which structured the project, 
and could accommodate different qualitative methods of data generation (Simons, 
2009). 
 
I chose an embedded case study design, because its’ design consists of a single, 
overarching case of interest, which is examined through the use of multiple sub-
units of analysis, all placed in (and interacting with) its context(s) (Scholz and Tietje, 
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2002; Yin, 2009). Taking an embedded case study approach structured the research 
such that learning from the sub-units would be synthesised, and then, importantly, 
linked to national-level decision-making.  
 
This design provided the flexibility to incorporate different local areas and levels of 
governance. Given the initial information I attained from scoping meetings about 
perceived local variations in the strategy’s implementation, I felt it was important to 
study multiple local areas31 with a view to understanding more about how 
implementation was occurring in different contexts. I wanted to ensure a variety of 
different settings and perspectives were represented (Stake, 2000), and so I opted 
not to undertake a traditional single case study design since that would have 
provided insight into implementation in one only local area was (discussed further 
below, Section 4.3.2).  
 
My research did not constitute a ‘multiple case study’ which relies on considering 
multiple ‘cases’ individually (Yin, 2009), because I was focused on the 
implementation of a single, national alcohol strategy and wanted to capture local 
variations. Since my analysis of the three local areas was all undertaken with 
reference to this overarching case, each was effectively a sub-unit of analysis, 
contributing knowledge for the same case study. While, for practical reasons, I 
conducted data generation in each location sequentially, in my analysis I primarily 
combined the data from all sites to explore in-depth key themes across the three 
locations (see Chapters 5-7).   
 
A key strength of case studies is their ability to allow for (indeed, best practices 
typically demand) multiple methods and sources of data generation (Ritchie et al., 
2013; Yin, 2009). This provides the researcher with flexibility to select methods best 
suited to addressing their research questions. As detailed further below, I used 
semi-structured interviews to engage with first-hand accounts and perceptions of 
alcohol policy stakeholders. I also used analysis of policy documents to attain 
official, statements by government, which represented their framing of the policy 
problem and expectations about its solutions (Freeman and Maybin, 2011).  
 
31 Local areas generally correspond to the geographical borders of Local Authority areas in 
Scotland, however the term ‘local areas’ is appropriate here because ADPs sometimes do 




4.3.2 Choosing Sub-Units and Negotiating Access: Three Scottish Local 
Areas 
To choose three of the 32 local areas in Scotland as the embedded sub-units for this 
research project, I took inspiration from Miles and Huberman's (1994) case selection 
framework. This framework suggests that a priori purposeful ‘sampling’ of 
geographical locations for qualitative research should be based on six criteria, 
including the researchers’ conceptual framework, potential of the location to 
generate rich information, and whether the sample strategy is feasible. I did not 
employ this framework as a formal ‘sampling strategy’ (employing the idea of 
‘sampling’ or ‘generalisability of learning’ would have diverged from my interpretivist 
approach [Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 2012]). However, I found some of Miles and 
Huberman’s suggestions useful as prompts to stimulate my thinking about how I 
wanted to choose and (feasibly and productively) access local areas for this 
research.  
 
In seeking areas which would collectively generate rich information, I wanted 
‘exposure’ (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 2012, p. 85) to a variety of settings in which 
the alcohol strategy was being implemented, in an effort to access the potentially 
diverse meanings local implementers were developing across different contextual 
settings. In selecting the three local areas, I sought to “encapsulate a relevant range 
in relation to the wider universe, but not to represent it directly” (Mason, 2002, p. 
124, emphasis in original). I therefore chose areas which were varied in terms of: (i)  
their status as urban, rural, or mixed urban-rural; and (ii) whether their local area’s 
ADP was situated within the Council or Health Board. Regarding the former 
characteristic, I perceived that local areas’ priorities and approaches to 
implementing key local aspects of the strategy (e.g. planning alcohol services) 
would potentially reflect their geography (and the challenges geography might 
present, especially in rural areas). This did become apparent in my local interviews, 
and I mention this in my results chapters. Regarding ADPs’ locations32, I wanted the 
opportunity to observe how local implementers’ experiences varied depending on 
where they were positioned within local governance structures. However, in my data 
 




this characteristic did not appear to have a meaningful influence. This may have 
been in part because of recent local health and social care integration33, which 
possibly meant ADPs’ location in either health or the council became less important 
or less distinct. I therefore do not comment further on this characteristic of ADPs in 
the results.   
 
Regarding feasibility, I perceived that three areas would be a manageable number 
given the time and resources I had available to me, without unacceptably 
compromising the depth of my analysis in each area. I also carefully considered 
which areas would be feasible for me to access during fieldwork, given my status as 
a sole researcher with limited time and financial resources. I decided not to include 
any local areas which I perceived to be inaccessible (including those where I could 
not feasibly visit multiple times) given my restricted resources.  
 
I also considered how my positionality as a PhD student funded by What Works 
Scotland would potentially help or hinder negotiating access to local areas. Given 
that a number of Local Authorities (~15) in Scotland had applied to participate in the 
collaborative action research work portfolio of What Works Scotland in the months 
prior to my starting this research, I considered that these areas may also be open to 
allowing me access for my own research. Further, in their applications to What 
Works Scotland, the areas identified their local policy priorities. Many of these were 
related to health and/or alcohol policy, and I took this as an indication of which local 
areas may be open to engaging with my alcohol-related research. I therefore used 
this as an additional consideration when choosing the local areas. 
 
4.3.3 Negotiating Access to Case Study Areas 
I ultimately sought access to one urban, one rural, and one mixed urban-rural site 
(Table 4.1). Two of the areas situated their ADP’s administrative teams in the Local 
 
33 During this research, local areas were navigating new changes to local governance 
caused by the enactment of the Public Bodies (Joint Working) (Scotland) Act 2014 (Scottish 
Parliament, 2014a), the legislation that triggered formal health and social care integration in 
Scotland. In doing so, the legislation aimed to enhance joint working between NHS boards 
and local authorities (and thus improve quality of services and achieve efficiencies), by 
creating new public organisations called ‘integration authorities’ (Burgess, 2016). This Act 
commenced in April 2015, and all integration authorities had to be operational by April 2016 
(Audit Scotland, 2015). 
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Council, and the other in the local Health Board. The three sites were accessible 
and affordable in terms of transport and accommodation, and having engaged with 
their local policy documents (available online), I perceived they would be  
‘information-rich’ areas in which to explore my research topic (Miles and Huberman, 
1994). This subsection describes how I sought access to the three areas, which laid 
the groundwork for recruiting individual interviewees in each. Recruitment of national 
level interviewees is discussed in Section 4.6. 
Table 4.1 Urban/Rural Classification of Included Local Areas 
Local Area Scottish Government  
Local Area 1 (LA1) Urban Area 
Local Area 2 (LA2) Other Urban Areas & Accessible Small Towns 
Local Area 3 (LA3) Remote Rural & Other Urban Area 
*Classification labels provided as per Scottish Government Classifications 
 
I approached the three selected sites sequentially. I made this decision because: (1) 
a sequential approach gave me the opportunity to use the first area as a ‘pilot’, and 
bring learning I gleaned from my experiences with this area in the other two; (2) the 
geographical distances between each area meant that it was more feasible, in terms 
of time and cost, to visit each in turn instead of bouncing between them; and (3) 
working with one site at a time allowed me to focus on and engage deeply with the 
work occurring in that particular site, avoiding potential cross-site confusion during 
data generation. I have labelled these areas LA1, LA2, and LA3 in temporal 
sequence, and refer to them in this way throughout this thesis.  
 
I understood that effectively accessing each local area would be contingent on, for 
example, the setting, the local actors with whom I was trying to engage, the 
particular pressures they were experiencing, and their perceptions of me as a 
researcher and of my research (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 2012). To begin 
developing relationships and seeking access, I first focused on each local area’s 
ADP as the key local organisation / body tasked with implementing Scotland’s 
alcohol strategy. I approached each ADP through their Coordinator, an individual 
employed full time to coordinate the ADP, and who I perceived to be an important 
gatekeeper. Initial contact with each Coordinator was via email. Through the ADP 
coordinators, I secured agreement from each ADP’s core decision-making group 
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(named, for example, their ‘Executive’ or Strategic Team) to participate in this 
research. 
 
I was fortunate in this process that all of my initially chosen local areas agreed to 
grant me access after conferring with their members. Although it is difficult to 
pinpoint exactly what caused their unanimous positive responses, it may have been 
a combination of social and contextual aspects of the research process (Schwartz-
Shea and Yanow, 2012). This may have included my initial contact with the ADP 
Coordinators, the timing of the project during the ‘refresh’ of the Framework for 
Action, a perceived general willingness of local implementers to participate in this 
type of research, and/or my links to What Works Scotland.  
 
Once each local area had granted me access, and I had obtained the necessary 
research ethics approvals (see Section 4.9), I proceeded with ‘recruiting’ individual 
interviewees and generation of interview data. The following sections discuss my 
approaches to generating and analysing documentary and interview data.  
 
4.4 Documentary Analysis: Rationale and Approach 
4.4.1 Selecting Documentary Analysis 
By engaging with documents in qualitative research, a researcher can enhance their 
explorations and understandings of a topic in a variety of ways. This includes using 
the documents to interpret and learn about the contexts relevant to their research, 
identify actors or agencies, access knowledge and representations about authors’ 
individual or collective meanings and decisions, or observe changes over time 
(Bowen, 2009). My decision to use documentary analysis followed authors such as 
Freeman and Maybin (2011) in seeing documents as critical to thinking about and 
studying policy processes, and Iannantuono and Eyles (1997), who note that the 
language in policy documents help a researcher to access “diverse and dominant 
meanings” in policy (p. 1612). Further, like Mason (2002) and other authors, I felt 
that the content of key policy documents would provide meaningful evidence and 
constructed representations of official, collective decisions taken by those with 
authority in the Scottish alcohol policy system, as well as the values underlying 
these policy decisions (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 2012; Simons, 2009). 
Pragmatically, I perceived that (i) accessing documents would be relatively 
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straightforward and not resource-intensive (Bowen, 2009; Ritchie et al., 2013; Shaw 
et al., 2004) given the availability of national policies and legislation online, and (ii) 
they would potentially provide a relatively linear, coherent narrative which 
represented what would have been a complex process of discussion and negotiation 
among a plurality of stakeholders (Fitzgerald, 2007; Ritchie et al., 2013).  
 
It follows that, in my research, each relevant national policy document was a 
comparatively ‘stable’ source of data which constituted a “critical moment or node” 
(Freeman, 2006, p. 52) that I, and interviewees, could discuss and reference. 
Importantly, the documents provided formal documentation of how their authors 
(e.g. Scottish Government, Parliament, and senior civil servants) framed the 
problem of alcohol-related harm in Scotland and the potential solutions for 
addressing it (Freeman, 2006). In my selected case study, key policy decisions had 
already been made and formalised by virtue of being officially documented, 
therefore analysing these documents was crucial for accessing information about 
the national policy decisions which had already occurred and expectations regarding 
implementation (and so I could analyse how well they matched what I observed in 
local interviews). However, there were also potential problems related to using 
official documents. For example, there were no guarantees they would discuss the 
topics and issues I was interested in, or address them in sufficient detail or depth 
(Bowen, 2009; Shaw et al., 2004). Further, being a written text meant I could not 
attain clarification from a document the way one can in an interview with a person, 
via dialogue (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 2012).  
 
Data from documents (Table 4.2) also helped me to better understand the 
interpretations and responses of local level implementers/interviewees in relation to 
the national documents. These data helped me explore and compare how these 
documents connected the actors within ADPs by bringing them together in 
partnership to implement the alcohol strategy, and coordinated their actions by 
outlining policy expectations (Freeman, 2006). Overall, I perceived that the policy 
implementation work of local implementers would be at least in part constituted via 
their engagement with the relevant national policy documents. Understanding these 




Following the above, my two chosen methods of documentary analysis and semi-
structured interviews were selected both for their logical fit with my research 
questions and for how they could complement one another. This is in terms of the 
access to knowledge each research method could provide, and the way they could 
improve the ‘intertextuality’ of the evidence I generated (Bowen, 2009; Schwartz-
Shea and Yanow, 2012). In other words, by treating documents and interviews as 
each having value, and by engaging in intertextual reading across these sources of 
evidence, I could generate opportunities for observing ambiguities, contradictions, or 
consensus across reported experiences of implementing Scotland’s alcohol 
strategy. Thus, in this project I followed researchers who position documents as 
having rather greater intrinsic value (as opposed to how they are represented by Yin 
(2009), who states, “the most important use of documents is to corroborate and 
augment evidence from other sources” (p. 103)). I also agreed with researchers who 
advocated for the use of more than one method of data generation, in order to 
access different situated knowledges and enhance the quality of the research (e.g. 
Bazeley, 2013; Hope and Waterman, 2003; Noble and Smith, 2015; Rolfe, 2006). 
 
4.4.2 Data Generation: Documentary Sources 
I decided to analyse and report on national policy documents which would contribute 
to my understanding of Scotland’s alcohol strategy and the policy/legislative context 
surrounding it. As noted, ADPs were responsible for developing their own local 
strategies, which outline how they would pursue and achieve agreed local 
outcomes. While I read each local strategy developed by my included local areas 
(all available online), I did not formally analyse or report on them here so as to 
preserve the anonymity of each area.  
 
I analysed 16 national policy, legislative, or guidance documents (Table 4.2), all of 
which were publicly available online. The identification of potentially relevant 
documents occurred through searching key government websites (including 
searching for Scottish legislation with keyword ‘alcohol’ in the UK’s online legislation 
database34); reading relevant academic and grey literature (e.g. MESAS reports); 
and speaking with key stakeholders during scoping interviews and formal semi-
structured interviews. Through the process of selecting and analysing documents, I 
 
34 legislation.gov.uk  
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noted that they varied in the richness of their relevant content, and what knowledge 
they provided in relation to the implementation of Scotland’s alcohol strategy.  
 
Below I briefly explain my decisions to include these documents, and use heuristic 
groupings for the purposes of organising my explanations in this subsection. These 
groupings represent my own interpretations of them, and I do not suggest that any 
grouping or its members would be ‘fixed’. However, these groupings were useful 
because the documents I analysed seemed to have varying significance to and 
types of impact for the actual work of implementing Scotland’s alcohol strategy (e.g. 
because of their legal or administrative weight, or how much they focus on alcohol 
policy and services). For example, legislation has direct legal bearing on the actions 
of implementers, while a document such as the Commission on the Future Delivery 
of Public Service’s (“Christie Commission”) seemed, at the time of my research, to 
serve more as a normative guide to implementation practice. This was illustrated in 
the data from interviews: 
“I wasn’t mandated or tasked to take it on in my job, but just that 
pressure that you feel when you read something like the Christie 
Commission and you think ‘yeah I’m part of this, and we need to 
start being part of it’.” (LA1, ADP Member) 
 
As a result, any linking of the expectations from these documents to interview data 
needed to consider how influential each document could have been on the 
implementation of Scotland’s alcohol strategy at the time of my research by virtue of 
how it was developed and the form it took. I acknowledge, however, that the 
significance of a given document on implementation of the strategy is likely to have 
been fluid and situated in the time and local areas in which I conducted this research 










Table 4.2 Legislation and policy documents selected for analysis, (by type and date) 
 Name Author Date Brief Description as Related to 
Alcohol Policy 
 Legislation    







Core document; sets out licensing 
objectives including ‘public health’.  
2 Alcohol etc. 






Supplementary document; Introduces 
Health Board as a mandatory 
consultee on Licensing Board’s 
Licensing Policy Statement and for all 
premises applications. 
3 Criminal Justice and 
Licensing (Scotland) 




2010 Supplementary document; modifies 
Licensing Act 2005 provisions 
regarding, for example, premises 
licence applications and powers of 
Licensing Standards Officers 





2014 Contextual document; triggered 
formal health and social care 
integration, with implications for ADPs 





2015 Supplementary document: Makes 
provision for updated rules and 
regulations surrounding alcohol 
licensing, including mandating 
Licensing Boards submit annual 
financial and functions reports. 
6 Community 
Empowerment 
(Scotland) Act  
Scottish 
Parliament 
2015 Contextual document; gives new 
rights to communities and duties to 
public sector, with possible 
implications for ADPs.   
 Policy and Guidance    
7 Licensing (Scotland) 
Act 2005 – Section 




2007 Core document; outlines guidance for 
Licensing Boards as to the exercise 
of their functions under the Licensing 
Act 2005 







2009 Core document; central policy of 
Scotland’s alcohol strategy 
9 Delivering Better 
Outcomes: An 
Outcomes Toolkit for 




2009 Supplementary document; provides 
guidance to ADPs about ‘operating in 
an outcomes based environment’ 
10 A New Framework 
for Local 
Partnerships on 






2009 Supplementary document; previous 
version of key guidance for ADPs 
11 The Quality 
Principles: Standard 
Expectations of Care 
and Support in Drug 




2014 Supplementary document; outlines 
Government’s alcohol and drugs 
quality improvement framework for 




12 Updated Guidance 
for Alcohol & Drug 
Partnerships (ADPs) 








2015 Core document, updates 2009 ‘New 
Framework’; sets out working 
arrangements of ADPs, intended to 
support performance measurement 












2016 Supplementary document; Letter 
regarding funding allocations was 
received by ADPs in July 2016 from 
the Acting Head of Health 
Improvement and Equality in the 
Scottish Government 




2017 Supplementary document; Letter 
regarding funding transfer to NHS 
Boards’ baseline budget was 
received by ADPs in January 2017 
from the Head of Health Improvement 
in the Scottish Government 
15 Supporting the 
Delivery of Alcohol 








2018 Supplementary document; Letter 
regarding Ministerial priorities and 
funding allocations was received by 
ADPs in May 2018 from Deputy 
Director, Health Improvement 
Division in the Scottish Government 
 Commissions    
16 Commission on the 






2011 Contextual document; makes 
recommendations for reforming 
Scotland’s public services 
 
First, I interpreted that there was a set of ‘core’ documents, such as the Framework 
for Action (2009) or Licensing Act (2005), that were a particularly rich source of 
knowledge because they specifically outlined actions or guidelines for Scotland’s 
alcohol strategy. As discussed in Chapter 2, the Framework for Action (2009) 
provides a strategic policy mandate for actions to “rebalance Scotland’s relationship 
with alcohol” (Scottish Government, 2009a, p. 4). Such documents appeared in my 
initial scoping of alcohol policy literature and other sources such as government 
websites, and were mentioned explicitly in my interviews. 
 
Second, a set of ‘supplementary’ documents, seemed to still clearly relate to alcohol 
policy, but appeared to augment the aims and activities of the Framework for Action 
and its implementation. These include, for example, The Quality Principles, which 
were published in 2014 and are specific to alcohol and drugs services (Scottish 
Government, 2014b). The Quality Principles are intended to: “support and drive a 
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culture of self-assessment whereby services are commissioned based on evidence 
of meeting principles of care, which will be measured by a range of tools including 
an agreed set of quality indicators of recovery” (Scottish Government, 2014b, p. 5). 
All ADPs were expected to implement these, and progress was monitored by an 
organisation called the Care Inspectorate (Care Inspectorate, 2017; COSLA et al., 
2015).  
 
Third, there was an important set of ‘contextual’ documents which, while they did not 
focus on alcohol specifically, were discussed in the interviews and seemed to have 
an explicit influence on the local governance context in which ADPs were situated 
(e.g. surrounding community planning or the integration of health and social care). I 
reflect here that the way such documents seemed to shape the context in which 
implementation was occurring was sometimes more interesting and discernible than 
the influence of certain ‘supplementary’ alcohol legislation (e.g. the Criminal Justice 
and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010). As an example, the Christie Commission 
(Christie, 2011) identified key principles for public service reform in Scotland, 
including prioritising prevention and integrating service provision. Both of these 
themes arose frequently in interviews conducted during this research, as being 
prioritised for local alcohol policy implementers. Other examples included the Public 
Bodies (Joint Working) (Scotland) Act (Scottish Parliament, 2014a) and the 
Community Empowerment (Scotland) Act (Scottish Parliament, 2015b) (Chapter 2). 
 
4.4.3 Analysis of Documentary Data 
To analyse the documents, I sought approaches consistent with an interpretive, 
qualitative research project. An example approach available to me, therefore, was 
thematic content analysis, which allows a researcher to examine how ideas and 
concepts were developed, discussed, represented and communicated within the 
documents (Smith, 2008). I decided to follow authors such as Bowen (2009) and 
Braun and Clarke (2013) in their use of thematic analysis. This approach was 
suitable to exploring the meaning within the different types of documents, and to 
comparing and reading across my analyses of the documents and the interviews.  
 
To develop my approach to thematically analysing each document, I drew on Walt 
and Gilson's (1994) Triangle Framework for health policy analysis as an 
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organisational device to plan key dimensions of my analysis. I was drawn to Walt 
and Gilson’s work because the authors’ explanation of their framework paid 
attention to issues of policy implementation. Further, their four categories of actors, 
context, process, and content were each obviously relevant for understanding how 
Scotland’s alcohol strategy and its implementation were represented in these 
documents. I was particularly drawn to the inclusion of ‘processes’, which drew 
attention to, for example, how policy actors navigate various (and sometimes 
competing) expectations and make decisions. Given my engagement with relevant 
literature and knowledge from my local interviews, these types of process issues 
seemed to be particularly interesting and important in the context of Scottish alcohol 
policy implementation. The authors are explicit that their framework is a “highly 
simplified model of an extremely complex set of interrelationships” (Walt and Gilson, 
1994, p. 355), and indicated that specific detail and depth must be added by the 
analyst.  
 
Given this, I used Walt and Gilson’s categories as a starting point from which to 
think through how I wanted to engage with the documents and generate knowledge 
from them. I used my reading of the Framework for Action, Christie Commission, 
and Licensing Act 2005 to begin developing a series of questions which guided my 
analysis (Table 4.3). I also followed authors such as Braun and Clarke (2013) and 
Bowen (2009) by drawing on knowledge I was generating from early analysis of 
local-level interviews. This included ideas about key themes which seemed to be 
emerging in the interviews. As an example, uncertainties about the role of ADPs 
which were evident in the interviews led me to include a question which explored 
this issue in the documents. This process was also informed by the methodological 
literature, which prompted some of my thinking about how to: (i) adopt a critical 
stance during analysis (Fitzgerald, 2007); and (ii) devise and organise data 
extraction to interpret what the purpose and reasons for the document may have 
been (Shaw et al., 2004). Once I had developed a draft set of provisional questions 
from the above sources, I returned to all the documents and conducted the analysis 
(modifying questions as needed). This overall approach helped me to analyse each 
document systematically, develop codes, and prompt my thinking about what the 




Table 4.3 Questions for Documentary Analysis 
Category Question 
Content • What was the policy’s stated aim? 
• What were the policy’s main recommendations? 
• What information/evidence is provided to justify/support main 
recommendations? 
• Are specific measures of policy success stated? (If so, what are 
they?) 
• Is ‘community engagement’ specifically discussed? If so, how is it 
represented? 
Actors • What actors are meant to be involved? 
• How are these actors meant to be involved?  
• How is the role of ADPs represented? 
• What was the role of other local government entities (Community 
Planning Partnerships, Health and Social Care Partnerships, Health 
Boards, Licensing Boards) constructed to be?  
• What actors seem to be ‘missing’ or excluded? 
Context • How are different contexts conceptualised and discussed? 
• Is ‘local context’ or local needs specifically discussed? If so, how?  
• Does the policy link to or draw upon other policies/guidance from the 
broader policy landscape? If so, which ones, and in what ways? 
Process • Where does the policy locate responsibility for pursuing its 
recommendations and achieving its aims? 
• How is accountability characterised? (e.g. formally defined and 
outlined? Remains unstated or assumed?) (Is there a stated 
expectation for ADPs and local actors to use ‘evidence’ in their 
decision-making?) 
• How is monitoring and evaluation of the policy process or outcomes 
proposed to occur?  
• Is there explicit guidance for policy implementation contained within 
the policy? If so,  
• What would you expect to see implemented by ADPs based on the 
policy’s content? 
• Is the level of autonomy of implementing stakeholders (i.e. ADPs) 
discussed? If so, how is it represented? 
• What are the expectations of ADPs in terms of ‘community 
engagement’? 
• What is the proposed process for collecting, allocating, and 
distributing resources? 
• Are there observable tensions between expectations of local 
stakeholders contained within the policy and what may be 
feasible/observed in practice, judging by how the policy describes 
their roles, responsibilities, and resources?  
 
While the documents were useful, for example in representing policy decisions 
made by Scottish Government, I reflect that they inevitably presented a limited 
account of the Government’s implementation plans and expectations (Ritchie et al., 
2013). Further, I was not able to interrogate each document (Schwartz-Shea and 
Yanow, 2012) beyond what was available in the text regarding the underlying 
mechanisms of how implementation of the alcohol strategy was subsequently 
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enacted (or alternatively, the countervailing mechanisms that were barriers to 
implementation). However, I was able to address these limitations by also employing 
interviews in this research.   
 
4.5 Semi-Structured Interviews: Rationale and Approach 
4.5.1 Selecting Semi-Structured Interviews 
I selected interviews because it was critical to understand the perceptions of alcohol 
policy implementers about how they were undertaking the policy work of 
implementing Scotland’s alcohol strategy. I perceived that rich, meaningful data 
could be generated through interacting directly with policy implementers, for the 
purposes of understanding and (re)constructing their experiences (Mason, 2002).  
 
My selection of interviews was also predicated on my beliefs and understanding of 
how best to explain a social phenomenon like the implementation of an alcohol 
strategy. I view such explanations as requiring an emphasis on the influence of 
context, and on “depth, nuance, complexity and roundedness in data” (Mason, 2002, 
p. 65), as opposed to broad, but shallow understandings of the relevant phenomena. 
As a result, I wanted to use research methods which would be flexible enough to 
allow me to deeply explore relevant analytic themes I had pre-identified from the 
literature, while also generating others inductively from the data, all while 
maintaining the connection to context (an imperative for interpretive research) and 
an awareness of complexity. Qualitative interviews were well-suited to these 
purposes.  
 
Following my interpretivist approach, I regarded my interviews as purposefully held 
conversations (Mason, 2002; Ritchie et al., 2013), in which knowledge is jointly 
constructed (Holstein and Gubrium, 1995; Smith and Elger, 2012) or “generated” by 
the interviewee and researcher (Ritchie et al., 2013). As a result of this, I do not 
represent data as a pre-existing entity that was ‘collected’ – instead I write about 
‘generating’ data in the context of participating in interviews with participants (Braun 
and Clarke, 2013; Yanow and Schwartz-Shea, 2006). 
 
To elaborate, I draw on Holstein and Gubrium (1995), who explain that, “both parties 
to the interview are necessarily and unavoidably active. Each is involved in 
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meaning-making work.” (p.4, emphasis in original). Conceptualising the interview as 
a purposeful conversation between two active participants seemed more useful than 
an approach adopting standardised questions. This is because the knowledge 
generated from interviews was contextual and situational (Mason, 2002). Thus, I 
approached my interviews as “meaning-making occasions” (Holstein and Gubrium, 
1995, p. 4), in which I was an ‘active interviewer’, with the perspective that any 
resultant data would be interpretive and context-dependent.  
 
4.5.2 Data Generation: Local Level Interviews 
Access and Recruitment        
In preparation for interviews in each local area, I reviewed the local ADP’s publicly 
available papers, strategies and annual reviews. Given that I did not know any of the 
potential interviewees in each local area (except for the ADP coordinators with 
whom I had been in previous contact), I recruited interviewees by first attaining the 
list of names and emails of the core ‘Executive’ from the ADP’s website or their 
administrator. I then emailed each individual directly. I sent a follow-up email after 
one week if I had no response, and emailed a third and final time if necessary, after 
which I categorised them as a non-responder (Table 4.4). The recruitment email 
briefly detailed the research project, stated my request for an interview, and outlined 
why I had chosen this individual as a potential interviewee. I also attached a two-
page ‘Research Statement’ which provided further details about the project 
(Appendix 7). 
 
In addition to the use of ADP membership lists I used ‘snowballing’ to identify 
additional potential interviewees (Miles et al., 2014). Snowballing was also helpful as 
a way of identifying when I was approaching the ‘saturation point’ of a given area, as 
interviewees began to recommend colleagues with whom I had already spoken. 
Although this overall recruitment approach generated a diverse set of local 
interviewees, one consequence was that some of the interviewees I recruited ended 
up having less useful knowledge given that they were less centrally involved in 
implementing the alcohol strategy.   
 
I also recruited local interviewees from the LB in each area (see Chapter 2). Here, I 
followed a similar procedure to recruit LB members as I had with ADPs, accessing 
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the publicly available list of LB member names from local Council websites and 
contacting individual LB members directly to request an interview.  
 
The responses to my local recruitment is summarised in Table 4.4. Where 
individuals declined, most gave the reason that they had recently left their post or 
were no longer involved with the ADP. The majority of individuals who were non-
responders were LB members.  
Table 4.4 Recruitment responses at local level 
Response LA1 LA2 LA3 Total 
Agreed 17 16 21 54 
Declined 5 1 3 9 
No Response 4 5 7 16 
Total 26 22 31 79 
 
My experience recruiting participants was easier than anticipated. Most individuals 
were generous with their time, and seemed genuinely interested in participating. 
Reflecting on this, I perceived that gaining the approval of the ADP Executive prior 
to recruiting individuals was critical to this success, as it meant the individuals I was 
approaching were generally already familiar with the research and had already 
agreed for the ADP to participate. The relative lack of interest by LB members may 
have been a consequence of not seeking their collective approval through a similar 
‘gatekeeper’ before recruiting individuals. In addition to these aspects of recruiting, 
this research may have had greater credibility and legitimacy because it was a) 
supported by the University of Edinburgh, a well-respected, Scottish university, and 
b) funded by What Works Scotland, an initiative funded by the Scottish Government. 
These affiliations may have contributed to the positive receptions I received from 
interviewees.  
 
Interviewing took place from December 2015-January 2017. The majority of 
interviews took place during multi-day visits to each local area. Interviews ranged 
from 40 minutes to two hours in length. They were most often conducted in the 
person’s office or a private room within their office building (with two exceptions, 
both at interviewees’ requests: one in the person’s home35, and one in a restaurant). 
 
35 I decided it was permissible and safe to conduct this interview at the request of this 
interviewee who expressed that they needed to look after their granddaughter at the time of 
our interview (and did not express a willingness to alter the timing of the interview).  
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The length was partially dependent on the verbosity of the interviewee, but also on 
how much time the interviewee had to spend. The average interview lasted 
approximately one-and-a-half hours. In one case I conducted two interviews with 
one person because of the quantity of knowledge and central position of the person 
within the local system of alcohol policy implementation.  
 
During my fieldwork I was conscious of how I presented myself in my interactions 
with interviewees (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 2012, p. 62). Within each interview, I 
was keenly aware that my Canadian accent identifies me as someone raised 
outside of Scotland, and thus an ‘outsider’. I tried to take advantage of my outsider 
status to allow me to ask for clarification on what might be considered a well-known 
local policy process (Sabot, 1999). Otherwise, however, I sought to present myself 
as a trustworthy, competent ‘insider’ among the professionals I interviewed. 
Specifically, given the management positions of my interviewees, I dressed in a 
recognisably professional style for these interviews (in contrast to other interview 
experiences I have had, where more casual dress felt more appropriate). Table 4.5 
below lists the final number of interviewees I spoke with in each local area, by their 
organisational affiliation.  
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Table 4.5 Number of interviewees from different organisational affiliations 
Sector Number of Interviewees by Local Area Total 
 LA1 LA2 LA3  
ADP-related interviewees 
ADP Role Only 2 2 3 7 
Health Board 3 5c 6 14 
Fire & Rescue Service N/Ab 1 N/A 1 
Education 0 0 1 1 
Social Servicesa 3 4 2 9 
Police Scotland 2 2 2d 6 
Prison Service 0 0 2 2 
Local Councillor  1 0 0 1 
Third Sector 
Representative 
1 1 1 3 
Licensing- related interviewees 
Licensing Board Member 4 1 3 8 
Licensing Clerks 1 0 0 1 
Licensing Standards 
Officer 
0 0 1 1 
Total 17 16 21 54 
a Includes those working in Adult Support and Protection, Criminal Justice, Mental Health 
Services, and Children and Families Services 
b Where N/A is written, no representatives from this sector were on the ADP or were 
suggested during snowballing 
c One interview with a health representative was conducted as a joint interview, where 
they invited a colleague from a neighbouring ADP to also participate in the interview 
d Both representatives spoken with during one joint interview, as per their request 
 
Local Level Interview Format and Structure 
Each interview was audio recorded, with interviewees’ consent. Most interviewees 
seemed pleased to have the opportunity to speak with someone who was interested 
in their day-to-day work. I tried to encourage this enthusiasm by building rapport and 
trust between us and being transparent about the research aims (Harvey, 2011).  
 
In the lead-up to my fieldwork, I initially assumed that I would be ‘vulnerable’ to my 
interviewees because I needed their cooperation for the success of my research 
project, but I also appreciated that my interviewer-interviewee relationships would 
probably be more complicated and dynamic than this. Exploring literature on ‘elites’ 
helped me to interrogate this relationship more deeply, including reflecting upon the 
positionality and ‘situatedness’ of my interviewees and myself in relation to one 
another. My early assumption was grounded in the perception that a power 
differential would exist between myself and the interviewees (Finlay, 2002), which 
would consistently be skewed in favour of them. Indeed, some of the literature on 
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interviewing ‘elites’ suggests that the authority of these ‘elites’ will be enacted within 
the interview setting. For example, Desmond (2004) argues that elite interviewee-
interviewer relationships are always asymmetrical towards the interviewee (note that 
others have critiqued this claim (e.g. Smith, 2006), but I came to these critiques 
later). After engaging with methodological literature on interviewing ‘elites’ more 
broadly (e.g. Harvey, 2011, 2010; McDowell, 1998; Smith, 2006), I decided that I did 
not consider my interviewees to be elites because, while they do have decision-
making responsibilities, they are influenced by the higher-level decisions of more 
senior individuals in local and national government – for example, in terms of the 
mandates and financial resources they are given. However, what I took from some 
of this literature was the importance of trying to reflect on power dynamics in 
interviews, for example by including relevant reflections in my interview notes after 
each interview.  
 
Reflecting on the actual experience of fieldwork, I rarely perceived significant power 
imbalances to be playing out within the interview space. I perceived that I was 
consistently treated respectfully in interviews and it was only in a small minority of 
interviews where I perceived the interviewee wished to rush through the interview, 
signalling they wanted to give only limited time to the research. In these 
circumstances, I attempted to use the interview time efficiently, while being careful 
not to skip over necessary probing questions. Although I was prepared for 
interviewees to attempt to control or lead the conversation, having read about 
others’ experiences of this (Harvey, 2010), this rarely happened. When interviewees 
were long-winded, I perceived this less about taking control, and more about them 
fully utilising the opportunity to ‘vent’ their information and experiences to me, a 
dedicated listener.   
 
Further, many interviewees explicitly stated they perceived my research to be 
valuable, and expressed a desire to hear about the research results. Participants 
also seemed readily willing to put me in contact with other potentially relevant 
interviewees, which I interpreted as a marker of their interest. One national-level 
interviewee, however, following their interview and while helping me to exit their 
office, commented that perhaps I was focusing too much on the role of ADPs in my 
research. I considered this comment in light of all the local-level fieldwork I had 
already conducted, my engagement with different sources of data, and this person’s 
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position as situated at national-level. I decided that, given my research aim and for 
reasons already discussed in Chapter 2, my focus on ADPs remained appropriate. 
However, I also recognised and accepted that the knowledge claims I could make 
would be inevitably limited to those surrounding the meaning-making of these 
particular individuals and groups (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 2012). Given the 
membership turnover within ADPs, this includes a recognition that my findings are 
also situated in the particular time period in which I was conducting my fieldwork.  
 
In addition to considering the ways I could be vulnerable to my interviewees, through 
my engagement with methods literature I recognised the possibility that an 
interviewee could also feel vulnerable to me as the interviewer. My interpretation of 
the interview data, and my decisions about what data is included or excluded (in 
other words, what voices or perspectives are ‘heard’ and ‘not heard’), would give me 
power in how the data was used (Harvey, 2010; McDowell, 1998).  
 
Given this possibility, and that feelings of vulnerability on the part of the interviewee 
could make them feel less comfortable sharing information with me, I felt it was 
important to help them feel as comfortable as possible while participating in my 
research. I sought to do this by, for example, ensuring that I fully explained the 
anonymity and confidentiality that they as a research participant had in this 
research, that they have the freedom to withdraw from the research at any time, and 
conducting the interviewee where they felt most comfortable. I also offered to return 
to each ADP and present early interpretations of my findings. This offer was 
accepted in all three local areas, and I was able to use this opportunity to reflect on 
how my interpretations were received – this is discussed further in Section 4.6 on 
member-checking. 
 
Local Level Interview Schedule 
I used my initial, draft research questions as the starting point for developing an 
interview schedule, and supplemented this with key themes from relevant literatures. 
The schedule was discussed with my supervisors and modifications were made on 
the basis of framing and tone. I used this schedule in interviews with LA1, 
contextualising it to each interview (e.g. different questions for representatives of 
social work and police). I made more substantive adjustments for interviews with LB 
members, when it became apparent that interviewing this group was necessary for 
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understanding the licensing dimension of alcohol policy implementation, but that 
their role was very different from ADP members.  
 
Following interviewing in LA1, I went through the schedule in detail, reflecting on the 
utility of each question, my perception of how understandable each question was for 
the participant, whether the question had yielded rich data, etc. This resulted in a 
modification to how I communicated with interviewees about their uses of evidence. 
I had originally split the schedule into two main sections: a) questions about alcohol 
policy implementation, and then b) questions about evidence use within alcohol 
policy implementation. On reflection, this was likely a function of my own research 
interests – my interest in evidence use within implementation made me want to 
emphasise it in my interviews, leading me to separate it out as a distinct topic. 
However, I found this structure slightly awkward when undertaking interviews in LA1 
and felt I ended up spending more of the interview time on the first section, leaving 
the second section rushed. Further, I found that interviewees sometimes struggled 
to understand what it was specifically that I wished to know about their evidence use 
(e.g. sometimes asking for clarification). It seemed that I needed a more tangible, 
relatable way to ask about this topic. I therefore modified the schedule to integrate 
the two sections. This allowed me to ask interviewees about their work translating 
and implementing alcohol policy, and then to probe whether and how they used 
evidence in the context of this work – thus positioning these questions as deeper 
explorations of interviewees’ implementation practices.  
 
These changes reflected the balance I struck between wanting to ask specific 
questions of the participants without prompting them to speak about certain things 
(e.g. I didn’t want to prompt them to mention certain aspects of context that they 
may think are important influences on their work). Further, I knew from engaging 
with evidence-use literature to avoid “assum[ing] that individuals are necessarily 
aware of the ways in which they come to learn about the findings from research.” 
(Nutley et al., 2007, p. 65) 
 
Upon reflection, this revised topic guide improved my access to the types of insights 
I sought to elicit regarding local implementers’ perceptions and uses of evidence, 
and I maintained this structure for both LA2 and LA3 interviews. While the above 
changes represent some intentional flexibility to data generation which is a 
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characteristic of interpretive research (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 2012), a key 
limitation was that I did not have the opportunity to use the revised schedule with 
interviewees from LA1.  
 
One aspect of the interview schedule related to evidence use which I retained, 
however, was a card exercise I conducted near the end of each interview. My use of 
cards to explore interviewees experiences of using evidence was adopted with 
similar intentions to using visual materials in qualitative research, for example 
graphic- or photo-elicitation (Crilly et al., 2006; Harper, 2002). Using cards followed 
the tradition of using visuals as ‘stimulus materials’ in interviews (in this case about 
barriers to evidence use) to elicit ideas or stimulate memory (Crilly et al., 2006). I 
was also hoping that it might enable interview conversations to build on, rather than 
simply repeat (or affirm) existing findings that have emerged with some consistency 
across studies regarding evidence use in policy and practice.  
 
The cards drew directly from existing literature: on each card was a known barrier to 
using evidence in policy and practice (Oliver et al. 2014). Interviewees were asked 
whether any of the barriers resonated with their own experiences of trying to use 
evidence when implementing alcohol policy locally in Scotland, and about whether 
and how they had tried to overcome those barriers. Given that the exercise came 
near the end of each interview, I perceived it had benefits for (i) helping to make the 
interview additionally engaging for the interviewee, and (ii) for keeping our 
discussion succinct and focused in light of limited interview time remaining. Since 
my analysis suggested a focus on barriers was not the most useful way of 
understanding evidence use in the context of local alcohol policy implementation in 
Scotland, I have kept the account of this aspect of the interviews short - see 
Appendix 8 for more detail.  
 
4.5.3 Data Generation: National Level Interviews 
Following my documentary analysis and early analysis of local interview data, I 
sought to enrich and add clarity to my findings (which often referred to national level 
decisions, actions and assumptions) by generating data through interviews with 
national level stakeholders. In doing so, I consciously expanded my ‘exposure’ to 




During early stages of my research planning I briefly considered doing national level 
focus groups. This was on the basis that focus groups could be a potentially 
‘efficient’ way to help me access national level perspectives in order to ‘test’ or 
corroborate what had been reported to me at local level. Ultimately, however, I 
opted to use interviews. This decision was pragmatic and purposeful, and aligned 
with my overall interpretivist approach (and reflected the evolution of my learning 
about this approach). To elaborate, upon reflection this pursuit of ‘efficiency’ in 
developing a research design was pragmatically misguided given that focus groups 
presented logistical issues of getting multiple, busy stakeholders into a room at one 
time. Additionally, I came to appreciate that I was not seeking to ‘test’ or ‘triangulate’ 
the national level interview data with the local level data (Schwartz-Shea and 
Yanow, 2012), and that ‘efficiency’ was also not a primary goal. Instead, I sought a 
method which would present opportunities to access rich, situated accounts of 
individuals’ perceptions, interpretations, and contextual expertise regarding the 
alcohol strategy at national level. I also perceived benefits in speaking with each 
person individually, to allow each national interviewee to feel comfortable critiquing 
the strategy if they wished. I felt this was more likely in a one-to-one interview than 
in a focus group with interviewees’ colleagues. 
 
I recruited interviewees who currently were, or had previously been, involved in the 
development and delivery of alcohol policy and/or legislation in Scotland. This 
included a range of representations across public and third sector organisations. 
Using a similar approach to that which I had used when recruiting local level 
interviewees, I emailed each potential interviewee directly with a tailored email, and 
sent follow-up emails as necessary. The recruitment responses are summarised in 
Table 4.6 below. Given that I undertook this recruitment almost entirely towards the 
end of data generation, I had had two years of embedding myself into the Scottish 
alcohol policy arena. Therefore, unlike my local interviews, I had often already met, 
spoken with, or even briefly discussed my research with, many of the people I 









No Response 1 
Total 11 
 
One pilot national level interview was conducted at the beginning of this research 
project as interview practice and to test the initial interview schedule, however the 
rest were conducted following local level interviews. I used a modified version of my 
interview schedule for these interviews, and used the same audio recording device 
and ethical procedures (Section 4.8) as for the local interviews.  
 
4.5.4 Thematic Analysis of Interviews 
All audio recordings of interviews were transcribed verbatim into individual Word 
Documents, either by myself or by a professional transcription company (who had 
confidentiality agreements in place with any staff who had access to the recordings). 
I originally intended to transcribe all interviews myself, but time constraints 
necessitated that I outsource transcription of some interviews. For interviews which I 
had professionally transcribed, I went through each audio recording with the 
transcription to double-check the company’s work. Because I initially chose a 
company based in America for financial reasons, often their unfamiliarity with 
Scottish accents resulted in minor mistakes, which I then corrected. This process 
also led me to re-listen to each interview, again ascertaining the tone and other 
verbal cues of the participant which I could consider in my analysis. However, the 
American company was unable to understand accents from interviewees in my most 
rural Local Area so I changed to a Scottish company for the final round of 
transcription. Confident in their transcription, I would not re-listen to each entire 
interview, only re-listening to certain sections where I wanted to check the 
transcription. While I offered interviewees the chance to read their interview 
transcripts (but did not offer for them to edit the transcript, e.g. to rephrase their 
responses), most declined. Of those to whom I did send their transcript, none 
responded with any questions or feedback.  
 
I analysed the interviews thematically, following researchers such as (Braun and 
Clarke, 2013, 2006; Clarke and Braun, 2018; Mason, 2002). Advantages of thematic 
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analysis include its flexibility; its accessibility to researchers who have limited 
previous experience in qualitative analysis, and its usefulness in helping a 
researcher to synthesise detailed information from a large data corpus while still 
retaining richness and complexity (Braun et al., 2015; Braun and Clarke, 2006). 
Risks of this approach, however, are that the researcher limits themselves to only 
describing the data, provide insufficient evidence to support their ideas or 
arguments, or are not sufficiently transparent in explaining how they undertook their 
analysis (Bazeley, 2013; Braun and Clarke, 2006). 
 
To undertake my analysis, I first read each interview transcript, during which I 
constructed an idea of what I could construe from the data (Mason, 2002). 
Practically, I organised the data by coding transcripts in NVivo 11 qualitative data 
software (QSR International Pty Ltd, 2010). To give myself a flexible organisational 
structure to work within, I initially used provisional, a priori codes, which allowed me 
to maintain an openness to the emergence/generation of other themes. I generated 
these initial codes based on my pre-existing understanding of potentially important 
topics, informed by the findings of my iterative engagement with literature, my 
research questions, and my recollections of the interviews themselves. These codes 
included, for example: ‘local relevance of Strategy’, ‘prioritisation of Strategy 
actions’, and ‘sources of evidence’.  
 
I then undertook a more in-depth, iterative process of generating codes from the 
data. Following common practices for thematic qualitative analysis (Bradley et al., 
2007; Miles et al., 2014), this involved creating new codes where needed, and 
further developing, expanding, or adapting my existing codes. My analysis thus 
represented a combination and synthesis of concepts, interests, and ideas which 
had been identified a priori and which were generated from the data.  
 
My approach to analysis as described above was necessarily an interactive one 
between my research questions and data (Mason, 2002). To facilitate this 
throughout the analysis, I made annotations in the transcripts themselves with my 
initial reflections/analyses, and wrote memos in NVivo with reflections about 
individual interviews and key themes or ideas. This process of supplementing the 
data with additional notes was helpful for moving from mostly descriptive coding to 
develop more analytical codes, particularly as I began drawing from across the data 
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corpus to develop my ideas. While I carried out my formal analysis of documents 
after I had already been coding my interviews for a few months, my interpretations 
of the interview data will have invariably been influenced by my previous reading of, 
and discussions about, relevant documents. Further, the influences of the two 
sources of data on my thinking will have been intertwined during writing up my 
findings.  
 
Having engaged with certain practical qualitative methods literature (e.g. Bazeley, 
2013; Miles et al., 2014; Saldana, 2016), I appreciated that the coding and analysis 
process would be complex and iterative. I believed, however, that with sufficient 
effort I could ‘organise’ my analysis enough to manage this complexity  – i.e. that I 
could develop well-organised, systematised coding trees which would neatly capture 
my analysis (a belief possibly borne out of my personality, which consistently seeks 
to organise when presented with chaos). However, I was quickly disabused of this 
as I dug deeper into my analysis, and the number of codes, and the connections I 
interpreted between them proliferated. Further, I realised I needed to move beyond 
this idea of trying to over-control the coding and analytic process, and allow 
interpretation and patterns to be generated more organically (Schwartz-Shea and 
Yanow, 2012). Consequently, as I sought to make this transition and evolve in my 
thinking from descriptive to more analytic, I found two exercises particularly useful: 
(i) developing a series of relatively short, thematic pieces of draft writing (akin to a 
‘vignette’), which each explored a particular overarching theme or concept and 
helped me to begin to make sense of the messiness of the initial codes I had 
developed; and (ii) visually mapping the key concepts and themes I had generated 
(Bazeley, 2013; Braun et al., 2015), drawing organising concepts, their related 
themes, and the connections between them. 
 
During the process of analysis, I found it particularly useful to go back to the data 
repeatedly (as suggested in the literature, e.g. Braun and Clarke, 2006) to observe 
or think more about where themes and codes tended to overlap in my coding (i.e. 
where I had frequently double-coded using the same sets of codes). From this, key 
observations emerged, for example the importance of partnership working contexts 
in helping to explain ADP members’ experiences of accountability (developed in 
Chapter 5). I was also interested to find that the longer, narrative stories 
interviewees told during interviews were rich sources of insight, often covering 
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multiple codes/themes (Bazeley, 2013). This was particularly the case once I 
revised my interview schedule and began asking interviewees to speak in-depth 
about particular alcohol policy activities in which they had been involved in 
implementing – a revision which better reflected my interpretivist and policy practice 
perspective, specifically recognising the importance of actors negotiating practice 
through stories (Bevir and Rhodes, 2012).  
 
I also sought to check were there were inconsistencies, tensions, or potential 
“silences in the data” (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 2012, p. 105). For example, in 
Chapter 5 I discuss ADP member experiences of different types of accountability, 
and a surprise in this analysis was how little the ADP members discussed their 
accountability to their local governance hierarchy (specifically Community Planning 
Partnerships) compared with the detail they used to discuss perceptions of 
accountability to the Scottish Government. However, this could have been a 
consequence of how we were co-generating this data, in terms of the interviewees 
responding to what they perceived I was most interested in (i.e. the national alcohol 
strategy, and thus the relationship of ADPs to national level government), despite 
me asking about their perspectives on Community Planning Partnerships in 
interviews. 
 
When writing the results chapters, as I discussed a particular theme or concept I felt 
was reflective of the data overall, I selected quotations I perceived to effectively 
represent or illustrate the theme. In each instance, however, I sought to check these 
points across the different sources, and aimed to reflect on the extent to which there 
was (or was not) consistency of an expressed perspective or view across different 
sources. I aimed to comment on this in the results, for example noting within the 
analysis where a particular quotation was selected to demonstrate a contrasting or 
minority perspective.  
 
4.6 Member-Checking  
I considered two methods of checking my sense-making within my analysis: 
requesting the assistance of a relevant colleague to check a minority of the results 
(Bazeley, 2009) and member-checking (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 2012). 
Regarding the former, and reflecting on my philosophical approach, I decided that 
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asking a single colleague to ‘check’ my results would introduce an assumption they 
were checking whether I reached the ‘right’ explanations (and that they would know 
what the ‘right’ explanations were). Instead, I felt conversations with my supervisors, 
peers, during conference presentations, and with stakeholders such as AFS 
provided additional space to discuss and reflect on my initial interpretations.  
 
In the end, I focused on member-checking my analysis with my three participating 
local areas. During the analysis phase of this research I asked my participants to 
comment on my early findings (Miles et al., 2014). During 2016-2017 I attended an 
ADP meeting in each local area following analysis of that area’s interviews, and 
presented emerging findings to the group for their reflections and feedback. I used 
this member-checking approach to check the accuracy and fairness of my 
interpretations and representations of the data, with the intention of increasing the 
credibility of the analysis (Simons, 2009). Additionally, this also served a knowledge 
exchange purpose, as I was able to communicate my early interpretations and 
findings to the participating areas. 
 
I found that these sessions had limited usefulness for my analytic work because the 
feedback was light-touch and almost unanimously positive. I did not receive much 
constructive criticism, in that the interviewees did not tell me whether my findings 
contradicted what they had intended to communicate in their interviews. This could 
have resulted from a number of factors. For example, I may not have presented 
sufficient detail of my findings for the audiences to critique; they may not have 
perceived the findings to be in contrast with how they had tried to portray their 
experiences; or they may not have felt comfortable challenging my conclusions. 
Considering the latter, I did encourage individuals to contact me privately with 
further feedback if they wanted to but none did. Further, because the member-
checking sessions happened a few months after my fieldwork in each area there 
were often new ADP members in attendance, some people were hearing about the 
research for the first time, and perhaps did not feel in a position to offer in-depth 
critique.  
 
I did not conduct member-checking with national level interviewees. However, by 
making a presentation to AFS midway through my analysis, I was able to receive 
feedback about my emerging findings from the key advocacy organisation focusing 
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on alcohol policy in Scotland36. This also helped me to keep up to date with any 
policy changes occurring after my fieldwork.  
 
4.7 Contextual Observations 
To inform my research, between 2015-2017 I observed 16 meetings and events, 
both within the local areas and at national level. This included six ADP Executive 
team meetings, three LB meetings, and multiple AFS ‘Knowledge Exchange’ events. 
While these observations did not constitute a formal source of data, they provided 
me with access to critical contextual information about, and familiarisation with, the 
broader priorities, successes, and challenges surrounding the Scottish alcohol policy 
landscape (Braun and Clarke, 2013; Ritchie et al., 2013). They also provided an 
opportunity to gain an understanding of tacit knowledge held by participants, 
observing them enacting work and interactions that were perhaps less ‘articulable’ 
during our interviews. All of this assisted my thinking when analysing the interviews 
and documentary sources. For a full list of meetings/events observed, see Appendix 
9.  
 
4.8 Ethical Considerations 
4.8.1 Ethical Approval 
This PhD research was granted Level 237 ethical approval by the School of Social 
and Political Science of the University of Edinburgh in April 2015 (Appendix 10). 
Although the research itself was considered low risk, in consultation with my 
research supervisors, I applied for and was granted Level 2 approval because I 
knew that one potential interview participant had a physical health issue that could 
cause them discomfort and adverse effects during our interview. For the ethics 
application, this risk was addressed by stating the measures I would take to check 
and safeguard the participant’s wellbeing during the interview, including meeting 
with them at a time and in a location that was most convenient and comfortable for 
them.  
 
36 Additionally, Alison Douglas, CEO of AFS, read and commented on Chapter 2 of this 
thesis.  
37 At the time I sought ethical approval, the School’s approach was to have three levels of 
approval: Level 1 – low risk; Level 2 – some risks with clear plans to manage; and Level 3 – 




I also sought ethical approval from the relevant authority for each participating local 
area prior to fieldwork in that area. In each case, the ‘relevant authority’ was named 
by my key contact in the ADP. For LA1, ethical approval was attained from the 
Council. For the LA2 and LA3, ethical approval was attained from the local NHS 
Health Board, each with a slightly different process. All (anonymised) ethics 
approval paperwork can be found in Appendix 11.  
 
4.8.2 Interview Ethics 
A Participant Information Sheet that included information about the research, 
researcher, and funding for the project was developed and given to each participant 
prior to the interview, in line with established research practice (Wiles et al., 2005). 
An Informed Consent form was also developed, and was signed by each participant. 
I made a minor, non-substantive revision to the consent form following the first Local 
Authority interviews, to improve its clarity for interviewees38. In discussion with my 
supervisors, this minor edit was agreed to be covered by the ethics approval already 
in place for the research. I continued to give participants the opportunity to opt out of 
confirming any (or all) of the specific statements of consent (for example, it was 
possible for interviewees to opt of the interview being audio recorded, while still 
consenting to the interview and subsequent analysis). However, none of the 
participants declined to consent to any statement. No other changes to the forms 
were made during the course of the research. See Appendix 12 for the original and 
revised forms.   
 
Given that I did not formally collect data from my observations of meetings, and did 
not directly use or quote any discussions at these meetings, I did not deem it 
necessary to seek informed consent from attendees at these meetings. However, at 
each ADP meeting I introduced myself and my purpose for attending, making clear 
that I would not be identifying any attendees, and encouraged attendees to contact 
me with any questions or concerns they had about the research (no one did).  
 
38 I had originally asked participants to tick ‘yes’ or ‘no’ in response to the statements on the 
consent form (e.g. whether they agree to take part in the study, etc.). I revised the form by 
removing the ‘no’ boxes, because my early interviewees expressed confusion and asked me 
why the ‘no’ box was there. Thus, the revised form asked participants to tick ‘yes’ to confirm 




4.8.3 Enacting Ethical Research 
Although the institutional ethical applications were relatively straightforward, the 
process of enacting ethical research practice throughout the data generation and 
analysis process was a more challenging experience because I had promised 
anonymity to participants. My reasons for promising this were multiple, including 
wanting to create an interview environment in which participants felt comfortable to 
provide candid and open answers, rather than feeling constrained by how material 
might be attributed to them (Miles and Huberman, 1994). The commitment was also 
made to protect participants, in the event that they said something in the context of 
an interview that could harm their interests, position, or career if it were to become 
public (Miles and Huberman, 1994). For example, I wanted interviewees to feel free 
to be critical of their ADP, Local Council, the Scottish Government, or other 
stakeholders in alcohol policy, and protect against any harm that could result from 
criticism communicated in the course of their research participation.   
 
In light of this, I made the decision to keep both the identities of individual research 
participants and the local areas confidential. I realised that the small number of 
people working on alcohol policy implementation in a given local area (typically 15-
20) meant that if the local areas were identified then the individuals may also be 
identifiable. This would be even more likely because I planned to identify 
participants’ organisational affiliations (e.g. Police, Social Work, Prisons, ADP 
Administration, etc.) if I needed to provide greater context about their perspective 
when quoting them. Given that there are often only one or two participants on a 
given ADP from each organisation, they would have been identifiable if the local 
areas had been named.  
 
Additionally, there was explicit concern expressed by some participants (albeit a 
minority) about ensuring their confidentiality was preserved. For example, with 
respect to their job security one participant stated: 
Interviewee: Is it ok if I tell you things and say “Can you 
anonymise that”? 
AW: Absolutely 
Interviewee: That would be good, because if I’m critical of the 
Council publicly, then I could get in trouble…I’d like to be as 
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honest and up front as I can without looking like I’m gonna get 
myself sacked.  
 
Maintaining this double layer of confidentiality often proved challenging, though 
ultimately manageable. This largely reflected three factors: 1) the interest of 
colleagues and stakeholders about which local areas I was working with, 2) the level 
of context-specificity of activities and policy environment of each local area, and 3) 
the relaxed nature of certain participants about whether they were identifiable to 
their immediate colleagues. For example, national-level stakeholders sometimes 
asked which local areas I worked with, and often colleagues at conferences or other 
settings asked whether I was working with a given area they were already familiar 
with. In each instance, however, I simply explained that the confidentiality 
arrangements in place did not permit me to divulge this, and this was consistently 
accepted. Additionally, during each interview, I asked each participant to keep their 
participation in the research confidential when speaking with people outside their 
own ADP (though, of course, could not in any way control whether they actually 
chose to speak about it or not). I remain aware that, although I felt I took all possible 
steps to prevent the identification of local areas and individuals in the research, a 
‘knowledgeable insider’ may still be able to piece together enough information to feel 
that they know where a particular area is or even, perhaps, who a particular speaker 
is (Crow and Wiles, 2008).  
 
One aspect of the above challenge was that, when recruiting participants, I would 
sometimes be asked by a potential interviewee whether I was interviewing a 
particular colleague, as they thought it would be convenient to be interviewed 
together. There were two instances in which colleagues conferred with each other 
while I was recruiting them both, and requested to be interviewed together, in what 
the literature calls a ‘dyadic interview’ (Morgan et al., 2013). I decided to accept this 
request and interviewed them together, after considering potential risks to the 
participants. For example, I decided this would not be problematic ethically because 
both interviewees were informed by me to keep their local area confidential, 
however this could have presented a problem if one declined to be interviewed but 
knew the other was going to participate. For this type of situation, however, I had to 
be aware that participants were free to tell their colleagues within the ADP that they 




4.9 Limitations of Methodological Approach 
As with any research, my PhD research design was constrained by temporal and 
material resources. For example, I only had a finite time period in which to conduct 
my fieldwork, meaning I needed to select a limited number of local areas in Scotland 
to include in my study. Further, I needed to select local areas in Scotland which 
were feasible and affordable for me to travel to. A consequence of these constraints 
was excluding local areas which may have contributed new knowledge and insight 
into how Scotland’s alcohol strategy was being implemented. As such, I do not claim 
that the findings of this research are ‘generalizable’. However, while generalizability 
is often viewed as a highly valued standard of research, from my interpretivist 
standpoint I was more focused on generating knowledge that was contextualised 
(e.g. see my decision to use approaches which would help me to generate ‘thick 
descriptions’ of the chosen case which would enhance my understanding of the 
‘whys’ and ‘hows’ of the Scottish alcohol strategy’s implementation) (Schwartz-Shea 
and Yanow, 2012, p. 48).  
 
Beyond this, I was conscious that I only met with most of my local interviewees once 
(despite member-checking and observing meetings). This means there were 
potentially missed opportunities to observe some of the dynamic meaning-making 
that my interviewees were undertaking over time, and to use more of my own 
learning to inform later, follow-up discussions or interviews (Schwartz-Shea and 
Yanow, 2012). As will be discussed in Chapters 5-7, this meant that I was unable to 
generate further data regarding my interviewees’ ongoing experiences of certain 
contextual changes related to, for example, funding or legislation. However, 
because I did my fieldwork in each local area sequentially, I was still able to bring 
my learning from each area to my fieldwork in the next one (and into my later 
national-level interviews). Additionally, my contextual observations (Section 4.7) 
may have helped to mitigate this, particularly when I visited a local area a few 
months after my interview fieldwork, and observed their discussion priorities.  
 
As a second example, the timing of my research also presented certain constraints 
on my design and analysis. I designed and undertook this research a few years after 
key policy and legislative decisions had been made (e.g. the Framework for Action 
was published in 2009 and the Licensing Act 2005 was enacted fully in 2009). While 
I was able to analyse documents which helped to represent certain decisions from 
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that time, I was not able to access interviewee perspectives which could reflect on 
either the strategy’s development or initial implementation as it occurred – the data 
generated in interviews was necessarily historical and influenced by interviewees’ 
experiences since that time. My research is therefore specifically situated in a time 
in which the strategy had been already established for a significant time (and was 
therefore not a ‘shiny’ new thing, particularly given most of it appeared to be 
overshadowed by the energy and resources required to support the MUP court 
case), and a ‘refresh’ was already being discussed. Potential benefits of this, 
however, were I had the opportunity to investigate the ‘everyday’ work of local 
implementers who (i) had to continue implementing the strategy long after many of 
its components were no longer in the national political or media limelight, and (ii) 
could reflect upon their experiences (e.g. challenges, successes) which, given the 
nature of the scale of changes pursued through the strategy, were only available 
after a substantive period of time had passed - this latter benefit being an 
observation previously made in the policy implementation literature (Sabatier, 1986). 
Additionally, asking stakeholders to reflect upon their experiences since 2009, with a 
view to thinking about informing the strategy ‘refresh’ was sometimes a useful ‘hook’ 
in interviews.  
 
Third, I engaged with the selected case, fieldwork spaces, interviewees and 
documents as an external researcher – I did not ‘participate’ in these spaces or with 
these artefacts as an embedded researcher helping to carry out the work of 
implementing the alcohol strategy. I therefore did not have access to the 
opportunities that this type of participation would bring for accessing, observing or 
developing the tacit or embodied knowledge that being a local implementer of 
Scotland’s alcohol strategy may have presented. I reflect here that while these types 
of embedded or ethnographic approaches could have been plausible alternatives to 
the approach I enacted, I did not consider using them when I was developing my 
research design. This may have reflected the assumptions I brought to this research 
(e.g. from my experiences at WHO and other professional positions), and my 
presuppositions which were informed by my initial engagement with the relevant 
literature and texts (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 2012). The combination of these 
may have contributed to my decision that it was important to use the time and 
resources I had available to engage with (i) interviewees at multiple levels of 




Fourth, more specific aspects of my research design presented limitations. For 
example, my decision to exclude local ADP delivery strategies from my formal 
analysis means I am unable to discuss those sources of formalised/official, 
collective representations of how each ADP made sense of the national alcohol 
strategy, within their own contexts. However, this decision was made in order to 
maintain the anonymity of each local area, a crucial part of my agreement with each 
area when I was negotiating access to them. Further, I perceived that I could 
incorporate questions into my interviews which would help me to understand what 
had been included in each area’s local strategy (having read them in advance to 
interviews), thus still generating contextual (but partial) knowledge about the content 
and decisions represented in the documents without directly reporting on them.  
 
Finally, my interviewee data included a smaller number of LB members than ADP 
members due to the lower response rates. This may mean that my insights into LB 
practices were more limited than my insights into ADPs’. However, I reflect that 
many of the interviewees based within ADPs had good knowledge of LBs and much 
to say about LB practices. Further, there is more published research in Scotland 
focusing on licensing and LBs, so I was also able to draw insights from this research 
analysed in Chapter 3 (systematic review).  
 
4.10 Conclusion 
This research is underpinned by an interpretivist position, and conceptualises 
alcohol policy implementation as policy ‘practice’ or ‘work’. A qualitative, embedded 
case study approach was employed, given its capacity to generate rich, in-depth 
descriptions and explanations of how Scotland’s alcohol strategy was being 
implemented in three local areas, and the suitability of this approach to the study 
aim and research questions. In this thesis, the ‘case’ of interest was the 
implementation of Scotland’s 2009 alcohol strategy, and the ‘sub-units’ of analysis 
were three, purposely selected local areas in Scotland. 
 
The chapter described how I generated data through semi-structured interviews (at 
both local [n=54] and national level [n=9]) and documentary analysis (focusing on 16 
national-level policy documents, which were a mixture of policies, legislation, and 
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guidance). The chapter also described my approach to data analysis, which involved 
taking inspiration from Walt and Gilson’s Triangle Framework to help develop an 
approach to analysing the documentary data, while using thematic codes (generated 
a priori and through engagement with the data) to help analyse the semi-structured 
interviews.  
 
In addition, this chapter provided a reflexive account of how and why I came to 
undertake this research. This included reflexive writing on my position as the 
researcher undertaking this work, and how my personal and professional 
backgrounds will have influenced how I approached the research. In particular, I 
noted that I felt my experiences in institutions such as WHO shaped the lens 
through which I initially viewed the problem of understanding and explaining the 
implementation of Scotland’s alcohol policy (and the ways I sought to access 
information about this). As I explain, this changed as I progressed through my 






Preface to Results Chapters 
This thesis now turns to the results of my empirical analysis. To make this transition, 
in this Preface I explain the development of my research questions and the focus of 
my empirical analysis, which will be presented in the following three chapters.  
 
As Chapter 1 outlines, the thesis is guided by an overarching research aim of 
investigating whether and how factors known to shape alcohol policy implementation 
in high-income settings shaped the local level implementation of Scotland’s 2009 
alcohol strategy. My research questions are: 
1. How was local implementation of Scotland’s 2009 alcohol strategy influenced 
by formal and informal accountability mechanisms in the contexts of: 
a. Alcohol and Drug Partnerships?; and 
b. Licensing Boards? 
 
2. What roles (if any) did evidence appear to play in the implementation of 
Scotland’s 2009 alcohol strategy? 
 
As would be expected from an interpretive, qualitative research project (Ritchie et 
al., 2013) (see Chapter 4), the finalisation of these research questions (from draft 
form at the beginning of the project) was informed by an iterative interaction with 
relevant literature, preliminary assessment of my data, and reflections on my 
discussions with, and observations of, relevant stakeholders.  
 
To detail each, the systematic review (Chapter 3) was developed in response to my 
research aim, and built on my earlier engagement with alcohol policy literature and 
initial data analysis. The systematic review identified three themes as being 
important for alcohol policy implementation: accountability and governance, 
evidence use, and context and resources. The first two directly informed my 
research questions – the results of the systematic review suggested there were 
important knowledge gaps in relation to ‘accountability and governance’ and 
‘evidence use’ that could be usefully explored empirically, via my embedded case 
study. Regarding the third theme, the systematic review suggested ‘context and 
resources’ were important considerations for alcohol policy implementation 
research, but that (a) there were fewer obvious gaps to address (since most 
research identified context and resources as important for alcohol policy 
implementation in some way), and (b) issues around this theme seemed 
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consistently intertwined with other aspects of implementation. Therefore, I felt this 
theme might be more usefully presented as a cross-cutting theme.  
 
In line with my interpretivist approach, my final research questions were also 
informed by my data and analysis. My preliminary data analysis suggested that, 
within the broader accountability and governance theme identified in the systematic 
review, it was accountability specifically that seems to be crucial to understanding 
and explaining the experiences of ADP and LB members in implementing Scotland’s 
national alcohol strategy. Further, my original interest in evidence use, which had 
been incorporated into my interview schedule, did indeed appear to be an 
interesting and important topic in the context of ADP and LB implementation work.  
 
Regarding context, I had incorporated careful consideration of this in my research 
design and analysis. My interpretive, qualitative case study approach (Chapter 4) 
explicitly sought to assess how variations in local context across Scotland might be 
shaping local implementation. For example, I had selected three different 
geographical contexts as my sub-units of analysis, and, in interviews, had asked 
about economic and political contexts. However, my data analysis did not identify 
obvious differences between the three local areas. Instead, it suggested the most 
interesting and important aspects of how context influences Scottish alcohol policy 
implementation was through experiences shared across the local areas (e.g. 
partnership working and constrained resources). In relation to resources, I paid 
particular attention to this issue in my data analysis and observations of local 
meetings. In interviews, I asked participants about resources, and gave them space 
to discuss different types (e.g. funding, human resources, technological support, 
etc.). My data suggested that funding in particular was a key, consistent concern 
among my interviewees but interviewees’ accounts of the significance of resources 
were generally intertwined with their accounts of accountability and evidence use.    
 
In light of the above, I decided that the final research questions should principally 
focus on accountability and on evidence use, whereas context and resources would 
be explored and discussed as a cross-cutting theme. The following three empirical 
chapters address my research questions in turn, with the Discussion section of each 
chapter also engaging with key issues relating to context and resources that emerge 
in the respective chapters. Question 1a is addressed in Chapters 5, Question 1b in 
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Chapter 6, and Question 2 in Chapter 7. Following this, the thesis Discussion 









5 Confusion, Complexity and Miscommunication: 
Accountability in Alcohol and Drug Partnerships  
5.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine how the implementation of Scotland’s 
alcohol strategy was influenced by the operationalisation of accountability 
relationships in ADPs. Specifically, in this chapter I seek to map and analyse the 
different accountability relationships experienced by ADPs and their members, and 
to understand how these were influencing ADPs’ implementation work. In light of 
this, this chapter addresses the research question: “How was local implementation 
of Scotland’s 2009 alcohol strategy influenced by formal and informal accountability 
mechanisms in the context of Alcohol and Drug Partnerships?” This chapter builds 
on the systematic review (Chapter 3). The review found that, while multiple studies 
identified issues relating to governance and accountability as important for 
implementation, only one study (Fitzgerald et al., 2018) explicitly focused on 
accountability in Scottish alcohol policy implementation, suggesting a potentially 
important research need. As briefly highlighted in Chapter 3, this empirical work also 
builds upon those authors’ work. Where Fitzgerald and colleagues provided an initial 
exploration of accountability-related issues identified by public health practitioners, 
their study did not focus specifically on examining the accountability systems of 
ADPs or LBs. Further, they restricted their study to interviewing public health 
practitioners (n=13) across 20 jurisdictions in Scotland about their perspectives on 
alcohol licensing, and did not include LB members. 
 
The issue of local partnerships for alcohol policy implementation is important for this 
research because in Scotland individuals representing various organisations are 
brought together in ADPs to implement alcohol policy (Chapter 2). This possibly 
creates a tension between ‘individual accountability’ to one’s organisation, and 
‘collective’ accountability to the partnership. Additionally, the work of ADPs to 
implement alcohol policy is embedded in a broader policy context characterised by 
an enthusiasm for partnership working (e.g. Christie, 2011). This suggests that any 
analyses of accountability in Scottish alcohol policy implementation need to consider 
the potential influences of this partnership working context. Further, for research on 
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local alcohol partnerships to not yet have engaged with literature on accountability in 
partnership contexts is a missed opportunity (see Chapter 3).  
 
To my knowledge, this is the first empirical study to map and analyse the 
accountabilities of ADPs in Scotland and to assess how these accountabilities 
influence their implementation work. My analysis of the data - national and local 
interviews and national documents - will suggest that the current configuration of 
ADPs’ accountability regime is complex and presents potential challenges for ADPs’ 
work implementing Scotland’s alcohol strategy. Importantly, my analysis suggests 
that this regime is constituted of distinct accountability relationships between ADPs 
and other implementation stakeholders, and these can come into tension.  
 
In the rest of this introduction, I will engage with relevant accountability literature, 
and then explain an accountability typology from Hupe and Hill (2007) which 
(organisationally) aided the analysis in this chapter. The results are then structured 
as follows. First, data regarding national expectations of ADPs’ roles will be 
presented, as written in policy documents and reported by interviewees working at 
the Scottish national level. This is important because it provides a reference point for 
how ADPs were expected by national-level decision-makers to undertake alcohol 
policy implementation, and therefore what ADPs were to be held accountable for 
(from a national perspective). Second, data are presented regarding ADP members’ 
perspectives on different types of accountabilities – and the different directions of 
accountability to diverse actors – that they experienced in practice. In particular, 
ADP members report varied experiences in terms of (i) accountability to the Scottish 
Government, labelled here as ‘top down’ accountability; (ii) accountability to partners 
in the ADP (or ‘horizontal’ accountability’); and (iii) accountability to the public and 
service users (‘bottom-up’). Reflecting this, the chapter discussion suggests a 
revision to the Hupe and Hill (2007) typology to better capture the complex and 
ambiguous accountability regime in which ADPs operate. It then situates the 
findings in relevant literature, presents plausible explanations for the findings, and 




5.1.1 Using Accountability to Analyse Alcohol Policy Implementation  
Accountability is a central concept within studies of governance (Bevir, 2009; 
Callahan, 2006; Dubnick and Frederickson, 2011). In this study of alcohol policy 
implementation, the concept of accountability is important because it helps explain 
how, when, and why key actors are responsible for undertaking implementation. The 
component parts of accountability processes—who is held responsible for policy 
implementation, how their actions are measured and judged, and how 
consequences are distributed—also provide insight into how governments perceive 
a given policy problem and its potential solutions. Following my findings in the 
systematic review (Chapter 3), it is useful to analyse Scottish alcohol policy 
implementation using accountability because, analytically, it can help a researcher 
understand and explain how implementation has been challenged or facilitated. The 
next few paragraphs explain my conceptualisation of accountability in this thesis. 
 
First, because there was no clear or consistent definition of accountability in the 
studies from my systematic review, I adopted Bovens’ definition: “a relationship 
between an actor and a forum, in which the actor has an obligation to explain and to 
justify his or her conduct, the forum can pose questions and pass judgement, and 
the actor may face consequences” (Bovens, 2007, p. 450). This definition captures 
three key phases of accountability (Schillemans, 2013), and offers a clear set of 
criteria against which an analysis of accountability in alcohol policy implementation 
could be effectively conducted. Within this definition, the ‘actor’ can be an individual 
or an organisation, and, similarly, the ‘forum’ can be an individual (e.g. a Minister) or 
an agency (e.g. a parliament, court, or inspectorate) (Bovens, 2007). The ‘obligation’ 
of the actor may be formal or informal (discussed further below). The sum of all an 
actor’s accountability relationships constitutes their ‘accountability regime’ (Bovens 
et al., 2008, p. 225). I use Bovens’ definition in order to help me assess and interpret 
whether relationships between ADPs or LBs (Chapter 6) and other alcohol policy 
stakeholders are indeed comprising accountability relationships. 
 
Second, in this thesis I conceptualise accountability relationships as both formal and 
informal (Bovens et al., 2014b; Romzek, 2011). These different types emerged as 
relevant for my analysis, because evidence of both formal and informal 
accountability relationships were reported by ADP interviewees. The ‘obligation’ of 
the actor in the definition provided above may be a formal responsibility, such as the 
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requirement to submit reports on a regular basis to a forum. Alternatively, a more 
informal, self-imposed obligation which may arise from beliefs and norms among the 
relevant actors about how best to enact and govern relationships between 
themselves and other stakeholders (Dubnick and Frederickson, 2011). Formal 
accountability is the most commonly discussed in the literature, and is based on 
formal agreements, often structured by contracts about the roles, responsibilities, 
and expectations of the relevant stakeholders (Romzek, 2011). However, (Romzek, 
2011) notes that “informal and norm-based accountability can be a significant 
complement to formal accountability relationships…[they] are at least as important 
to effective network operations as formal accountability structures” (p. 32). Informal 
types of accountability seem to emerge from: partners’/collaborators’ recognition of 
their interdependencies; a shared desire to work together; development of reciprocal 
relationships; and a sense of partner accountability which is characterised by shared 
norms and an informal system of rewards and sanctions (Romzek, 2011; Romzek et 
al., 2013, 2012).  
 
Third, I conceptualise accountability as a ‘mechanism’ or an institutional 
arrangement, as opposed to a ‘virtue’ or a normative concept relating to the 
behaviour of individual actors. Accountability as a mechanism “involves an 
obligation to explain and justify conduct” (Schillemans and Bovens, 2011, p. 5). It is 
also aligned with the definition of accountability identified above, and can apply to 
both formal and informal types. From the ‘mechanism’ perspective, there is less 
focus on the behaviour of actors, and more on the institutional arrangements which 
govern their behaviour (Bovens et al., 2014b). Examples of accountability 
mechanisms may include system-level mechanisms such as elections, or 
administrative-type mechanisms such as auditing or performance reporting (Bovens 
et al., 2014b). Institutional accountability mechanisms may also be employed, such 
as independent regulators or audit institutions. Mechanisms such as performance 
targets are a way for central governments to control or govern the work of policy 
implementers, for example when the centre is trying to retain control over 
implementation processes despite broader shifts in governance to bottom-up 
approaches (Richards and Smith, 2004, as cited in Cairney [2012], p. 351). As was 
discussed in the systematic review (Chapter 3), performance measurement is 
relevant in UK alcohol policy contexts, in which targets and indicators are regularly 
used by governments. Informal or ‘intrinsic’ mechanisms also exist, such as 
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fostering certain norms which promise increased integrity, legitimacy, or fairness in 
governance processes (Dubnick and Frederickson, 2011). Viewing accountability as 
a mechanism is consistent with this project’s concern to examine the operation of 
institutional accountability arrangements which help govern the implementation of 
Scotland’s 2009 alcohol strategy. 
 
Finally, actors may be held accountable ‘collectively’ or ‘individually’ (Bovens, 2007; 
Bovens et al., 2014). In the former, any actor in an organisation may be called upon 
to render account, regardless of their involvement in an action/decision (Bovens, 
Schillemans, et al., 2014). In the latter, individual actors are held to account only for 
their involvement in an action undertaken by the organisation (Bovens, 2007).  
Accountability within partnership-working contexts can be challenging because they 
include complex, potentially diverse and sometimes conflicting expectations (both 
among the actors within the partnership being held to account, and among the range 
of other stakeholders outside the partnership who are holding them to account) 
(Romzek, 2014; Steets, 2010). This is particularly relevant in the Scottish alcohol 
policy implementation context in relation to ADPs. As Thomas (2012) notes, shifts to 
more collective approaches to accountability require mechanisms which can 
account for collaborative arrangements. 
 
Conceiving of accountability in the manner described shaped my empirical analysis. 
It ensured I consistently analysed accountability regimes of ADPs and LBs in terms 
of relationships across stakeholders. Further, it ensured I was open to the possibility 
for both formal and informal types of accountability to be identifiable within the 
findings. 
 
5.1.2 Organising the Accountability Results: Hupe and Hill’s (2007) 
Typology  
In order to help make sense of the diverse ways in which accountability was 
discussed by my interviewees, I employed and critically engaged with a typology 
developed by Hupe and Hill (2007) as an organisational tool. This typology was 
initially attractive because it appeared to fit well with what I was learning from 
engaging in the policy implementation literature in the early stages of my research. 
Further, the selected typology treated accountability as a mechanism, but did not 
preclude me from investigating both formal and informal accountability relationships. 
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I reflect further on the basis of the typology, then present its’ three ‘types’ of 
accountability which are taken forward to organise my data.  
 
My use of Hupe and Hill’s typology warrants some reflection on their consideration 
of Michael Lipsky’s work on street-level bureaucracy (Lipsky, 1980). When I began 
analysing accountability in my own data and thinking about using the selected 
typology, I perceived that alcohol policy implementers in this research did share 
certain characteristics with Lipsky’s definition of street-level bureaucrats (an 
assessment shared with alcohol policy scholars such as Nicholls [2015]). This 
informed my sense that Hupe and Hill’s typology may be well-suited to my own 
analysis. For example, I perceived that Scottish alcohol policy implementers were 
acting with certain discretion and with severely restricted resources – key facets of 
Lipsky’s conceptualisation of street-level bureaucrats. Additionally, they shared a 
status as stakeholders who act and make decisions in the public domain, and 
therefore may be held publicly accountable for their decisions and the resultant 
outcomes (Hupe and Hill, 2007). Finally, the way Scottish alcohol policy 
implementers’ decisions, routines, and coping devices “effectively become the public 
policies they carry out” are similar to that described by Lipsky (1980, p. xii).  
However, I note a difference here – that many of the local implementers I 
interviewed acted as managers, more rarely being public-facing in the same way a 
traditional street-level bureaucrat might be seen to do. For instance, many of my 
interviewees had been promoted to management levels after having had an earlier 
career as a service delivery practitioner. Nonetheless, after engaging with more 
recent literature discussing street-level bureaucracy (discussed below) I assessed 
this difference did not prevent my use of Hupe and Hill’s typology.  
 
To explain, as my analysis progressed, I began to appreciate more contemporary 
critiques and interpretations of street-level bureaucracy, which located the work of 
policy implementers in more modern governance contexts. For example, authors 
such as Brodkin (2012) and Durose (2011, 2007) have discussed how public sector 
governance has evolved since Lipsky (1980), observing a much greater emphasis 
on complexity, collaboration, and partnership across policy areas and sectors. 
Where Lipsky’s writing is in a context of hierarchies, with street-level bureaucrats at 
the bottom practicing vertical accountability to those higher up the chain, authors 
have since identified the ‘multiple accountabilities’ public sector workers may 
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experience as a consequence of their embeddedness in complex governance 
structures (Durose, 2007; Schillemans and Bovens, 2011).  
 
Hupe and Hill’s (2007) typology, with its’ grounding in Lipsky’s work and synthesis of 
accountability and policy implementation considerations, stood out as being well-
suited to my own analysis of accountability in Scottish alcohol policy implementation. 
However, I felt it was important to re-engage with it in light of these contemporary 
critiques. My consideration of Hupe and Hill (2007) in this light showed the authors 
remained committed to the notion of street-level bureaucracy, for example seeing 
value in employing the concept of a ‘street-level’ layer of implementation work. 
However, the authors did recognise the importance of the modern shift “from 
government to governance”, and positioned their discussion of implementation and 
accountability “against this backdrop” (p. 279). To me, their engagement with re-
interpreting and building upon Lipsky provided further indication that their typology 
may be well-suited to my research. For example, I perceived a key strength of the 
typology was Hupe and Hill’s argument that local policy implementers experience 
accountability as a ‘web’ of relationships (not only vertical ones). The authors note 
that local policy actors are held accountable in a variety of ways, which go beyond 
exclusive accountability to the political centre (and may still include accountability to 
the public). Furthermore, that these different accountabilities, which sit in a context 
of multi-level governance, can be contradictory (Hupe and Hill, 2007). This 
acknowledgement of complexity made this typology additionally attractive, given my 
systematic review  (Chapter 3) and early data analysis which suggested this 
complexity existed within the governance of local alcohol policy implementation. 
 
Another strength was Hupe and Hill’s (2007) challenge to Lipsky’s relative neglect of 
key differences between street-level agencies – Hupe and Hill noted that agencies 
vary in their occupational make-up, functions, and tasks. Additionally, the authors 
discussed the importance of context in shaping these agencies’ work, how public 
services are dependent on collaboration. To me, the authors’ recognition of these 
complex factors spoke to the multi-sectoral, contingent, and collaborative nature of 
policy implementation, and felt relevant to my research because of the necessarily 
multi-sectoral, highly-contextualised nature of alcohol policy (World Health 
Organization, 2010; and Chapter 3). For example, this chapter and the next will 
explicate differences between ADPs and LBs, who, despite both contributing to 
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Scottish alcohol policy implementation, have important differences in the “nature of 
their tasks” (Hupe and Hill, 2007, p.283) and in the structural contexts in which they 
operate.  
  
Despite the above-noted strengths of the Hupe and Hill typology, however, I 
reflected that it did not have a focus on ‘collective’ or partnership accountability. This 
was important in my research because the Scottish local policy context is 
characteristic of more contemporary governance – see, for example, its’ 
commitment to community planning (Chapter 2) and the influence of the Christie 
Commission (Christie, 2011) calling for partnership and joined-up working. In 
Scottish alcohol policy implementation, partnership and multi-sectoral working are 
key factors underpinning ADPs’ structure and their accountability relationships. 
Therefore, I reflect here that while Hupe and Hill’s typology remained useful for 
organising my complex data into ‘types of accountability’, I needed to adapt it to 
accommodate more explicit analysis about partnership working (p.183). 
 
Further, while Hupe and Hill do acknowledge the potential for multiple types of 
accountability to be experienced at once, they did not discuss or demonstrate how 
the different types may be experienced simultaneously (and, for example whether a 
certain type may be experienced more strongly than others) or effectively navigated. 
Here I drew from Durose (2007) in observing that my interviewees took on a role 
that “emphasises pragmatism and negotiation and focuses on skills facilitated by 
local knowledge, experience, and networks” (p.213). This suggested that my 
analysis would need to consider how implementers negotiated experiences of 
multiple, potentially simultaneous (and possibly conflicting) accountabilities, and 
what aspects of their context (e.g. knowledge, collaborators, resources) may assist 
in this effort. 
 
Considering the strengths and limitations of the Hupe and Hill’s typology, the utility 
and fit of it to my own analysis ultimately seemed robust, and I therefore used it 
organise my data while, at the same time, considering potential limitations as my 
analysis progressed. The typology includes three types of accountability: ‘public-
administrative, ‘professional’, and ‘participatory’. Public-administrative accountability 
refers to traditional, vertical understandings of political, legal, and managerial 
accountability, in which the forum is an entity which is higher in the formal hierarchy 
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than the actor, who in turn reports to the forum. This is founded on the forum (e.g. 
courts, inspectorates, government departments, etc.) being seen to have 
“authoritative and legitimate jurisdiction” over the actor (Hupe and Hill, 2007, p. 288). 
Contexts in which this type of accountability relationship may be enacted are, for 
example, within a state’s legal system (Hupe and Hill, 2007).  
 
Professional accountability is conceptualised by Hupe and Hill (2007) in terms of 
how implementers are held accountable by their peers, either within their chosen 
profession or related professions. This can include institutionalised self-regulation 
within particular formal professions – an intra-profession form of professional 
accountability (e.g. medical professions may self-regulate through horizontal, 
collective self-management within their ‘colleges’) (Hupe and Hill, 2007). 
Professional accountability can also be related, however, to more loosely defined 
‘cooperation’ between people from different professions (Hupe and Hill, 2007). The 
latter conceptualisation seemed intuitively more appropriate for my purposes, given 
the way ADPs are constituted as partnerships involving multiple sectors and 
professions.  
 
Participatory accountability is characterised by the involvement of citizens or clients, 
who can evaluate the work of local policy implementers. Hupe and Hill’s (2007) 
discussion of participatory accountability focuses mostly on local policy 
implementers and their clients, and they depict this type of accountability as being 
horizontally organised. However, they also note participatory accountability can be 
enacted in relationships between local policy implementers and, for example, 
national associations which represent some part of the population (e.g. patients), 
media, interest groups, associations, and citizens or voters (Hupe and Hill, 2007). 
Thomann and colleagues (2018) summarise this as capturing “expectations from 
society” (p. 300), and frame participatory accountability as resulting from the “shared 
citizenship of street-level bureaucrat and client” (p. 303, emphasis in original).  
 
Hupe and Hill argue that each of the above types of accountability can be enacted in 
relationships between actors (here, local alcohol policy implementers, primarily ADP 
members) and forums at different ‘action scales’ or institutional levels: system, 
organizational, and individual (Hupe and Hill, 2007). However, the presence of 
multiple ‘action scales’ was not particularly evident in my data and my ensuing 
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analysis (in Chapters 5 and 6) therefore focuses more on distinguishing different 
types of accountability.  
 
In this chapter and the next I analyse the accountability ‘regimes’ of ADPs and LBs, 
respectively. In each, I employ this typology to organise the results, with sub-
sections focusing on Hupe and Hill’s different types of accountability. Within this 
chapter, Section 5.4.1 highlights my reflections on using the typology and suggested 
revisions for its use in the Scottish alcohol policy implementation context.  
 
5.2 Results: National- and Local-Level Expectations of ADPs’ Role 
Implementing Scotland’s Alcohol Strategy 
To contextualise the results in the rest of this chapter, it is important to briefly 
provide a sense of what the expectations were for ADPs, as suggested by my 
national-level data. National-level documentary data suggest that ADPs were 
formally intended to be a contributor to the Government’s whole population 
approach (Kleinberg, 2018; Scottish Government, 2009a), with a focus on 
developing local strategies and commissioning treatment services.  
 
First, the guidance document A New Framework for Local Partnerships on Alcohol 
and Drugs (Scottish Government, 2009c) established ADPs39. The New Framework 
outlines the roles and responsibilities of ADPs, and “aims to ensure that all bodies 
involved in tackling alcohol and drugs problems are clear about their responsibilities 
and their relationships with each other” (Scottish Government, 2009c, p. 2). It further 
states: 
“the framework sets out the responsibilities of the Scottish 
Government and local government, NHS Boards, agencies and 
partnerships, and the accountability arrangements between them. 
It also sets out the capacity required, and support available, to 
enable partners to carry out these responsibilities.” (Scottish 
Government, 2009c, p. 2) 
 
The more recently published Updated Guidance for ADPs on Planning and 
Reporting Arrangements (COSLA et al., 2015) states what ADPs’ responsibilities 
are, including that: 
 
39 Replacing ‘Alcohol and Drug Action Teams’ (Chapter 2). 
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“[ADPs] have a key role in delivering the national policy initiatives, 
the Alcohol Framework: Changing Scotland’s Relationship with 
Alcohol…” (p. 2) 
 
Referenced in the quotation above, Changing Scotland’s Relationship with Alcohol: 
A Framework for Action (Scottish Government, 2009a) was the central policy to 
Scotland’s alcohol strategy during my study period. Reaffirming the quotations 
above, the Framework for Action also indicates that all alcohol policy stakeholders 
have a role in supporting the Government’s whole population approach, a view that 
was echoed by most national interviewees. One national interviewee emphasised 
this point by highlighting the Scottish Government’s support of other organisations 
(such as Alcohol Focus Scotland) so they can, in turn, support ADPs in their efforts 
to enact Scotland’s alcohol strategy: 
“AFS has had a post funded [by Scottish Government] for about 
the last three or four years…it’s been about how [AFS] help 
Alcohol and Drug Partnerships to embed the whole population 
approach.” (National Level 1)  
 
Some national-level interviewees offered a contrasting perspective, however, 
suggesting that the role of ADPs in Scottish alcohol policy was meant to be minimal, 
or narrowly focused, and that their goals were meant to be commensurate with their 
local-level remit of providing services to relatively small numbers of people. For 
example, one interviewee said they felt ADPs were not positioned to be key 
stakeholders in population-level changes related to alcohol-related harm:  
“[ADPs] would not necessarily be focused on the broader social 
determinants of drug and alcohol issues because they were too 
small, they didn’t have enough power to do that...” (National Level 
2) 
 
The interviewees who had minimal expectations of ADPs emphasised their 
particular position in the governance system of alcohol policy implementation, one 
that is restricted by geographical territories and limited resources.  
 
Despite this, overall the national document and interview data suggest that ADPs 
are expected to contribute to implementing the ‘whole population approach’ of 
Scotland’s alcohol strategy. However, these data do not provide a clear sense of 
how ADPs were expected to do this, which emerged as being a potential source of 




At local level, interviewees across and within the three local areas often gave 
different descriptions of how they perceived the role and goals of their ADP. Before 
discussing this data, I note that ADPs broadly discussed similar concerns and 
portfolios of work stemming from the alcohol strategy and broader policy priorities, 
for example finding cost savings, developing ‘recovery-oriented systems of care’, 
and meeting delivery targets for ABIs and waiting times. However, importantly, ADP 
interviewee data also demonstrated some variability in each ADP’s primary focus. 
For example, LA1 interviewees tended to express a focus on trying to influence local 
alcohol licensing, given their reported perceptions that the area was overprovided 
for. In contrast, LA2 interviewees tended to emphasise their work to engage service 
users in local consultations, a recovery café, and peer research. Finally, LA3 
interviewees also emphasised their work on engaging with service users but 
additionally spoke frequently about their work to provide diversionary activities for 
youth.  
 
In response to questions about how they perceived the role and goals of their ADP, 
responses variously described the ADP as: a contributor to Scotland’s whole 
population approach; a partnership to bring together relevant organisations whose 
work could influence alcohol-related harm; a commissioning body for alcohol and 
drug services; a community- and recovery-focused organisation; or simply a forum 
where ideas about addressing alcohol-related harm could be shared. To illustrate 
the latter:  
“the ADP, it's like a collection of stakeholders…it's a consensual 
forum where people with interests try to get together to make 
things better within the constraints that they're operating in.” (LA1, 
local councillor) 
 
The above data points to a range of perspectives on ADPs’ roles, potentially 
suggesting a lack of clarity, or flexibility, in how ADPs are expected to operate. I 
additionally note, however, that interviewees represented their perceptions of these 
roles not as fixed and static, but as relatively loosely defined and potentially 
overlapping. It is against this backdrop that, overall, the data suggest ADPs have a 
key function as local implementers of the 2009 alcohol strategy, and it is in relation 




5.3 Public-Administrative, Professional, and Participatory 
Accountability of ADPs 
The following subsections present an analysis of how ADP members experience 
accountability, organised using the Hupe and Hill (2007) typology. Table 5.1 depicts 
a hypothetical summary of potential ‘forums’ with whom ADPs may experience an 
accountability relationship. Reflecting the data, I focus on: public-administrative 
accountability to Scottish Government; professional accountability between partners 
on the ADP; and participatory accountability to service users and citizens.  
 
Table 5.1 Potential forums for ADP accountability  











Peers/Partners on ADP Service users, carers, 
citizens, residents, etc. 
 
5.3.1 Public-Administrative (Vertical) Accountability of ADPs 
As discussed earlier in the chapter, Hupe and Hill (2007) use ‘public-administrative 
accountability’ to describe types of accountability relationships which represent 
traditional, vertical or hierarchical approaches to accountability. Within this, the 
accountability ‘forum’ is a legitimate, authoritative body which is higher in the formal 
hierarchy than the ‘actor’ (here, the ADP), who in turn reports to the forum (in this 
case, the Scottish Government). The data in this section are presented in three 
subsections, which discuss: (i) whether ADPs are accountable to the Scottish 
Government for implementing the 2009 alcohol strategy; (ii) what ADPs are 
accountable to the Scottish Government for; and (iii) how ADPs are held 
accountable in a context characterised by differing expectations and partnership 
working.  
 
Identifying Whether ADPs are Accountable to Scottish Government 
The previous results section (5.2) concluded that ADPs were expected to contribute 
to implementing Scotland’s alcohol strategy. This subsection presents data that 
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examine whether strategy documents and actors involved in establishing ADPs 
envisaged ADPs as being accountable to the Scottish Government for implementing 
the strategy. The data from interviews and documents suggest there was a lack of 
clarity about this. Two conflicting perspectives were identified. The first viewed no 
(or minimal) accountability to Scottish Government, with Government instead being 
a source of ‘support’ for implementation (a perspective more often expressed by 
national interviewees). In contrast, the second perspective saw clear and formal 
accountability to Scottish Government (more often expressed by local ADP 
interviewees). As will be shown with data below, the contrasts in these perceptions 
may help explain the confusion and miscommunication which characterises ADPs’ 
accountability regime. 
 
The data in this subsection were often particularly insightful when the accountability 
mechanism of ‘reporting’ was discussed. Reporting is one of the most basic ways to 
observe accountability between an actor and a forum (Dubnick, 2005). The results 
from the documentary analysis suggested that ADPs were indeed positioned by 
national policymakers as being responsible for reporting annually to the Scottish 
Government on progress towards specific targets and outcomes that have been set 
at national level (COSLA et al., 2015). This includes a range of measures discussed 
in Chapter 2, including ADP Core Outcomes and The Quality Principles (Scottish 
Government, 2014, 2013), as well as relevant measures from the broader policy 
landscape (e.g. the NPF). These reporting responsibilities were also mentioned by 
local interviewees (discussed below from page 159). 
 
However, some of the national level interviewees explicitly said that ADPs are not 
accountable to Government: 
“ADPs are not accountable to the Scottish Government…that has 
always been the case. And that has meant that there is a fairly 
unusual relationship there, in accountability terms, in that the 
Scottish Government has provided funding, via health boards to 
ADPs. But, has asked for a degree of evaluation to take place, and 
for the outcomes of that evaluation to be reported back to the 
Scottish Government. But that's really without any formal line of 
accountability, from ADP to Government. So that reporting has 
been variable, and in some instances, fairly light touch, in terms of 




The quotation above illustrates how confused the messaging from Scottish 
Government to ADPs can appear to be in relation to accountability. The quotation 
indicates ADPs are not formally accountable to Scottish Government, but 
additionally that Government seeks to retain oversight of ADP work and outcomes 
(although this is framed as a ‘request’) – the latter potentially indicating an informal 
accountability relationship. Further, the quotation hints that the Government’s 
approach to their relationship with ADPs may have led to variability in ADP 
reporting, suggesting that ADPs have exercised flexibility in interpreting the level of 
reporting that is required. Further, with the mention of funding, the quotation 
provides initial indication of a national-level narrative that the Scottish Government is 
mainly supposed to be a source of ‘support’ for ADPs (discussed further below).    
 
Some national policy documents also represent ADP reporting to Scottish 
Government as fairly minimal. For example, the quotation below from the Updated 
Guidance for ADPs on Planning & Reporting Arrangements seems to suggest that 
ADPs are only indirectly accountable to the Scottish Government, and again 
represents Government’s oversight of their work as being relatively ‘light’:  
“ADP accountability is via [Community Planning Partnerships] (and 
for HEAT targets/standards via Health Boards), rather than directly 
to Scottish Government. The Scottish Government will offer light 
feedback to individual ADPs on Annual Reports and Delivery 
Plans.” (COSLA et al., 2015, p. 7) 
 
This describes a governance approach in which the Scottish Government seems to 
try to shift accountability to local government, while still retaining reporting 
relationships with ADPs. What constitutes ‘light feedback’, and whether responding 
to this feedback is optional for ADPs appears unclear. Further, while the national 
documents embed ADPs’ work in Scotland’s wider arrangements for ‘community 
planning’ (Scottish Government, 2009c), and briefly note ADPs’ accountability to 
their Community Planning Partnership, the specifics of this relationship to the local 
actors appear to be delegated to local level. For example, the Updated Guidance 
states: 
“your [Delivery] Plan should articulate your ADP’s relationship with 
the Integrated Joint Board (IJB)40 as well as your ADP’s ongoing 
relationship with your Community Planning Partnership 
 
40 The document is referring to a type of ‘integration authority’ created through local policy 
reforms following the Public Bodies (Joint Working) (Scotland) Act 2014 (see Chapter 2). 
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(CPP)…Your plan should indicate through what route and with 
what frequency your ADP reports and advise how often you 
expect to receive feedback” (COSLA et al., 2015, p. 10) 
 
From the documentary analysis and local interview data, it does not appear that 
more specific guidance has been provided to ADPs about this local accountability 
relationship, and local interviewees spoke infrequently about their relationship with 
the Community Planning Partnership (only half mentioned this Partnership at all). 
However, this may have been a consequence of the interview structure – while I did 
ask about ADPs’ general relationship to other local structures like the Partnership, I 
did not ask explicitly about ADP accountability to them. Of the data which discussed 
this, interviewees either simply indicated they had reported as an ADP to the 
Community Planning Partnership in the past, or represented the relationship as 
being in flux as a result of the current organisational changes being made regarding 
health and social care integration. For example: 
“I’m asked to give an update on what the ADP’s doing and answer 
questions and whatnot.  I think it could be more…it could be a 
more robust relationship because we’re expected to get feedback 
from the Community Planning Partnership, but we don’t really get 
an awful lot of feedback from them.” (LA3, ADP Member) 
 
“The ADPs were set up to be a reporting arm of the Community 
Planning Partnerships. But we've now lost sight of that because, 
as well, there'll be inconsistencies right across Scotland in terms 
of the ADP reporting structure, but as you know we are now 
reporting into the Health and Social Care Partnership even though 
the ADPs were set up to report into the CPP. And we've probably 
touched on this before, the Health and Social Care Partnership are 
still to get their house in order, so they've not really given us any 
kind of direction about what they need from their ADP.” (LA2, ADP 
Member) 
 
“The ADP reports to [Local LA3 Safety] Partnership, which reports 
up to the overarching Community Planning Partnership. That 
whole structure is under review - there are negotiations ongoing 
around exactly what format that's going to mean in terms of a 
redesign of the reporting structure with a smaller number of 
Community Planning Partnerships and Single Outcome 
Agreements.” (LA3, ADP Member) 
 
From these quotations it appears that, while some ADP members acknowledged 
their reporting responsibilities to Community Planning Partnerships, this situation 
was undergoing substantive changes which led ADP members to depict fluid and 
uncertain relationships rather than clear lines of accountability. Overall in my data 
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corpus, and particularly the national documents, the richest and clearest data 
regarding accountability focus primarily on the Scottish Government’s expectations 
of ADPs and how they work within local and national policy contexts.  
 
Returning to this ADP-Scottish Government relationship, data from documents and 
national interviews suggested there was a perception that Government would be 
seen as a broader support for ADPs and their local policy implementation work. This 
narrative regarding the Scottish Government as a source of ‘support’ arose within 
the data as an alternative to the idea that ADPs would be held directly accountable 
to them. As outlined in Chapter 2, the Scottish Government supports local alcohol 
policy implementation through the provision of funding. The government also 
provides funding to organisations such as Alcohol Focus Scotland, who have a role 
in providing additional support by working directly with local areas. Further, the New 
Framework for Local Partnerships on Alcohol and Drugs, states that the “Scottish 
Government…should support these partnerships to achieve agreed local outcomes.” 
(Scottish Government, 2009c, p. 4). Contained in key guidance for local 
implementers, these types of statements seem to identify the government as being a 
potential source of support beyond only financial maintenance.  
 
While the above data provide examples of the Scottish Government positioning itself 
as a source of support, and claims that the reporting requested is minimal, some of 
the interviews presented a contrasting perspective. They suggested a more rigid, 
strongly imposed accountability relationship between Scottish Government and 
ADPs is sometimes enacted. For example, some national level interviewees 
indicated the reporting regime is rather stricter than the above data suggest, while 
recognising the confused messaging around lines of accountability, which they 
suggested was problematic. To illustrate: 
“We were walking that…line when we were developing that and 
those outcomes and indicators for ADPs, sort of, couching it as in, 
you haven’t really got a choice about reporting on this…[…]…there 
was a conversation I remember having with colleagues who were 
working in the improvement team within Scottish Government 
about you’re creating a problem here because you’re trying to hold 
[ADPs] to account but at the same time you’re trying to… 




These data suggest that Government wanted to be perceived as a source of 
support, but that much of this ‘support’ was by maintaining reporting structures that 
have their own underlying tensions. Data from documentary sources illustrate this 
further. For example, a letter regarding funding allocations was received by ADPs in 
July 2016 from the Scottish Government (Kleinberg, 2016), which I attained while 
mapping ADP funding (Chapter 2). The letter states that funding provided to ADPs is 
conditional upon them demonstrating progress towards national and local outcomes 
and Ministerial priorities. Further, that:  
“Scottish Ministers reserve the right to withdraw all or part of this 
funding if funds are not used for the purpose intended; if 
improvement/activity is not demonstrated; or if value for money is 
not demonstrated” (Kleinberg, 2016, p. 3) 
 
The 2017-18 version of this letter contains the same statement (Kleinberg, 2017b), 
and the 2018-19 version (while not including the exact statement above) notes that 
funding provided should be “invested transparently, informed by a robust evidence 
base and appropriate needs assessment” (Kleinberg, 2018, p.1). Further, the 
quotation above is in contrast to the narrative of Scottish Government primarily 
being a source of ‘support’ to ADPs – while support may be provided financially, 
these communications suggest ADPs can be penalised if their conduct is not judged 
as being sufficient – key components of an accountability relationship. 
 
The national-level data above has illustrated contrasting perspectives about the 
extent to which ADPs are accountable to Scottish Government. At local level, 
however, ADP interviewees were more consistent in reporting that they did perceive 
themselves to be accountable to Scottish Government. First, ADP interviewees 
reported feeling accountable to the Government because of the funding they 
receive, above and beyond their formal accountabilities to their local area hierarchy. 
For example: 
“…the ADP feel they are accountable back to the government in 
terms of the funding that they get.” (LA2, ADP Member) 
 
Further, interview data from ADP members were in contrast with the reported 
narrative of Scottish Government as a source of ‘support’ for ADPs. For example, a 
member of the ADP administrative team in LA2, after explaining her/his 
disappointment with Government feedback on their most recent annual report, 
provided the following, rather blunt statement of how this felt:  
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“we are not getting any support from the national level.” (LA2, ADP 
Member) 
 
This perceived lack of support for implementation was primarily reported in relation 
to the substantial amount of reporting ADPs were expected to carry out on an 
ongoing basis. The below quotation provides data that contrasts with the ‘light touch’ 
perspective on reporting suggested by the national-level Government data:  
“So the ADP has a Strategy…it has action plans, it’s relentless, 
actually. The [ADP] coordinator has to feed the Scottish 
Government quite a lot of information because of the treatment 
target.” (LA3, ADP Member) 
 
An illustrative example of the weight of reporting required by ADPs came with the 
Scottish Government’s 2014 introduction of, and efforts to monitor, The Quality 
Principles (Scottish Government, 2014b). The Principles were developed to provide 
standard expectations of care for alcohol and drug services, for example ensuring 
quick access to services and high-quality, evidence-informed treatment (Scottish 
Government, 2014b). Multiple local interviewees from across ADP member 
organisations reported that the Principles were aligned with their existing work and 
values, for example that the Principles simply reflected basic social care values. 
Despite this, the introduction of this policy came with substantive additional reporting 
requirements for ADPs: 
“the work around Quality Principles, each service was asked to do 
a self-assessment around that, and had to do a report…so that’s 
been a massive piece of work for us at the moment.” (LA2, ADP 
Member) 
 
Further, despite having reportedly consulted with ADPs during development of The 
Quality Principles (Scottish Government, 2014b), it seems that the formal 
accountability mechanism surrounding the Principles was subsequently 
implemented in what was perceived by interviewees to be a strongly top-down 
manner, with little or no consultation. This approach included introducing in-person 
inspections of ADP work by the Care Inspectorate (Care Inspectorate, 2017), with 
the first inspections to be conducted in 2016, only a few months after the 
announcement. Some concern, even outrage, was expressed by interviewees about 
the expectation that they engage with the Care Inspectorate in this way, especially 
those from LA2 (which may have been because their inspection coincided with the 
interviews I undertook).  
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“You’re basically, you’re crippling, you’re crippling us with what 
you’re expecting.  It’s so disproportionate it’s unbelievable, did 
they listen? Fell on deaf ears big time. And this was a meeting 
where we had been told that 22% of any ADP budget was being 
reduced.” (LA2, ADP Member) 
 
This quotation provides a forceful account of the intersections of pressures local 
implementers perceive in public-administrative accountability, and seem to directly 
contrast with some of the national-level perceptions that Scottish Government 
oversight would be ‘light touch’ and ‘supportive’. Some of the interview discussions 
suggested that performance measurement obligations were so great that they had 
begun to monopolise the time and capacity of local implementers, a finding aligned 
with Chalmers and colleagues (2016), who found a similar challenge in the 
Australian alcohol services context (see Chapter 3).  In the following extract, a local 
implementer reports frustration with this situation:   
“We do report to the Scottish Government every year, and you get 
feedback on it. But actually does it mean anything?... I'm saying to 
[ADP Coordinator], trim it down a bit, ‘cause…we're doing all this 
work, we'll tell the Government, and actually it's a paper exercise, 
it's really not going to mean much…we got the feedback on it and 
we sat down with the feedback, and thought ‘they don't 
understand what we've told them’…What a complete waste of 
time. You know, of course they're the paymasters, of course they 
have to be satisfied” (LA2, ADP Member) 
 
This quotation further underlines the sense that ADPs appear to be navigating a 
pressured situation in which they experience accountability to the Scottish 
Government, but do not necessarily feel supported to effectively engage with or 
meet such expectations. This suggests that, in their work to implement the alcohol 
strategy, this aspect of their accountability regime is a source of confusion and 
frustration.  
 
Public-Administrative Accountability of ADPs: Examining what ADPs are 
accountable for 
So far, we have seen that the data suggest ADPs are accountable to Scottish 
Government in practice, despite a narrative at national level to frame the relationship 
in more supportive terms. I now explore the accountability relationship between 
ADPs and Scottish Government further by investigating what ADPs are being held 
accountable for (e.g. contributing to achieving targets). It is important to consider 
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what ADPs are accountable for because this influences what they prioritise in their 
implementation work.  
 
The data initially suggested an emphasis on working towards nationally-agreed 
targets. For example, the 2018-19 letter to ADPs from the Scottish Government 
noted that ADPs had certain ‘compliance requirements’, which included two ‘Local 
Delivery Plan Standards’: the ‘Drug and Alcohol Treatment Waiting Times Standard 
and the Alcohol Brief Interventions Standard’ (Kleinberg, 2018). However, this letter 
did not outline whether ‘compliance’ for these Standards meant ADPs would be 
formally held accountable for their contributions towards these. These 
considerations were explored further in the local interview data, in which 
interviewees consistently reported that they felt responsible for meeting national 
level targets: 
“Alcohol brief interventions, there’s an evidence base which we 
have researched and the expectation is, you know, that each ADP 
or Health Board area will promote that and deliver that. And 
there’s been obviously [national ABI] targets that have been set 
and the expectation of meeting them.” (LA2, ADP Member) 
 
Additionally, when one interviewee spoke about a locally-developed recovery 
initiative, I asked whether s/he thought this initiative worked towards targets from 
national level. In response, s/he spoke about how national pressures permeate 
her/his thinking during this type of work: 
“I think [national indicators] are helpful because they keep you 
focused, and particularly there’s a huge recovery focus, huge 
family involvement focus, and I think sometimes you tend to get 
blinkered and set in your own…this is what we’re doing, this is why 
we’re doing it. I think we need these things to remind us that there 
are wider support networks, etcetera, out there that we should be 
tapping into, and I think when you know that that’s being looked at, 
it makes you more conscious of the direction.” (LA2, ADP 
Member) 
 
The quotations above suggest that performance measures such as indicators or 
targets seemed to serve as an accountability mechanism which influenced local 




Importantly, however, the data regarding reporting against national targets was 
discussed in relation to a context in which significant resource cuts were being 
made: 
“You can't do that [budget reduction] without losing posts, you 
can't lose posts without losing some capacity, you can't lose 
capacity without waiting times increasing, but there's meant to be 
no impact on the waiting times target…and that starts to become, 
you know, somebody's psychotic here and it's not me…So policy 
is fine provided the carpet [i.e. resources] is not pulled out from 
under the people who have to implement policy” (LA1, ADP 
Member, NHS) 
 
…we are in a situation at the moment where the level of cuts that 
we’re being required to make are eye watering and completely 
unprecedented…I think we have to accept that the public services 
envelope, financial envelope, is just reducing to a point that if we 
continue, or if we try or want to continue doing everything that 
we’ve done before, it’s just completely unsustainable, we can’t, we 
are not going to be able to do it. (LA1, ADP Member) 
 
“…[the way treatment services are set up] you can’t really have a 
proper conversation about at the meetings because people get 
defensive about their budgets and about the priorities…it’s always 
about money, isn’t it? […] every year we’re being told more and 
more about budget cuts and how we’ve got to do things with less. 
(LA3, ADP Member) 
 
These quotations strongly signify the importance of resources for ADPs’ ability to 
implement Scotland’s alcohol strategy – a finding which is consistent with the 
importance placed on resources in other studies of alcohol policy implementation, as 
demonstrated in the results of the systematic review (Chapter 3). Further, despite 
the clarity evident in the data regarding the significance of targets, a lack of clarity 
about other responsibilities emerged – appearing to relate, at least in part to the 
confusion observed over ADPs’ roles (Section 5.2) and to how the Scottish 
Government communicated with ADPs.  
 
The topic of commissioning is also illustrative in exploring the sense of confusion 
about what ADPs are being held accountable for by the Scottish Government, and 
how this lack of clarity presents a challenge to their work implementing its alcohol 
strategy. At national level, relevant policy documents suggest that ADPs are 
responsible for commissioning local treatment and services. For example, the 
Scottish Government’s New Framework for Local Partnerships on Alcohol and 
Drugs states that “Each local alcohol and drug strategy should…set out an approach 
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to the commissioning and delivery of services…” (Scottish Government, 2009c, p. 
7). Further, the Standard Reporting Template for ADPs’ annual reports has multiple 
references to ADP commissioning work (COSLA et al., 2015). For instance, it 
requires ADPs to link their “strategic commissioning work” to other local community 
planning (COSLA et al., 2015, p. 32). However, national guidance about 
commissioning contained in the Framework for Action is much more limited, stating 
only that local commissioning decisions should be “shaped by the priorities identified 
by ADPs” (Scottish Government, 2009a, p. 24).  
 
National-level interviews showed variable perspectives about whether ADPs were 
expected to engage in commissioning work. Some agreed they were, with one 
interviewee stating that “ADPs primarily are commissioning services” (National Level 
4). However, one national interviewee was hesitant to define ADPs as having a 
commissioning role, because s/he perceived them to be primarily a partnership 
which brought together stakeholders who themselves already provide alcohol-
related services, such as NHS and third sector. S/he perceived that the ADP 
‘commissioning’ was actually ‘buying’ those services from these stakeholders (who 
are also represented on the ADP).  
 
The relative degree of uncertainty at national level around ADP commissioning 
seemed to inform local confusion about whether ADPs were accountable for 
commissioning and how their accountability for this work was being communicated. 
Interviewees across the LAs spoke about their perceived responsibilities for 
undertaking commissioning in different ways – from seeing it as a central task of the 
ADP (LA1) to being a minor aspect of their remit (LA3). For example, in LA1, one 
interviewee described their primary role on the ADP as being focused on 
commissioning services, placing this as a central activity of the ADP overall and 
describing it in the following terms: 
“What I tend to do now is fairly specifically about…what outcomes 
we’re looking for from our system of care and managing the 
contracts for the people who are doing the treatment.” (LA1, ADP 
Member) 
 
This interviewee suggests that a central aspect of their ADP-related role, and thus 
what they are held accountable for, is to commission treatment services. This 
interviewee’s mention of outcomes also indicates that they perceive their 
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responsibility for commissioning as being linked to their accountability for progress 
towards key outcomes. It was also notable that LA1 had established a working 
group on commissioning and had designated a member to focus on this activity (i.e. 
it was clear that it was not only the above interviewee but the ADP, as a partnership, 
which saw commissioning as a core part of its role).  
 
The other two local areas, however, reported rather different perceptions of their 
commissioning responsibilities. Interviewees in LA2 suggest that they did see 
commissioning as one of their responsibilities, but that there is a tension between 
their commissioning responsibility and their lack of legitimacy as commissioners. For 
example, an ADP member in LA2 described feeling that the culture towards ADPs 
from statutory bodies (who are also ADP members) is to view the ADP simply as a 
source of funding, and whom s/he perceived as treating the ADP with “contempt”. 
This same interviewee further described the history of ADPs, in terms of funding and 
priority being weighted towards statutory services: 
“Going back to historical backdrop of [being] heavily weighted 
towards statutory services, that really just see us [ADP] as a cash 
cow, and until that changes…I don't think we're gonna be 
respected commissioners.” (LA2, ADP Member) 
 
Such descriptions illustrate that statutory services are members of the ADP but also 
seem to take priority over non-statutory services, creating a potentially problematic 
relational imbalance within the partnership. There appears to be an important 
distinction between statutory and non-statutory services, and the different 
perspectives and resources they have. Here, the interviewee suggests that as a 
non-statutory body, the ADP is not perceived as a credible commissioner for 
services by statutory organisations.  
 
In LA3, interviewees seemed to either perceive commissioning was not a primary 
role of the ADP, or that there was ‘confusion’ about this aspect of the ADP’s role. 
The quotation below helps to illustrate this, and the potential tension arising from 
this perception sitting alongside efforts to hold ADPs formally to account for 
commissioning: 
“Our ADP I think, unlike some other ADPs around the country, 
doesn’t do an awful lot of commissioning work – I know that some 
ADPs actually commission services, ours doesn’t do that yet, or if 
it does, it’s very, very little […]To have the ADP commission, in a 
167 
 
formal sense, would require quite a bit of change in terms of how 
the government has set them up and how the government holds 
different bodies that sit round the ADP to account…I don’t know if 
our ADP are [sic] different to other ADPs” (LA3, ADP Member) 
 
The interviewee also acknowledged how LA3 may be different from ADPs, however, 
and attributed this to “the way services have been set up”, which they described as 
“very different, historically”, suggesting variation across Scottish ADPs may be 
somewhat path dependent. Ultimately, this interviewee went on to suggest that the 
ADP’s primary responsibility was to provide a space in which members could 
discuss on alcohol policy priorities and work in partnership towards these. A third 
sector representative to the LA3 ADP summed up the confusion regarding this topic: 
“There’s a lot of confusion about whether they have a 
commissioning role or not.  It’s been a discussion that’s been 
going round for years and years...  And they don’t really have a 
commissioning role at the moment.  And that’s one of the things 
that’s, kind of, controlling the whole situation.  ‘Cause a lot of the 
assumption is that the money is NHS money.  And that’s very 
much a convention here, that it is seen as NHS money.” (LA3, 
ADP Member) 
 
Indeed, in this local area, interviewees (particularly NHS representatives) who 
reported the ADP did do some commissioning reported this as being more about 
negotiating local agreements (given the non-statutory nature of the ADP), because it 
was actually the NHS which holds the funding for this commissioning.  
 
Overall, it seems that while certain ADP responsibilities (e.g. pursuing national-level 
targets) were clearly understood across all three ADPs perspectives on other 
aspects of their role - and thus what they reporting feeling they would be held 
accountable for - varied between local areas and was a source of confusion.  
 
Public-Administrative Accountability in the Context of Partnership Arrangements 
It was evident from the data that the accountability relationship between ADPs and 
Scottish Government was complicated further by key characteristics of ADPs’ 
structures as partnerships. ADPs exist because the Scottish Government mandates 
that local alcohol (and drugs) policy implementation stakeholders form and maintain 
partnerships (Scottish Government, 2009c) (see Chapter 2). National level policy 
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documents provided an initial sense of how these partnerships were expected to be 
held accountable: 
“The governance and accountability arrangements for these 
partnerships should be consistent with existing accountability 
arrangements between the Scottish Government and local 
partners - chiefly, [Single Outcome Agreements] between 
Government and [Community Planning Partnerships]; and the 
NHS performance management arrangements” (Scottish 
Government, 2009c, p. 4) 
 
This quotation suggests accountability for ADPs is intended to be operationalised at 
the level of individual organisations, feeding back into established, traditional lines of 
accountability, via Community Planning Partnerships and NHS bodies. However, the 
more recent national document, the Updated Guidance for ADPs, suggests that 
responsibility for implementation of the alcohol strategy would be jointly shared 
between members of each ADP, stating: 
“Partners are jointly accountable for delivery of the ADP outcomes 
within this financial framework.” (COSLA et al., 2015, p. 6) 
 
The Updated Guidance does not give further explanation for how this apparent shift 
from individual organisation accountability to joint partnership accountability is 
intended to be operationalised, nor why it has occurred. In some ways, this 
collective accountability of ADP partners seems reasonable, given that ADPs are 
supposed to collaboratively implement alcohol policy. However, the extent to which 
this approach faces challenges was strongly evident in the data, with the majority of 
ADP members across the participating local areas suggesting they felt the way the 
Scottish Government has enacted this ‘joint accountability’ was inappropriate for a 
local, non-statutory, multi-agency partnership. For example, the following ADP 
member indicated they felt that Scottish Government perceived ADPs in a way 
which was inconsistent with their structure and remit, and that this was problematic 
for the relationship between the two: 
“The Scottish Government write to ADPs as if they’re part of an 
NHS board, and they ask questions of us and they hold us to 
account and they seek documentation and plans, and they meet 
with us as if we’re part of an NHS board and they don’t really 
understand the partnership. It’s as if sometimes the ADP is 
another agency, a separate agency that has its own governance 
and accountability. It doesn’t have any of that, it’s just the 
agencies, the partners sitting around a table, but that’s not how it’s 




This quotation suggests that the Government’s apparent conception of ADPs as a 
separate organisation poses a challenge to effective communication; the interviewee 
suggests that such an approach does not fully appreciate where ADPs are 
positioned in the governance system or what their capacities are. This quotation 
also lends further support to the results above, which suggest that the Scottish 
Government is enacting a direct accountability relationship with ADPs. The data 
make clear that this approach does not sit comfortably with ADPs given it differs 
from stated expectations regarding Government acting as a ‘support’ and does not 
appear to take account of the fact ADPs are partnerships of multiple statutory (and 
non-statutory) bodies.  
 
Indeed, interviewees across all three local areas raised concerns that ADPs were 
being held collectively responsible for activities that the partnership members 
undertake individually and/or beyond the partnership (e.g. by NHS bodies, Police 
Scotland, etc.):  
“So we partially fund NHS things and yet we are held accountable 
for things that the totality of the NHS do, the NHS are reporting on 
stuff that we partially fund, I think there's real muddle, no clear 
lines of accountability, which I think makes it more difficult to 
deliver on the policy.” (LA2, ADP Member) 
 
“I think there are challenges around – I’ve talked about it all the 
way through – accountability and governance.  I can’t quite get my 
head around Scottish Government’s thinking around holding ADPs 
to account for things that are delivered by a single organisation 
that’s part of that ADP.  I think that needs to be sorted out, it 
seems bonkers to me that they continue to do that.” (LA3, ADP 
Member) 
 
Another interviewee suggested that decisions to fund some services on a partial 
basis created further confusion about what the ADP would be held accountable for 
and how governance approaches related to this: 
“We're supposed to report back on alcohol brief interventions for 
example…but we partially fund two or three areas that deliver a lot 
of these ABIs in key areas, for example, through midwifery and 
through GPs. But we don't fully fund that. So if we're not 
successful then who's actually accountable for that? […] What I 
would welcome is the government saying to me, ‘right, see that 
£1.6 million budget, actually we're going to cut that in half. You're 
getting £800,000 but here's what you're going to do. You're going 
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to go do that forward facing, community based, prevention work. 
See all the stuff you invest in treatment just now? That's the NHS 
are delivering that, why are we trying to hold you to account as an 
ADP for that?’ Why are you expecting me to influence the NHS, to 
do government policy, which is government policy for the NHS as 
well?” (LA2, ADP Member) 
 
In contrast to their preferred approach, outlined above, this interviewee described 
their actual experiences as substantially circumscribed by major resource 
constraints: 
“I look at our budget…80% odd goes to the statutory bodies who 
deliver. Now some of that is absolutely how the money should be 
spent, I've got no qualms about that at all. But then you look at the 
ADP itself and say, well, it's heavily populated by NHS and 
Council employees who have targets, who have things they have 
to do, who rely on money from the ADP to achieve those targets. 
Not all of which are the ADP targets.” (LA2, ADP Member) 
 
This suggests that, given some of these organisations rely on ADP funding to meet 
their own, separate targets, there may be a conflict of interest for some members in 
their engagement with ADP funding decision-making. Such data identify a range of 
challenges with holding ADPs accountable as a partnership and highlight the 
challenges faced by ADPs as partnerships comprised of representatives from a 
range of different organisations.  
 
Overall, the data regarding public-administrative accountability between ADPs and 
Scottish Government suggests current arrangements may require reconsideration. 
However, it was unclear how (or whether) this might happen since both national and 
local level actors expressed some sense of powerlessness to change these 
arrangements.   
 
5.3.2 ADP Professional (Horizontal) Accountability 
Professional accountability is described by Hupe and Hill (2007) as examining 
horizontal accountabilities, specifically those which exist between officials and their 
peers at local level. However, Hupe and Hill (2007) did not discuss this type of 
accountability within the context of multi-sectoral partnership working, which is 




Discussion of concepts related to professional accountability was relatively limited in 
in my analysis of national documents. For example, the Framework for Action (2009) 
merely notes that “everyone has a part to play – whether in central government, 
local government, the police, the health service, the third sector, alcohol producers 
or retailers and the public” (Scottish Government, 2009a, p. 7). The document does 
not, however, discuss how local implementers should be interacting with each other 
in terms of accountability.  
 
The stated aim of the 2009 New Framework for Local Partnerships for Alcohol and 
Drugs is to “ensure that all bodies involved in tackling alcohol and drugs problems 
are clear about their responsibilities and their relationships with each other” (Scottish 
Government, 2009c, p. 2 emphasis added). However, this New Framework goes on 
to focus on how ADPs are collectively accountable contributing to meeting 
performance management targets and to other local accountability arrangements 
such as Single Outcome Agreements [see Chapter 2]. It does not provide guidance 
on how professional accountability should be undertaken within the partnerships, 
beyond stating that local authorities, Health Boards, and other relevant local 
partners should participate fully in local partnership arrangements. For example:  
“Each local authority and NHS Board should…. ensure that these 
partnership arrangements enable them to meet their respective 
responsibilities to account to the Scottish Government, other 
partners and the public...[and] ensure that these partnership 
arrangements enable the appropriate involvement of other local 
partners with a potential contribution to make to the achievement 
of agreed local outcomes…” (Scottish Government, 2009c, p. 6 
emphasis added) 
 
Additionally, the 2015 Updated Guidance for ADPs demonstrates a focus on ADPs’ 
accountability to their superiors in the government hierarchy as opposed to intra-
partnership accountability (COSLA et al., 2014). What guidance does exist from 
policy documents therefore seems to suggest that professional accountability 
decisions are primarily left to local actors. 
 
Among national level interviewees, only a minority discussed aspects of ADPs’ 
partnership working, and none discussed how professional accountability may work 
in this context. Only one national level interviewee explicitly reported on general 
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challenges they perceived ADPs to be faced with when enacting partnership 
working:  
“The trouble is ADPs, like all of these things, there’s some great 
ones and some not so great ones, and I think partnership working 
is always a really troublesome thing to do, because if someone 
doesn’t want to play with you they won’t. So real partnership 
working is hard going.” (National Level 6) 
 
Another national level interviewee recognised the added complexity that the 
partnership approach involved, however did not further link this to challenges: 
“[Scottish alcohol policy] moved towards this model of Alcohol and 
Drug Partnerships, saying that they needed to be strategic 
partnerships embedded in community planning…I suppose it’s a 
bit like these Russian [nesting] dolls, isn’t it, you’ve got the national 
strategy and then you would hope that you’ve got community 
planning partnership approach.” (National Level 1) 
 
Overall in the national policy documents and interview data there appears to be a 
lack of national guidance about how professional accountability should be enacted 
in ADPs. In light of this lack of national guidance, it is perhaps unsurprising that the 
evidence suggests there is variation in how ADPs were performing professional 
accountability. While interviews with ADP members suggested some consensus 
about the need for, and benefits of, partnership working, responses about how they 
perceived the current quality of professional accountability in their ADP revealed a 
wide range of perspectives. For example, the following interviewee, a senior 
manager from LA2, expressed a broadly positive view: 
“I think folk are accountable and report back to the ADP and I think 
there's clear actions that come from meetings of the ADP, that 
people have to work on so I'm quite satisfied that it operates well.” 
(LA2, ADP Member) 
 
Most local interviewees, however, provided much more negative accounts of within-
ADP accountability. This included an exchange from a colleague of the above 
interviewee, in LA2: 
“A failure on our part is, see the sub-group activity, it is appalling.  
The activities are probably really great out there. I don’t know 
about it though, and they’re terrible at bringing it forward. So we 
don’t know what is going on…People are just not reporting back 
and I keep on banging the drum to that [ADP Executive] to say, 
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‘well youse41 [sic] are senior managers. These are your services, 
what are youse doing to help me to get this information?’” (LA2, 
ADP Member) 
 
This quotation suggests the interviewee perceived senior managers to be lacking in 
their professional accountability support to the ADP (i.e. that managers were not 
using their influence in their respective organisations to ensure that their services 
were fulfilling reporting requirements to the ADP). The quotation above, from a 
senior manager in the same local area, however, suggests that this message has 
either not been received or has been ignored/discounted at senior management 
level. The following exchange with an ADP member from LA1 demonstrates a 
similar frustration – the interviewee highlights the challenges of attaining information 
from the (statutory) NHS, and compares this with a very different arrangement the 
ADP has with the third-sector services they have commissioned. All of this is also 
intertwined with resource-related issues: 
Interviewee: “Inter-organisational things within how the 
partnership work are very big considerations…The way that 
funding is allocated to different parts of the services are different. 
The money gets given to the NHS as bankers. They’re just 
supposed to give it to us to run [services]. Historically what they 
actually did was take what they needed to run their services, say, 
‘no these are the important grown up services, these are the 
things that count, these have the evidence base, this is the, this is 
the seriously important stuff’, and then trickle out what was left to 
be delivered under a strategic plan. […] So then it comes to the 
Partnership who then get what’s left over and we commission 
under contracts mostly, with we have theoretical contracts with the 
NHS – “ 
AW: “What do you mean by a theoretical contract?” 
Interviewee: “It doesn’t matter if they break them. If we tell them 
this is how much money we’re spending and this is how many 
people we want, and you need to report back to us how many 
people you saw, they just don’t report, and that’s ok ‘cause they’re 
the NHS. Whereas if you did that in the voluntary sector and we 
were funding you on a three-year rolling contract that says this, 
this, this and this, we’d just pull the money if they didn’t [report 
back] … My biggest frustration is…that I don’t know how many 
clients there are in the NHS, so we give them money, but I don’t 
know how many clients there are” (LA1, ADP Member) 
 
This interviewee is part of the full-time administrative ADP team, and seems to 
perceive different levels of effectiveness of horizontal reporting than interviewees 
 
41 Colloquial Scots for ‘you’ (usually more than one person) 
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who were part of the ADP representing another organisation. It may be that ‘central’ 
ADP members have more specific insight into the issue of horizontal reporting 
because they are individually responsible for coordinating it and thus potentially 
more aware of existing challenges.  
 
Local interviewees reported further challenges related to partnership working. For 
example, that this approach did not guarantee the work of the ADP would feel 
aligned with each members’ work for their own organisation. The below quotations 
from different ADP members in LA2 help to illustrate this: 
“What I'm trying to do just now, and again this is what I think we 
need [to] work better as a partnership, you know I've got 4 or 5 
subgroups in the ADP structure…how it should work is those 
subgroups should drive activity. Whereas the feeling I get, is that 
actually the subgroups is people doing their jobs for the agencies 
they work for coming together to have a chat, and going away and 
working for the agencies they work for.” (LA2, ADP Member) 
 
“…it can be difficult, because everybody leaves that table and 
goes away to manage their own services, in the best way that they 
can. Which immediately then falls back into their local priorities, 
and local governancing [sic] arrangements. And that can be very 
difficult to continually keep on your radar that, I have to be mindful 
of that, of that, and of that, or X, Y, Z, whatever it happens to be. 
When you then get the barrage of emails of, you need to do, you 
need to do, you need to do. And you're thinking, but I have a day 
job to do.” (LA2, ADP Member) 
 
The second quotation indicates that this ADP member may feel torn between their 
‘day job’ and the demands of the ADP. From this, a key challenge regarding 
accountability in ADPs emerges: once partners leave the space of the ADP (e.g. 
leave a meeting of the ADP) their organisation’s own priorities and responsibilities 
are of primary concern, indicating that the work and responsibilities of the ADP as a 
partnership may be de-prioritised.  
 
Tensions around resources also appeared to be a key source of challenges to 
partnership working and accountability across this chapter’s analysis: 
“So the ADP want us to redesign on 20% less [funding] to increase 
capacity. And I do get to a point where I say, you know guys, not 
possible. Not possible. Not unless, well, they need to rob Peter to 
pay Paul, basically, and it gets very divisive because we have 
quite well established formal and informal partnerships across 
health, social care and the voluntary sector that have taken a long 
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time to build up. Before there was any talk of [health and social 
care] integration…there was well established partnerships sharing 
of information despite governance issues around data protection 
and that kind of stuff, we still managed to share information that's 
required and people get a holistic service you know. But now we're 
all competing for 20% less, it all gets a lot tetchier again. We've 
come through a lot of tetchiness, there've been a lot of antipathy 
between sectors and you know I fear it’s all kicking off again 
because nobody can see how they make 20% less work without 
that impacting…with no change in policy direction and no change 
in outcomes… it seems really easy to me for Scottish Government 
just to say, ‘off you go and do this’, and they really don’t 
understand that policy into practice doesn't work with that kind of 
catastrophic change.” (LA1, ADP Member, NHS) 
 
Another interviewee described accounting for money spent by the ADP with the 
intention of progressing on the local Strategy and Delivery Plan. They noted the 
challenges which arise when partners from statutory organisations (e.g. police, 
health) are asked to account for their contributions to this progress: 
“I think partnership working with statutory services is not 
particularly great historically, and that’s come down to budgets…a 
massive part of our budget goes to [statutory services], and there 
doesn’t seem to be any sort of – I don’t know – governance 
particularly… [statutory services] just get that money every year. 
And they just see it as their money, so as an ADP when you’re 
kind of saying, this is our Strategy and Delivery Plan and these are 
the objectives that we need to make, how are you with that more 
money helping us with that? The hackles go up and people get 
quite defensive, and they don’t like reporting on that and 
responding to that, so that’s quite difficult and it makes 
relationships not the best at times” (LA2, ADP Member) 
 
This suggests that although the ADP has an agreed Strategy and Delivery Plan to 
implement alcohol policy, services and initiatives are often being implemented within 
the professional context of these statutory organisations, rather than the ADP. Thus 
it appears that any pressure towards professional accountability between ADP 
members is often outweighed by each member’s sense of accountability back to 
their own organisation.   
 
Although much of the above analysis is critical of the current system, there were 
some, more positive reports of shifts towards a growing sense of professional 
accountability within ADPs. In particular, the role of effective leaders who are 
strategically placed seemed to be important for increasing effective professional 
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accountability practices within the ADP. For example, in LA2 a shift among the 
leadership of the ADP reportedly resulted in ADP subgroups being included more in 
discussions and, in turn, raising accountability expectations. The quotation from the 
LA2 member below suggests they perceived this to be a positive shift.  
“It's only been fairly recently the [ADP Executive] have been very 
keen to get the subgroups more involved and to be more 
accountable as well…Previously, it has been very much, we have 
subgroups, away doing their own thing, we maybe don't get an 
awful lot of feedback from them, and now and again we'll ask them 
some questions about something, or what's being delivered. 
Certainly, we have to do quarterly reports back into the [ADP 
Executive] but I've noticed, certainly recently, that there seems to 
have been a shift in emphasis where we are now included in the 
[ADP Executive] meetings, and we are expected to provide 
feedback on whatever we're doing. So, it's about more 
accountability which I don’t think is a bad thing” (LA2, ADP 
Member) 
 
This echoes public administration literature which observes the leadership roles 
managers can adopt in an effort to stimulate action within horizontal networks 
(Wallis and Gregory, 2009). The findings are further aligned with studies in the 
systematic review, particularly Mooney et al. (2017) who suggest that leadership is 
an enabler of alcohol policy implementation. Building on their study, my data 
suggest leadership can play a role in improving accountability relationships within 
partnerships. Other local interviewees also spoke of the influence that ADP 
leadership could have on the relationships within, and ethos of, their partnership. 
Leaders such as ADP Chairs spoke of how they perceived their role as an 
opportunity to enact positive change in this partnership context, for example by 
seeking to strengthen the commitment of ADPs to ideas of prevention and recovery-
oriented systems of care.  
 
Despite the challenges noted in the data above, a commitment to partnership 
working was evident among my interviewees. The following quotations from different 
ADP members in LA2 indicate the importance of partnership for demonstrating the 
outcomes being achieved. 
“All of these things need to be done in partnership, no single, 
whether it’s ADP, or health or social care, nobody should be 
setting these things on their own. It needs to be partnership 
considered because they need to be achievable, we need to 
understand what they mean…we’re trying to be clever and we’re 
177 
 
trying to develop systems and processes to meet, to help us 
demonstrate some of these outcomes, but if these things are not 
marrying up, it can cause quite a bit of confusion, so that would be 
my caution. These things are great but they need to be done in 
partnership.” (LA2, ADP Member) 
 
“Where it can be difficult is that understanding of each other's 
services, and constraints and boundaries that we work within. And 
that can be very, it can lead to, not a lack of understanding - the 
good thing about that group is there's not really any conflict of it. 
But there can be, as we seen yesterday, where communication 
breaks down. For instance, with alcohol brief interventions in 
maternity, we don't want to be raising it away up there, to a 
strategic level. But we may have to, because that means that we 
won't be able to meet our target. But really, we're relying, then, on 
one of the agencies at the table to just pick the phone up and 
speak to us.” (LA2, ADP Member) 
 
There seemed to be a consensus, or a baseline assumption, that working in 
partnership was the best way to achieve positive outcomes and reach set targets. 
This assumption existed within the context of constrained finances, and ADP 
members seemed to perceive that not only was partnership working the best way 
forward, it may be the only way to achieve their objectives and targets.  
 
A specific benefit of working in partnership, as reported by local interviewees, was 
that it gave members an opportunity to develop productive, understanding 
relationships with one another:  
“Although it’s a large area geographically, it’s a relatively small 
population. So, a lot of the same people sit on a lot of the same 
committees. And the nice, well the downside of that, is you never 
met anybody new but the upside of that is, I think, they have quite 
a lot of influence in a lot of areas. So, they can take work or 
initiatives and so on, perhaps from one committee, and they can 
put it in context over all the other work that they do.” (LA3, ADP 
Member) 
 
“I think [the ADP] does have added value, to be honest, finances 
aside. I think partners working together is massively important, 
and I think because it’s got some sort of statute if you like behind 
it, people are very compliant and will turn up to those meetings.  
Secondly, I think that it’s really important because it serves to give 
a common language amongst partners who work with 
organisations who have their own organisational language. So, it’s 
very, very easy for people to say, well, I’m doing this because it 
meets my organisational goals and I’m not doing this because it 
doesn’t. What the ADP does in some of the Quality Principles and 
the drivers which are new are coming out of the Scottish 
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Government does, start to say, we all collectively need to be 
working towards something as a group and understanding that. 
So, to that end, I think it’s useful.” (LA3, ADP Member) 
 
This second quotation places the work of the ADP within the broader accountability 
framework mandated by the Scottish Government (i.e. the mandate to establish 
ADPs, and to demonstrate adherence to the Quality Principles). It identifies that this 
helps organisations to buy in to the work of the partnership, even if some activities 
are not directly targeted at meeting their individual organisation’s goals.  
 
5.3.3 ADP Participatory (Vertical) Accountability  
‘Participatory accountability’ within Hupe and Hill’s (2007) typology is described as 
the appraisal of policy implementation by citizens or service users, against their own 
expectations. In the data reported below, interviewees often used the term 
‘community engagement’ to describe aspects of ADPs’ relationships with the 
public42. Further, while the data will suggest ADP members are motivated by a 
sense of responsibility to service users, a similar responsibility to the broader public 
appears to be somewhat absent (or sometimes conflated with service user 
engagement). Note, these data are situated within the broader Scottish policy 
context in which there has been increased discourse around ‘community 
engagement’ or ‘empowerment’ in local governance in Scotland (SCDC, n.d.; 
Scottish Government, n.d.).  
 
From the outset, my documentary analysis highlighted that while national policy 
documents and guidance communicate the importance of community engagement 
by ADPs, they do not tend to explicitly state that this should create an accountability 
relationship between ADPs and their communities. For example, the Framework for 
Action suggests that community engagement was required only in order to ascertain 
‘local needs’ (Scottish Government, 2009a) and did not elaborate on expectations 
regarding the relationships between ADPs and the public. A brief section in this 
policy envisages “working with a wide range of partners to ensure that local delivery 
of services and activities to tackle alcohol misuse is effective, efficient and 
 
42 My interpretation was that most respondents were using ‘community engagement’ as a 
catchall-phrase to refer to a spectrum of activities involving the public in local alcohol policy 
(including, for example, ‘consultation’ or ‘community empowerment’). I report these terms as 
the respondents use them. 
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accountable” (Scottish Government, 2009a, p. 25). However, the content that 
follows does not identify community members, service users or the broader public 
as parties having authority or capacity to hold to account actors involved in 
implementing the alcohol strategy.  
 
Somewhat in contrast to the above, the 2015 Updated Guidance for ADPs uses 
slightly stronger language regarding community engagement by ADPs, and 
conceptualises this as involving service users (but not necessarily the broader 
public) in planning and decision-making, as well as conducting local needs 
assessments. Regarding the development of local ADP Delivery Plans, the Updated 
Guidance states in an Annex that:  
“[ADPs] should outline in your Plan how service users and carers 
are/are to be embedded within your partnership commissioning 
processes and how service users and their families play/will play a 
central role in evaluating the impact and supporting improvement 
of your statutory and third sector services.” (COSLA et al., 2015, p. 
10) 
 
Additionally, the Updated Guidance goes on to simply state that a priority action for 
ADPs is to “indicate arrangements for strengthening service user engagement” (pg. 
12). These excerpts suggest a more formal role for service users and their families 
to be involved in ADP planning and decision-making, yet their evaluation role 
appears to be limited to evaluating services. It is therefore not entirely clear whether 
(and if so, how) ADPs should engage in an accountability relationship with service 
users. However, the quotations also indicate that ADPs can themselves outline in 
their Plan how they are going to engage with service users, which appears to 
provide ADPs with some flexibility in enacting this relationship. In other words, ADP 
members could potentially incorporate accountability into the relationship. The local 
interview data, which will be discussed below, examines how this relationship has 
been enacted in the three local areas in this study, and how ADP members often 
expressed an intrinsic sense of ‘responsibility to’ their respective local communities.  
 
A final observation from the national documentary analysis is that the national 
documents were not always clear and consistent about who in the community ADPs 
should engage. For example, as noted, the Framework for Action (2009) generally 
indicated the need to “work with a wide range of partners” (pg. 5). When documents 
(e.g. the Quality Principles, Updated Guidance for ADPs) did name a particular 
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population group, this was most often ‘service users’ accessing alcohol and drug 
services and their families or carers. This guidance seems to contrast with the idea 
of a ‘whole population approach’ to tackling alcohol-related harm.  
 
Within national-level interview data, there was limited evidence that national 
stakeholders expected local implementers to be formally accountable to their 
communities beyond simply involving the public in some capacity (though I 
acknowledge that interview questions regarding accountability and community 
engagement were generally asked separately). The statement by the interviewee 
below is unique among the national-level interviews in indicating that ADPs should 
actually make changes to their implementation practice on the basis of ‘community 
engagement’: 
“I think that Alcohol and Drug Partnerships did have a remit to do 
some local community engagement. And I think that there was an 
expectation that they would modify their messaging and their 
techniques accordingly. But, I've said before, they tend to focus on 
quite narrow segments of the local population.” (National Level 4) 
 
Although this quotation recommends a responsiveness of ADPs to community 
needs, it still does not provide a strong sense of how, or to what extent, local policy 
implementers ought to be accountable to their communities. Further, this 
interviewee acknowledges a tension between ADPs’ apparent mandate to undertake 
community engagement to implement Scotland’s alcohol strategy (and its whole 
population approach), while having a remit which focuses their attention on 
particular segments of the population. Another national-level interviewee 
commented on the lack of clarity about how ADPs’ involvement of service users 
would be enacted, stating that while there was a “push” from Scottish Government 
to involve service users in shaping services:  
“Bits of the local authority involved in the ADPs would have been 
far more, insightful and aware of how to do that or experienced in 
doing it than [Scottish Government] were.  It was almost…I mean, 
I’ve heard some people say, ‘oh yeah, well Scottish Government’s 
just rediscovered community development that had happened 20 
years before,’ whatever. But that has definitely built [an] 
expectation from central government, that whole community 
empowerment and engagement…[It’s] not always necessarily 




This quotation is consistent with the observation from the documentary analysis 
above, that there is a lack of clarity about how ADP relationships with the public are 
intended to be enacted, including with whom in the public they are intended to 
engage. It also suggests, however, that local actors may be better positioned than 
Scottish Government to decide how to enact this relationship.  
 
Local-level interview data provided a sense of how ADP members interpreted 
national-level expectations (and ambiguity) about community engagement. In 
particular, local-level interviewees provided a greater sense that ADP members felt 
an intrinsic sense of responsibility in the course of their work for ‘making a 
difference’ or ‘improving things’ for their communities and service users:  
“[ADP Members] are in public service or they're in voluntary sector 
because they really want to make a difference to individuals and 
families and communities.” (LA1, ADP Member) 
 
“if we can identify areas that are needing a wee bit of 
improvement, we can look at what supports are there to help 
people move things forward, and ultimately improve things for the 
folk that are using the services” (LA2, ADP Member) 
 
“most people who end up working with alcohol and drugs, they do 
it because they believe they can make a difference, so you’ve got 
a group of committed people.” (LA3, ADP Member) 
 
Further, ADP members described how they sought the feedback of service users 
and people in recovery in the course of their implementation work: 
“We spent probably the best part of 18 months to two years 
engaging with not just people in recovery but we were really keen 
to hear their thoughts in terms of what did it feel like to be in 
recovery from addiction, and what were services were doing or not 
doing, what was the ADP doing or not doing, what was [LA2] as a 
whole doing or not doing in terms of supporting recovery?” (LA2, 
ADP Member) 
 
This interviewee, and others from LA2, indicated that this engagement did inform the 
ADP’s priorities. Relatedly, another person suggested that, in addition to the ADP 
and services being responsible for addressing the local community’s needs, 
community input should inform decision-making on both instrumental and normative 
grounds:  
“I think our services should be designed and reviewed with service 
user involvement…We need to have services that are relevant to 
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the needs of the people that we’re providing services to. The best 
way to do that is to involve service users in the planning of these 
services and the reviewing of them and then getting feedback from 
them. I mean that’s just as a matter of principle. It’s just a way I 
think that services are most effective when they're are designed in 
that way.” (LA2, ADP Member) 
 
This person seems to hold as self-evident that responding to service user needs is a 
primary task of the ADP, and that this is best achieved by their involvement and 
evaluation of these services. This was consistent with other local interviewees in 
also suggesting that ADP members were drawing on normative motivations for 
involving service user perspectives in their decision-making. Indeed, while the data 
from the local-level interviews provide evidence that community engagement is 
occurring within local implementation practices, local interviewees rarely cited policy 
guidance as their reason for doing so.  
 
Further, it appeared that ADP members’ recognition of the importance of responding 
to service user needs was perceived by them as separate from their accountability 
obligations back to the Scottish Government (e.g. for achieving national targets). 
The data also suggested that ADP members’ being subject to these different types 
of accountability created challenges, as they navigated the formal pressures of 
working towards targets as well as simultaneously responding to service user needs 
based on their own normative motivations: 
“If you go into a community and ask them about indicators, that 
means nothing to them. What you need to be able to do is take the 
stuff that they want you to do and take the stuff the people’s telling 
you to do and find the middle ground. Find the middle ground and 
deliver what people what you to do down here. And they don’t 
need to understand all of that stuff, nor should they about…I’m not 
being disrespectful with that, but we need to be able to show the 
government that you’re implementing what they want you to do. 
And that’s our job in the middle. Our job’s to find that bit to enable 
people at the ground level to do stuff and feel empowered, but tick 
the boxes for the government. That’s my job.” (LA2, ADP Member)  
 
This interviewee described local implementers as occupying a ‘middle ground’. 
Other interviewees, from a range of organisational perspectives, also described a 
similar drive to ensure that community needs and community-level change was 
pursued while also meeting national-level requirements: 
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“We do look at the national policy, and the national drivers, there's 
got to be a recognition that it's not gonna go away. It probably is 
under-resourced, it's probably more hidden in a lot of areas, than 
we really know. And it's up to us, as agencies, to continue to keep 
that on the front burner, whilst deflecting a lot of the difficult stuff 
that needs to be doing, and advocating for our client group to 
show them that there is something at the other end of it.” (LA2, 
ADP Member, NHS) 
 
“We can do things to tick boxes all day long, and I know we have 
accountability to Scottish Government and there's funding issues 
as well, but the way I look at it is we should be delivering projects 
which are having a meaningful impact on these things, not just to 
say that we've done something to help to tick a box, something 
that's hopefully going to have a lasting effect on the communities.” 
(LA2, ADP Member, Police) 
 
Despite the clear commitment evident in some local interviews to meaningfully 
addressing local needs, it was apparent that efforts to achieve this were challenging. 
For example, one interviewee reported they perceived some panic from their 
partnership colleagues in response to efforts to enact participatory accountability: 
“We’ve developed a service audit tool which aligns itself with the 
Quality Principles, because that’s what we need to be reporting 
on, and a large part of that will be service user involvement…and 
my first meeting with statutory services when we looked at the 
audit tool, there was a panicked look on the face, and ‘there’s an 
awful lot of service user questions on here’. Yeah, there is, and 
that’s the way that it should be, because this is what we’re wanting 
people to, we want to know people’s experiences” (LA2, ADP 
Member) 
 
It is notable that I did not have any interviewees say directly that they were resistant 
to community involvement. However, as introduced in the quotation above, there 
were a small number of other instances in the data where local level interviewees 
suggested they had other colleagues who they perceived to be more dismissive of 
community involvement and participatory accountability. As an example, one 
interviewee from LA3 expressed frustration with colleagues whom s/he reported 
were dismissing feedback from service users:  
“When I first came here I had this real sort of sense at different 
meetings I went that there was a real what I would describe [as]… 
professional snobbery. So ‘the experts are right’. And that 
manifested in one meeting where we were talking and listening to 
some [service] user voice experience stuff and somebody was 
quite detrimental to this user experience because they believed 
their service was performing really well, and they tried to move the 
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whole meeting on, and that really frustrated me…I said, ‘look, you 
can’t just dismiss that, your service maybe is doing a good job, but 
this particular individual’s perception on this particular day is that 
they weren’t treated well, and that is a legitimate voice that needs 
to be listened to.’” (LA3, ADP Member) 
 
An additional challenge interviewees reported was the potential conflict between 
participatory and public-administrative accountability, with interviewees suggesting 
that the former was often de-prioritised in favour of the latter.  For example: 
“The alcohol project […] is a case in point. That’s not a statutory 
service.  If I’m going to make a choice, which I might have to, next 
year, about what we continue to provide, service wise, that service 
might be at risk, because we don’t have to do it, whereas we do 
have to write court reports, we do have to supervise community 
payback orders.”  (LA3, ADP Member) 
 
This suggests that the current national level emphasis on formal public-
administrative accountability (and relative neglect of participatory accountability) was 
informing local decision-making in ways that reflected this prioritisation.  
 
The data presented here suggest ADP members often feel a sense of responsibility 
to service users or the public, and that engaging them is an important component of 
fulfilling this responsibility. However, the data did not appear to demonstrate that 
ADPs experienced any formalised mandate to enact a participatory accountability 
relationship with the public. Further, the data did not provide any evidence that there 
were formal mechanisms available to members of the public to impose 
consequences or otherwise exert pressure on the ADP if they judged their decisions 
to be poor. However, this may be shifting as a result of changes to the legislative 
context, specifically the introduction of the Community Empowerment Act (2015).  
 
 
5.4 Discussion  
5.4.1 Principal Findings: Reflecting on Hupe and Hill (2007) 
This chapter mapped and analysed different accountability relationships 
experienced by ADP members (their ‘accountability regime’) to examine how these 
may influence ADPs’ work to implement Scotland’s alcohol strategy. While Hupe 
and Hill’s (2007) typology of accountabilities was employed to organise the data, the 
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results suggested ADPs’ accountability regime can be further  illuminated by treating 
these key accountability relationships as ‘directional’ and top-down or bottom-up in 
nature: (i) vertical, top-down accountability of ADPs to Scottish Government; (ii) 
horizontal accountability of ADP members to their colleagues within these 
partnerships; and (iii) vertical, bottom-up accountability of ADPs to service users / 
the public (Table 5.2). My analysis of these relationships suggests ADPs’ 
accountability regime is more complex than the Hupe and Hill typology alone allows 
- they were observed to exist simultaneously to create a complex, sometimes 
confusing, and context-dependent ADP accountability regime. 
 
Table 5.2 Revised Representation of ADP Accountability Regime 
Vertical (top-down) 
accountability 
Horizontal accountability Vertical (bottom-up) 
accountability 
Public-administrative Partnership Professional Participatory 
Scottish Government 





Peers from own 
organisations 
Service users, carers, 
citizens, residents, etc. 
 
Reflecting on my findings, I have added a column to the revised table to highlight the 
complexities of the ‘partnership’ aspects of ADP accountability. While Hupe and 
Hill’s emphasis on professional accountability is clearly reflected in the interview 
data regarding accountability across partners within an ADP, it fails to capture key 
aspects of concerns about the ambiguous sense of collective responsibility for the 
actions of particular actors within the ADP, highlighting the significance of distinctive 
‘partnership’ dynamics as well as professional. Other literature which has used the 
Hupe and Hill typology in a partnership context, such as van Berkel and colleagues 
(2010, p. 451), have linked Hupe and Hill’s description of intra- and inter-
professional cooperation to partnership working but do not explain or justify how 
they have operationalised this.  
 
In light of the complexity and interconnectedness I observed within ADPs’ 
accountability regime, I felt it was more productive to bring the directional, 
‘horizontal’ terminology of this typology more to the fore here, following other 
accountability scholars by re-labelling this aspect of ADP accountability as 
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‘horizontal accountability’ (e.g. Michels and Meijer, 2008). This labelling refers to 
accountability where the ‘forum’ or ‘principal’ is not hierarchically superior to the 
‘agent’ (Schillemans, 2011). This more accurately captures how (i) ADP members 
were interacting with each other in horizontal, partnership-based relationships, (ii) 
how members interacted with the partnership as a whole, and (iii) how these 
relationships and interactions sat within the context of how the Scottish Government 
treats ADPs. This modification in how I saw my data in relation to the typology 
expands from a narrow focus on individual professionals holding their individual 
peers to account within the same profession (as depicted in the original 2007 Hupe 
and Hill typology), to a focus on how ADP members try to hold other members to 
account for their work contributing to the ADP’s goals and values.  
 
Finally, where Hupe and Hill (2007) depicted accountability between local 
implementers and service users as horizontal, I perceived participatory 
accountability in the relationship between ADPs and service users to be a bottom-
up, vertical one. This was because I observed a lack of a formal participatory 
accountability relationship between these actors - service users do not have a 
formal evaluative power which would make this relationship more horizontal. It 
seemed that ADP members were motivated by an intrinsic sense of responsibility, 
generated from ‘bottom-up’, towards service users and the broader community. 
 
5.4.2 Principal Findings on ADPs’ Accountability Regime, Influence of 
Context, and Contribution to Literature 
This chapter addressed the research question: How was local implementation of 
Scotland’s 2009 alcohol strategy influenced by formal and informal accountability 
mechanisms in the context of ADPs? The principal findings from the analysis are as 
follows.  
 
My analysis of the data regarding ADPs’ vertical, top-down accountability 
relationship with the Scottish Government indicated it was characterised by 
ambiguity and complexity. Firstly, the data suggested the Scottish Government is 
inconsistent in their communication and actions about whether they are ‘supporting’ 
ADPs or holding them to account (e.g. through traditional mechanisms such as 
reporting and inspection). Second, such ambiguities led ADP members to 
sometimes speculate what they might be held accountable for (e.g. in relation to 
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commissioning), which resulted in different actions and variable alcohol policy 
implementation. Third, this relationship was made more complex by ADPs’ status as 
non-statutory partnerships. The data suggested they were held collectively 
accountable for realising Scottish Government expectations but their structure often 
presented a challenge to meeting these expectations, leading to frustration and 
confusion. For example, ADP interviewees expressed concern that they were held 
accountable for alcohol policy activities over which they did not have (sole) financial 
control.   
 
Thus, a second principal finding regarding ADPs’ accountability regime was related 
to horizontal accountability arrangements within ADPs. Namely, that these 
arrangements are enacted within the context of these partnerships’ broader vertical 
accountability relationship with Scottish Government described above, and bring 
their own set of challenges for ADPs. Key among these were, despite the mandate 
that ADPs work in a partnership format, they had not been provided formal guidance 
about how to operationalise intra-partnership accountability, and this led to a lack of 
effective horizontal accountability. This challenged progress in implementing the 
alcohol strategy because not all partners would regularly or adequately report on 
their actions, leaving the ADP with incomplete information with which to make 
decisions.  
 
The third principal finding was that while there is not a formal bottom-up, vertical 
accountability between ADP members and the community, ADP members reported 
being motivated by an intrinsic, or normative, sense of responsibility towards them. 
This was evident in how ADP members sought to engage service users for the 
purposes of informing ADP decision-making, and how ADP members sought to 
respond to their identified needs. Two secondary points are important to make here. 
ADPs’ community engagement was most often undertaken with service users 
specifically, and ADP members sometimes appeared to conflate ‘service users’ as a 
group with the ‘community’ more broadly. While the focus on service users 
appeared pragmatic and useful to inform ADP implementation work, it seemed in 
contrast with the ‘whole population approach’ of the Scottish alcohol strategy. It 
implies a narrow sense of participatory accountability focused on service users 
rather than entailing broader engagement of local communicates affected by 
alcohol. Additionally, while ADP members reported their own prioritisation of 
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community/service user engagement, when forced to decide between this and 
fulfilling top-down accountability obligations to Scottish Government, the top-down 
accountability would necessarily be prioritised. This suggested that these 
accountabilities were sometimes in conflict with one another, meaning ADPs are 
unable to prioritise community engagement, despite the Scottish Government’s 
broader rhetoric about the importance of this type of work.  
 
Considering the above findings collectively, ADPs’ accountability relationships and 
associated mechanisms were experienced simultaneously as ‘multiple 
accountabilities’, which link together to structure the overall, complex ADP 
accountability regime. This observation aligns with Hupe and Hill’s contention that 
implementers would, in practice, exist in a “complex institutional web” (Hupe and 
Hill, 2007, p. 290) and be “confronted with multiple demands for accountable 
behaviour” (ibid). It is only by analysing the ‘directions’ of accountability 
relationships, as well as the types and mechanisms, that we can fully understand 
how such a sense of complexity, confusion and miscommunication around 
accountability arises within ADPs.  
 
Context and Resources 
It is evident across this chapter that aspects of ADPs’ context and members’ 
experiences regarding resources influenced their accountabilities and 
implementation work (for example, see p. 160, 162, 165, 167, 174-175). A specific 
contextual influence were the budget cuts faced by ADPs at time of data generation. 
My data make clear that ADP members felt these cuts were strongly influencing 
their implementation decision-making work and that they perceived the expectation 
they would continue delivering local alcohol policy at previous levels profoundly 
problematic. This reinforces the finding in the systematic review (Chapter 3) and 
broader implementation literature, that resources are a critical factor in 
implementation work (Casswell et al., 2018; Exworthy and Powell, 2004; Fitzgerald 
et al., 2015; Foster, 2016; Hill and Hupe, 2014; Matland, 1995; O’Toole, 2004; 
Parkes et al., 2011). These budget cuts occurred in the broader context of austerity 
in the UK (Taylor-Gooby and Stoker, 2011) but, perhaps surprisingly, no national 
interviewees mentioned austerity, and only two local interviewees did (with only one 
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of these directly linking cuts to the ADP budget)43. Instead, local interviewees 
seemed to place responsibility for ADP budget cuts with the Scottish Government. 
This inevitably impacted on the relationship between the Scottish Government and 
ADPs, with ADP members generally perceiving the Scottish Government to be 
imposing accountability for alcohol policy implementation while not providing the 
necessary resources for implementation. 
 
Another obvious contextual factor discussed throughout the chapter was the 
influence of ADPs’ partnership working context, to which funding issues presented 
further complications. A key finding was that ADPs were being held collectively 
accountable for activities which they only partially funded (and/or were delivered by 
a single organisation within the partnership), with members reporting frustration 
about this. Further, the lack of funding available appeared to foster competition 
between partners, potentially damaging their ability to collaborate effectively. 
Together, these results suggest that the funding structures and governance 
approach to supporting ADPs are currently presenting a challenge to their 
partnership working and accountability, and thus their overall implementation work. 
These challenges were evident in the lack of clarity ADP members seemed to have 
about their responsibilities, and in interviewees’ suggestions for how to redistribute 
their budgets (and accountabilities) in a manner which reflects their status as non-
statutory partnerships.  
 
These findings are again consistent with existing literature which recognises the 
difficulty of working in partnership in a context of constrained resources (Fawcett et 
al., 2010). For example, in an in-depth report of partnership and alcohol policy 
implementation, Thom and colleagues (2011) found that “financial 
constraints/funding”, “lack of resources or problems with allocating resources”, and 
“managing cuts often in the face of increasing demands” were the most frequently 
mentioned weaknesses and challenges of partnerships as identified by local alcohol 
coordinators (p.26-27). The findings in this chapter and relevant literature 
consistently point to a continued need for investing sufficiently in alcohol 
 
43 However, one of the included local area’s ‘Strategy and Delivery Plan’ acknowledged that 




implementation partnerships to support both their partnership and implementation 
work.  
 
Interestingly, resources were not mentioned in the data  as factors shaping ADPs’ 
participatory accountability (although I should note that I did not ask about this 
specifically in interviews). I can only speculate that, like other implementation 
activities, community engagement seems likely to have resource-related 
implications and, therefore, to be shaped by resources  
 
Contribution to Literature 
To my knowledge, this is the first analysis of Scottish ADPs’ accountability regime. It 
is useful to place my findings in the context of relevant alcohol policy implementation 
research and broader literature.  
 
First, ADPs’ work to interpret top-down Scottish Government expectations reaffirms 
findings from the systematic review (Chapter 3) in which the ‘translation’ work of 
local alcohol policy implementers often leads to variation in implementation. While 
the ways accountability relationships are enacted often have elements of subjectivity 
(Schillemans, 2008), a lack of formal guidance may be exacerbating this variation in 
Scottish alcohol policy implementation. While such variation is consistent with what 
is known from existing literature (e.g. Fitzgerald et al., 2017; MacGregor et al., 2013; 
Parkes et al., 2011), it develops this further by demonstrating variation within 
accountability relationships between alcohol policy stakeholders.  
 
Second, these findings also add new insight to the findings of the systematic review 
in terms of ‘community engagement’. While the systematic review results found 
‘public involvement’ to be a frequently identified facilitator of local alcohol policy 
implementation, the research in this chapter represents the first exploration of how 
and whether local alcohol partnerships in Scotland are being held accountable for 
their efforts to involve communities and/or respond to their needs. Additionally, none 
of the included studies in the systematic review differentiated the sets of people 
within communities with whom alcohol policy implementers may be interacting. This 
chapter highlights how ADP members are often seeking to engage service users, 
but that there is less evidence of them proactively engaging the broader public – an 
approach which is arguably pragmatic and appropriately ‘targeted’ given their time 
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and resource availability, however is in contrast with the stated  ‘whole population 
approach’ of the 2009 alcohol strategy.  
 
Third, as noted in the above subsection on context, this chapter builds on the limited 
literature which examines partnership working within alcohol policy implementation 
(Thom et al., 2013a; Thom et al., 2011). Existing research from an English context 
has noted that tensions can arise between professional cultures within local alcohol 
partnerships, and calls for a deeper interrogation of how issues of responsibility and 
accountability may be challenging partnership working (Thom et al., 2013a). This 
chapter helps confirm Thom and colleagues’ (2013a) claim that tensions 
surrounding accountability to one’s own organisation and to the partnership “prevent 
fully integrated partnership working” (p. 74). My findings help to illuminate and 
explain these issues in the Scottish context, suggesting that ADP members’ 
accountability to their own organisation is often prioritised over the needs of the 
partnership. This was potentially exacerbated by the ADPs’ status as a non-statutory 
partnership, which meant that there did not appear to be any meaningful 
consequences if a member’s participation was limited. Further, the findings showed 
how intra-partnership relationships and accountability between local alcohol policy 
implementers (from different professional backgrounds) can be a potential barrier to 
alcohol policy implementation progress.  
 
The finding that horizontal accountability was influenced by the context created by 
ADPs’ vertical accountability relationship with the Scottish Government is consistent 
with existing accountability literature which discusses horizontal accountability as 
existing in the “shadow of hierarchy” (Schillemans, 2008). Accountability and 
governance scholars (e.g. Conteh, 2016; Peters, 2011; Schillemans, 2011, 2008) 
have argued that the influence of central government is always present (even if not 
directly applied) in local/decentralised decision-making and actions. For example, 
this may be through group or partnership members being aware that their “horizontal 
interactions may have an impact – for better and for worse – in their vertical 
relations” (Schillemans, 2008, p. 191). In the ADP context, the data suggested ADP 
intra-partnership relationships and accountability were perceived in relation to the 




In the broadest sense, having analysed that ADPs’ accountability regime is often 
characterised by complexity, confusion, and miscommunication, it appears these 
findings – from a Scottish public health policy context – align with broader 
governance literature which highlights that problems can arise when an actor 
experiences multiple accountabilities that potentially conflict with one another 
(Koppell, 2005; Schillemans and Bovens, 2011). My findings suggest learning from 
this literature may be usefully applicable in a Scottish alcohol policy context, where 
ADPs report conflicts between their formal, top-down accountability to Scottish 
Government and their normative, bottom-up accountability to service users and the 
community.  
 
5.4.3 Understanding and Explaining ADP Accountability 
The findings in this chapter suggest the top-down accountability relationship 
between Scottish Government and ADPs is underpinned by Scottish Government’s 
uncertainty about balancing centrally- and locally-held control, discussed above. 
This in turn seems linked to the way Scottish Government miscommunicates with 
ADPs and their interpretations of their role. It is therefore understandable that 
variation in how alcohol policy implementation is enacted locally results from this. 
Additionally, Government appeared to continue using traditional accountability 
mechanisms like reporting to keep the partnership collectively accountable. My 
analysis suggested this use of more singular, traditional, hierarchical accountability 
mechanisms which treat ADPs as independent entities may be inadequately 
nuanced and static for effective use within these partnership contexts. 
 
These partnership-related challenges create a context which influences and can 
help explain the findings generated about horizontal accountability. In particular, the 
lack of horizontal accountability within ADPs appeared to be linked to the distinction 
made between statutory and non-statutory organisations, and how statutory ones 
did not perceive the ADP to be an authoritative, legitimate forum to whom reporting 
is mandatory. This was plausible given that ADPs are comprised of such a variety of 
different organisations, each with different backgrounds, professional expectations, 




Turning to vertical, bottom-up accountability, the manner in which ADPs prioritise 
engaging with service users instead of the broader public may be explained by how 
they reported perceiving service users as being the most relevant population with 
which to engage. Indeed, the data suggests they perceived service user experiential 
knowledge as being a key source of information with which to inform ADP decision-
making (explored in greater detail in Chapter 7). While this approach to engagement 
is somewhat in contrast with the ‘whole population approach’ of the 2009 alcohol 
strategy, it is unsurprising given ADPs’ constrained time and resources to undertake 
engagement work, and the lack of formal mechanisms or guidance which support 
them in doing this. Additionally, the language used in ADP guidance suggested 
ADPs were seen more as service delivery organisations, given that ‘service users’ 
and their families/carers were the focus, providing further explanation for why ADPs 
appear to prioritise their engagement with these particular populations. 
 
The confusion, complexity, and miscommunication which characterises ADPs’ 
accountability regime seems to be explained by a combination of the above factors 
and the ways in which ADPs are attempting to balance their responsibilities for each 
of the above accountabilities. For example, local interviewees suggested that ADP 
members attempted to meet their responsibilities to both central government bodies 
and to communities (or, at least, service users). Further, that because these 
pressures were relatively disconnected from one another, ADP members were 
experiencing both top-down and bottom-up accountability at any given time, creating 
tensions and challenges. The data suggest these tensions were commonly resolved 
via decisions to prioritise formal, top-down accountabilities rather than the bottom-up 
accountability, despite often reporting that they felt the latter was more meaningful. 
This suggests that ADPs are currently navigating a system which they feel (despite 
national level statements about ‘support’) asks them to participate in an ‘indicator-
oriented’ accountability regime (Hupe and Hill, 2007), in which local implementers 
are overtly and formally concerned with their performance in relation to their 
superiors, and seek to comply with performance targets. This was happening to 
such a degree that ADP members claimed top-down accountability and reporting 
was negatively impacting on their ability to effectively implement Scotland’s alcohol 
strategy, because these efforts were taking time and resources away from meeting 
community needs. Throughout the data, it appears that these elements have served 




5.4.4 Implications for policy and practice 
Several implications for policy and practice potentially follow from this chapter’s 
findings. First, the ambiguities evident in the ADP-Scottish Government top-down 
relationship, and the challenges to progressing with alcohol policy implementation 
which result from this, suggest a need for clear communication between these 
actors about expectations of ADPs within implementation. Further, any top-down 
accountability mechanisms need to be cognizant of ADPs’ non-statutory partnership 
structure.  
 
Second, the findings regarding ADPs’ current approach to community engagement 
suggest there may be potential for ADPs to draw on broader policy and legislation to 
buttress their prioritisation of engagement. For example, the Community 
Empowerment Act (2015) may potentially create more horizontal relationships 
between ADP members and service users, given that it creates situations in which 
local public organisations may be held increasingly accountable for demonstrating 
how they involve the local community in their work (SCDC, 2015). Note, however, it 
is unclear whether this would extend beyond service users in ways that reflect the 
whole population approach of the alcohol strategy.  
 
Third, ADP members were clear about the need to have commensurate resources 
and authority to meet the expectations placed upon them. As noted above, the 
accountability expectations experienced by ADP members appear to be currently 
imbalanced compared with the resources they have available. Rethinking may be 
required to find more reasonable balance between these, although this will be 
challenging in a context in which the need for alcohol services remains high (Audit 
Scotland, 2019).  
 
5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter demonstrated that ADPs report experiencing an accountability ‘regime’ 
characterised by confusion, complexity, and miscommunication between themselves 
and those to whom they feel formally or informally accountable to. In their 
experiences of this accountability regime, ADPs report multiple accountabilities, 




This chapter made a number of contributions to alcohol policy implementation 
scholarship. First, it showed how Hupe and Hill’s (2007) framework can be usefully 
adapted in terms of rethinking the idea of ‘professional accountability’ within a 
partnership working, alcohol policy implementation context. Second, the analysis 
represents the first time research has mapped and analysed the accountability 
regime of Scottish ADPs and how this may influence their work to implement locally 
Scottish alcohol policy, including considering how their accountabilities overlap and 
potentially conflict. Third, it built upon what is known about alcohol partnerships in 
the context of alcohol policy implementation, and more explicitly interrogated the 









6  “You’ve got to weigh up different things”: 
Accountability and Licensing Boards in Scotland 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines how LBs, as public organisations that exist beyond the 
traditional health arena, can have important impacts on implementation processes 
and subsequent health policy outcomes. In doing so, this chapter addresses the 
specific research question: “How was local implementation of Scotland’s 2009 
alcohol strategy influenced by formal and informal accountability mechanisms in the 
contexts of Licensing Boards?”  
 
This chapter presents data and analysis which have been published as a research 
article in the International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 
(Wright, 2019 - see Appendix 14). For thesis submission, this chapter elaborates 
and expands on this already published material.  
 
As described in Chapter 2, LBs are constituted of elected local Councillors, who, 
barring an appeal process in court, are the sole decision-makers about whether an 
alcohol licence is granted to an individual or premises. The formal roles of other 
alcohol policy implementation stakeholders, such as members of the local Health 
Board, or Police44, are as ‘consultees’ to the LB, which means they can officially 
‘object’ to a premises being granted a licence and present evidence to support their 
objection, but are not licensing decision-makers. Further, LBs are quasi-judicial 
committees, which means their decisions can only be challenged in a Sheriff’s court 
(MacGregor et al., 2013); this distinguishes them from other local political 
committees which have corresponding ‘scrutiny’ functions (Cllr L Young, 2018, 
personal communication, 6 May). Finally, local Councils and their respective 
Councillors are relatively autonomous from the Scottish Government – this 
relationship is governed by a Concordat between them, but the important note here 
 
44 Members of the Health Board and police service are also members of local ADPs, 
however their status as consultees to Licensing Boards are a separate aspect of their 
organizational role.  
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is that Councillors on LBs are consequently not automatically obliged to follow the 
priorities of the Scottish Government. 
 
This chapter is situated within and looks to build upon existing alcohol policy 
literature. First, it takes as its point of departure that LBs are responsible for 
contributing to alcohol policy implementation and its intended public health 
outcomes. This reflects existing research linking alcohol availability and alcohol-
related harm (Alcohol Focus Scotland, 2018; Richardson et al., 2015, 2014; 
Stockwell and Gruenewald, 2004). Second, it follows clear indications from the 
Scottish Government that LBs are intended to be key stakeholders in the 
implementation of Scotland’s whole population approach to alcohol (and its public 
health goals). These include statements within the Framework for Action and related 
guidance which identify reduced availability of alcohol as linked to the achievement 
of reduced alcohol-related harms (Scottish Government, 2009a). This link is most 
explicitly established through the public health licensing objective within the 
Licensing (Scotland) Act 2005. As has been noted (Chapter 2), Scotland is unique in 
the UK context for including the protection of public health as a statutory objective in 
its licensing legislation. This objective gives LBs a duty to assess the number and 
density of licensed premises in their area, which is operationalised in the concept of 
‘overprovision’ (MacGregor et al., 2013).  
 
While existing research contributes to understanding about licensing processes, 
there remains a limited body of empirical research in the UK and Scottish contexts 
reporting how key stakeholders are being held accountable for their role in 
effectively implementing licensing policy, or how the accountability regime(s) 
surrounding licensing influence alcohol policy implementation. Indeed, recent work 
by Fitzgerald and colleagues (2018) is unique in its inclusion of accountability as a 
sub-theme in their analysis of democracy and power in Scottish licensing. Their 
research reported a lack of mechanisms available to influence Councillors who were 
members of local LBs, and that LB convenors and licensing clerks had power to 
shape a given LB’s attitude towards public health. This situation sometimes resulted 
in challenges to public health progress locally and variation across local areas in 
terms of how the public health objective was perceived and implemented. This 
chapter helps to build upon and complement those authors’ work. For instance, 
where Fitzgerald and colleagues (2018) interviewed 13 public health actors and 
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covered 20 LB areas in Scotland, this chapter draws on interviews with both health 
and non-health actors - including LB members’ themselves – and focuses on deeply 
exploring interviewees’ experiences in only three local areas. Further, Fitzgerald and 
colleagues’ stated aim was to explore distributions and manifestations of power 
within licensing processes – it is with this explicit interest in mind that they briefly 
turned to accountability. This current chapter is exclusively focused on the issue of 
LB accountability, seeking to understand and map formal and informal 
accountabilities of LBs, and thus provides an in-depth, nuanced account of this 
issue in relation to Scottish alcohol policy implementation.  
 
More broadly, in-depth inquiries specifically into accountability remain limited in 
existing alcohol policy implementation literature, and findings are not linked to 
accountability literature, a substantive area of research from which theoretical and 
empirical lessons may be drawn (see Chapter 3). Alcohol policy implementation 
studies have sometimes discussed accountability-related issues including the 
importance of clearly establishing responsibility for particular interventions 
(Fitzgerald et al., 2015), or policy stakeholders’ compliance with relevant alcohol 
legislation (Herring et al., 2008; MacGregor et al., 2013). Despite this, a notable gap 
in published research exists which draws explicitly upon lessons from accountability 
scholarship to empirically examine alcohol policy implementation. This chapter 
seeks to contribute understanding to this gap. It will do this by examining, mapping 
and analysing different accountability relationships experienced by local licensing 
decision-makers in Scotland.  
 
The structure of this chapter is as follows. First, the empirical results will present a 
detailed account of LBs’ accountabilities, as reported in both the national and local 
interview data and gleaned from national policy documents. Similar to the previous 
chapter (Chapter 5), the typology of public-administrative, professional, and 
participatory accountability from Hupe and Hill (2007) will be utilised to organise the 
results. This typology is again useful to shed light on different types of accountability 
LBs may experience. However, given that LBs are not structured as ‘partnerships’, 
the modification I made to the typology in the previous chapter to incorporate 
consideration of partnerships will not be utilised here. The second main section of 
the chapter will present an in-depth discussion of these data in order to explain that 
LBs’ accountability regime is characterised by a dependency on legal accountability, 
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and a relative absence of other public-administrative, professional, and participatory 
accountabilities. It will be argued that there is a gap between the intentions of 
licensing legislation with respect to public health and the way it is enacted in 
practice. 
 
6.2 Public-Administrative Accountability of Licensing Boards 
6.2.1 Perspectives on the Licensing Objectives and the importance of 
accountability: Policy context of alcohol licensing 
My analysis of LBs’ public-administrative accountability first acknowledges how 
Scottish Government reportedly conceptualised LBs’ contribution to implementing 
the alcohol strategy, namely by helping to reduce alcohol availability and related 
harm. Multiple national level interviewees involved in developing the Scottish 
Government’s Framework for Action reported that they consciously considered the 
link between availability and harm during the development of this policy. For 
example, one interviewee spoke about using the concept of availability as a key 
component of the Government’s new, whole population approach to alcohol: 
“If you’re thinking about a policy or a strategy you’ve got to have 
interventions at all…levels, and that price and availability fits in 
that wider society, that population level intervention. So we were 
sort of reframing, if you like, alcohol as not just being an individual 
choice thing, and it also wasn’t just about the high risk drinkers at 
one end of the spectrum, that those are the ones to target. That’s 
very much the industry framing. So we were shifting it.” (National 
Level 6) 
 
It was in the context of such a perspective that LB members and other licensing 
interviewees discussed the licensing objectives. Of particular importance is how they 
contrasted the public health objective with the priority afforded to the other 
objectives, suggesting that the public health objective had not yet led to major 
changes in how licensing actors operated: 
“I think [the public health objective] has always been the poor 
cousin of the five licensing objectives. It's a difficult one for the 
Board to deal with, because an application where there are issues 
of disorder, or public nuisance, noise, whatever, in an immediate 
area, that's quite clear… and the police might provide evidence to 
that effect…they can tie in a refusal with the kind of disorder and 
public nuisance licensing objectives. Public health has always 
been more of a difficult one for the Board… the Board doesn't 
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really see favour with overprovision as a concept” (LA1, job title 
withheld) 
 
“.…[the public health objective] doesn’t have teeth at the 
moment…there are very few of my colleagues on the Licensing 
Board that would be happy to argue for the refusal of a licence 
based purely on that licensing objective.  You’ve got to try and find 
something else as well. You’ve got to find overprovision or you’ve 
got to find local knowledge or you’ve got to find something else to 
turn a licence down. You can’t do it just on the basis of that 
objective. That’s the perception anyway.” (LA1, Licensing Board 
Member) 
 
In relation to this, the interview data suggested that an analysis of LB accountability 
may help explain some of the problems associated with implementing the public 
health objective, and the role of licensing in pursuing Scotland’s public health goals 
more generally. For example, one interviewee reported on frustrations being raised 
across local statutory alcohol policy implementation actors in relation to the lack of 
accountability surrounding LBs: 
“[we were]…working with the police and the NHS, to try to 
influence the Licensing Board, nothing really happening, and then 
that frustration coming back at the Community Planning 
Partnership level because they can’t influence it either. So yeah, 
Licensing Boards, because of legislation, are sitting out here doing 
as they please without any accountability.” (LA1, ADP Member) 
 
It is against this backdrop that the rest of this section’s analysis is presented. 
 
6.2.2 Legal Accountability of Licensing Boards 
Existing legislation and regulation for LBs outlines the relevant provisions regarding 
accountability of LBs. Table 6.1 provides the legislative accountability context for 
LBs, however the data suggest LBs have certain flexibility within it, which has 
implications for how they contribute to the public health-related aspects of the 
legislation, and Scotland’s whole population approach overall. 
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Table 6.1 Legislative provisions regarding Licensing Board accountability  
Legislation Relevant provisions regarding accountability of Licensing Boards 
Licensing (Scotland) 
Act 2005 
• Mandates that LBs produce a Licensing Policy Statement 
once every three years, which provides a locally-specific legal 
basis for their decision-making. 
• Mandates that the Licensing Statement include statement on 
whether local areas are overprovided for (enacted 2009). 
• Outlines the five licensing objectives, including protecting and 
improving public health. 
Alcohol etc. 
(Scotland) Act 2010 
• Makes modifications to mandatory conditions of premises and 
occasional licences which were in 2005 Act. 
• Sets out actions Licensing Board must undertake before and 
after it makes a variation to premises licence conditions, and 
states a variation to licence conditions may be made only 
where the Board is satisfied that the variation is necessary or 
expedient for the purposes of any of the licensing objectives.  
• Amends the 2005 Act to add the relevant Health Board to the 
bodies the Licensing Board is required to consult when 
developing their Licensing Policy Statement, and to notify the 
Health Board of any premises licence applications. 
Criminal Justice and 
Licensing (Scotland) 
Act 2010 
• Makes modifications to 2005 Act regarding application 
notification requirements, occasional licenses, hours, etc. 
Air Weapons and 
Licensing (Scotland) 
Act 2014 
• Mandates Licensing Boards submit annual reports of 
functions to Scottish Government, which must include a 
statement explaining how the Board has had regard to the 
licensing objectives and their Licensing Policy Statement 
 
An example of this flexibility is in their development of overprovision statements. The 
Licensing (Scotland) Act 2005 has accompanying Guidance for Licensing Boards 
and Local Authorities, which notes that LBs are meant to make an “accurate 
assessment of overprovision” (Scottish Executive, 2007). However, the Guidance 
does not specify what an ‘accurate’ assessment was to entail. The only existing 
legal stipulation is that LBs must demonstrate they have considered the number and 
capacity of licensed premises in the area and have conducted certain mandatory 
consultations with, for example, statutory services and the public. However, the 
number and capacity at which an area should be designated as overprovided is 
determined by the LB itself – there is not a uniform threshold against which areas 
are measured, nor is there a national ‘example’ or template overprovision statement 
from which LBs can draw (MacNaughton and Gillan, 2011). Accordingly, LBs act 
autonomously to interpret availability-related evidence and establish local thresholds 
for overprovision as they see fit. In this context, ADP members reported their 
frustration in attempting to inform LB decisions regarding their Policy Statement and 
overprovision. For example, one interviewee described working with other local 
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licensing stakeholders to provide an evidence-informed report to the LB, which 
recommended certain local areas be labelled ‘overprovided’, noting that this was 
unsuccessful given the autonomy LB members had to make the final decision. The 
issue of LB interpretations and uses of evidence, and the tensions created with how 
ADPs use evidence to progress public health goals, will be discussed further in 
Chapter 7. 
 
The interview data also illustrated that members of LBs recognised, and consciously 
used, their existing discretion within the legislative framework. Some LB members 
spoke about their consideration of the relevant legislation: 
“So we do implement the policy, but the policy is always open to 
interpretation” (LB Member, LA1) 
 
“The licensing laws…they keep everybody tight on what way we 
should be going or what we can do or can’t do or if we’ve got 
leeway in a certain place.” (LA3, LB Member) 
 
The second interviewee quoted above made this statement while explaining how the 
LB had decided to change a local policy about licensed premise curfews. S/he 
explained that such decisions must be reviewed by legal personnel to ensure that 
they are aligned with, or are ‘tight on’, national legislation, but that in this instance, 
the LB had the discretion, or ‘leeway’, to make a decision regarding curfews. There 
are specific personnel who help LBs to navigate the licensing legislation - legally 
qualified Clerks, which are mentioned throughout the Licensing etc. (Scotland) Act 
2005 (Scottish Parliament, 2005). A similar, institutional support mechanism does 
not exist for other aspects of LB’s public-administrative accountability, an early 
indication of the dominance of legal accountability in the overall set of LB 
accountability arrangements.  
 
The flexibility within the licensing legislative framework seems to have been 
intentional on the part of legislators and civil servants. For example, in the cover 
letter of the associated Guidance for Licensing Boards, the Scottish Government 
states:  
“…would like to stress that Boards will have the flexibility to 
operate and take decisions in light of their particular 
circumstances…That is a fundamental principle of the [Licensing] 
Act and it is important to maintain it. The guidance does not seek 
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to instruct Boards exactly how to make the Act work.” (Scottish 
Executive, 2007) 
 
This purposeful flexibility seems to help LBs maintain substantive autonomy to 
interpret and implement the legislation. An implication of this, however, is that 
although this may allow LBs to contextualise the legislation (‘in light of their 
particular circumstances’), this also leaves them free to interpret the licensing 
objectives flexibly, or even ignore the ‘spirit’ of the legislation which seeks from LB 
members an understanding and concern about public health impacts of availability. 
The findings from this research suggest this flexibility has contributed to the limited 
implementation of the public health objective. For example, as will be discussed 
below, LB members appear to often prioritise local economic concerns (which are 
not enshrined in a licensing objective), presenting a potential challenge to the 
pursuit of public health goals. 
 
When asked what consequences would be applied if LBs were to diverge from their 
legal responsibilities, interview responses suggested that the primary fear was 
licensing decisions being appealed in court by the licence applicant, and that the 
cost of this would be significant. 
“Well the Board’s accountable. I mean, it’s accountable by the 
reason that if it makes the wrong decisions, it ends up in 
court…and costs the council, you know, £50,000, £70,000, 
£100,000 in the court case.” (LA3, LB Member) 
 
By ‘wrong decision’, this interviewee appeared to be referring to a decision which 
can be legally challenged because it is/appears to be in error of the law or against 
the LB’s Licensing Policy Statement. They also seem to have internalised a belief 
that being taken to court about a given decision indicates that it was therefore the 
‘wrong’ one.  
 
This legal challenge is the clearest mechanism of LB accountability (i.e. an LB may 
face consequences for their decisions) that was generated from the research 
findings. In this instance, a licence applicant (e.g. supermarket chain, restaurant, 
etc.) or a licence holder (whose licence has been varied, suspended, or revoked) 
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can appeal to the Sheriff Court, a civil court in Scotland45. In this system, LBs are 
held to account by the court as an organisation. This type of legal accountability is 
an important mechanism which can prevent the abuse of public powers and which 
operates largely independently from the political process (Bovens, 2010).  
 
If a licence applicant or holder wishes to trigger an appeal of Board decision, they 
can do so within 21 days (Scottish Courts and Tribunals, n.d.). The grounds for 
appeal can include that the LB erred in law, based their decision on incorrect facts, 
acted contrary to natural justice, or used their discretion in an unreasonable manner. 
In contrast, ‘objectors’ to an application (who may, for example, be a statutory 
consultee like the police/NHS or members of the public) are not able to appeal a 
decision (Alcohol Focus Scotland, 2016a). Therefore, the same routes for triggering 
legal accountability mechanisms do not exist for objectors, constituting an inbuilt 
imbalance between the powers of licence applicants and alcohol policy 
implementers. Additionally, given the costs associated with mounting legal 
challenges, this system favours those with greater financial resources, and it 
seemed evident, from the interview data, that this informed members’ sense of 
where challenges were likely to originate from (and where not). For example: 
“I think the Board…has a lot of responsibility and a lot of authority 
that's pretty much unchallenged unless you can afford to go to a 
Sheriff to overturn a decision. I mean if…we refuse alcohol in a BP 
[formerly ‘British Petroleum Company’] service station, BP will take 
us to court…But, small retailers won't, it's just not worth it” (LA1, 
LB Member) 
 
“again it's that independence, the Board's quasi-judicial so 
whatever we decide can only be overturned by a sheriff or a judge 
making that, and apart from some of the big corporate companies, 
most people are not going to go to the expense of engaging a 
sheriff to say, "I want that to change". So your decision's pretty 
much final.” (LA1, LB Member) 
 
The findings suggest that this LB flexibility has contributed to the limited 
implementation of the public health objective.  
 
 
45 A Sheriff Court is where the majority of civil court cases in Scotland are heard and is a 
lower court in the Scottish courts hierarchy, sitting below the Court of Session and the UK 
Supreme Court (Scottish Courts and Tribunals, n.d.).  
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Flexibility Helps Permit Prioritisation of Economic Considerations Over Protecting 
and Improving Public Health 
The flexibility of LBs to interpret legislation discussed above was also evident in 
interview data about local economic concerns. The way economic considerations 
and public health can come into conflict within Scottish alcohol policy has been 
noted in the existing literature (e.g. Fitzgerald et al., 2017), which this research 
complements by adopting an accountability perspective. 
 
Multiple LB members discussed the need for licensed premises to contribute to 
employment and the economy, despite the absence of the economy being a 
consideration in the licensing objectives. For example: 
“A lot of places…they need their licensing outlets…it’s job 
provision.  It’s like having a factory, you know…so that’s the way 
you’ve got to look at it” (LA3, LB Member) 
 
This type of response indicates that LB members’ interpretations of the licensing 
legislation and objectives is flexible enough that they can take into consideration the 
(local) economy, even if this leads them to make decisions that go against the stated 
licensing objectives and increase the availability of alcohol in a given area.  
“The third pub’s open for the tourists.  So that then brings in 
tourism and it brings in employment…you’ve got to weigh up the 
different things.” (LA3, LB Member) 
 
This quotation was provided by a LB member concerned with the economic 
wellbeing of their local area, which they perceived as being dependent on tourism. 
Other LB interviewees displayed similar concerns, that the anticipated money and 
jobs that licensed premises might provide were considerations when they decided 
on a licensing application. However, LBs have a formal, legislative-determined 
responsibility for progress towards the public health objective and no formal 
responsibility for being concerned with the economy, and yet the concerns of 
members seem to be often focused on the latter.  
 
The tension between LB prioritisation of the economy and public health was 
explicitly discussed by one LB member, as shown in the quotation below. However, 
this interviewee’s perspective that public health should be of greater consideration 
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was a minority voice among LB interviewees (only two of the eight LB interviewees 
expressed this viewpoint explicitly).  
“I’m aware that other Board members have conversations about 
the economic impact of their decisions. Now obviously under the 
[Licensing] Act they’re not supposed to take that into account at all 
and I certainly try not to when I’m making decisions but I know that 
other Board members do and I’ve been told for example in the 
members’ lounge, ‘well, if that supermarket wasn’t going to set up 
there then it would just be another empty unit for years to come 
and they’re providing jobs anyway so why on earth are you 
standing in their way?’ I think that’s a somewhat short-sighted 
approach and doesn’t take into account a fair bit of evidence that 
suggests that adding another off-licence in an area that’s already 
over provided for is just likely to make problems with alcohol, and 
overconsumption of alcohol worse.” (LA1, LB Member) 
 
Recognition of this was also evident in a national level interview: 
“[Licensing Boards] sit outside that local accountability. And I 
suppose the tension between the licensing objectives and what 
they see as their economic objective now licensing doesn’t have 
an economic objective that it has for five licensing objectives, but 
they still see themselves as having an economic objective, and 
that probably provides quite a lot of tension.” (National Level 3) 
 
This quotation suggests that some LB members have adopted a sense of 
accountability for pursuing economic objectives relating to perceived local needs 
and that this is felt more strongly than their obligation towards the licensing 
objectives, despite the legal framework attached to the objectives. It also suggests 
that this approach will be maintained as long as LBs are excluded from other local 
accountability structures. The problem with this tension is that, from the perspective 
of other local implementers, it challenges their efforts to implement the 2009 alcohol 
strategy and achieve its goals of reducing alcohol-related harm in the Scottish 
population:  
“unfortunately a lot of our objections haven't met with much 
success, and the Board have granted applications that we've 
objected to…sometimes [licence applicants’] lawyers quote 
economic reasons, employment, and all of those reasons, whilst it 
might be a factor in the decision-making, it shouldn't really be 
because they should be basing decisions on the licensing 
objectives and the legislation.” (LA1, Police Representative) 
 
The police are a statutory consultee on every license application, and thus can file 
formal objections to any application. In the above quotation, a police representative 
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suggests that LB members have made licensing decisions based on information 
surrounding the economy or employment. These are not only unsupported legal 
grounds for licensing decision-making but may also come into direct tension with the 
licensing objectives and legislation (and existing public health research). Further, 
this person seems to suggest that these economic reasons are used by the LB to 
overrule local statutory objections to applications. This means that economic 
considerations may be a threat to this mechanism by which local statutory actors 
can attempt to influence the restriction of alcohol licences. This is despite the 
existing Guidance for Licensing Boards (2007) stating,  
“Commercial considerations are irrelevant to a policy which is 
designed to protect the wider public interest” (p.19) 
 
While formal guidance for policy action separates commercial considerations and 
public interest, it appears that the level of flexibility allowed to LBs within their legal 
accountability arrangements has created space for economic considerations to push 
aside public health concerns. 
 
6.2.3 Lack of Public-Administrative Accountability to Scottish Government  
Data from documents and interviews generated understanding regarding LB 
accountability in relation to the Scottish Government. In the Government’s 
Framework for Action, LBs are mentioned multiple times as contributors to reducing 
alcohol-related harm in Scotland (Scottish Government, 2009a). However, the 
language around holding LBs to account for these contributions is restrained. For 
example, the Framework for Action states, “we will encourage local Licensing 
Boards to develop local solutions to address local problems.” (Scottish Government, 
2009a, p. 14 emphasis added). This inscribed language suggests that the 
Government recognises and perpetuates the autonomy of LBs, indicating in its 
communications that it must request, not demand, their cooperation in the whole 
population approach to reducing alcohol-related harm (a point also underlined by the 
cover letter to LB guidance discussed earlier (Scottish Executive, 2007)). National-
level interview data also suggested the Government was clear that LBs were not 
accountable to them: 
“Licensing boards aren't accountable to Scottish Government. So 
we were not performance managing this across the whole 




This view of the consequences of the system’s accountability arrangements seem to 
have been clearly communicated to local level - LB members consistently indicated 
that they were not accountable to the Scottish Government. Further, LB 
interviewees reported that they did not perceive Scottish Government to be actively 
monitoring their decisions or actions. What is notable here is the tension between 
the Scottish Government’s role in leading Scotland’s approach to tackling alcohol 
related harm, and the inability to hold a key set of organisations to account for 
contributing to (or undermining) this effort.  If the Scottish Government is providing 
the mandate to pursue public health goals through the implementation of their 
alcohol strategy, but cannot hold LBs to account for their role in this, then it seems 
likely that LBs will continue to prioritise other concerns. As an example, the LB 
interviewee quoted below argues that the purpose of a national policy is nullified if 
LBs can simply ignore it. 
“you can have a national policy up here, but if the Board's just 
ignoring it, I'm not suggesting the Board is ignoring it, but we might 
sometimes ignore it, what will you do about it? You know I don't 
think there's any accountability to the Scottish Government to say, 
'so you can sit and make a big document to sit on the shelf all you 
want, but we'll just ignore it'. And what are you going to do about it. 
So, I'm not sure there's any point in having a national policy 
document if Licensing Boards can just make their own minds up.” 
(LA1, LB Member) 
 
A tension between LB members’ roles as Board members and as local Councillors 
is evident. The Scottish Government has implemented legislation that places 
Councillors on quasi-judicial Boards, but has not developed a corresponding system 
to hold them accountable for their actions on it. Further, it may be difficult for the 
Scottish Government to enact a new approach to accountability over Councillors 
because, one could speculate, Councillors could perceive such actions to 
undermine local democracy. These results demonstrate that this particular mismatch 
in LB accountability constitutes a barrier to full implementation of Scotland’s 2009 
alcohol strategy because it means LBs’ responsibility for contributing to public health 
goals are not enforced by existing governance structures.  
 
Additionally, this lack of LB accountability to the Scottish Government further 
distinguishes LBs from other alcohol policy implementers such as ADPs. For 
example, the Framework for Action is stronger surrounding the responsibilities of 
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ADPs, including phrases such as “we expect decisions…” (Scottish Government, 
2009a emphasis added) when discussing the roles of ADPs. This suggests the 
Scottish Government feels differently (and less strongly) about the accountability of 
LBs to the government in comparison with ADPs. Overall, it appears there are 
important differences between LBs and other alcohol policy implementers (i.e. 
ADPs) in terms of their accountability relationships with the Scottish Government. 
Further, these differences seem to stem from a failure to make an important change 
that was needed to accompany the introduction of public health as a licensing 
objective to facilitate implementation. This is important because it reveals the 
variation in accountability arrangements across different implementation 
stakeholders, which may have implications for implementation processes.  
 
6.2.4 Criticism of Lack of Accountability to Scottish Government 
Within the interview data, critiques of current public-administrative accountability for 
licensing were clearly evident. It was notable that some LB members were critical of 
their own accountability arrangements and advocated greater consideration of public 
health outcomes by their LB. For example, two LB members from LA1 were 
particularly critical of current LB governance and accountability throughout their 
interviews. The quotation below discusses an LB member’s issues with how their 
Policy Statement was developed (a process which is conducted mostly in private46). 
“[The Licensing Board]’s not very accountable and it’s not very 
transparent […] I have no great problem with people making 
decisions that I disagree with but I do think they should be 
accountable for those decisions and at the moment they aren’t 
entirely” (LA1, LB Member) 
 
This quotation speaks to the issue of LB governance and transparency as it relates 
to accountability. It also raises the issue that if an individual or organisation wanted 
to hold the LB to account for the final content it puts in its Policy Statement, it might 
be difficult to do so. The quotation below also demonstrates this: 
“We pretty much make our own minds up, and that's final. I mean 
[licence applicants] can appeal the decision in the Sheriff court but 
other than that there's no way to appeal to, to anyone […] So, not 
 
46 The Policy Statement is developed by an LB in private, then sent for public consultation 
and review by the LB’s legal team. Final decisions about the content of the Policy Statement 
are made in private, without further public input following consultation. 
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to sound big-headed in any way, but I don't think there is a huge 
feeling of accountability from Board Members to anyone in 
particular.” (LA1, LB Member) 
 
This quotation also illustrates the relative lack of checks and balances that influence 
LBs (with the exception of appeals). In their interview, the LB member quoted above 
is critical of this situation, perceiving that the LB can simply ignore national policy 
and makes decisions about the development of their Policy Statement unchecked.  
 
6.2.5 Lack of Public-Administrative Accountability to Local Governance 
Hierarchy  
Moving on to an analysis of LBs’ public-administrative accountability within local-
level governance, findings demonstrate Boards sit beyond local accountability 
regimes and lack local-level accountability. 
 “[The Board] has nothing to do with the other council structures.  
It’s a body on its own.  It's not accountable to anybody else in the 
council.” (LA2, LB Member) 
 
The above quotation is indicative of the consensus among interviewees that, at an 
organisation-level, the LB is not accountable to the local council – it sits 
independently from the usual local accountability regime for local Council 
committees.  
 
Local and national level alcohol policy interviewees were critical of the lack of 
accountability of LBs to local governance bodies. In particular, there was recognition 
and frustration surrounding the inability of local public sector actors such as 
members of Community Planning Partnerships or other health and social care 
representatives to hold LBs to account for work which affected other local 
organisations.  
“lots of activity at my level…working with the police and the NHS, 
to try to influence the Licensing Board, nothing really happening, 
and then that frustration coming back at the Community Planning 
Partnership level because they can’t influence it either. So yeah, 
Licensing Boards, because of legislation, are sitting out here doing 
as they please without any accountability.” (LA1, ADP Member) 
 
Frustration was also expressed by national level stakeholders: 
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“health is now one of the objectives of the licensing system and 
health partners are statutory consultees.  But that’s quite 
tricky…you’ve got locally elected members who sit on Licensing 
Boards, but the Licensing Board isn’t part of community 
planning…so you can have a Community Planning Partnership 
that says, alcohol’s a priority for us and then you’ve got a local 
Licensing Board that basically says, who cares?  You know, 
nothing to do with us, guv…so you’re ignoring the whole evidence 
base and there’s no accountability.” (National Level 1) 
 
This lack of accountability creates a barrier for effective achievement of alcohol 
policy goals, specifically the reduction of alcohol-related harm through the restriction 
of availability. The above quotation illustrates that interviewees generally felt LBs 
could essentially ignore the goals and priorities of other local government entities, 
even when these priorities were directly related to LB decision-making about alcohol 
licenses (e.g. health as a licensing objective, and alcohol problems as a community 
planning priority). It also suggests that public health evidence has a limited impact in 
this context. This is problematic because it has the potential to create a tension 
between LBs and other alcohol policy implementers (an issue discussed in greater 
depth in Chapter 7).  
 
6.2.6 Recent Changes to Licensing Board Accountability: Continued need 
for accountability considerations 
More recent legislation makes amendments to the existing regulatory regime 
surrounding LBs, which may have implications for their accountability. Specifically, 
the Air Weapons and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2015 builds upon the expectations of 
LBs by mandating they publish annual reports on their functions. The Air Weapons 
and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2015 was developed following a 2012 consultation 
surrounding two main themes: “strengthening the powers” of LBs and Police 
Scotland; and improving the “effectiveness of the licensing regime” (Scottish 
Government, 2012, p. 3). It also introduced a mandate for LBs to report annually to 
the Scottish Government. Therefore, one might hypothesize that accountability of 
LBs to the Scottish Government may change with more comprehensive enactment 
of the Act, although my interviewees did not express any expectations of this when I 
interviewed them in 2015/16.  
 
A key component of the Air Weapons and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2015 is the 
requirement of LBs to begin submitting annual reports of their ‘functions’ (Scottish 
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Parliament, 2015c). In interviews, a Deputy Clerk for a LB was optimistic that this 
would enhance the accountability of LBs: 
“you can have several months' worth of [Licensing Board] 
business going by without much awareness, outside, of what's 
going on. And I think annual reporting, with specific information 
about the financial, you know, details of the annual fees coming in, 
details of what the fees are being used for, details of the numbers 
of applications, all of that. I mean, I don't know, I think we'll find out 
in due course, by way of regulation, what those annual reports will 
have to contain. But I think it's a good thing.” (Deputy Clerk to a 
LB)47 
 
The Air Weapons and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2015 (s.56 (2) (2)) requires that the 
annual functions report include statements regarding how the LB has had regard to 
the licensing objectives and their Policy Statement, as well as a summary about 
their decisions and the number of licenses in their area. However, although this 
section of the legislation was enacted in 2017, meaning the first reports began to be 
submitted in June 2018, the format and specific content of LB annual reports have 
not yet been published by Government (Scottish Parliament, 2017)48.  
 
Additionally, language in the legislation suggests that these requirements will have 
the same flexibilities as observed with other licensing legislation. For example, the 
Act states: 
“A report under this section may include such other information 
about the exercise of the Licensing Board’s functions under this 
Act as the Board considers appropriate.” (s.56 (2) (3), emphasis 
added) 
 
This type of language suggests LBs will again be given autonomy in how they 
participate in this accountability reporting exercise, even the type of information they 
wish to submit for scrutiny. In light of Bovens’ definition of accountability 
 
47 The local area number is not provided to ensure the Deputy Clerk’s anonymity  
48 The corresponding annual financial reports were first produced by LBs for the year 2016-
2017, and initial assessments by AFS suggest they vary in their level of detail, suggesting 
similar variation in quality of reporting for functions reports can be anticipated (G Crompton 
2018, personal communication, 8 May). At time of writing, no formal guidance has yet been 
issued to LBs. A consultation regarding updated guidance for LBs was held in 2019 (Scottish 
Government, 2019b); at time of writing the Alcohol Policy Team at Scottish Government is 
analysing the consultation and the revised guidance will include mention of the Air Weapons 
and Licensing Act and the corresponding annual functions report (A. Ferguson, 2020, 
personal communication, 13 February).  
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underpinning this analysis (Bovens, 2010, 2007) this type of statement, in which the 
potential ‘actor’ may use discretion to select what information they provide to a 
‘forum’ (and thus what they have to explain/justify), may undermine the possibility of 
establishing a robust accountability relationship between LBs and the Scottish 
Government.  
 
Although the Deputy Clerk above was positive about this anticipated change, when 
asked about this upcoming obligation, LB interviewees expressed some scepticism 
about the extent it would make a difference to accountability. For example:  
“It should have an effect. I don’t know if it will…it’s just 
unfortunately I think some individuals will stick to their guns 
regardless.” (LA1, LB Member) 
 
Additionally, multiple LB interviewees stated that they either had not studied the 
2015 legislation yet (and needed to be reminded of how it included the annual 
reporting obligation) or had only heard of it recently in a brief meeting discussion 
(despite these interviews having been conducted in late 2016). These findings could 
suggest that the stakeholders in the licensing system do not perceive the reports to 
be an important activity, or that its impact on licensing has not yet been well 
communicated. Overall, interviews with LB members indicated that the legislative 
changes were not yet implemented at the time of the interviews and did not suggest 
that there was any urgency to do so.  
 
6.3 Professional Accountability of Licensing Boards 
6.3.1 Professional Accountability of Licensing Board Members to Political 
Party 
Professional accountability is concerned with accountability to one’s professional 
peers (Hupe and Hill, 2007). It is operationalised in this research as including a 
range of potential professional relationships; it is not restricted to, for example, 
accountability of a professional to their respective national association (e.g. a 
physician to their college). To examine professional accountability within LBs, the 
members selected for interview represented different political parties, with diversity 





In terms of their accountability relationships at this level, LB members reported not 
feeling accountable to their political party for LB decisions, and this was reaffirmed 
by non-LB interviewees. For example, there is no mechanism by which political 
parties hold their members to account for decision-making in this forum: 
“the Licensing Board is not political, so it's not whipped, so you 
don't have to vote with your party colleagues, you vote however 
you want. You know if you do that in some committees you'd be 
punished by it. But this is an independent Board you can vote how 
you want.” (LA1, LB Member) 
 
Generally, however, when asked about this in interviews, LB members were 
consistent in confirming that they were free to make their own decisions, and that 
this was how they preferred it. This preference is illustrated in this quotation:   
“I can sit beside an Independent49 pal but take a different decision 
on a particular issue. I think that’s the way it should be and I see 
other party folk doing exactly the same, arguing with each other. 
You’ve forgotten your political affiliations and I think that’s 
important. I think that’s the way it should stay.” (LA3, LB Member) 
 
Despite the above, one LB member from LA1 was critical of those who they 
perceived to vote along party lines instead of fully engaging with the decision at 
hand (and its implications), stating that this is “really unhelpful”. 
 
6.3.2 Professional Accountability within Licensing Boards 
At the organisational level of professional accountability, data from interviews spoke 
to the importance of relationships among Councillors on the LB in the context 
decision-making. Within this, members vote individually on each licensing 
application instead of seeking a consensus. 
“I sit next to the Convenor…I wouldn't say I advise [them] but 
sometimes I've got to nudge [them] and keep [them] going with 
things. But we have completely different views. You know, [their] 
view is, give everybody a licence…I'm the opposite of that, I think 
we shouldn't give people licences unless there's a need… We 
have quite different views so quite often I, well, in most occasions I 
vote against [them].” (LA1, LB Member) 
 
 
49 Referring to a Councillor elected as an ‘Independent’  
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This quotation highlights that LB members can hold very different views on how 
readily licences should be granted locally, a point which was evident across all three 
LBs. This particular member demonstrated that s/he was an advocate of reducing 
the number of licensed premises locally, citing reasons which included public health 
goals. In contrast, s/he described the Convenor as an advocate of allowing the free 
market to determine how many licensed premises could survive in a given area, and 
being unconvinced about the need to pursue public health goals through licensing. 
Overall, the data from licensing interviewees suggested that members primarily vote 
autonomously and do not feel accountable to other members within the LB.  
 
6.3.3 Professional Accountability of Licensing Boards to Other Local Alcohol 
Policy Stakeholders 
Licensing Boards’ Accountability Relationship with Alcohol and Drug Partnerships 
ADPs are the primary alcohol policy implementation partnerships at Scotland’s local 
level of governance, while the licensing system (and its control over alcohol 
availability) is a key component of progressing towards public health-related alcohol 
policy goals. In light of this, ADPs and LBs could potentially be working 
collaboratively towards these goals. However, the data in Section 6.2 demonstrated 
that LBs are not being held accountable through public-administrative accountability 
for pursuing their public health licensing objective. LBs often prioritise immediate 
economic concerns over public health ones, a potential difference from priorities 
they would otherwise share with the ADP. 
 
In this context, I examined whether there was any discernible form of accountability 
relationship between LBs and ADPs (in either direction). Despite consciously looking 
for possible examples, I found that the licensing legislation does not mention ADPs, 
while ADP interviewees did not report any sense that LBs were accountable to 
them. Further, in response to specific interview questions, LB members only went as 
far as saying that they sometimes perceived themselves to be “monitored” by ADPs 
(i.e. that ADPs are paying attention to the decisions that they make without 
suggesting that this leads to any further scrutiny or judgement). Overall, it did not 
appear that LBs were accountable to ADPs (or vice versa), and thus this potential 
professional accountability mechanism is not currently available for ensuring LBs 
pursue the public health goals of the Scottish alcohol strategy. This was perceived 
as problematic by some interviewees, in the context of broader community planning. 
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The below interviewee discusses this with reference to the ‘community plan’, known 
formally as the Local Outcome Improvement Plan (Scottish Government, 2019a): 
“although the Licensing Board is independent from the Council, 
they can’t really be independent from the community plan, not in 
theory because the community plan should be everything we’re 
trying to achieve for [LA1].” (LA1, ADP Member) 
 
This led me to observe an important tension for ADPs and their alcohol policy 
implementation practice given that LBs are not accountable to ADPs. There remains 
a perception among both ADP and national level interviewees that ADPs should still 
attempt to engage with LBs to support progress towards the public health objective. 
For example, when asked about LB accountability, a small number of national level 
interviewees indicated that ADPs could have a role in influencing licensing: 
“we did a lot of work to try and support local ADPs, local public 
health and trying to get licensing boards to have a different 
approach and ADPs are now far more involved in licensing than 
they ever were,” (National Level 9) 
 
 “I think ADPs do have the potential to influence alcohol 
availability, in particular at the local level. To be a strong, and 
vocal actor in licensing decisions, at a local level.” (National Level 
7) 
 
Additionally, in interviews with ADP members in each participating local area the 
issue of licensing arose as a key issue on which ADPs could be targeting efforts. 
Interviewees (especially those from LA1) spoke about LBs often, however this was 
framed as a challenge as they continued to struggle to convince many LB members 
about the need (and evidence) for a stronger overprovision statement and limiting 
local alcohol availability. The frustrations experienced in LA1 in particular were 
linked to the LB’s accountability and their interpretations of evidence (an issue 
discussed further in Chapter 7) – it was perceived as unfair that the ADP was 
expected to evidence their own decisions, while the LB had much greater discretion, 
and thus was often impervious to the ADP’s recommendations: 
“…there’s nothing that holds that Board to account. So there’s 
nothing that says to that Board, “Show us how you used evidence 
in developing your policy.” Whereas for many other areas of 
decision-making you’d be asked to set that out. You’d be asked for 
an annual report that said “What’ve you done this year, what was 
your evidence behind doing it”, those sorts of questions. It’s just 




Additionally, within this same LA that had a relatively weak overprovision statement, 
there was a recognition of other, interlinked local priorities which may be a barrier to 
stronger measures, and a sense of futility about creating positive change through 
licensing: 
“the economic climate has tempered our aspirations a bit on what 
we can achieve around overprovision…So you start to say well, 
you know we’re never going to reduce [availability], there’s such a 
drive to get tourists to come to [LA1].” (LA1, ADP Member) 
 
In contrast, in LA2, where the overprovision statement within the Licensing 
Statement was already more stringent (i.e. more localities in the LB’s area were 
labelled ‘overprovided’ by the LB), licensing was reported by the ADP administrative 
team as being of less concern to them50. When asked specifically about their 
relationship with the LB, interviewees from LA2 still identified this as relevant for 
their Health Board colleagues who attended LB meetings as statutory consultees, 
but otherwise reported the ADP did not have an active  relationship with the LB. For 
example, a member of the LA2 ADP stated that the Clerk of the local LB was a 
member of the ADP, but “never attends any meetings”. This person further 
described trying to avoid the significant responsibility that would come with being 
given the remit of negotiating the ADP-LB relationship: 
“The ADPs used to employ somebody who…all they were doing 
was licensing work. That person moved on and then the Health 
Board basically expected myself and [colleagues] to take on that 
role… [Chair of ADP] was very unhappy with this, and he did 
escalate that to say basically [I’m] not touching this with a barge 
pole.” (LA2, ADP Member) 
 
Neither national nor local interviewees provided further detail about how ADPs could 
address this tension and fulfil the vision of becoming ‘a strong and vocal actor in 
licensing decisions’. Further, there does not seem to be an indirect accountability 
mechanism incentivising LBs to more actively consider ADP evidence-informed 
recommendations – neither the local Council nor the Scottish Government appears 
to be in a position to ensure this occurs. Thus no legal, political, or social 
 
50 An analysis from AFS in 2018 has shown the total number of alcohol outlets in this area 
has indeed plateaued between 2012-2016 (reference not provided to maintain anonymity). I 
also contacted LA2’s Licensing Clerk to inquire whether the LB in LA2 was actually not 
granting some licenses in response. The Clerk provided minutes for the LB, in which I could 
confirm that they were not granting some licenses (or license variations, e.g. increasing off 
sales capacity) on the grounds of overprovision.   
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accountability mechanism is assisting ADPs in these efforts, and LBs continue to be 
free to make decisions without reference to the expertise or suggestions of ADPs. 
Therefore, a tension remains between the expectation that ADPs will influence LBs 
(which is likely to require considerable time and resources to undertake these 
efforts), and the (lack of) governance structures capable to addressing this 
expectation.  
 
Licensing Boards and Local Licensing Forums 
Local Licensing Forums were created under Section 10 of the Licensing Act 2005 to 
“keep under review the operation of the licensing system in their area and to give 
advice and recommendations to the Licensing Board.” (Scottish Executive, 2007, p. 
73). In turn, the LB must “have regard to any advice given, or recommendation 
made, to them” from the Forum (Scottish Executive, 2007, p. 73). This suggests that 
Licensing Forums provide oversight and scrutiny of the work of LBs, and that they 
therefore may have a function in holding LBs to account – this is now interrogated 
further.  
 
While Forums often convene quarterly, the Forum and LB are only mandated to 
formally meet once per year (Scottish Executive, 2007). Licensing Forum members 
must include a licensing standards officer and a representative from the local health 
board, however members may include other interested stakeholders, such as 
alcohol license-holders or local residents (Alcohol Focus Scotland, n.d.; Scottish 
Executive, 2007).  
 
The limited research that exists suggests that Licensing Forums and their impact are 
often perceived negatively by licensing stakeholders (MacGregor et al., 2013). 
These perceptions have been linked with issues with the functioning of Licensing 
Forums, including inadequate leadership and commitment from existing members; 
lack of clarity about the Forum’s role, remit, scope and power; and variability in 
quality relationships with LBs (MacGregor et al., 2013) 
 
LB Guidance states that LBs must provide reasons should they decide not to act on 
Licensing Forum recommendations (Scottish Executive, 2007), suggesting that an 
LB has an obligation to explain and justify their conduct to the Licensing Forum - a 
key component of the definition of accountability relationships used in this research 
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(Bovens, 2010). However, this ‘obligation’ seems to be the extent of any 
accountability component of this relationship, with Licensing Forums lacking any 
power to further interrogate these decisions or trigger consequences for LBs. 
Interviewees from LBs portrayed this relationship as largely administrative: 
“I think we have to meet the Forum twice a year…they meet with 
us to present some suggestions or recommendations to the Board. 
And I think officially we're supposed to, well we're supposed to 
look at the recommendations or other suggestions, and give them 
feedback, we have to give them feedback. So yes we'll take that 
on board when we put our policy in place, or no we won't and 
here's why not.” (LA1, LB Member) 
 
This relationship between LBs and Forums sits within the broader governance 
system of local alcohol licensing, where different perspectives on public health 
evidence across groups appear to at least partially reflect their professionally 
diverse memberships. For example, the quotations below demonstrate the relative 
consistency with which alcohol policy implementers concerned with public health 
view Licensing Forum members focused on trade as having been unconvinced by 
public health evidence.  
“You'll have the NHS there for the public health licensing 
objective…But then, there's the trade representatives, who are 
perhaps not so persuaded.” (Deputy Clerk to LB) 
 
“The relationship between public health, myself and the Licensing 
Forum has not always been a good one…We have a different 
perspective on life…I’m often, along with some of the Women’s 
Aid people and often the health improvement from the council, we 
often disagree with members of the Licensing Forum, and it’s 
because they’ve got a trade, they call themselves from the trade, 
which means that they sell alcohol or have sold alcohol in the 
past.” (LA3, ADP Member) 
 
Overall, the data suggest Licensing Forums have limited influence on alcohol policy 
implementation, and generally act in a limited capacity as a consultee to LBs, 
particularly when LBs are developing Policy Statements.  
 
Licensing Boards and Other Council Committees 
The first results section on public-administrative accountability identified that LBs are 
not formally accountable to the local Council hierarchy. From a professional 
accountability perspective, however, interview data drew attention to the potential for 
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informal accountability relationships between LBs and other local Council 
committees. For example, one LB member reported: 
“There is pressure to [bring jobs to certain areas].  And there can 
be pressure not just from the trade and industry itself but there 
may be pressure from other Council committees, like Economic 
Development…I don’t think any of our Board members sit on 
economic development but that would to me be a conflict if you’re 
talking about wanting to bring prosperity to this deal on one hand 
and then sitting on a Board which says potentially, no, you can’t 
have a licence.” (LA1, LB Member) 
 
Further data illustrated LB members’ concern for the economy and informal sense of 
obligation to the local Council. As an example, the below quotation positions the LB 
in relation to other local decision-making bodies, and suggests that these bodies are 
disconnected. In this example, a local Planning Committee approved an application 
for a premises, which was rejected for an alcohol licence by the LB. The alcohol 
license was subsequently approved: 
“…the overprovision policy was brought in, a short time afterwards 
somebody wanted to convert one of the older builds into the [on-
sale wine-based premises], and they came to the Licensing Board 
and the Licensing Board said well, overprovision, you can't have a 
licence. So we've given them planning permission, to change a 
building, and we knew it was going to be a wine-based [on-sale 
premises], and then they came to get an alcohol licence and we 
said no. Bizarre situation, but that's independence of two quasi-
judicial bodies planning and alcohol, and they come to different 
outcomes. Which is legitimately the right thing to do, but it didn't 
make [LA1] look very clever...It was overturned and they got the 
licence in the end.” (LA1, LB Member) 
 
Although not formally accountable to other Council committees, the quotation 
describes what could be perceived as an informal accountability relationship 
between the LB and the local Council: The LB’s decision was judged as problematic 
because it appeared to conflict with a decision made by another part of the Council, 
with consequences for the LB in having to reverse their decision. Overall, the data 
here suggested that although direct, formal accountability often does not exist for 
LBs, members are sensitive to their broader political and economic context. In 
accountability terms, this further supports the idea that public health goals (or indeed 
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public health objective) within Scotland’s alcohol strategy will not be their primary 
consideration when making decisions.51 
 
6.4 Participatory Accountability of Licensing Boards 
This section focuses on the potential accountability relationships between LBs and 
the public. This refers to involvement of citizens or public bodies who can, or may be 
positioned to, evaluate the work of local alcohol policy implementers (Hupe and Hill, 
2007).   
 
6.4.1 Accountability to Non-Government National Stakeholders 
The typology from Hupe and Hill (2007) lists actors such as national interest groups 
and the media as acting at a system-level of participatory accountability. In Scottish 
alcohol policy, this includes organisations such as AFS, SHAAP and (UK and 
Scottish) media outlets. Concern about LBs’ role in reducing alcohol-related harm in 
Scotland has been expressed by advocacy organisations, who have hosted events 
and developed materials focused on licensing (e.g. see (Alcohol Focus Scotland, 
2016a, 2014b, 2014a). For example, AFS hosts mandatory training for new LB 
members (Alcohol Focus Scotland, 2017d). 
 
Despite AFS’ and other organisations’ roles in the Scottish alcohol policy landscape, 
there is no evidence in the interviews that LB members feel meaningfully 
accountable or responsible to AFS or similar alcohol policy stakeholder groups. This 
was articulated clearly by a LB member from LA1: 
“Groups like Alcohol Focus will come along and sit and watch and 
make comment. Our particular Convenor will ignore that totally 
and utterly…When we have joint forums and things he will listen to 
them and be quite dismissive. As will some of the other members 
of it.” (LA1, LB Member) 
 
In addition to asking about organisations such as AFS, I also asked about the 
broader news media as a possible source of public accountability. However, LB 
 
51 As an additional note, the data did not explore whether LB members were aware of, or 




members rarely commented on it, and those that did (both from LA1) dismissed it as 
a source of accountability: 
“we have a very critical media in [LA1], some would say overly 
critical. I would genuinely say that most Councillors have the 
attitude when they pick up a local paper say, 'right what've we 
done now?'…So I don't worry too much about the media (LA1, LB 
member) 
 
“I can’t think of any media reports that have made me think I’m 
making the wrong decision here I need to reassess it.” (LA1, LB 
member) 
 
It seems that while LB members do engage with the media, speaking familiarly 
about local papers and media reports, they do not consider it to be particularly 
important for their own decision-making.  
 
Despite the above, there was one notable instance in which interviewees reported 
that a community’s lobbying and social media had influenced an LB’s decision about 
whether to change local nightclubs’ curfew hours. An LB member, who was 
Convenor at the time, states: 
“we were really, really heavily lobbied by the public [to abolish the 
curfew], by the younger generation. And, you know, it’s actually 
good when you get the younger generation involved in something, 
because they don’t usually bother to get involved in anything. So 
there were lots of Facebook media…active groups setting up and 
all sorts of things” (LA3, LB Member) 
 
This person reports that the LB was split on the vote about abolishing this curfew, 
but that s/he had the casting vote and decided to abolish it. This particular story 
does not demonstrate a formal accountability of the LB to the public, but does seem 
to suggest that the LB can be influenced by an interested public – in this case a 
group which was perceived to be a fresh voice, that had become loud and active 
enough.  
 
6.4.2 Accountability to Local Communities and the Public 
In their 2003 review of the Scottish licensing system, the Nicholson Committee 
highlighted a need for increased community involvement (Scottish Executive, 2003). 
This was taken forward in the Licensing Act 2005 by establishing the right of the 
public to object to licence applications and including local residents as consultees on 
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the LB overprovision statement (Nicholls, 2015; Scottish Executive, 2007). One LB 
member indicated that the public may have a role in the accountability of LBs, 
although s/he seemingly perceives this role to be as a passive audience: 
AW: What extent do you think that the Licensing Board is being 
monitored and evaluated by anybody? 
Interviewee: Well, it is a public meeting so in that sense I suppose 
members of the public can come and listen to us while we 
deliberate.” (LA1, LB Member) 
 
Other data showed that although some members spoke broadly about their concern 
for their communities (e.g. whether they perceived alcohol-related problems are 
affecting their constituents), they did not report feeling accountable to the community 
for LB decisions, despite being asked about their constituents during interviews. For 
example, one LB member in LA1, when asked about whether their constituents’ 
views influenced decision-making, said they did, but only “up to a point”.  
 
The data also generated observations about whether the existing licensing decision-
making system enabled or challenged members of the public if they attempted to 
engage. For example, one LB interviewee highlighted how the governance of 
licensing may prevent the public from engaging with decision-making, and thus 
possibly preclude any capacity to hold LBs to account: 
“we had a long, long discussion about our policy on overprovision, 
previously and in the end it was decided by the Convenor slipping 
round a bit of paper literally two minutes before we were to take 
the decision, slipping round a bit of paper, not giving us the 
adequate time to read it and saying do you accept this or not? 
That to me is not transparent or democratic or accountable…and 
the fact there are no standing orders means [s/he] was perfectly 
within [her/his] rights to do it that way.” (LA1, LB Member) 
 
In addition, there was evidence that LB members may not perceive members of the 
public to be capable of fairly monitoring their decisions, and thus as not well 
positioned to comment. For example: 
“my local community council were delighted that an extension to a 
licensed restaurant was refused, and it was, "first time that's 
happened in a long time", actually no that happens every month, 
but you only come when it's in your area… even if you were to 
keep a score of how many applications were applied for, how 
many were granted against objections, you would have to actually 
know and be able to score the objection…[for example] it was by 
somebody who stayed 3 streets away, who just doesn't like people 
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drinking. That's completely different to objections sayin’ ‘this is a 
problem bar that really has been a problem for years’…completely 
different circumstances. So monitoring fairly Licensing Board 
decisions would be quite a complicated business because you 
would need to, you would have to score the level of objection I 
would think. (LA1, LB Member) 
 
This quotation from a LB member highlights intrinsic difficulties for the public in 
monitoring of LB decisions, itself indicating a potential lack of governance 
mechanisms in LBs to make them sufficiently open and transparent to the public, so 
as to be more easily engaged with. This is consistent with previous critiques of the 
Scottish licensing system that it is largely inaccessible to the public (Alcohol Focus 
Scotland, 2017e).  
  
Considerations of Public Interests Interpreted as Economic Concerns  
The findings in this research suggest that any active accountability that LB members 
feel towards the community is based primarily from their role as elected Councillors 
(related to concerns with re-election), not as LB members (with a responsibility for 
the public health objective). I had initially thought that the political nature of 
Councillors/LB member’s roles would lead them to feel accountable to, and 
cognisant of, the public health desires of their local community. In practice, this type 
of participatory accountability seems to lead LBs to privilege concerns about the 
economic livelihoods of local constituents and the availability of jobs.  
 
For example, in the rural local area included in this research, there was concern 
about the community’s vitality: 
“we have got a difference here, because of all the rural localities. 
‘Cause a lot of the time, the pub is the centre of the whole village. 
And the trouble is with a lot of the rural pubs, a lot of them shut 
down is, it takes the centre of the village away.” (LA3, LB Member) 
 
This indicates the contextual decision-making of LB members, in which not just the 
economic, but also the socio-cultural context of a local area influences their sense of 
how licensing will impact on their local community, which then informs how they 
respond to this sense of informal accountability to their constituents. A quotation 
from a police representative involved in licensing also reflected this tension: 
“you're asking them to object to a licence for that pub or that 
supermarket, when they know it's going to generate so much 
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money in a community that's run down, that's needing that 
injection…hopefully they just try and make decisions that they 
believe are the best for communities and people in [LA1]. And 
whether that's injecting money and jobs into an area to the 
detriment of putting more alcohol into that area, so even people 
susceptible to increased availability and increased consumption 
and things like that, but it's all a balancing game.” (LA1, police 
representative) 
 
One source of information about community needs is public consultations. By law, 
LBs are expected to carry out consultations when developing their Licensing Policy 
Statements. However, similar to variation observed around development of LB 
overprovision statements, there is variation in LB commitments to public 
consultation. While I did not ask about this issue specifically in interviews, it arose in 
one interview with an LB member in LA1:   
Interviewee: The clerks drafted up…our current statement of 
policy.  We went out to consultation. I can’t remember exactly what 
the questions we went out to consultation with were but I think it 
was quite broad.  “Here’s a previous statement of policy.  Do you 
have any suggestions for how they should change?” 
AW: Was that to the public? 
Interviewee: Yes. 
AW: Okay. Where is that sort of thing advertised? 
Interviewee: On the council website.  
 
It is not clear how effective this consultation was, nor how accessible this type of 
consultation would be, especially if only advertised on the Council website.  
 
6.5 Discussion 
This chapter addressed the question of how the implementation of Scotland’s 
alcohol strategy in Licensing Boards was influenced by formal and informal 
accountability mechanisms. To do so, it explored the accountability regime 
surrounding local LBs, which are positioned as contributing to alcohol policy 
implementation and the achievement of public health outcomes via the regulation of 
alcohol availability (Scottish Government, 2009a).  
 
Similarly to Chapter 5, this chapter drew upon the Hupe and Hill (2007) public 
accountabilities typology. Reflecting on its use here, and by contrast with ADPs, it 
was not necessary to modify the framework to include ‘partnership’ accountability 
because LBs are not structured as partnership organisations. Drawing on the 
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framework became particularly useful for identifying where accountability was 
perhaps assumed to exist but, in practice, appeared absent.  
 
6.5.1 Principal Findings on Licensing Boards’ Accountability Regime and 
Contribution to Literature 
The public health objective makes Scotland’s approach to licensing unique in the 
UK. However, the principal findings suggested that LB members are not held 
sufficiently accountable for pursuing and protecting public health to enable this 
objective to make a meaningful difference to licensing decisions. In particular, 
accountability mechanisms surrounding licensing do not currently ensure the 
objective can have a meaningful impact, given a tension between what the existing 
legal and policy framework surrounding alcohol licensing says about the importance 
of public health, and the limited traction that public health arguments appear to have 
in alcohol policy implementation practice among licensing stakeholders. The 
absence of a regular mechanism to ensure LBs are fulfilling their public health-
related obligations means their decisions often present a challenge to alcohol policy 
implementation and, therefore, to the achievement of stated alcohol policy goals 
regarding alcohol availability.  
 
Legislative and Legal Tensions  
The findings suggested that public-administrative accountability of LBs was 
characterised by legal appeals-based mechanisms, and there was an overall 
absence of formal (and very limited informal) professional or participatory 
accountability influencing LB members. The fear of costly appeals appeared to be 
the strongest formal accountability-related influence on LBs’ licensing decision-
making. This finding reaffirms understanding generated from public health actors’ 
about what mechanisms influence Scottish LBs (Fitzgerald et al., 2017).  
 
While a legal accountability system exists to regulate LBs, the arrangements are 
arguably not conducive to effectively protecting public health interests. The data 
show that public-administrative accountability of LBs relies on legal accountability 
arrangements; beyond this there is a lack of other formal mechanisms for holding 
LBs to account. This creates challenges for alcohol policy implementation and public 
health in this process, because any gaps or failures within legal accountability 
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processes to support alcohol policy implementation cannot be mitigated by other 
mechanisms. While LB accountability is reliant on legal mechanisms, the practical 
arrangements are characterised by substantive flexibility and a de facto imbalance 
towards wealthy industry stakeholders.   
 
This leads to two observations. First, LBs’ flexibility to interpret legislation and the 
licensing objectives permit them to contextualise the legislation (‘in light of their 
particular circumstances’), and can go so far as to allow them to ignore the ‘spirit’ of 
the legislation in terms of an understanding and concern about public health impacts 
of availability. This finding adds to existing literature on alcohol policy 
implementation by providing greater understanding about how a lack of 
accountability can potentially contribute to variation in implementation. For example, 
the finding of variation in implementation is aligned with results from literature 
reviewed in Chapter 3 (e.g. the ‘room to manoeuvre’ identified by Herring et al. 
[2008]). It is also consistent with a review of LB Policy Statements by AFS which 
showed that overprovision statements were varied in their breadth and strength 
(Alcohol Focus Scotland, 2014a), suggesting interpretative flexibility of availability-
related evidence. However, this analysis provides an in-depth examination of the 
role accountability may play in this variation.  
 
Second, the observed imbalance towards wealthy licence applicants suggests LBs 
are only held to account in legal terms by applicants who have the financial 
resources to challenge their decision-making on a legal basis. Hence, while the 
court case regarding MUP positioned the alcohol industry as an adversary of 
government and its public health goals (Gillan, 2012), the accountability structures 
and practices surrounding alcohol licensing at a local level continue to favour large 
industry retailers, and serve to largely exclude public health stakeholders. If this is 
the principal mechanism for holding LBs to account, this excludes (a) alcohol policy 
implementers such as ADPs and their member organisations from holding LBs to 
account, because they cannot engage in the system in this manner, and (b) less 
financially secure licence applicants (or community members who do not have a 
financial interest in the outcome). The imbalance in this power distribution favours 
larger economic actors with access to significant resources, namely large industry 
producers and on- and off-trade retailers. This creates a system in which industry 
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actors are the most empowered to challenge the system that exists to regulate 
alcohol availability.  
 
These findings are aligned with existing research in which public health actors 
perceive licensing processes as unfair, disempowering, and favouring of well-
resourced licensing actors (Fitzgerald et al., 2018). These findings also align with a 
discussion of legal accountability by Hill and Varone, where they highlight that the 
“law may be comparatively impotent in the face of complex issues of administrative 
discretion” and that this concern “stimulates a search for other models of 
accountability” (Hill and Varone, 2017, p. 344). However, my findings go beyond this 
to show that the resources required to use the legal mechanism available mean the 
system actively shifts the balance of influence to favour interests which are counter 
to public health.  
 
The problem of the licensing system serving to privilege large retailers appears to be 
perpetuated by the way the system traverses multiple policy areas, i.e. justice/legal 
and public health, which have different approaches and priorities. However, it has 
been observed that public health seems to generally be losing in contests against 
competing economic or justice priorities. Ultimately, the dominance and 
characteristics of legal accountability for LBs help explain the gap between what is 
formally set out in Scottish alcohol licensing legislation and policy (i.e. a clear public 
health focus) and what is observed in practice (i.e. the extremely limited traction of 
public health considerations). 
 
Democracy, Accountability, and Public Health in Scottish Alcohol Licensing 
Fitzgerald and colleagues (2018) have made an important previous contribution to 
exploring democracy and power in Scottish licensing, finding that public health 
actors perceived members of the public are generally supportive of overprovision, 
and that ongoing involvement of the public in licensing was critical. My analysis in 
this chapter builds upon their findings by highlighting that characteristics of local 
democracy contribute to the gap identified above - in particular in relation to the 





The first example relates to local democracy, accountability, and the economy. My 
data suggested that while LBs have a formal responsibility regarding the public 
health objective and no formal responsibility for being concerned with the economy, 
their operational concerns reversed this focus. This could be a function of their 
simultaneous status as elected councillors and as LB members. In terms of 
democratic accountability, as councillors, they have a responsibility for the economic 
wellbeing of their local area because they have been elected by their local 
community. However, in terms of legal accountability, LB members have 
responsibility for public health, not economic concerns—the document guiding their 
decision-making states that commercial considerations are irrelevant to a policy 
which is designed to protect the wider public interest. Therefore, it is arguable that 
their simultaneous roles of elected councillor and LB member seem to be in conflict, 
and that their democratic accountability and legal accountability are also in tension. 
 
A second component of the analysis related to local democracy observes 
differences between elected and non-elected alcohol policy implementation 
stakeholders; Councillors experience democratic accountability which local, non-
elected policy implementers do not. In light of this, there is a tension inbuilt to the 
position of an LB member, which has implications for how alcohol policy 
implementation is governed. Elected Councillors are not part of the same systems of 
accountability as non-elected local government officials. However, the NPF identifies 
health as a Scottish priority, and LBs have a direct influence in contributing towards 
the alcohol-harm-related goals of the NPF because they control the availability of 
alcohol52. It appears that their role as a LB member is again in tension with this 
Councillor role, because being a LB member is a policy-led, administrative position 
which is explicitly intended to contribute to central Government goals relating to 
alcohol-related harm (MacNaughton and Gillan, 2011), and one would presume that 
they should, as such, be held accountable for this policy work. Yet, my research 
identified no obvious mechanism through which LB members were held to account 
for this work. 
 
 
52 Note, an updated 2018 version of the NPF states both ‘increased wellbeing’ and 




Third, LBs have a different arrangement of formal accountabilities than other alcohol 
policy implementers, who are subject to more explicit accountability and reporting 
mechanisms within local and national governance systems. These differences are 
important because, as a consequence, LBs have greater discretionary powers and 
are subject to less oversight than other local policy implementers (e.g. ADPs). For 
example, LBs are quasi-judicial bodies which sit independently from the established 
accountability regime for other local Council committees (Cllr L Young, 2018, 
personal communication). Thus, although LBs make decisions that influence the 
local populace and may impact on local government progress towards their own 
strategic priorities, they sit beyond the accountability arrangements that could 
monitor LBs. This includes lacking accountability from other local government 
bodies or through public involvement. This is problematic because, if their actions 
present a barrier to the achievement of local strategies, local actors do not have any 
recourse to hold them to account (i.e. data showed ADPs are having a limited 
impact on LBs in this context, despite the expectation that they will influence LBs). 
This demonstrates a key aspect of the LB accountability problem for alcohol policy 
implementation: while LBs sit beyond the system of accountability applied to other 
alcohol policy implementers, they will continue to present a key challenge to 
achieving availability-related alcohol policy goals. As an example, decisions by LB 
members about their Policy Statement have an effect on the alcohol policy 
implementation practice of ADPs (e.g. leading to increased time and resources 
spent on licensing issues) despite the sense that these efforts may be futile. 
 
 
Context and Resources 
The results presented and discussion above have touched on a number of aspects 
of context and resources which appear to influence the nature of LB accountability, 
and in doing so, influence Scottish alcohol policy implementation (e.g. see p. 204, 
206, 218, 221, 225).  
 
It has been made clear that concern with the local economic and financial context 
was an influence on LB decision-making, evident in LB members’ concern with the 
economy and, in relation to resources, their fear of the cost of appeals in court. The 
data in this regard also indicated there is an informal but strong concern among LBs 
of not wanting to contradict or impede the actions of another committee, suggesting 
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they were influenced to a certain extent by their local political context. In LA1, this 
was framed in terms of the Planning Committee wanting to bring ‘prosperity’ (a 
positive framing) and the local LB potentially making a decision which would go 
against prosperity (see page 221). If public health stakeholders are concerned with 
how LB members seem to prioritise the local economy over public health (and the 
barrier this creates for alcohol policy implementation), then they may wish to engage 
in the broader local discourse surrounding this issue. For example, this may require 
better understanding of the context in which LB members are working, and help 
them reconcile economic and public health concerns.  
 
This finding is broadly consistent with Foster (2016), who writes about licensing in 
England and Wales and found that while the licensing legislation in this context did 
not take economic issues into account, some of the study’s interviewees “described 
the economy as the ‘unofficial fifth [licensing] objective’” (p. 71). Foster ultimately 
recommended that a new licensing objective be introduced to “promote sustainable 
economic development and the wellbeing of the locality” (p. 15), or for 
England/Wales to adopt the same ‘overprovision’ concept as Scotland. While this 
recommendation seemingly aims to bring greater standardisation to licensing 
decisions made on the basis of economic considerations, Foster does not suggest 
how to overcome the difficulties in implementing ‘overprovision’ that are evident in 
the chapter findings above and in other existing research (e.g. MacGregor et al., 
2013). 
 
Finally, related to the democratic governance context of LBs, interviewees in the 
study by Fitzgerald and colleagues (2018) have suggested potentially influencing or 
holding LBs to account through the power of the voting public. My findings 
countered their participants’ perspectives somewhat, because my data suggested 
LB interviewees did not perceive LBs to be directly accountable to their communities 
for licensing decisions. Literature from Chapter 3 (e.g. Fitzgerald et al., 2018; Foster, 
2016; Herring et al., 2008) has called for increased public involvement and 
consultation. While this may be valuable in its own right, whether this would provide 
an accountability mechanism for LBs to pursue public health goals would require 
further exploration. Overall, however, in light of these contextual factors, local 
politics and councillors’ democratic accountability need to be acknowledged as 
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important considerations underpinning LB accountability processes, with 
implications for alcohol policy implementation.  
 
6.5.2 Implications for research and practice 
The findings in this chapter suggest there is a gap between the intentions of 
licensing legislation with respect to public health and the way it is enacted in 
practice. If the Scottish Government is serious about achieving its public health 
alcohol policy goals, both the absence of a clear accountability mechanism for LBs’ 
contributions to these goals, and the tension between these goals and the other 
priorities of LB members, need to be addressed. 
 
While the results presented in this chapter are aligned with existing research 
suggesting the public health objective has been difficult to implement (Macgregor et 
al., 2013; Fitzgerald et al., 2017) they also suggest that the lens of accountability is 
an important component of explaining why implementation has been challenging 
thus far. They lend support to an analysis which is focused on the accountability 
mechanisms surrounding licensing decision-making and its relationship with alcohol 
policy implementation. 
 
This chapter does not claim that giving licensing actors a responsibility to contribute 
to alcohol policy implementation has failed, or indeed that the public health objective 
itself has failed. Instead, it suggests that the implementation of the licensing system 
and the public health objective are suffering from challenges that are well-
recognised in the wider policy implementation and governance literature: that it is 
insufficient to develop public health policy or legislation and expect that the 
implementation of this will straightforwardly follow from this top-down decision. In 
this case, this problem is particularly acute given the complex interplay of public 
health, economic, democratic, and governance concerns which influence the 
decisions and actions of alcohol policy implementation stakeholders. The key 
message, however, is that national alcohol policy in Scotland is likely to continue to 
fall short of intended goals if tensions between overarching goals and local practices 
remain and these tensions seem unlikely to be resolved without meaningful changes 




6.6 Conclusion  
This chapter adds to existing literature an empirical investigation and mapping of LB 
accountability and how this influences the implementation of Scotland’s alcohol 
strategy. It draws lessons from accountability literature, and combines data from 
interviews with both public health licensing stakeholders as well as LB members 
themselves. 
 
This chapter studied how the implementation of Scotland’s alcohol strategy was 
influenced by formal and informal accountability mechanisms and relationships 
surrounding alcohol licensing decision-makers. It found that their regime is 
characterised by a nearly exclusive dependency on legal accountability, and a 
relative absence of other public-administrative, professional, and participatory 
accountabilities. In terms of implications for how local Scottish alcohol policy 
implementation occurs (including enactment of the ‘public health objective’) it 
highlighted a tension between the intentions of licensing legislation and the way it is 
enacted in practice. In particular, it suggests that there are a lack of accountability 
mechanisms within the regime governing Scottish LBs to ensure they contribute to 
the public health goals of the Scottish alcohol strategy. From a public health 
perspective, this has perpetuated a system in which LBs continue to act with 
problematic levels of flexibility and autonomy from the rest of the alcohol policy 
implementation system. Consequently, this creates a significant challenge to alcohol 
policy implementation and the achievement of Scotland’s alcohol policy goals 
related to the reduction of alcohol-related harm. In the context of limited empirical 
alcohol policy research which examines the interplay between alcohol policy 
implementation and accountability, and in light of the above, this chapter makes an 
empirical contribution to understanding how and why different types of accountability 
(or lack thereof) which help to govern licensing stakeholders influence the 
effectiveness of alcohol policy implementation in Scotland. 
 
The final results chapter is presented next, and turns to focus on the role of 







7  “Shades of grey”: Evidence, Expertise, and 
Experience among ADPs and Licensing Boards  
7.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to explore the role of evidence in implementing 
Scotland’s 2009 alcohol strategy. It investigates how members of ADPs and 
licensing stakeholders perceive and use evidence in the context of their alcohol 
policy implementation work. I begin by briefly discussing my rationale for studying 
this topic and reflect on my approach in this chapter, followed by a discussion of 
relevant literature. The chapter then transitions to presenting the results and 
discussion. 
 
7.1.1 Rationale for Studying Evidence Use in Scottish Alcohol Policy 
Implementation 
The systematic review (Chapter 3) identified evidence use in alcohol policy 
implementation as an important area for study, but that existing literature left 
research gaps requiring further empirical exploration. These findings helped to 
inform the development of this chapter. For example, geographically, literature often 
focused on English/Welsh contexts (e.g. Toner et al., 2014) and, methodologically, 
was often based on a limited number of interviews with public health actors (e.g. 
Fitzgerald et al., 2017; MacGregor et al., 2013). In the Scottish context, there 
remains a gap in understanding about perceptions and uses of evidence by ADPs 
(and their diverse members), particularly with respect to how ADPs use evidence in 
their structure as multi-sectoral partnerships. This dynamic has not yet been 
explored, yet seems critical to understanding alcohol policy implementation. With 
respect to licensing, the systematic review identified that accessing licensing actors’ 
perspectives first-hand would provide an opportunity for enhancing existing 
understanding about their approaches to evidence. Taken together, existing 
literature has thus far provided limited explanation of, or ideas for how to address, 
the ‘epistemological discord’ (Nicholls, 2015) between public health and licensing 
actors in their approaches to evidence – an issue previously identified as presenting 
a barrier to implementation (Fitzgerald et al., 2017). Examining ADPs and LBs 
together in the context of local alcohol policy implementation provides an opportunity 




The rationale for exploring the issue of evidence use in Scottish alcohol policy 
implementation was additionally informed by the Scottish Government’s explicit 
claim of having developed the 2009 strategy as an evidence-informed policy53, a 
claim supported to some extent by subsequent evaluations (e.g. Fitzgerald & Angus, 
2015). However, in-depth understanding of the role of evidence within the 
implementation of this strategy is still required. My analysis of national level 
interview and document data underlines the 2009 strategy’s claim that the 
implementation was intended to be an ‘evidence-based’ process, at least in ADPs (it 
is less clear that this expectation extended to LBs). For example, national level 
interviewees explained how ‘evidence-based policy making’ is a component of best 
practice for ADPs and is linked with their accountability obligations: 
“having a national dialogue across all of the local ADP areas, is 
really important, in order to further encourage best practices, in a 
number of areas.  And evidence-based policy making is certainly 
one of them” (National Level 7) 
 
“[Annual reporting] would be a circumstance where a fair question 
would be can you evidence that? And by evidence I think we'd be 
looking for both quantitative and qualitative evidence…you need to 
have a plausible argument. You need to have worked out your 
logic models as we did. And then be clear what the plausible 
connection is.” (National Level 4) 
 
In contrast to the expectations that ADPs would use evidence in implementing 
policy, there did not appear to be a similar, explicit expectation of LBs or their 
members. However, LBs are expected to work within the framework provided by the 
licensing objectives in the Licensing (Scotland) Act 2005, and guidance for the 
public health objective encourages LBs to consider evidence on alcohol availability 
and harm in their decision-making regarding overprovision and individual licenses 
(see Chapter 2). Nonetheless, during interviews, it became apparent that while LB 
members did not perceive an explicit expectation from national-level to use 
evidence, they were regularly doing so. Analysing further the perspectives and uses 
 
53 This claim appears again in the Alcohol Framework 2018, which states “We have taken, 
and will continue to take, an evidence-based approach to our alcohol strategy” (Scottish 
Government, 2018a, p. 8).  
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of evidence among ADPs and LBs within these contexts seemed an important line 
of inquiry in this thesis54.  
 
I wish to reflect briefly on my approach and analysis for this chapter. Following my 
chosen definition of implementation from O’Toole (Chapter 3, p.41), I have 
interpreted that the local policy work in which my interviewees are engaged is all 
‘implementation’ work. I brought this viewpoint to my interviews and my analysis of 
the data. For example, while I did sometimes ask interviewees whether they could 
think of specific examples in which they used evidence in making decisions, I 
allowed them to discuss their evidence use within the broad context of their work, 
and did not press them to demonstrate how this evidence use could be directly 
linked to a specific implementation action. I undertook the interpretive task of linking 
evidence and implementation myself when analysing the data - I found that the data 
helped me understand the role of evidence within implementation as defined, and to 
identify consequences of the findings for implementing the Scottish alcohol strategy. 
I perceived this approach as useful and appropriate in the context of my interviews, 
because I felt my interviewees were more comfortable talking about evidence use in 
general terms as related to their work, without always having to speak specifically to 
actions they have taken to implement aspects of the 2009 alcohol strategy. This 
approach also acknowledged understanding from evidence and policy literature that 
recognises evidence use is often not instrumental (Nutley et al., 2007). Further, LB 
members sometimes indicated they did not perceive themselves as strictly being 
‘implementers’ of alcohol policy (Chapter 6), therefore I felt forcing them to link their 




54 I remind the reader that I modified my interview schedule after reflecting on my 
experiences asking about evidence use in LA1 (Chapter 4). However, I do not 
perceive that this led to significantly different results across the three areas with 
respect to my findings on their evidence use. As the results of this chapter will show, 
the data across the three areas supported identification of a ‘culture of evidence’ for 




7.1.2 Engaging with Relevant Literature 
There is a wealth of existing research regarding evidence use in policy, key areas of 
which have been usefully reviewed and provide background knowledge for this 
chapter. First, these reviews demonstrate that decision-makers source evidence 
from diverse scientific and non-scientific sources and use different types of evidence 
(e.g. Masood et al., 2018; Orton et al., 2011). For example, public health 
policymakers have been found to source information mainly from Government 
websites, the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE), and through 
personal contacts; sourcing evidence less frequently from academia or online 
journals (Oliver et al., 2017; Oliver and de Vocht, 2015). Second, relevant research 
suggests that the types of evidence policy-makers access are often local data and 
needs assessments, as well as practical guidelines and surveillance data (Oliver 
and de Vocht, 2015). It has also been noted that individuals’ own opinions, 
preferences, or interests (even within an organisation, network or other group) will 
influence their perceptions of evidence (Contandriopoulos et al., 2010).  
 
Third, there is a well-developed literature around what factors can influence 
evidence use in policy. These have included availability and access to research; 
clarity, relevance, or reliability of research findings; timing of research; and 
interactions between researchers (or other evidence producers) and evidence users 
(Contandriopoulos et al., 2010; Kneale et al., 2017; Nutley et al., 2007; Oliver et al., 
2014; Walter et al., 2005). A recent systematic review also notes that barriers to 
evidence use can be individual, organisational, related to aspects of the research 
itself, or be related to the social, economic, or political environment (Masood et al., 
2018). Fourth, there has been much discussion about how evidence influences 
policy decision-making, with models showing a multiplicity of mechanisms for how 
this occurs, from direct, instrumental uses to indirect, complex, or more conceptual 
uses (Best and Holmes, 2010; Nutley et al., 2007; Orton et al., 2011; Weiss, 1979).  
 
For this research project it is valuable to consider that the literature suggests context 
(e.g. social, economic, political, institutional) is critical to understanding how 
evidence is being, or will be used, in policy (Contandriopoulos et al., 2010; Liverani 
et al., 2013). For example, Liverani and colleagues (2013) emphasise that 
developing evidence-informed health policy is necessarily a political challenge, 
which will be influenced by factors such as the level of state centralisation, influence 
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of external organisations, the nature of bureaucracy, and how well evidence aligns 
with stakeholders’ values and political agendas. This is additionally evident at local 
government level as certain powers are devolved to local areas – a review by 
Kneale and colleagues (2017) suggests that primacy is given to local evidence and 
to the knowledge of local experts which is perceived as more readily applicable.  
 
While seeking to apply such insights, this chapter (consistent with the thesis overall) 
is specifically situated within the alcohol policy implementation literature. To return to 
the findings of the systematic review (Chapter 3), a number of studies have 
considered the role of evidence in alcohol policy implementation. For example, 
studies have reported a perceived lack of (relevant) evidence as a specific barrier to 
implementation (e.g. Fitzgerald et al., 2015; Foster, 2016; Herring et al., 2008). 
Others explored actors’ perspectives on evidence in different alcohol policy 
implementation contexts (e.g. Fitzgerald et al., 2017; Martineau et al., 2013; 
Muhunthan et al., 2017; Toner et al., 2014). For example, certain articles discussed 
the use of evidence in alcohol licensing contexts (e.g. Grace et al., 2016; Randerson 
et al., 2018), noting how licensing decision-makers had different perceptions of 
evidence than public health actors, implying that the evidence which public health 
actors might assume give their arguments credibility are not necessarily effective in 
a licensing context. Similarly, in their study of the implementation of Scotland’s 
‘public health objective’, Fitzgerald and colleagues (2017) reported that various 
alcohol policy implementers brought different values and beliefs to their 
implementation work, which influenced their interpretation of licensing legislation 
and related evidence. This sometimes resulted in LB members apparently regarding 
public health evidence as unpersuasive – a finding which is supported by my own 
data (Section 7.2.2 below). Notwithstanding these contributions, the review 
suggested that understanding of how key stakeholders use evidence in Scottish 
alcohol policy implementation remains relatively limited, especially in spaces other 
than LBs.   
 
In this chapter I have sought to build upon Fitzgerald and colleagues’ (2017) 
examination of Scotland’s public health objective, in which they reported on the 
experiences of 13 public health practitioners engaging with licensing across 20 
licensing areas. Their interviewees perceived a challenge to effectively enacting the 
public health objective in that, while they approached this work with a ‘whole 
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population approach’, this perspective was not always adopted by licensing 
decision-makers (Fitzgerald et al., 2017). Interviewees reported that not all licensing 
stakeholders agreed that current Scottish alcohol consumption levels and related 
harms were significant problems, and that the licensing community lacked 
consensus about whether “addressing public health was a legitimate role of 
licensing” (Fitzgerald et al., 2017, p. 7). Additionally, interviewees perceived LBs as 
tending to prioritise economic considerations and concerns over those related to 
public health (Fitzgerald et al., 2017). This chapter seeks to expand upon Fitzgerald 
and colleagues’ analysis by examining evidence use in the implementation of the 
2009 alcohol strategy more broadly, exploring a more diverse set of relevant policy 
perspectives on evidence use in alcohol policy implementation from across ADPs 
and LBs. This inclusive lens permits observations about how, for example, ADP 
members are using and perceiving evidence in their broader alcohol implementation 
work (which stretches beyond trying to influence LBs), and attain first-hand LB 
member perspectives on evidence.  
 
In concluding their account, Fitzgerald and colleagues (2017) suggest that the 
concept of variation in ‘cultures of evidence’ might usefully be employed in 
examining alcohol policy implementation. The concept of ‘cultures of evidence’ 
refers to observed patterns in how policy actors use evidence and the factors that 
influence this use (Lorenc et al., 2014b). It was developed by Lorenc and colleagues 
(2014), out of their systematic review of qualitative research across ‘non-health 
sectors’, and rests on the idea that there is a divide between health and non-health 
uses of evidence. The authors acknowledge the need for research to examine “the 
actual decision-making process in specific fields” (Lorenc et al., 2014b, p. 1045). In 
this research, ADPs and LBs have emerged as particularly valuable contexts for 
such analysis, given their involvement in making health-relevant policy decisions in 
contexts often shaped by other priorities, and their composition in bringing together 
actors with diverse professional backgrounds and varying priorities. Thus, this 
concept facilitated my analysis by helping me to explore complex data about two 
distinct organisations involved in alcohol policy implementation, and aid in their 
comparative analysis.   
 
Lorenc and colleagues' (2014) analysis is inherently contextual given their 
consideration of how cultures of evidence among non-health actors may be different 
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from those in health. In particular the authors consider how the political context of 
non-health actors may influence their perceptions and uses of evidence, and 
implications of this for their relationship with public health research. I wanted to 
examine the significance of diverse institutional contexts, and the interactions 
between them, and was inspired by this aspect of their analysis.  Their analysis was 
developed to answer three questions: (i) what is considered to be evidence by non-
health decision-makers? (ii) what factors affect decision-makers’ use of research 
evidence? (iii) how do decision-makers use research evidence?  In this chapter I did 
not follow Lorenc and colleagues (2014) in assuming a divide between ‘health’ and 
‘non-health’ uses of evidence; such an assumption felt inappropriate in the context  
of examining complex cross-sectoral setting such as ADPs (being potentially both 
normatively loaded and limiting scope to explore more complex patterning of 
evidence use). Instead, I used ‘cultures of evidence’ as an underpinning idea 
through which to approach the analysis. By using the concept in this way, I was able 
to go beyond consideration of ‘research evidence’ to analyse how evidence 
conceptualised broadly may be influencing alcohol policy implementation. I was also 
able take into account the complex dynamics within the organisations I was studying 
– specifically the partnership basis of ADPs, and the diverse personal and 
professional backgrounds contained within both ADPs and LBs. In light of this, this 
chapter addresses the question of: What roles (if any) did evidence appear to play in 
the implementation of Scotland’s 2009 alcohol strategy? 
 
The results of this chapter will now be set out in two substantive sections, each 
describing how the data point to the existence of distinct ‘cultures of evidence’ 
among ADPs and LBs, respectively. The results are followed by the chapter’s 
discussion section.  
 
7.2 Results 
7.2.1 “We always have to take a nuanced view”: ADPs’ Culture of Evidence  
This section presents data from members of the three included ADPs, in relation to 
their culture of evidence surrounding work to implement the 2009 alcohol strategy. 
As will be shown through the data presented, while a general culture of evidence 
could be identified across the three ADPs, at an individual level members displayed 
some diversity in their evidence preferences and approaches. Thus the ADP culture 
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of evidence was made additionally complex by their multi-sectoral partnership 
composition. Despite the diversity of their partnership membership, the data will 
suggest an ADP culture of evidence broadly characterised by (i) a general openness 
to different types and sources of evidence, depending on needs; (ii) a preference for 
evidence which is contextualised and actionable; and (iii) uses of evidence to inform 
both personal decision-making and to persuade other policy actors. These 
characteristics will be the focus of the following subsections. 
 
Using different types and sources evidence to meet different needs  
ADP interviewees described drawing upon a wide variety of types of evidence to 
inform their policy work to implement the 2009 strategy, spanning from experiential 
or informal types such as stories or anecdotal feedback, to data-driven evidence 
(both at the at national or local level). However, ADP members reported attaching 
particular meaning and importance to experiential evidence, and, where they did use 
more data-driven evidence (in particular with respect to quantitative data) they 
highlighted the need for consistency with the experiential data. Furthermore, ADP 
interviewees reported using a wide range of organisational- and individual-level 
sources of evidence, including academic research, national-level organisations such 
as Information Services Division or NHS Health Scotland, data from their own (or 
other) local areas, and individual-level sources such as colleagues, service users, or 
other public perspectives. My data further suggested they used evidence in ways 
which spanned a range of instrumental and conceptual uses (Nutley et al., 2007). 
With this contextual understanding in mind, the rest of this section expands on the 
discussion of types and sources of evidence ADPs report using summarised thus 
far. 
 
First, ADPs reported drawing upon a range of experiential evidence, including 
professional experience; service user feedback; information from colleagues or 
other stakeholders; and personal experiences, stories, or ‘common sense’. The 
following quotation discusses drawing upon colleagues’ knowledge, shared learning, 
and the professional expertise of others: 
“It came from one of the area team social workers and their team 
manager flagged it up to me… so I said to [NHS colleague], I says 
‘this is an issue’, so [we] organised a meeting with a few folk and 
gave them permission to address that at the grassroots level” 




This quotation suggests that the professional expertise of key colleagues was 
perceived as credible and valuable, and even more importantly actionable, as this 
interviewee then communicated the issue to another ADP colleague, resulting in a 
change in practice. It also demonstrates the cross-sectoral nature of their work, 
indicating that ADPs may share learning across their members in order to make 
implementation decisions. Other ADP members also reported perceiving value in 
colleagues’ professional opinions: 
“Personally, myself, I find it more helpful to have discussions with 
people, what worked, what didn’t work. If you were doing it again, 
what would you do kind of thing?” (LA2, ADP Member) 
 
“I suppose informal contacts with the managers in particular. I still 
know a few [service] workers and I tend to listen to their news 
quite a lot although I don't actually directly ask them the questions 
but you bump into people. You know and you get impressions and 
quite often they carry a lot of weight. The things that people say to 
you informally…you know, ‘we'd manage fine if you gave us a third 
of the value of those six beds, we could deal with all of those 
clients’. That didn't happen at the meeting it's not minuted 
anywhere, but actually when we have to make the cuts… yeah 
that’s a source of information.” (LA1, ADP Member) 
 
In the latter quotation above, it is suggested that this interviewee’s professional 
background in service delivery continues to influence how they identify and assess 
evidence. Additionally, this person was currently involved in commissioning for the 
ADP, and the quotation suggests the ‘impressions’ from service providers may be 
influencing this aspect of their implementation work. In particular, informing their 
thinking about how they can feasibly make local services cuts in the context of 
broader ADP budget cuts (Chapter 2), suggesting that this type of professional 
expertise may help implementers make tough decisions for which more formal or 
documented evidence may not be available. Drawing on professional expertise also 
emerged as important in the context of ongoing health and social care integration. 
For example, the below quotation refers to one interviewee’s experiences 
developing a relapse prevention programme in the context of this integration: 
“I strongly believe in a bottom-up approach, [we] had a number of 
staff events, and we used, it was called appreciative inquiry … this 
is about bringing two cultures together, this is about bringing all of 
the interventions together…But at these events, what we did was 
gauge from the staff what worked for them, how they would like to 
take [the programme] forward, how we as a management team 
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could steer it forward, we just took ideas and it was borne out of 
that.” (LA2, ADP Member) 
 
Alongside showing uses of experiential evidence, the quotations above begin to 
indicate the personalised nature of evidence assessment and use. In addition to the 
quotations above, there were instances in the data of where an individual 
interviewees’ background influenced their relationship with evidence. In the below 
quotation the interviewee was asked about the persuasiveness of ‘recovery’ as a 
priority within the ADP’s work, and they referred to their own experiential knowledge 
which stemmed from their previous role:  
“I suppose it’s probably linked to my previous job… I think it was 
my knowledge of addiction issues from that role and my 
experiences of working with young women” (LA2, ADP Member) 
 
These excerpts suggest that ADP members bring their own backgrounds (including 
professional and personal norms, values and ideas) into their relationship with 
evidence, and that this may influence their perceptions of different types of 
evidence. Finding that people’s professional backgrounds inform their relationship 
with evidence is not unusual (Bartley, 1992) and broadly reflects the assumption 
underpinning Lorenc and colleagues’ (2014) work in exploring evidence preferences 
of health actors and non-health actors. However, the partnership context of ADPs 
perhaps means that members’ variable professional backgrounds are informing a 
wider range of approaches to evidence than would be the case for non-partnership 
organisations. An obvious example was health, police, or social work 
representatives primarily reported drawing from their own health-, crime-, or child 
protection-related data, respectively. 
 
This diversity was recognised explicitly by one interviewee in LA1, who had 
discussed how their own background led them to seek academic evidence, but 
reflected that other ADP members had different approaches which led them to rely 
on other types or sources of evidence (including relying on ‘instinct’): 
“I think because the Alcohol and Drug Partnership is a group of 
people who don’t, you know, they’ve got various strategic leads 
and a lot of them, it isn’t a drug and alcohol lead, so the head of 
police, their role isn’t drug- and alcohol-specific, I think they are 
relying more on stories and gut and all those things rather than 
thinking ‘well I’ll read some evidence on this’… ‘cause this isn’t 
their day job so to speak, they would be going on their gut instinct 
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of what they feel is right. Based on their perspective.” (LA1, ADP 
Member) 
 
This quotation suggests some interviewees felt their ADP colleagues were drawing 
upon instinct rather than external/explicit evidence, particularly where their usual 
organisational role was not specifically focused on alcohol. The references to ‘gut 
instinct’ might be conceptualised in terms of the use of tacit or intuitive knowledge in 
local alcohol policy implementation – knowledge which is embodied, rather than 
external (Freeman and Sturdy, 2014; Gabbay and le May, 2004; Greenhalgh, 2002). 
As such, the references to ‘instinct’ reflected broader and internalised norms and 
frames of reference which were not expressed explicitly in everyday work of the 
interviewees. This contributed to ADPs’ culture of evidence, however I note that, 
across the data, most ADP members appeared to be drawing to some extent on 
both embodied and external sources of evidence to inform their implementation 
work.  
 
Another type of experiential evidence - feedback from service users - was a 
particularly meaningful type of evidence to some ADP members (especially in LA1 
and LA2). Members of the ADP coordination teams in particular spoke about the 
importance of obtaining service user feedback, for example: 
“[Service user feedback] makes it much richer as a result. … 
we’ve done a lot of ‘conversation cafés’ where people in recovery 
have come together with other professionals and talked about 
what they want to see happening in their local community, and 
how we will make it happen. Those stories are really helpful 
because, if I’m honest, sometimes you learn something new there, 
something comes up and that’s great. A lot of the time you’re 
hearing what you already know but it inspires you to do something, 
it gives you the motivation to do it, because suddenly you’ve got 
people in recovery sitting there saying ‘we’d like to work in our 
treatment, we’d like to volunteer in our treatment services’ and 
you’re thinking, ‘yeah we know we need peer workers in our 
treatment services’. And when you hear that you think ‘right, there 
are people out there who want to do it, let’s do it’. So it’s a 
motivator to get it going.” (LA1, ADP Member) 
 
“We were really keen to hear [service users’] thoughts in terms of 
what did it feel like to be in recovery from addiction, and what were 
services were doing or not doing, what was the ADP doing or not 
doing, what was [LA2] as a whole doing or not doing in terms of 




As noted in Chapter 5, involvement of ‘peer’ service users was a focus of the 
included ADPs’ partnership work - these data suggest service users are also playing 
a key (and potentially growing) role in providing evidence to implementers of 
Scotland’s alcohol strategy. In particular, these quotations suggest that ADP 
members seek to understand the perspectives of service users and use this to 
inform their priority-setting and decision-making for implementation. This suggests 
ADP members may seek to balance, or consider in tandem, priorities as named in 
the national alcohol strategy and community-identified needs. This adds to the 
complexity of the implementation work they engage in, given these priorities may not 
necessarily align and could end up competing for local implementers’ time and 
resources.  
 
However, available guidance for ADPs does encourage them to make decisions, at 
an organisational level, in consideration of locally-identified needs. For example, 
ADPs are encouraged to undertake or commission ‘local needs assessments’55 
which help assess the extent of service needs and gaps. In particular, the Updated 
Guidance for Alcohol and Drugs Partnerships  (COSLA et al., 2015) links funding 
and evidence use, with explicit mention of needs assessments:  
“[funding] is a partnership resource and the full allocation must be 
directed to ADP level for decision-making informed by robust 
needs assessment and in line with recognised evidence base.”  
 
Interviewees in all three local areas referenced their needs assessment in 
interviews; assessments seemed to provide a key source of evidence to  inform 
ADPs’ service delivery decisions and potentially fulfil national expectations of 
evidence use and locally-identified needs.     
 
When locally-relevant evidence was unavailable to support implementation decision-
making, there were limited, but meaningful examples of ADP members overcoming 
the lack of evidence observed by creating evidence themselves, by conducting 
research in their organisation or synthesising existing information. This was 
 
55 Local Needs Assessments are strategic, structured assessments to “[identify] the needs of 
the local population, so that services can be planned and delivered to meet those needs]” 
(Scottish Executive, 2004, p. 1). They often include data generated from service users, or 
their representatives, families or carers, as well as service providers. They are therefore an 
important, structured way in which service user perspectives are accessed.  
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particularly evident in LA2 and LA3, where members of the ADP reported structured 
information gathering to assess service user or broader public perspectives on a 
particular issue. For example, in LA2 an interviewee spoke about the lack of 
available evidence on barriers that women face to accessing addiction services and 
the solution the ADP developed to address this: 
“there really wasn’t anything that was kind of current or pertinent to 
us, there wasn’t an awful lot of availability of evidence [on barriers 
to women accessing services] […] that’s why we did the peer 
research, and for us, I suppose it was twofold in terms of the 
outcomes for that. We got the evidence to hopefully try and move 
forward, but we also were able to train up the peers in delivering 
that research and increase their capacity and confidence and skills 
and everything.” (LA2, ADP Member) 
 
This interviewee described instituting a new organisation-level tool for developing 
needed, context-specific evidence which incorporated experiential types from 
service users (‘peers”). This approach appeared to increase both the capacity of the 
ADP as an organisation to generate and use evidence, and the capacity of people in 
recovery. However, this was a single instance in this ADP, and it was not clear 
whether this ADP was being supported to continue this type of internal research 
work to inform implementation. In LA3, there was another instance of the ADP 
gathering their own evidence to access public perspectives: 
“We went out and did some public survey work, we spoke to 
people, I think we asked…over a thousand people about their 
views, and one of the questions we asked was around licensing, 
‘do you believe there’s enough licensed premises?’ Or something 
like that, in [LA3], and overwhelmingly the public think there are, 
and don’t feel there needs to be any more, so we had that 
information.” (LA3, ADP Member) 
 
In addition to demonstrating locally-generated evidence is a privileged source of 
information within ADPs, this again suggests ADP members are concerned with 
understanding local perspectives. Data from another ADP member supports this, 
exemplifying data in which interviewees were explicit about trying to access, and 
respond to, needs identified by their local community: 
“Within our local policing plans, I think probably all our local 
authorities have got alcohol and substance misuse as a priority… 
Within that we're laying out our kind of commitment to addressing 
issues roundabout alcohol misuse within that. Because the 
communities have told us that's an important issue for them.” 




These data indicate that uses of evidence to assess public perspectives about local 
alcohol issues may be closely linked with the idea of ‘participatory accountability’ 
discussed in Chapter 5. Having gained an understanding of these public 
perspectives, members of ADPs seek to act upon this evidence given their apparent 
sense of responsibility to their local community. Further, that experiential types of 
evidence (both intuitive and gleaned from professionals and/or service users) 
influence priorities and decisions in alcohol policy implementation. These findings 
provide initial indications of ADPs’ culture of evidence, one which assesses 
evidence based on ADP members’ needs, and a preference for evidence which is 
sufficiently contextualised and actionable.  
 
Shifting to focus on another type of evidence, ADP members referred to quantitative 
evidence as important. The below quotations illustrate ADP members’ perceptions 
of quantitative evidence, including recognition of its’ limitations: 
“The ISD data may be a little bit out of sync with what you know 
locally, but you kind of just have to live with it, you just have to 
make the best of what you’re getting. The data has improved 
enormously over the years” (LA3, ADP Member) 
 
“if I need a piece of information as I said with the recent budget 
setting, and looking at risk assessments, some of the quality 
impact reviews, we could draw on stats and information, to be able 
to make informed decisions” (LA2, ADP Member) 
 
“the way I look at it is there's a place for the data and the stats, it 
has to be, you know there has to be an educated approach to it, 
there's no point in just throwing money, resources, at a project, 
there has to be some sort of theory behind it as well.” (LA2, ADP 
Member) 
 
The above quotations suggest ADP members are regularly using quantitative 
evidence. The interviewees indicated this type of evidence could be particularly 
useful in helping ADP members to measure progress against key local indicators (a 
component of their role identified as important for accountability reasons, see 
Chapter 5). Interviewees reported the quantitative data they used was often 
collected across Scotland or local areas. Locally, the above-mentioned local needs 
assessments can also include quantitative data – for example in LA1 a needs 





As a qualifier to the above, however, some interviewees reported a need to interpret 
quantitative data to make it more useful. This appears to occur when the quantitative 
evidence (e.g. statistics) aligns with an individual’s experiential understandings, and 
if it is being used to prompt thinking about what can be actioned in response to the 
statistics:    
“I can get the stats out to show you that, but I know that ‘cause I 
work in the area.  So although I could talk to that, I could still 
evidence it.  So it’s that wee bit about saying to people, I know 
what works, right, and I can back it up. But it’s about knowing 
where your field of expertise stops. It’s about knowing where that 
stops and you’ll need to go and ask other people. We’ve got a 
system called [redacted], so I can go in and download fast 
statistics…But stats are only numbers. How I interpret the stats 
and how I evidence what I do, but the stats is the difference. When 
we do a report, what I would say to somebody is, pull down the 
stats and see what your hotspots are and then tell me what you’re 
doing about it. So tell me what you’re doing about it is the 
difference.” (LA2, ADP Member) 
 
Overall, it appears that ADPs’ organisational-level culture of evidence includes a 
range of different types of evidence that can be perceived as useful in the context of 
their alcohol policy implementation work. With respect to this characteristic, ADPs 
appear to generally use an eclectic mix of evidence types depending on their needs, 
but with a striking emphasis on experiential evidence, and with some notable 
diversity arising from tacit knowledge they bring to this work.  
 
Turning to focus more closely on sources of evidence ADP interviewees reported 
drawing upon, these are clearly very closely linked with the types of evidence 
discussed above. Common sources appeared to be health organisations, other local 
organisations (e.g. local Councils or Heath Boards) and academia. ADP members 
broadly discussed academic research as a potential source of evidence (most often 
to say they likely should be using this source more). In particular, resources which 
synthesised available research evidence were perceived to be valuable:  
“There is some, some evidence and it’s very well collated through 
Drug and Alcohol Findings [website], which is my absolute bible 
for everything and occasionally you can just email [website 
creator] and say ‘I don’t know this, tell me’ and he tells you and it’s 




Given that policy implementers do not have time set aside in their workday to 
engage broadly with available evidence (despite national expectations to use 
evidence), this type of resource seemed to assist individuals in understanding 
available research. Another ADP member reported how useful academic research 
was when it was specific to Scotland: 
“… the international stuff which is great. But it is much more 
helpful to have stuff like Niamh and Jamie’s56 work to be able to 
say look this is Scottish data.” (LA1, ADP Member) 
 
However, certain interviewees expressed frustration with academic research. For 
example, interviewees reported feeling that academic research often did not help 
them address the particular problem with which they were grappling: 
“So how many alcohol detox beds do we need? … Who knows?  
There isn’t really a formula, and even if you look in the 
international literature, everywhere it is arranged differently. You 
don’t really know, and academic articles don’t usually spell out 
exactly what the treatment system in general is in that area.” (LA1, 
ADP Member) 
 
A similar frustration was expressed with regards to ADPs’ capacity to act upon 
research to pursue preventive approaches. Alcohol research, similar to broader 
public health literature, consistently recommends prioritising prevention (e.g. 
Groves, 2010; World Economic Forum and World Health Organization, 2011). In the 
Framework for Action, the Scottish Government followed this evidence, indicated: 
“We are committed to taking action now through legislative change and a record 
investment in prevention treatment and services” (Scottish Government, 2009a, p. 
5). However, ADP members spoke in-depth about the difficulties in acting upon this 
evidence and related policy imperative because of constrained resources. For 
example:  
“yes we need that whole population approach, but we need 
additional resources, because the whole population approach, 
assuming it works, will have that long term preventative impact. So 
we can’t afford not to have that, but right now we also need, 
additionally [to] focus on people with very specific and high level 
needs. So it’s about actually, for a period, needing to do both. […] 
 
56 Interviewee is referring to research conducted by Dr Niamh Shortt and Professor Jamie 
Pearce, from the Centre for Research on Environment, Society and Health (CRESH) 
(www.cresh.org.uk). Dr Shortt and Professor Pearce conduct research related to alcohol 
policy in Scotland, the UK, and internationally.  
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But when you come to then say ‘oh and by the way we need 
resources for prevention’ and when those resources are finite 
[funders] are saying ‘okay well where should we take them from 
then’. And the reality is we can’t take them from the highest levels 
of need because they are screaming out for services” (LA1, ADP 
Member) 
 
As another example, one ADP member expressed their frustration with research 
evidence in terms of what were identified as its ‘biases’, and what these meant for 
its relevance to their work:  
“…the biases in the evidence base, which make it very 
problematic… [individual interventions are] the things that are 
evidenced, that are researched. Social changes, employment, the 
impact of your community, the impact of having a strong 
relationship with family members, isn’t, because the research is 
based on who does the research, and the research is done by the 
people who sell methadone…so simply to follow the evidence 
base by what has a large number of research papers supporting it 
as an intervention wouldn’t work for running a treatment system. It 
would say ‘we have to do an enormous amount of CBT [cognitive 
behavioural therapy], we have to give out methadone, we have to 
use motivational interviewing’ and it would exclude some really 
fundamentally good things that we do, like wrap-around services 
that we need, trying to develop recovery communities, enabling 
people to access mutual aid, a whole string of things that are 
under-researched. So we always have to take sort of a nuanced 
view of that because we tend to get doctors and psychologists 
coming in and saying what you need to do is spend all of your 
investment on this exact piece of CBT. And I know that 
successions of CBT isn’t necessarily going to work and no amount 
of evidence is going to convince me that it will to be honest.” (LA1, 
ADP Member) 
 
Somewhat in contrast to the data regarding prevention above, from this 
interviewee’s perspective academic research is typically too focused on individual 
interventions to the exclusion of researching upstream socioeconomic factors (which 
would need to be taken into account when making local alcohol policy 
implementation decisions). Consequently, despite the culture within my three ADPs 
appearing to be generally open to a wide range of evidence, the data also suggest 
some types and sources of evidence, notably academic evidence, were sometimes 
perceived to be not well-suited to alcohol policy implementation decisions locally 




Alongside these critiques, further data suggested resistance to research evidence 
among some ADP members. For example, there was a contrast between the 
national level expectations about using research evidence and a sense among 
some ADP members that research was already overly influential and ought to be 
rebalanced by a stronger focus on people’s experiences. For example:  
“I think working in a health system, sometimes that’s problematic 
because the whole culture of the health system is you’ve got a 
whole group of professionals who are the experts in what they do, 
and of course they are and they’re highly trained, etc.  But I don’t 
think we’re good at turning that round and putting the experience 
of individuals who’ve been through recovery at the heart of what 
we do.  We still work on what the research says and what the 
policy says and what the guidelines say, and actually if we did 
much more of the, but what do people who’ve been through it 
actually say and we tailor what we do to that, I think we’d be much 
better at what we do.” (LA3, ADP Member) 
 
Additionally, interviewees in different local areas expressed a need for viewing and 
interpreting evidence (particularly academic research) in a nuanced, context-
sensitive way: 
“you get these very broad general, sort of, sweeping statements 
about the evidence. And it doesn’t really get challenged. And I see 
that as really unhealthy, because I think it’s almost put to people 
that, as though that’s a truth. You know, that’s a, kind of, accepted 
truth and because it appeared in a systematic review or whatever 
then it can’t be questioned. Whereas I think… it’s a lot more 
complicated than that.  And it’s, kind of, shades of grey rather than 
black or white stories.” (LA3, ADP Member) 
 
This quotation, which informed the chapter title, helps characterise the data 
presented here, indicating that a broad culture of evidence surrounding ADPs can 
be identified - in terms of valuing different types of evidence, finding a range of 
different evidence sources credible, and seeking evidence which is presented in a 
way that is context specific and actionable.  
 
In sum, ADPs appeared to have a relatively open and eclectic ‘culture of evidence’ 
but evidence was more likely to be used if it met the following criteria: (i) it was 
perceived to address specific questions/problems the ADP was dealing with; (ii) it 
was Scottish-specific or acknowledged constraints implementers were under; (iii) it 
was informed by local perspectives; and (iv) it felt credible (e.g. because it fitted with 
members’ experiential accounts or their ‘gut’ feelings). Despite the sense of 
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openness to different types and sources of evidence, academic evidence was 
highlighted as having limitations since it was perceived to rarely meet such criteria.  
 
‘Real’, powerful, and contextualised: ADP perceptions of effective presentation of 
evidence 
This subsection builds on the results above. Given the emphasis placed on 
experiential evidence, it is perhaps unsurprising that some ADP members 
suggested hearing about experiences directly from those affected was a particularly 
powerful way of evidence being presented. For example,  
“The workforce development session we had … one of the most 
powerful inputs I thought from that was the modern apprentice 
who was in. She was talking about mental health, and problems 
particularly with teenagers and mental health, and I thought that 
was fantastic… she was very honest and very open and she 
spoke about her own experiences, and I loved her quote about 
you know if I broke my leg you wouldn't expect me to walk about 
for 6 weeks with a broken leg, and yet I have to wait for 6 weeks if 
my mind is broken, I thought that was fantastic. So I think, inputs 
like that and from people like that, I think are far more lasting and 
far more powerful…It's somebody, it's not somebody speaking in 
statistics or shooting PowerPoints or pie charts, it's about actual 
real life you know…these are people who've been through it and 
know what they're talking about, I think there has to be a bit of 
credibility behind it” (LA2, ADP Member) 
 
This suggests that evidence which was about ‘real life’ was more valuable and 
interesting than quantitative data, highlighting how this ADP interviewee gives 
credibility to a person with lived experience of engaging with services, and that this 
evidence had been presented in an engaging, powerful way which was perceived as 
relevant and meaningful to this person’s work. 
 
A key observation about presentation, in terms of ADP members’ culture of 
evidence, was the need for evidence to be provided in a way which was sensitive to 
the context in which it would be used. This helps reiterate the results presented 
above, and suggest evidence needs to be relevant to ADPs’ policy work and 
‘actionable’ given the constraints (e.g. in terms of resources) of ADPs’ work. With 
respect to presentation, ADP members were critical of research which did not 
provide clear, practical guidance. For example, one ADP member expressed 
frustration with academics who s/he perceived to be producing research that 
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reflected the researchers’ lack of experience actually delivering the services (e.g. 
ABIs) they were writing about, often concluding there was a need for future research 
but not providing clear, actionable ways forward: 
“it gets a bit tiresome sometimes reading things that very often 
conclude that there’s a need for further research… the amount of 
investment time and investment that goes in to academic 
research, I think people expect a bit more from it, a bit more in 
terms of clarity and more of a, sort of, guide in terms of how it can 
be put in to practice…in terms of credibility, you can pick up quite 
easily when people don’t actually have experience in an area that 
they’re talking about.” (LA3, ADP Member) 
 
Thus, ADP members seemed to value evidence which had not only been 
undertaken in a way that was sensitive to context, but was also presented with the 
same sensitivity. They expressed further frustration with having evidence they 
perceived could not be ‘actioned’ or ignored the research needs of local 
implementers. The quotations below illustrate these frustrations further, as local 
policy implementers shared the challenges they faced when trying to use evidence, 
particularly academic research: 
“I suspect if you're a researcher you're kind of going ‘well I'm going 
to learn all of this stuff because I'm going to tell people, and then 
the people that I tell are going to change things’. But nobody's 
asking what we'd like to know…We have a research project 
currently going on…[about] whether putting a senior social worker 
in a GP's practice improved outcomes for clients. There is 
absolutely nothing more useless than knowing that if I had another 
£5 million I could put somebody (bangs table) who costs £40,000 
a year into every one of our GPs’ surgeries, that's lovely, I'm sure 
it did, but (laughing), why? Why find that out? You know, yeah, so 
ask some questions that we might be able to action. (LA1, ADP 
Member) 
 
This quotation suggests a key difficulty faced by ADP members is interacting with 
evidence which does not include recognition of the constraints they are under, which 
require trade-offs between what will work and what is feasible in terms of resources. 
This again emphasises the importance of usability or ‘actionability’ of evidence as 
discussed in the subsection above, this time in relation to what the evidence is 
focused on (or neglects – with the above quotation suggesting a lack of attention to 
resources). The quotation above also touches upon a number of other challenges 
discussed by ADP members, including a perceived ‘gulf’ between evidence (most 
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often academic research) and policy. When I asked how this challenge might be 
addressed, the same interviewee responded:  
“[researchers asking] what are our problems... Our problems 
would be what would improve outcomes… what would improve 
efficiency, and something about evidence-based commissioning… 
if people asked us what we wanted, and that’s not what happens 
it’s the opposite of what happens.” (LA1, ADP Member) 
 
A colleague of theirs helped to confirm this: 
“if you narrow the gulf between research and policy 
makers…actually having them directly interacting, I think it’s very 
helpful.” (LA1, ADP Member, NHS) 
 
The quotations above suggest a need for research-policy engagement and co-
production, particularly to improve key processes within alcohol policy 
implementation (i.e. undertaking commissioning). The data suggest the content of 
available evidence is currently too remote from the realities of local alcohol policy 
implementation work, and is therefore difficult to use. Again, evidence was less likely 
to be perceived as persuasive or as having value if it was not sensitive to the 
context in which Scottish alcohol policy implementers were working (e.g. one 
characterised by resource constraints). Instead, it appeared ADP members 
perceived additional, locally-focused evidence would be useful: 
“We just need small, simple independent bits of research on an 
ongoing basis with some consistency to them, that would help us” 
(LA1, ADP Member) 
 
This section has been focusing ADP members’ evidence use in their own work to 
implement Scotland’s alcohol strategy. However, interviewees also richly discussed 
using evidence to try to influence other alcohol policy stakeholders.  
 
“Knitting them all together to paint a picture”: Evidence as a tool to persuade or 
justify decisions 
The data also demonstrate ways in which ADP members use evidence as a tool to 
persuade, both within the ADP to inform or influence each other in their partnership-
working context, and to persuade other alcohol policy implementation stakeholders 
outside the ADP. The individuals or organisations ADPs appeared to be trying to 
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persuade often included LBs (although this may have been a result of my interview 
approach), as well as others in local or Scottish government.  
 
First, ADP interviewees indicated the persuasiveness of evidence for use within their 
partnerships could be enhanced by integrating different types of evidence. For 
example, one interviewee from LA3 described bringing ‘the evidence’ together 
relating to alcohol and social marketing in order to make an organisational-level 
decision. When asked what this entailed, s/he described: 
“[we] would have done some kind of review of what the literature 
said around social marketing and alcohol and we’ll have taken that 
and put it into a case… [we] would have taken information from 
the needs assessment, we would have taken information at the 
morbidity mortality statistics, alcohol admissions to hospital, and 
just again built a picture, bringing all that in together and building a 
bit of a picture around it.  And then presenting that as, ‘here’s the 
evidence behind it, here’s what our aim is, here’s what we’re 
proposing to do and here’s how much it’s going to cost’…and 
getting that signed off by the partnership.” (LA3, ADP Member) 
 
The quotation above also suggests an important component of ADPs’ work was to 
play a translational role in relation to evidence, for informing ADPs’ decision-making: 
“Part of my role is actually...drawing on published research or the 
literature is being able to translate that into a meaningful context 
for local use, it’s not always necessarily easily understandable or 
readable. So yeah, so it’s being able to pull key messages and 
distil that down to the local context.” (LA3, ADP Member)  
 
These quotations suggest ADP members were reflective about their role in evidence 
translation and that this role was not a passive one – they were explicit that this was 
done in an effort to influence decision-making. This translation responsibility fell to 
the core ADP administrative team. However, when attempting to influence others 
(an issue to which this section will now turn), ADP members more broadly appeared 
to have a role to play in translating and synthesising evidence to persuade LBs and 
others in local government.  
 
This persuasion role of ADP members emerged as a distinct aspect of the culture of 
evidence of these partnerships. The translation role they play, noted above, was 
also evident in this context:  
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“I am filtering the research through my lens in order to get the 
policy-makers to make the kind of decisions that I am 
recommending to them” (LA1, ADP Member) 
 
This interviewee appears to be conscious that they are filtering research through 
their own perspective. ADP members seemed to also be reflective about the 
differences between their own uses of evidence for individual decision-making, and 
the more performative aspects of using evidence in ways they perceived to be 
required by their target audience – i.e. their own organisation or policy actors they 
were trying to influence. This was expanded upon further by another ADP member, 
who described using an approach which ‘knitted together’ sources of evidence to 
develop a targeted and persuasive argument:  
“we’ve done a lot of work to present the evidence around alcohol 
and alcohol brief interventions, and we would use local 
information…we’d use information about alcohol related 
admissions to hospital and things like that, we’d look at some of 
the morbidity and mortality statistics around alcohol.  So it’s about 
taking the information that we have available along with the 
national policy and guidance that comes along, along with the 
local situation and just knitting them all together to paint a picture 
for people about why it’s important, why it’s important to them...” 
(LA3, ADP Member) 
 
Interview data provided further insight into what types of evidence ADP members 
thought would be persuasive for this purpose, although there were different 
perspectives among them. Remembering that ADP members reported finding 
experiential evidence was often persuasive to them in their own work, by contrast 
some ADP interviewees reported that, to be persuasive to others (such as LBs or 
others in local government), evidence needed to be ‘real evidence’. In this context 
this seemed to mean evidence which had been collected systematically and was 
quantitative:  
Interviewee: If you talk with belief and conviction but don’t back it 
up with real evidence then that’s when it’s easier for people who 
don’t really want to hear the argument to dismiss it so we really 
are dependent on some very cutting facts I suppose in terms of 
how we are trying to put our argument together…we just need to 
keep making that argument in a coherent and cogent way not just 
in an emotive kind of way I suppose.   
AW:  What do you mean by ‘real’ data when you say that, what 
types of information are you saying are going to be most 
persuasive?   
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Interviewee:  Well I suppose anything that is evidence-based 
really, so fact and figures and numbers, rather than, you know “we 
know that it makes a difference”. We actually need to use, we 
need to use hard data as opposed to, to logical argument.” (LA1, 
ADP member)  
 
This exchange suggests that quantitative data is perceived as ‘real evidence’ when 
it comes to persuading others, while argument based on experience is not. This 
person goes on to place this in the context of needing to make implementation 
decisions which get best value for money: 
“I suppose if what we are going to do is use our resources to 
absolute best effect we need to understand better what that best 
effect is and how its achieved and I am not sure we necessarily do 
with that very well….And [service user feedback is] different from 
hard data and it’s much softer and it’s probably more difficult to 
capture in a sense, but it probably would be, if not as, I mean it’s 
not as compelling in terms of the kind of arguments that I have 
described earlier, so what is compelling for people is just to have it 
straight, you know, X number of these Y number of those extra, 
because that is very powerful.” (LA1, ADP Member) 
 
These quotations exemplify how some ADP members spoke about justifying 
decisions to others in  government, or providing persuasive evidence to or LB 
members. Yet, a police representative from the same local area helped explain why 
this approach, in a licensing context, may still be fraught with challenges:  
“if we're going to evidence something, hard, solid facts, saying that 
something might lead to an increase in crime and disorder doesn't 
really do anything of the Board, they prefer to…get that the 
concrete facts, evidence that something has led to something. So 
really, crime stats… might not be persuasive enough. What I've 
found what's not really to our favour is they look at a 250m radius 
from the proposed premises, but if you actually work out crime 
stats for a 250m radius of premises, you wouldn't actually get that 
many crimes. Whereas if you were looking at a bigger radius then 
you would get a truer picture. But sometimes you'll object to a new 
premises and they'll ask for an analytical report, so we'll ask our 
analysts to do a crime and anti-social behaviour report, and it 
works out to be two crimes every week. So it doesn't actually look 
that bad. And you know it's a hotspot for police officers.” (LA1, 
ADP Member) 
 
This quotation suggests that, while LB members may request locally-contextualised 
data it is difficult to present numerical data which illustrates the significance of the 
problem on such small scales. Meanwhile, a different ADP member from LA1 
expressed a contrasting perspective to those above, emphasising their sense that it 
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was sometimes ‘stories’ or more experiential evidence that worked to persuade LB 
members: 
“when [LB members] hear stories it means something to them, 
much much more. So it gets a bit complicated when you try to 
explain rates per 10,000 and all the rest of it but actually, we’ve 
had stories from colleagues who work in the alcohol-related brain 
disease unit and things like that, people coming in with those sorts 
of stories have far more impact than we’ve had setting out some of 
the data. Police talking about how they, what’s happening in the 
night-time economy, those sorts of stories. Various members of 
the Forum and the Board have in the past been out with the police 
sergeant out on a Friday or Saturday night to see what’s 
happening in the city as well so there’s those sorts of stories, 
those sorts of personal experiences have been really quite helpful. 
But we need to do more of it, because it feels like that works more 
than, well it works probably alongside data rather than just as 
we’ve done in the past, bang down data and people have 
questions. And once you get into a detailed discussion about data 
you know you’re onto a loser, because half the people have 
switched off.” (LA1, ADP Member) 
 
This helps illustrate that even within a given ADP there are different perspectives 
about what evidence might be most useful in interactions with other alcohol policy 
stakeholders such as LBs. This interviewee sees an important role for experiential 
evidence to engage their audience. However, another ADP member, while saying 
they personally valued evidence from service users, reported they could not use this 
type of evidence to justify a local decision to others (e.g. local governance actors to 
whom they are accountable, or other alcohol policy stakeholders):  
“We do conversation cafes where we meet with clients... The first 
few times we did them they were amazing, 'cause even, you know 
I, I now sit in an office, removed from treatment services and even 
when you see the treatment services you're in quite a structured 
formal conversation with people a lot of the time. And the 
conversation cafes where people were just coming and talking 
about their experience and jumbling up professionals with people 
in long-term recovery with current clients. And just throwing them 
together was amazing. I mean it was astonishing how much you 
could discover. That offered a lot of insight into the treatment 
system…So that's a real source of information that's great but you 
couldn't make a major investment decision based on it because 
you can't, ‘I chatted to four blokes at [Name] Cafe and they all 
thought it was a good idea’. Now that might actually convince me it 
was a good idea but I, it wouldn't stand up for me to spend money 




“at the end of the day if its informal stories that’s okay for me but 
does it move the world on, you know, in terms of its legitimacy and 
so, if we had bodies of research…I am not an expert in all of that 
but something that would then lend it weight in academic terms or 
that we could say this is a genuine piece of work that we can base 
our decisions on in terms of service development, because that is 
necessary to justify facts and figures.” (LA1, ADP Member) 
 
The quotations above illustrate differences between evidence used by ADP 
members to make their own decisions or persuade partnership members, and 
evidence they used to persuade others or justify decisions beyond the partnership. 
The ADP members quoted above also appeared to be using evidence somewhat 
defensively; using evidence they perceived as credible to their target audiences (to 
whom they may also be accountable) in ways to pre-empt and prevent possible 
criticism. I reflect, however, that the quotations above were from core ADP team 
members, and this apparent sensitivity to scrutiny was less evident among ADP 
members beyond the core team.  
 
Consistent with findings across this chapter, the work of ADPs to influence others 
was happening in the context of partnership working. There was some evidence 
ADPs tried to capitalise on their partnership structure to influence LBs. For example, 
a police stakeholder from LA1 provides more insight to this by describing working 
with colleagues to provide a detailed objection to an alcohol licence application 
supported by multiple sources of evidence: 
“in terms of how we frame objections to licensing applications, it 
will be around some of that research that's been done linking 
outlet density with crime and disorder. And we'll quote some of 
those pieces of research, and we'll also provide crime stats, so 
that's where [NHS representative] comes in because [s/he] can 
provide some of the health stats as well, so what we tend to do is 
if we're going to object to applications, [s/he] would object on the 
basis of the health information and I would provide more crime and 
anti-social behaviour, information. And then see how we get on. 
Unfortunately, a lot of our objections haven't met with much 
success, and the Board have granted applications that we've 
objected to for whatever reason…in terms of the grounds for those 
decisions, sometimes lawyers quote economic reasons, 
employment, and all of those reasons. Whilst it might be a factor in 
the decision-making, it shouldn't really be because they should be 
basing decisions on the Licensing Objectives and the legislation. 




The interviewee suggests their collaborative approach with local partners to 
combine evidence had not been successful because ultimately the LB was 
concerned with economic factors (a key concern noted in Chapter 6). Considering 
this further in context, LA1 also did not have a strong overprovision statement and 
all LBs have autonomy to interpret evidence flexibly (also noted in Chapter 6). It 
appears that, despite partners working together to combine evidence to support 
objections to licence applications, it was difficult to overcome the determination of 
this LB to consider the local economy, and that in this way the public health 
objective was again limited in its ability to achieve public health goals. Another 
quotation from LA1 illustrates this issue further: 
“I did a huge piece of work on the overprovision statement, 
researching right back to the original evidence…we did a great 
deal of work…it’s impeccably researched, it presents a very logical 
argument that goes from there is harm, we know that consumption 
is linked to harm we know that provision, consumption is linked to 
availability, ergo you will reduce harm, and it was impeccably 
argued from beginning to end, fully cited, (pause) absolutely 
ignored. They took no notice whatsoever.” (LA1, ADP Member) 
 
These quotations provide an example in alcohol policy implementation of a decision 
space in which the two organisational cultures of evidence interact, and begins to 
illustrate differences between them. Ultimately, some ADP interviewees expressed a 
sense of futility and frustration following efforts to persuade others, in particular the 
LB, where quality and weight of combined evidence do not seem to overcome 
economic considerations. LBs’ own culture of evidence and their perspectives on 
evidence provided by ADPs, are discussed in the next results section (Section 
7.2.2). 
 
To summarise, the data suggest an organisational level culture of evidence 
surrounding ADP members can be identified. Broadly conceptualised, it appears 
that ADP members are working within a policy and partnership context in local 
governance, in which they evaluate the value and persuasiveness of different 
evidence in terms of its fit with their own evidence needs and/or how well it can help 
them persuade other alcohol policy implementation stakeholders. Additionally, they 
report using a wide variety of evidence, but that this occurs in an environment which 
has important resource constraints (and thus requires difficult prioritisation 
decisions). While it was possible to identify an organisational ‘culture of evidence’ 
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across the case study ADPs, this incorporated diversity in how individual ADP 
members perceived and used different types and sources of evidence, which 
reflected the fact that ADPs bring varied organisations into partnership. Regarding 
using evidence to persuade others, the data has suggested that ADP members had 
their own opinions about what type(s) of evidence will be most persuasive to LBs or 
local government actors - i.e. either experiential or quantitative evidence - but often 
ended up using a mixture of both, a potentially pragmatic and strategic choice. This 
seemingly was in an effort to anticipate if individuals in LBs may have different 
evidence preferences, or to try to overcome LBs’ consideration of economic factors 
in their licensing decisions. These findings, however, remain limited by being based 
on ADP members’ perceptions of LB preferences – the next results section 
examines what LB members themselves report. 
 
7.2.2 “We’re the ones that make the decisions”: Licensing Boards’ Culture of 
Evidence  
Correspondingly to ADPs, the data in this section will show that it was possible to 
identify a culture of evidence within LBs, albeit one that involved diversity in 
members’ perspectives on evidence. As a reminder to the reader, LBs are operating 
in a quasi-judicial capacity, in which their decisions are only challengeable through 
an appeals process (see Chapters 2 and 6); this legal context helps differentiate 
their culture of evidence from that of ADPs. To describe LBs’ culture of evidence, 
the below subsections again organise the data into types and sources of evidence, 
and then presentation of evidence.  
 
“Facts and judgement”: Using different types and sources of evidence in a licensing 
context 
When asked about evidence use, LB interviewees most often reported using 
evidence contained within the package of licensing application documentation, 
which is provided to them for their monthly licensing meeting and is comprised of 
different types of evidence57. This documentation package is compiled and provided 
by the LB Clerks, and contains the specific individual or premises licence 
applications to be discussed at the meeting. It also includes any relevant notes (e.g. 
 
57 Although note, they also receive evidence for other decisions such as for informing the 
development of their Licensing Policy Statement. 
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“information of how many [licences] there are in a certain area” [LA2, LB Member]) 
or objections. Objections may be included from the public or statutory organisations 
who are permitted to submit comments and related evidence (health and police 
rather than ADPs as a whole). The below quotations help illustrate LB members’ 
perceptions that evidence within the documentation package was a core part of the 
licensing decision-making process: 
“The licensing applications are straightforward, there'll be police 
reports basically saying, you know, they're alright with this, the 
ones that have objections…we get to see the police reports that're 
not made public […] On the wider front, the ones for licensed 
premises, again I'll look at the reports and we will get maps of how 
many different licensed premises there are in that area.” (LA1, LB 
Member) 
 
 “We will get a set of papers which will have a cover sheet…then 
there would be supporting documentation from Police Scotland, 
perhaps giving their concerns and…sometimes there may be other 
people, other departments, putting in their concerns too, from 
building controls, the licensing standards people, there could be all 
sorts of people who have just put in their – if there are complaints 
from – objections…then those might get listed as well.” (LA1, LB 
Member) 
 
Given the licensing documentation package is produced specifically for the 
purposes of the licensing meeting, it appears designed to contain the most specific, 
focused evidence available to LB members for their decision-making. While 
evidence may have been provided from a variety of people and departments, this is 
collated into a recognisable, standardised package for the LB members to read. 
Hence, the compilation of the package represents a funnelling function occurring in 
the process of submitting and collating evidence, to ensure the evidence provided to 
LB members meets the needs and requirements (i.e. legal and regulatory) of the 
licensing meeting.  An additional consideration is that the funnelling and collating of 
the evidence is also carried out in a political context: 
“at each of these committees we're fed a paper report from officers 
who've written that in two ways, it's written for what the 
professional officer wants, and it's also normally written to meet 
the priorities of the ruling administration.” (LA1, LB Member) 
 
This suggests that evidence contained within the licensing documentation 
sometimes serves a strategic function, consistent with existing research which 
observes that evidence is generated and used in political contexts that influence 
how this use occurs (Hawkins and Parkhurst, 2016; Liverani et al., 2013). For LB 
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members, this means their interpretations and uses of evidence may be shaped by 
local and national politics, especially given they are also elected political actors.   
 
Indeed, nuances can be observed in terms of how the evidence is perceived and 
used. The below quotation indicates that LB members may ‘interrogate’ those who 
have produced the documents, and further interpret the information contained within 
them:  
“You have to listen to the facts on the day and make a decision on 
the basis of these facts and judgement, and as a result of 
interrogation of those who are producing the reports, because 
sometimes they make quite interesting reading, when you actually 
start probing what's on the reports.” (LA1, LB Member) 
 
This suggests that the sources (institutions or individuals) who contribute to 
producing this evidence for LB members are potentially important influences on how 
LB members interpret the evidence included in their licensing documentation. 
Sources of evidence will be discussed in greater detail below (p.XX). 
 
Moving on from the documentation package, types of evidence discussed by LB 
members included statistics and research, as well as ‘stories’ or narratives.  First, a 
minority of LB interviewees explicitly reporting using statistical evidence. As an 
example, one LB member described finding statistics provided to them by the ADP 
useful: 
“I found particularly useful, [the ADP] had the four stats which from 
memory was something along the lines of alcohol-related 
admissions to hospital, alcohol-related crime, number of off-
licences per head of population and number of on-licences per 
head of population and in, I think it was six or seven data zones in 
the city, all four of those indicators were well above average and 
that rang alarm bells in those four areas… I think there needs to 
be an ongoing discussion about whether those are the right 
statistics to look at but I found them particularly useful.” (LA1, LB 
Member) 
 
This LB member seemingly perceives statistics as a useful and credible indicator of 
where problems may exist in their local area, while expressing an awareness that 
available statistics’ usefulness may be limited. They further indicate that ‘right’ (or 
better) statistics may exist (although does not provide further details about what 
‘right’ statistics may entail). The way this same interviewee goes on to caveat their 
response and refers to the need for ongoing discussion seems grounded in an 
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awareness that some LB colleagues are more critical of such health-related, 
population-level statistics: 
“Personally I prefer statistics and…academic research however I 
am aware that other colleagues prefer it the other way around.” 
(LA1, LB Member) 
 
This quotation directly acknowledges the diversity of perspectives on evidence 
among LB members. Another LB interviewee provided a more nuanced view of 
statistics, in relation to how they are more useful if they can help tell a story: 
“The stories in [Licensing] Committee don’t tend to resonate, it’s 
the statistics, but talking to them outside on a one-to-one basis 
has a big impact….it depends…the straightforward stats can tell a 
bigger story. If I can give another example? A real life example. A 
couple of years ago it was…I was going to say Halloween.  It was 
Halloween. It fell on a Friday night.  All these requests came in, 
‘we want to extend [our licence] by another two hours’. And the 
police had provided a report saying that the last time Halloween 
had fallen on the Friday that the levels of crime rose tremendously 
…went stupidly high…So, those stats to me provided enough 
concern about worrying about crime and disorder. (LA1, LB 
Member) 
 
This interviewee appears to perceive ‘stories’ as less impactful than statistics or 
speaking with other LB members directly. However, they indicate that statistics can 
be valuable for helping to substantiate a narrative about the alcohol-related 
environment locally, which was useful for licensing members to incorporate into their 
thinking. Indeed, it appeared that, like ADP members, LB members were more 
interested in statistics if they could help tell a story about the local context. For 
example, a LB member from LA1 discussed this type of evidence when describing a 
conversation s/he had with an NHS representative from the local Health Board and 
ADP: 
“If it was about the real impact locally, you know and real life 
stories, would impact more. And maybe giving regular updates 
that there were X amounts of people went through A&E with 
alcohol-related illnesses or deaths in the last 6 months, in your 
ward. That's a hard stat for me. You know, that's a hard thing to, 
'cause it's a fact. It's not just somebody coming to the Licensing 
Board with scaremongering, getting a fact, there are X amount of 
people died in your ward this month, this year, because of alcohol, 
and that I think is the real, kind of the, practical real life stories that 
councillors need to hear. Because the policy's just documents on 
the shelf and we've got professionals officers and health and 
solicitors whose job it is to know what these policies say. But we're 




This quotation suggests this LB member wanted to be provided with information 
they perceived as relevant to their local area and the license decision they needed 
to make. It also shows a clear understanding that LB members have responsibility 
for making decisions in this licensing context, which distinguishes them from other 
local officials (i.e. ADP members).  
 
I turn now to focus on the sources of evidence LBs discussed – these individuals or 
organisations may contribute evidence to the licensing documentation package 
described previously or provide it in other ways (e.g. during Licensing Policy 
Statement consultation). First, several preferred sources of evidence appeared to be 
first-hand accounts or discussions which were part of the licensing decision-making 
process on the day of the licensing meeting, or processes directly associated with it. 
This included discussion with colleagues, site visits to premises, and listening to 
members of the public (either as applicants or objectors), all of which appeared to 
be common mechanisms for LB members to obtain information in the course of their 
decision-making. The below quotations illustrate these particular different sources, 
and indicate how these sources are considered within the legal context of a 
licensing meeting: 
“We usually have a pre-meeting. And we talk over… looking at 
legal points and then kind of talk over with this, and then we make 
a decision on the day […] Sometimes when it’s a place that we 
don’t know, that’s why we go on site visits…the premises gives 
you a better insight” (LA2, LB Member) 
 
“I genuinely listen to the representations made, individual people 
coming up and pleading their case.” (LA1, LB Member) 
 
These quotations suggest that opportunities for conversation or hearing individual 
representations can inform LB decisions. However, it was additionally apparent in 
the data that LB members drew upon their own individual backgrounds and 
experiences, or other sources of tacit knowledge, to help make sense of evidence. 
These individual characteristics appeared to help explain some of the diversity 
within LBs, with interviewees often being explicit about how their personal or 
professional experiences could shape their overall perceptions of evidence and their 
subsequent decision-making: 
“We might have experience in previous lives before we were 
Councillors… I have worked with people who have been victims of 
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domestic abuse and that is often come about as direct effects of 
their partner drinking. I’ve seen the affect that alcohol can have on 
individuals. I can see walking around the place the effect 
sometimes that alcohol will have.” (LA1, LB Member) 
 
“It is building that knowledge of our own personal knowledge and 
experiences, a knowledge of our wards and the effects it has 
there. The knowledge of where we live, if they are different and 
someone and their knowledge of what it is like and knowing what 
it’s like not just for people who use the premises but people who 
live by them. Yes, we bring in our own experiences but of course 
that doesn’t mean to say we all agree.” (LA1, LB Member) 
 
These quotations suggest that LB members were aware of how they brought 
elements of their own backgrounds with them into their licensing roles, and that this 
would help to shape their culture of evidence (similar to ADPs). Another important 
element of LB members’ backgrounds and understandings they bring with them was 
illustrated in the following quotation: 
“we haven't…refused a license on the grounds of the impact on 
people's health…I think it's because a number of Licensing Board 
members either don't, they don't read the information they've got 
or don't accept there is a real problem with alcohol in Scotland and 
in [LA1]. So that reason's never, I don't think, taken as seriously as 
a reason why you should refuse someone to have a license. (LA1, 
LB Member) 
 
This quotation suggests that LB members’ interpretations of evidence are being 
shaped by their broader perceptions of alcohol use and harm in Scotland. Further, it 
speaks to the potential impact that local actors’ perceptions of evidence can have 
implementing Scotland’s alcohol strategy.   
 
In addition to their own experiences, their colleagues and members of the public, LB 
members reported receiving evidence from formal sources which exist to support 
the licensing system, such as Licensing Clerks and Licensing Forums. The roles of 
these actors were notable in the data, particularly in the case of Clerks, who are 
described as having a key role in the evidence funnelling, collating, and even 
filtering process described above in relation to the licensing documentation package: 
“My own view is that they’re very much guided in their decision-
making by the Licensing Board Clerk who is a qualified solicitor. 
Who, if you like, filters their own thoughts and values and ensures 





“You get all the statistics for the areas... (AW: Who provides those 
statistics to you?) …The Clerk of the Board, who’s a lawyer. You 
get information given to you.” (LA2, LB Member) 
 
“Well the Clerk gives us all the relevant policy details usually, so 
we know what were’ looking at” (LA1, LB Member) 
 
These data suggest that Clerks are perceived as a trusted and credible source of 
information, partly because they have technical expertise which enables them to 
identify what is relevant to LB members. This is aligned with Fitzgerald and 
colleagues’ (2017) observation that Clerks hold power rooted in their legal expertise, 
but builds upon this to note Clerks also perform this ‘funnelling’ function in relation to 
LB evidence. 
 
Licensing Forums (discussed in Chapters 2 and 6) appear to be perceived as a 
credible source of evidence when they are representing (or at least communicating) 
what the ‘community’ opinion is on a given issue. A specific example of this was 
reported with regards to weekend license times:  
“We recently changed the licensing on a Sunday…the Licensing 
Forum were quite good at giving us kind of feedback about what, 
what communities thought about that. ‘Cause for years we thought 
that’d be hugely contentious issue, but the Licensing Forum were 
able to say, as representatives, community groups across the city, 
people are not concerned about it.” (LA1, LB Member) 
 
Another LB member articulated why they perceived meeting with the Licensing 
Forum as valuable: 
“So they [Licensing Forum] then bring out certain things that they 
would like to go or what we think about that or how they think it’s 
been run…  So that way keeps us in contact with, that loop with 
everybody, if you see what I mean, from a cross section of people. 
From the pubs who are selling it right down to the ones who are 
getting the sharp end, likes of Alcohol Focus or, you know, some 
of these groups.” (LA3, LB Member) 
 
This quotation suggests that, while meeting with the Licensing Forum is mandatory 
for the LB, this information is perceived as valuable because the Forum seemingly 
represents (and can therefore connect LB members with) public opinion. This 
perception appeared to be shared by LB members across the local areas, although 
one member from LA1 expressed hesitation given the Forum included members 
from the licensed trade. Further, these quotations suggest a more meaningful role 
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for the Forum than other data in this research. For example, this is somewhat in 
contrast with the way LB members were quite dismissive of their relationship with 
the Forum or any feeling of accountability to them, as briefly discussed in Chapter 6.  
 
In addition to the sources discussed above, LB members also discussed receiving 
evidence from the statutory organisations who are permitted to participate in 
licensing meetings, particularly police and health representatives (who were not 
necessarily members of the ADP58). The data suggested that LB members had 
different perspectives about the value or credibility of evidence from these 
organisations. In general, police sources of data appeared to be trusted and valued. 
For example: 
“At the point of making the decision for me fairly often the most 
persuasive people are the police…They tend to have a very 
pragmatic- our officers have a very pragmatic approach. They 
don’t tend to dress things up or over sensationalise something….I 
find they balance information they give us…And they will- primarily 
with the police they will be taking about on-sales in the pubs and 
the clubs of an area so they are providing us with the statistics to 
do with that, that area and we know that the…change to a licence 
or a new licence will have a direct impact on where they are 
talking about.” (LA1, LB Member)  
 
“But pretty much you base it on a report that's put in front of you 
from Police Scotland. They're the biggest sway before us I 
suppose because it's quite often about crime or preventing crime 
and disorder, and you don't want to be responsible for creating 
more crime and disorder. So they're the biggest providers of 
information” (LA1, LB Member) 
 
In contrast, health sources were more often critiqued, a result which appeared to be 
related to how health stakeholders linked public health evidence with licensing 
decisions:  
“I suppose what my problem with the NHS is, (pause), I'm not 
convinced that all of their arguments are relating to the problems 
as we actually see them. I think they come from, 'yes we've got a 
problem, we have to deal with the carnage' they would put out the 
problem drinkers […] I'm not convinced that there's a direct linkage 
about decision the Board's making and relation to what they're 
actually seeing. Because that, what I say, I can't get that argument 
because the number of outlets distantly affects the outcomes at 
the NHS. They'll give us ideas where they're saying there's huge 
 
58 For example, in LA1, the member of Police Scotland who attended the LB was not also 
member of the ADP, however their police colleague was (with whom s/he worked closely).  
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area of alcoholism in that area. Those areas have hardly any bars 
in them at all. ” (LA1, LB Member) 
 
However, it was evident that this approach remained challenging, for example due 
to a lack of available high-quality evidence. For example, an NHS representative 
among the ADP interviewees pointed out: 
“The licensing data is very poor. They don’t collect it very well; 
they don’t collect it for statistical purposes really. Hopefully that will 
improve…because I kind of argue back to the Council saying, 
‘well, if you want evidence-based policy, if you’re saying I haven’t 
presented enough evidence to you, one of the things that’s holding 
me back is the fact that the Board can’t give me the data that we 
need to help you develop the evidence.’” (LA1, ADP Member)  
 
I explore LB members’ perceptions of health evidence further in the following 
subsection which explores the importance of how evidence was presented. For now, 
the data suggest the police are, for the most part, seen as a credible source of 
information which can be directly relevant for licensing decisions. This may have 
been grounded in a specific experience of some LB members in LA1 - they listened 
to a police briefing and participated in a Saturday night patrol, which seemed to 
provide further experiential and contextual information about the local impacts of 
alcohol. The participating LB members provided vivid descriptions of what they 
observed, with the above member stating the experience “illustrates the sort of 
things that…the police and the ambulance services have to put up with” (LA1, LB 
Member). It seems that police representatives to the LB have effectively linked 
issues of crime and disorder to alcohol use, by using different types of evidence 
(e.g. reports or experiences for LB members).  
 
There was one reported exception among the LB members’ generally positive 
perceptions of police evidence - an LA1 LB member reported s/he thought the police 
sometimes exaggerated their reports in order to manage the night-time economy. 
Mostly, however, it appeared s/he was critical of the police reports when they did not 
align with her/his own, self-identified ‘liberal’ attitudes. Indeed, elsewhere in their 
interview this LB member named the police as one of their primary sources of 
information when making decisions. 
 
The preceding section on ADPs found they are continuously thinking about how to 
persuade others outside the ADP, including LBs. LB members consistently reported 
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that the ADP had an opportunity to feed evidence into the LB’s process of 
developing their Licensing Policy Statement once every 4-5 years (during 
consultation), but beyond this particular ‘window of opportunity’ (Petticrew et al., 
2004) they had limited interaction with the ADP as a whole:  
“I separately meet with [LA1 ADP Coordinator] a number of times 
to talk about when we were forming the last Licensing Policy, 
about how we might be able to get it tweaked to help what [s/he] 
would like around NHS, so I have, personally I have a good 
relationship with the ADP, well, with [LA1 ADP Coordinator]. But 
the only real involvement that we have with them is through when 
we set our Licensing Policy which is every couple of years or so… 
So they're active at that point of informing, or trying to shape each 
policy as we set it, then after that they don't have any involvement 
in the Licensing Board.” (LA1, LB Member) 
 
This suggests the ADP as a partnership is very restricted in its opportunities to 
inform LB decision-making. This is different from individual statutory organisations 
such as health or police, who are members of the ADP but feed into the LB on a 
more regular basis as statutory ‘consultees’. This is potentially important for alcohol 
policy implementation, because national expectations are that ADPs will be involved 
in licensing (see Chapter 5), however there appear to be limited opportunities to do 
so. Further, the previous section showed ADPs perceive limited success in 
persuading LB members with evidence even when they do manage to engage.  
 
The above data have suggested that the licensing process provides opportunities for 
LB members to source evidence from different individuals or organisations. 
However, among these results it was clear that, within a given LB, individual 
members had different perceptions of these sources of evidence. This was summed 
up by one LB member: 
“If we have come to a different opinion it’s because we’ve listened 
to various experts and various people contributing to it and feel 
that they have some merit and perhaps our colleagues disagree” 
(LA1, LB Member) 
 
It is apparent that differences partly reflect LB members’ perceptions of the 
credibility or trustworthiness of certain sources. This will continue to be evident in 
the subsection below in which public health sources of evidence are discussed, 




Presentation of Evidence 
Akin to ADPs, a key element of LBs’ culture of evidence (as identified in the 
interview data) was the presentation of evidence and its impact on evidence 
assessment and use. This was most apparent in data regarding LB members’ 
reported perceptions of NHS or public health evidence, which appeared to contrast 
with perceptions of police evidence (as discussed above). In particular, while health 
stakeholders were considered to be a potentially important source of evidence, the 
manner in which health evidence was presented reportedly frustrated LB members: 
“At every meeting the police, the building control, the licensing 
guys, and the health, are expected to be there because they can 
raise their objections. Unfortunately, the health guy just reads 
everything that he's written, and that's it they're thinking ‘I've read 
this, I don't need to see it again’ and that frustrates me. A trivial 
point but it just annoys me…'Cause it's that opportunity to say ‘yep 
you put in the official document, now tell your story, tell your story 
about how that is going to damage people in your community.’ 
That’s his opportunity, but… (shrugs).” (LA1, LB Member) 
 
The licensing culture of evidence tended to privilege or value characteristics of 
evidence which were not always present in public health research, for example a 
need for local specificity of evidence (as opposed to de-contextualised, population-
level public health evidence). This was recognised as a challenge among national 
level interviewees, one of whom described public health and local authorities as 
communities that “basically spoke different languages” (National Level 9).  
 
Furthermore, LB interviewees had mixed perspectives on the role of the NHS 
representatives in providing that evidence. A spectrum of views was identified in the 
data: three licensing interviewees appeared most welcoming to evidence provided 
by the NHS (and persuaded by health and ‘alcohol availability’-related arguments), 
three were much more dismissive of NHS evidence they had seen, and the rest 
were more equivocal. Those that were dismissive varied in their reasons for this, 
including, as illustrated in the quotes below, scepticism towards the availability 
argument (as opposed to ‘personal responsibility’) or insufficient communication of 
evidence on overprovision: 
“I'm not clear in my own mind about the true definition of 
overprovision. If you're saying by having too many bars it'll cause 
problem drinking, how many do we have to reduce to before 
problem drinking goes away? If there are two off-licenses in a 
street, and somebody with a drink problem wants to get alcohol, 
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they've got a choice of two. If there's a choice of one, they'll still 
get alcohol. But if they have a choice of five, they're still going to 
get the same choice.” (LA1, LB Member) 
 
“The NHS…come up with absolutely ridiculous stuff. You look at it 
and you think, these people are not in the real world, you know. 
There is no way we could do that…You talk about 
overprovision…every licence that we get in for a licensed 
premises, they’ve got an overprovision [objection] in. And we’ve 
already had a word with them saying, don’t send this…you must 
have just your machine in there and it just clicks about, you 
change the name and bang it out. That’s useless…What I would 
say is, to stop listening to the NHS too much unless they start 
really getting detailed analysis and not general broad brush” (LA3, 
LB Member) 
 
The first quotation suggests a resistance to population-level evidence supporting the 
link between alcohol availability and (risk of) harm – a tension that has been 
previously discussed as a challenge in Scotland (Fitzgerald et al., 2017). However, 
the latter quotation also suggests a frustration when public health actors are seen to 
repeatedly apply the same objection statement to applications. When asked what 
they would prefer to receive in terms of evidence, this interviewee stated they 
wanted “More context. More, deeper analysis. More detail.” (LA3, LB Member). By 
being presented in a generic, or decontextualised manner, public health research as 
a source of evidence ends up being perceived as less credible than other sources 
(i.e. from the police, discussed above) which are viewed as more detailed or 
relevant to the specific, local, individual licence decisions.  A reflection from an LA1 
health representative is worth noting here, which expresses a sense that the 
evidence in and of itself is unlikely to be persuasive to their LB audience, and thus 
developing relationships was the approach they were currently taking: 
“it’s so well documented the evidence on its own which just gets 
you nowhere.  So, I think, I’ve always also had my mind thinking 
how do I build a credible relationship with [LB members] without 
becoming, without getting dismissed by all of them, just as the 
health lobby who’s just whining on about alcohol… sometimes I 
think actually with some of these folk, I am not going to persuade 
them.” (LA1, ADP Member)  
 
This relationship-building effort may have been somewhat productive, as another LB 
member from LA1 shared a similar critique regarding how evidence is presented by 
the Health Board, but expressed greater empathy towards the health representative: 
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“You’ll base your decision on that case on what’s in front of you. 
And if the letter from the Health Board – quite often is – the exact 
same one as you’ve just read and the one before that, you just 
start ignoring them. And I’ve talked to the health [representative] 
‘cause I like [them]… ‘I think you need to stop just giving us facts 
and figures about the policies…you change your tack and it might 
impact more, people will listen to you because they just switch off. 
Because you’re just running on about health policy and alcohol 
policy and Scottish Government policy. And it's fairly irrelevant to 
[how] a local ward is perceived, it's fairly irrelevant to a local 
licensing application. If you were to tell a different story about it, 
about how many people in that street or that community had 
suffered an alcohol illness or death, it might make a bit of 
difference.’” (LA1, LB Member) 
 
This quotation again demonstrates the importance of the evidence provided to LB 
members on their meeting day, and the need for it to be presented in a way that is 
considered useful and contextualised. This suggests that even if the content of 
evidence is potentially robust, and the source of the evidence is credible, it remains 
important to present it in a way which emphasises its relevance to the local context 
for which licensing decisions are being made. This quotation also adds nuance to 
the understanding about how persuasive statistics can be – that while numbers may 
be important (as discussed above), local stories may connect more meaningfully 
with some licensing decision-makers. This again supports the idea that quantitative 
data is most persuasive when it helps illustrate or substantiate a narrative about the 
local context. It also helps to show some of the complexity in how licensing decision-
makers are perceiving and using evidence. 
 
An example of this complexity repeatedly arose in interviews on the topic of 
overprovision. The level of detail and contextuality in the presentation of evidence 
that LB members sought from public health often appeared to be linked to how 
nuanced their assessments were of individual licenses and overprovision. Most 
licensing interviewees expressed (unprompted) perceptions that different types of 
licenses could result in different benefits or harms to their community, and this 
influenced how they perceived the applicability of  public health evidence. This was 
most commonly illustrated in their perception that off-licences were more 
problematic (in terms of encouraging cheap drinking at home) than restaurants, 




“I’ve always found it really difficult to treat all alcohol licenses in 
the same way […] The areas of overprovision I find problematic 
because you are brandishing all these, the pubs, the restaurants, 
the clubs, specialist shops, supermarkets, corner shops, in all the 
same way and they don’t work in the same way. They don’t sell to 
the same people. They don’t sell in the same quantities.” (LA1, LB 
Member) 
 
Another LB member from LA1 stated that “we do implement the [overprovision] 
policy, but the policy is open to interpretation”. S/he went on to discuss this 
interpretation, using the example of being willing to give a new hotel an alcohol 
licence even if it applied in an area of overprovision: 
“because it's in an area of overprovision there will be objections 
because by the very nature we've designated that, NHS Scotland 
will probably come forward and say there's too many bars in that 
area, the police would probably do it, and perhaps even the 
Licensing Officers. And all they would be doing would be reflecting 
the Board's own policy on overprovision. But I suspect the Board 
make take a benevolent look at that type of application.” (LA1, LB 
Member) 
 
The quotations above speak to the “blunt instrument” (LA1, LB Member) nature of 
overprovision as a policy tool. While public health evidence or legislation may 
portray types of alcohol licenses as falling into categories (i.e. either as an ‘on-‘ or 
‘off-license’), LB members may value evidence which helps them assess licences 
and interpret ‘overprovision’ in more nuanced ways. Further, given the critiques 
interpreted in the data, it appeared there was room for improvement in how certain 
public health actors understand the needs of, or present evidence to, licensing 
actors.  
 
This section has discussed the way LB members report perceiving the content/type, 
source, and presentation of evidence with which they engage during alcohol 
licensing decision-making. Comments from a Board member in LA1 neatly illustrates 
the interaction between these factors:  
“Previously I've done night-time visits with the police where we 
went to nightclubs at one in the morning and seen them, and in 
fact the one I went to a fight broke out right in front of the police 
and we were able to stop it, I'm sure they set it up (laughing). But 
these visits have started happening, there's just recently had a 
couple of Board members went but again, they're the more 
sympathetic Board members that are prepared to say ‘yeah I want 
to go see what's happening there because I think that, that helps 
your head when you're making a decision about this is another 
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application’…But for a majority of Board members they've never 
experienced that and I think that again it's why I get back to the 
real evidence from [ADP] or NHS, people need to see or at very 
least hear this is what's happening. If you're not seeing it…all 
you're then getting in front of you is an objection from the police 
maybe, some technical things from other officers, but then a 
lawyer given the opportunity to argue his case in front of you, 
they're usually quite good. So your information sources are a 
written document from officers, a well-oiled licensing solicitor” 
(LA1, LB Member) 
 
This quotation depicts different types, sources, and presentations of evidence 
available to LB members (e.g. experiential-type evidence sourced from police night-
time visits) and how they describe acting upon them (an optional decision, if they 
wish to take advantage of these opportunities). It also demonstrates recognition 
among the members that they are engaging with evidence differently.  
 
It is clear from LB member interviews that they consider evidence in terms of how 
persuaded by it, or how highly they value it, and that they often valued a mixture of 
numerical and more qualitative content. LB member interview data suggested LB 
members found evidence persuasive when it was sufficiently detailed, 
contextualised to the locality, and supported by the existence of personal 
relationships (and, ideally, aligned with members’ pre-existing ideas about alcohol-
related harm). Additionally, the data indicated a potentially important role for 
quantitative evidence when such data could be used to help tell a ‘story’. These 
findings suggest the demands of Scottish alcohol policy implementers are consistent 
with alcohol policy implementation literature from other UK contexts reviewed in 
Chapter 3 (Foster, 2016; Haggard et al., 2010). The data also suggest, however, 
that public health evidence is not typically being delivered in this way, by contrast 
with legal or ‘crime and disorder’ evidence, which interviewees suggested was 
delivered persuasively more often.  
 
Based on the data regarding types, sources, and presentation of evidence above, 
this section suggests there is a broad culture of evidence surrounding LBs. First, 
their culture of evidence appears characterised by a legal and political decision-
making context; a need for evidence which is attained from a source they trusted or 
perceived as credible; and a need for detailed, localised/contextualised evidence 
that is supported by quantitative evidence. Second, that, like ADPs, their culture of 
evidence is informed by the diversity of their members. The data above suggest that 
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an important component of this culture of evidence is their explicit bringing (and 
valuing) their individual personal and professional backgrounds (and experiential 
knowledges) to their interpretations of evidence. Given that LB members are drawn 
from a range of backgrounds however (e.g. different professions, communities, and 
political leanings) prior to becoming local Councillors, the way these backgrounds 
influence their evidence use is also different (including as to whether and how they 
accept evidence about alcohol problems in Scotland).   
 
7.3 Discussion 
7.3.1 Principal Findings and Contributions to Literature 
This chapter took forward a suggestion from Fitzgerald and colleagues (2017) which 
identified potential different ‘cultures of evidence’ among local alcohol policy 
stakeholders. I engaged with Lorenc et al.'s (2014) conception of such cultures to 
empirically investigate whether and how ADP and LB members perceive and use 
evidence in their work and their interactions with each other. The focus on ‘cultures 
of evidence’ enabled an exploration of the organisational-level evidence preferences 
of ADPs and LBs and thus offered new insights into the influence of organisational 
context (within their organisations and in terms of their external environments) on 
perceptions and uses of evidence. It further allowed for comparison and critical 
analysis about how the cultures may interact during alcohol policy implementation.  
 
With respect to the research question this chapter addresses, the principal findings 
indicate that evidence indeed plays a central role in the context of local actors’ work 
to implement Scotland’s alcohol strategy. The findings suggest evidence helps 
shape decision-making by both ADP and LB stakeholders; that ADPs and LBs each 
have an identifiable culture of evidence which influences how they perceive and use 
evidence; and that these cultures can usefully be explored through their perceptions 
of types, sources, and presentation of evidence.  
 
ADP and LB cultures of evidence share some core features. Both had a broadly 
identifiable organisational-level culture of evidence, a component of which was the 
diversity of perspectives contained within it. For both, this appears to be partly a 
result of the diversity of backgrounds, professional training, values, or other 
perspectives of the individuals who are brought together within ADPs and LBs. 
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Despite this diversity, however, the cultures of evidence of ADPs and LBs could be 
understood through analysing their preferences regarding types, sources, and 
presentation of evidence. For example, both reported using multiple sources of 
evidence, and requiring locally contextualised evidence. This similarity was 
unsurprising given what is known about how policy actors report desiring relevant, 
local, and actionable evidence (Kneale et al., 2017; McGill et al., 2015). However, 
and importantly for my research, interviewees suggested that this was not yet being 
sufficiently acknowledged in the provision of public health evidence to these 
organisations. The perceived lack of contextualisation of public health research may 
contribute to explaining the frustration that certain ADP and LB members expressed 
with this source of evidence. Interviewees from both expressed a sense of what they 
would like to know about alcohol problems or policy locally, but that the evidence 
provided to them from public health research often does not adequately address 
these needs.  
 
Key differences between the ADP and LB cultures of evidence were observed. The 
overarching point is that evidence use among ADP and LB members appeared 
related to their organisational structures and contexts. For example, LB members 
appear to be using evidence within a legal and political context, while ADP 
members’ engagement with evidence appears to be influenced by their policy 
context which is more administrative, partnership-oriented, and resource-
constrained. Consequently, they tend to use different forms of contextually-
determined evidence. Second, ADP members reported evaluating evidence based 
on whether it is useful to them and whether it useful when they try to persuade 
others. Some ADP interviewees appeared to make a distinction between evidence 
which was useful for them personally and that which was useful for persuading 
others (either in hopes of influencing others taking a particular decision, or to justify 
to others why the ADP itself made a particular decision). In contrast, LB members 
reported evaluating evidence only in terms of its usefulness to their own, individual, 
licensing decision-making. This suggests LB members position themselves primarily 
as recipients and users of evidence, and that evidence was always assessed in the 
context of broader policy narratives and with regards to its persuasive power.  
 
Further, the system of licensing has inbuilt mechanisms to ‘funnel’ evidence for them 
in the form of the licensing documentation, which means LB members are typically 
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considering evidence which has been provided to them within particular formats (i.e. 
licensing documentation). While they have other opportunities to attain evidence 
beyond this (e.g. through engaging more experientially with police or health 
representatives), they are not expected or required to do so.  
 
In contrast, the chapter demonstrated that ADPs were expected to engage with 
evidence as a core component of their alcohol policy implementation practice. Given 
this, ADP interviewees described complex relationships with evidence which 
involved developing, translating, and using evidence. They also described using 
evidence within their partnerships and ‘knitting together’ evidence to inform decision-
making.  
 
Having demonstrated that ADPs and LBs have cultures of evidence, an important 
question is whether this may to some extent explain the perceived failure/challenge 
of ADPs to influence and persuade LBs. This would in turn be a potential 
explanation for challenges to Scottish alcohol policy implementation. While they 
have similarities of both using multiple sources of, and valuing locally relevant 
evidence, there are clear differences in their context(s), what they deem to be 
useful, and how they use evidence. Indeed, even the similarities, namely using 
multiple sources, do not mean they use the same multiple sources at all times. As a 
result, this can help explain why the evidence that ADPs present/provide is not 
always as persuasive to LBs as desired, in turn being a challenge to 
implementation. Overall, my findings are largely aligned with Nicholls’ (2015), who in 
considering evidence use in Scottish and English alcohol licensing from a historical 
perspective, suggested tensions between them in terms of what counts as evidence 
must be addressed if public health is to influence licensing. My findings confirm that 
significant differences exist and that these may be having a meaningful impact on 
ADPs’ ability to influence LBs and progress towards public health-related goals of 
alcohol policy implementation. 
 
In the Scottish licensing context, these findings build upon Fitzgerald and 
colleague’s (2017) study of public health actors’ perceptions of evidence, in which 
they reported the perception that licensing officials did not always understand or 
value health or statistical evidence. My findings suggest that some of these actors 
do respond to such evidence if it is perceived to be adequately contextualised and 
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helps to tell a story (e.g. by being combined with qualitative information). Further, my 
results speak in more detail to the perceptions of ADP members about what is most 
persuasive to other actors, including licensing actors.  
 
While Fitzgerald and colleagues (2017) reported public health actors’ perceptions 
that LB members may simply ignore public health evidence, my findings suggest the 
situation can be more complex. My data indicate that LB members draw upon many 
types of evidence, including public health evidence, but that public health evidence 
often does not fit well with the LB culture of evidence that values experiential 
accounts and stories. Therefore, public health actors should not assume LB 
members will prioritise, or be more persuaded by, public health evidence than these 
other types. Furthermore, Fitzgerald and colleagues reported LBs members may 
regard public health as beyond the legitimate scope of licensing. By contrast, the 
majority of my licensing interviewees did not express the view that public health was 
irrelevant to licensing, though they recounted both questioning this evidence and 
critiquing public health arguments. Reflecting the culture of evidence outlined above, 
these critiques often appeared based on their desire for evidence to be locally 
contextualised – in my data this emerged through a comparison between LB 
members’ perceptions of health and police data, in which police data tended to be 
viewed as more useful because they appeared more locally relevant to particular 
licensing areas.  
 
More broadly, the findings in this chapter are largely consistent with the results of 
the systematic review in Chapter 3. For example, a number of articles reported that 
a lack of evidence to inform their decision-making was problematic (e.g. Fitzgerald 
et al., 2015; Toner et al., 2014), and that certain implementing organisations 
respond by undertaking their own local context-specific research (Toner et al., 
2014). My interviewees reported limitations with the evidence they had available to 
them, and described efforts to develop their own evidence to better address their 
needs.  
 
Articles in Chapter 3 also reported that both scientific and non-scientific evidence is 
used within local alcohol policy implementation (Foster et al., 2007; Grace et al., 
2016; Herring et al., 2008), in a manner consistent with understanding from 
evidence and policy literature. My results lend further support to this in the Scottish 
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context. For example, within their respective cultures of evidence, ADP and LB 
members appeared to sometimes combine or ‘knit together’ evidence to inform their 
policy work and decision-making. How they combined types of evidence differed, 
however. While ADP members reported ongoing interaction with a range of 
available evidence sources which they could use to piece together an informed 
sense of local needs, LB members reported using more clearly demarcated sources 
– for example evidence ‘funnelled’ into the licensing application documentation, and 
very contextual understandings of their local communities. These differences are 
important because implementation of Scottish alcohol policy may remain limited 
while key stakeholders are using, and finding value in, different types of evidence 
(i.e. if these different types suggest contradictory ways forward for tackling alcohol-
related harm). 
 
The reported requirement of both ADP and licensing actors to have detailed and 
locally contextualised evidence is also consistent with findings from Chapter 3 that 
local, contextually-specific data were likely to be most persuasive to other 
implementation stakeholders and perceived as most relevant by local officials 
(Foster, 2016; Haggard et al., 2010). This aligns further with broader public health 
literature. For example, Petticrew and colleagues (2004) have noted the need for 
evidence at ‘micro level’ is a key influence of evidence use in policy. Reported 
frustrations in my own data about a lack of locally contextualised evidence 
suggested, however, that local implementers currently have to work to translate 
evidence to their own contexts or allocate time and resources to generating their 
own evidence (e.g. in LA2). These frustrations perhaps help explain why 
interviewees suggested that evidence constructed in traditional public health 
settings (e.g. the NHS and universities) was not translating well to either setting, 
suggesting ‘cultures of evidence’ can conflict in ways that restrict the traction of 
seemingly relevant evidence.   
 
Context and Resources 
Existing literature examining the interactions between evidence and policy sees 
evidence use as inherently contextual (Contandriopoulos et al., 2010; Dobrow et al., 
2006, 2004; Moat et al., 2013; Weyrauch et al., 2016). In this chapter, the concept of 
cultures of evidence was identified as being analytically useful for understanding 
evidence use in the context of alcohol policy implementation. My findings suggest 
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that the varying cultures of evidence among ADPs and LBs appear to be at least 
partially explained by their external and organisational contexts. For ADPs, their 
policy and partnership-working contexts complicated their relationships with 
evidence, while LBs’ legal context and inbuilt autonomy helped explain their culture 
of evidence. 
 
In this chapter, it has been observed that ADPs work in a policy and partnership 
context which influences how evidence is perceived and used. While the data in this 
chapter was able to identify an organisational-level culture of evidence for ADPs, at 
an individual level interviewees expressed varied perspectives on what they found 
most useful. These variations may have implications for how issues are 
problematized within ADPs and what solutions are pursued. This has the potential to 
both facilitate and challenge alcohol policy implementation. For example, multi-
sectoral partnerships may be productive for alcohol policy implementation practice, 
such as when ADP members strategically combine evidence from different areas of 
expertise, to develop well-evidenced, joined-up arguments for other policy 
audiences. However, if partnership members’ understandings of evidence and 
evidence needs differ in ways that appear contradictory (e.g. as a result of their 
different professional backgrounds or organisational perspectives), there may be 
potential for conflict. For example, in one ADP there was a clash between health 
and police representatives, because they examined problems and relevant evidence 
through different population and individual perspectives, respectively. Potential 
issues surrounding evidence use in partnership are important to address because 
partnerships continue to proliferate across local areas in Scotland, and this type of 
collaborative working continues to be perceived as the best way forward for public 
policy more broadly in Scotland (Scottish Government, 2017i). 
 
Further to their partnership working context, ADPs reported perceptions and uses of 
evidence shaped by their role as local implementing officials who used evidence for 
multiple purposes. While ADP members assessed the value of evidence based on 
how useful or relevant it was to their own decision-making (i.e. whether they 
perceived it as reflecting, or sensitive to, local realities), they also spoke in detail 
about how they valued evidence when they thought it could be useful in persuading 
others. This seemed to be a result of their position in a complex local governance 
context, in which they needed to justify decisions to others in local government, as 
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well as try to influence stakeholders such as LB members. These findings suggest 
that the way ADP members use evidence in their work to progress the alcohol 
strategy’s implementation is influenced by how credible they think others will find it. 
This introduces a performative aspect to their evidence use which seems to respond 
to their local governance contexts, in particular linking back to their accountability 
obligations. An implication of this is that ADP members appear to be playing a more 
substantive knowledge brokering or translation role than has been previously 
acknowledged in the literature. Further, they may require more support to do this 
effectively, particularly in circumstances such as licensing where ADP members are 
trying to have influence, but political and economic factors challenge this. Learning 
which may be useful to inform these efforts could be drawn from knowledge 
brokering literature, especially that which recognises the challenges faced by local 
policy practitioners (Kislov et al., 2017; Ward, 2017; Ward et al., 2009).  
 
ADPs further reported that their relationships with evidence were influenced by the 
resource constraints they worked within. This is consistent with how Dobrow and 
colleagues (2006) conceptualise resource constraints as being a part of policy 
actors’ “external decision-making context”, which “modifies,  facilitates and 
constrains” (p. 1817) their evidence use. Importantly, ADP members expressed a 
particular need to use available evidence to inform strategic decisions in light of 
recent budget cuts. ADP members also expressed frustration that insufficient 
resources constrained their capacity to act upon evidence (e.g. relating to the need 
for shifts to preventative approaches). Vice versa, ADP members also expressed 
irritation with evidence which recommended actions that were financially impossible. 
These findings suggest that ADPs may often, in effect, be prevented from 
undertaking evidence informed alcohol policy implementation work, despite 
expectations that they do so. 
 
Turning to LBs, the findings suggest LBs continue to be preoccupied by their 
concern with the local economic and political contexts, which in turn shaped their 
own culture of evidence. For example, LB members appear to use their autonomy to 
interpret evidence in light of their perceptions of ‘need’ for tourism or jobs. Further, 
LB members’ relationship with evidence appeared influenced by the structure of the 
licensing system and their role within it. Specifically, LB members work within a 
quasi-judicial, legal-type system in which evidence is often ‘funnelled’ to them in 
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particular formats, and needs to be demonstrably relevant to their specific decisions 
to be considered valuable. The findings suggested a consequence of this was LB 
members often did not consider public health evidence to be particularly relevant in 
this context (although they did appear to view local criminal justice evidence as 
relevant). This then presents a challenge to using the public health objective within 
licensing to help achieve the public health goals of Scotland’s alcohol strategy. 
 
Finally, in relation to interactions between LBs and ADPs, my data suggested the 
ADP as a whole appeared to have limited formal opportunities in which to interact 
with LB members to communicate or share learning. However, in terms of the 
organisational members of the ADP, LB members spoke more readily about having 
contact with the health or police representatives who attended LB meetings 
(discussed above). This suggests that other members of the ADP, such as social 
work or third sector representatives, are not able to access the LB through their 
membership of the ADP. It appears the licensing system still engages with ADP 
members as individual organisations (i.e. statutory or non-statutory), and not as a 
partnership. This has consequences for ADP members (beyond health and police) 
to be able to inform the licensing process, and for the ADP to potentially develop a 
unified voice with which to engage in licensing.  
 
7.3.2 Consequences for Scottish Alcohol Policy Implementation and a 
Potential Opportunity 
This chapter has made a contribution to understanding the role of evidence in the 
context of Scottish alcohol policy implementation. I reflect here that the findings may 
also have more distinct consequences for the implementation of the alcohol 
strategy. First, it was reported that public health evidence often does not strongly 
influence LBs. A consequence of this is they continue to make licensing decisions 
which impede progress on addressing availability of alcohol, thus limiting progress 
overall towards the goals of the alcohol strategy. Generated from interviews with LB 
members, this finding confirms results gleaned from public health actors’ 
perspectives in existing literature (e.g. Fitzgerald et al., 2017).  
 
Second, ADP members reported often lacking the evidence they required, either in 
terms of evidence being contextually-specific enough or targeted to their research 
needs. This has potential consequences for how well they are able to inform 
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decisions, and then justify them, when implementing the strategy. This challenge is 
important particularly when decisions are increasingly pressured in light of reduced 
budgets, where value for money becomes even more important to demonstrate, and 
given explicit guidance from Scottish Government that their decisions need to be 
evidence-based (COSLA et al., 2015; Scottish Government, 2009c). While certain 
ADP interviewees reported filling this evidence gap by accessing context-specific, 
experiential-type evidence, this was often reported as not being a type they could 
use to justify decisions. This tension – between evidence they have available but 
cannot always use, and evidence they lack but are expected to use – increases the 
complexity of the implementation role ADP members are navigating and may 
frustrate both the implementation progress and public health actors’ efforts to 
influence this with available evidence.  
 
While the Scottish alcohol strategy itself is ‘evidence-informed’, challenges remain in 
ensuring its’ implementation can also be so. In terms of addressing this, evidence 
use only seems likely to substantially increase if: (i) there is a greater organisational 
focus on supporting evidence use within ADPs, including efforts to better embed 
mechanisms designed to support evidence use (e.g. internal mechanisms such as 
needs assessments, or external mechanisms such as greater resources); and (ii) 
efforts are made to ensure available evidence better meets local implementation 
needs. Regarding the latter, one approach to achieving this may be via collaborating 
with academic partners (e.g. see Cherney et al., 2015; Holmes et al., 2017; Hunter, 
2009; Nutley, 2003).   
 
As discussed, one of the ‘audiences’ ADPs try to persuade are LBs. A potential 
opportunity for addressing the ‘epistemological discord’ between ADP and LB 
approaches to evidence may be emerging. In 2019 the Scottish Government held a 
consultation on draft Revised Guidance for Licensing Boards, which seeks to update 
the 2007 Guidance and provide greater clarity for LBs (Scottish Government, 
2019b). The draft revised guidance59 has been developed by the Government and 
working group that includes the Council of the Scottish Institute of Licensing, AFS, 
and health professionals (Scottish Government, 2019b). Of particular interest within 
the draft revised guidance are the details provided about how LBs can assess 
 
59 The final version of this guidance is not yet available at time of writing.  
286 
 
overprovision, and the factors (i.e. evidence and data) they may take into account 
during this assessment. However, the guidance states the overprovision 
assessment “must be based on credible evidence of a causal link…between the 
engagement of one or more of the licensing objectives and a concentration of 
licensed premises…in a locality” (Scottish Government, 2019b, p. 27) and that, “It is 
for the Licensing Board to determine…how the evidence will be interpreted and 
weighted” (p. 22). While the definition of a ‘causal link’ refers to ‘locality’ level in the 
area (as opposed to individual premises level), it seems likely that the tension 
between available measures of population-level harm and the need to demonstrate 
localised levels of harm will persist. 
 
7.4 Conclusion 
This chapter aimed to explore whether and how evidence informs local decisions 
about implementing Scotland’s 2009 alcohol strategy, and to explicitly build upon 
existing alcohol policy implementation research (Fitzgerald et al., 2017). It found that 
evidence did indeed inform local decisions about alcohol policy implementation 
among both ADP and LB members, and that their perspectives on, and uses of 
evidence permitted the identification of distinct ‘cultures of evidence’ at 
organisational level. Similarities between these cultures of evidence included that: 
they valued locally contextualised evidence; quantitative evidence was perceived as 
more useful if combined with local stories; neither perceived public health or 
academic evidence as being particularly persuasive because it tended to be 
decontextualized; and, importantly, the cultures of evidence for both ADPs and LBs 
were observed to be additionally complex because of the diversity within each 
organisation. Despite these similarities, however, interaction between the two in 
terms of evidence use remained challenging. This could be at least in part explained 
by the differences in their cultures of evidence, including the different legal and 
policy contexts in which they worked, the greater importance LBs placed on how 
evidence was presented, ADPs’ use of evidence within their partnerships, and that 
ADPs both used and translated evidence to persuade others while LB members 
tended to position themselves solely as users of evidence. It was also found that the 
LB does not often interact with the ADP as a partnership, because the licensing 
system primarily provides opportunities for only some statutory organisations to 
engage with LBs.   
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8 Discussion  
8.1 Introduction 
As outlined in Chapter 1, investigating implementation in the field of alcohol policy 
has been identified as important globally and specifically in Scotland (Alcohol Focus 
Scotland, 2019; Fitzgerald et al., 2017; MacGregor et al., 2013; WHO, 2019). 
Further, Scotland has been heralded for its ambitious and innovative approach to 
tackling alcohol-related harm (Hilton et al., 2014; Trueland, 2016). The plaudits for 
Scottish policy notwithstanding, however, levels of alcohol-related harm remain high 
(Audit Scotland, 2019; Giles and Robinson, 2019). Policy energy and resources, and 
research priorities, have often remained focused on national-level initiatives, most 
notably MUP, while a relative dearth of research has been available to explain local 
processes of implementation. This research sought to investigate the gap between 
aspirations of Scotland’s alcohol strategy and what happened locally, in practice.  
 
Given that I discussed my empirical findings in detail in Chapters 5-7, this chapter 
explores what I consider to be the key findings of the thesis in relation to the 
research questions, and reflects on how these findings relate to existing literature. I 
will then explore my contributions through a discussion of governance challenges in 
multi-sectoral collaboration, namely partnership working, and policy coherence in 
the context of Scottish alcohol policy implementation. Finally, the chapter reflects on 
the overall strengths and limitations of the thesis, and identifies potential directions 
for future research.  
 
8.2 Addressing the Research Questions 
Chapter 3 presented a systematic review of the literature on alcohol policy 
implementation in high-income settings. This is, to the best of my knowledge, the 
first such systematic review of alcohol policy implementation literature. It found that 
resources, performance measurement, partnership working, evidence use, and 
public involvement have previously been identified as factors that help explain 
alcohol policy implementation variation, successes, and challenges in high income 
settings. Importantly, the review highlighted key research needs which could make 
contributions to knowledge in the field of alcohol policy implementation, and which 
my research was designed to address. The results chapters were organised to 
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address two research questions in order to achieve the overarching research aim of 
investigating what factors shaped the local level implementation of 2009 Scottish 
alcohol strategy. Further, the thesis considered how contextual factors and 
resources appeared to shape the local implementation of Scotland’s 2009 alcohol 
strategy. 
 
8.2.1 Research question 1: How was local implementation of Scotland’s 
2009 alcohol strategy influenced by formal and informal accountability 
mechanisms in the contexts of Alcohol and Drug Partnerships and 
Licensing Boards? 
In Chapter 5, ADP members reported experiencing an accountability regime 
characterised by complexity, confusion and miscommunication. This included 
significant formal pressures from Scottish Government, challenges in intra-
partnership accountability, and, to an extent, an informal sense of responsibility to 
service users. These different, but overlapping, accountabilities, and the confusion 
surrounding them, created challenges for ADPs’ implementation work. Specifically, 
ADP members reported a lack of clarity about what was expected of them, weighty 
reporting obligations to Scottish Government, and difficulty in balancing formal top-
down accountability obligations with their perceptions of service user needs. Further, 
ADPs’ partnership structures presented challenges to implementation, possibly 
because of a lack of horizontal accountability across the partner organisations 
involved. ADP members’ experiences of being held collectively accountable for 
implementation activities was perceived as confusing (and sometimes unfair), given 
the non-statutory nature of ADPs’ structure. 
 
The findings demonstrated substantive differences in the accountability regimes of 
ADPs and LBs.  In contrast to ADPs, in Chapter 6 the findings showed that LBs’ 
accountability regime almost exclusively relies on legal accountability arrangements, 
which do not sufficiently ensure that they contribute to the public health goals of 
Scotland’s alcohol strategy. My findings demonstrated that this was, in large part, 
because LB members in practice have the freedom to prioritise (and indeed often do 
prioritise) economic considerations over public health ones, despite the formal 




Together, Chapters 5 and 6 demonstrated how a research focus on accountability 
increases understanding of specific challenges of advancing implementation of a 
national strategy at local-level across diverse organisations. Some elements of my 
findings were broadly corroborative of, or aligned with, existing literature. These 
included, for example, that challenges arise when local implementers are forced to 
continuously fulfil multiple, simultaneously-experienced accountability obligations 
and when there is a lack of clarity over responsibility for meeting relevant health 
targets (Chalmers et al., 2016; Fitzgerald et al., 2015). Additionally, where Fitzgerald 
and colleagues (2017) reported perceptions among public health actors that LBs 
tended to prioritise economic considerations over public health, my data from LB 
interviewees themselves appears to confirm this. 
 
In extending existing literature, my analysis was able to shed significant new light on 
the complexity of Scottish ADPs’ accountability regimes and juxtapose these with LB 
accountability. In light of the findings from the systematic review, these findings 
regarding accountability are novel in respect of alcohol policy implementation in 
high-income countries. As has been previously noted, while issues related to 
accountability have been discussed in the literature previously, this is the first 
analysis of alcohol policy implementers’ regimes in Scotland (and, to my knowledge, 
in high-income countries globally), which includes consideration of both formal and 
informal accountability as well as different ‘directions’ of accountability relationships.  
 
8.2.2 Research Question 2: What roles (if any) did evidence play in the 
implementation of Scotland’s 2009 alcohol strategy? 
The second research question was addressed in Chapter 7, via an analysis of the 
role of evidence in alcohol policy implementation. The chapter presented the first 
substantive analysis using ‘cultures of evidence’ (Lorenc et al., 2014b) in two key 
organisational settings for alcohol policy implementation in Scotland (ADPs and 
LBs). This analysis expanded on the work of Fitzgerald and colleagues (2017), 
which had flagged the ‘cultures of evidence’ concept as potentially useful. It also 
built upon the findings of the systematic review in Chapter 3, which demonstrated 
that understanding evidence use within alcohol policy implementation work helps 




The principal findings here are that: evidence does play an important role in the local 
implementation of Scotland’s alcohol strategy since evidence helps to shape 
decision-making by both ADP and LB stakeholders; and ADPs and LBs each have 
an identifiable culture of evidence which influences how they perceive and use 
evidence. Their cultures of evidence can usefully be explored through their 
perceptions of types, sources, and presentation of evidence. Furthermore, there 
were discernible similarities and differences across ADPs’ and LBs’ cultures of 
evidence.  
 
With respect to similarities, both were open to multiple sources of evidence but 
generally preferred locally contextualised evidence. Related to this preference, the 
findings indicated that evidence constructed in traditional public health settings (e.g. 
NHS and universities) was often perceived by local implementers not to translate 
well to local implementation settings (either in ADPs or LBs). This appeared to be a 
consequence of the perception that public health evidence tends not to provide  
solutions to the challenges implementers are facing locally, or to be cognisant of 
resource-constrained contexts. For example, interviewees said they felt that public 
health evidence was often not providing actionable recommendations for how to 
effectively address local needs (e.g. reducing service delivery in light of budget 
cuts).  
 
In terms of differences, it was shown that ADPs and LBs were assessing and using 
evidence within different organisational contexts (i.e. a partnership-oriented policy 
context and a legal and political context, respectively). Further, that the 
organisations have different relationships with evidence – the findings suggest ADPs 
may develop, use, or translate evidence in their implementation work, and use 
evidence to persuade others, while LB interviewees positioned themselves 
exclusively as relatively autonomous users of evidence.  
 
Having demonstrated that ADPs and LBs have identifiable cultures of evidence, I 
posited that this helps to explain the challenges ADPs report experiencing when 
trying to influence and persuade LBs and, in turn, broader challenges to Scottish 
alcohol policy implementation. For example, despite the similarities between their 
cultures of evidence – such as using multiple sources – the data suggest that ADP 
and LB members do not necessarily value or use the same sources. This may help 
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explain why the evidence that ADP members present to LBs is not always as 
persuasive to LBs as ADP members hope. Furthermore, this issue sits in the context 
of the governance of local alcohol policy implementation, in which ADPs as a whole 
partnership have limited opportunities to interact with the LB, and LBs act relatively 
autonomously to interpret evidence related to alcohol availability, overprovision, the 
economy, etc. Overall, the findings helped to illustrate that in Scotland’s local 
alcohol policy arena there is not a unified public health approach to evidence, or 
even a single culture of evidence. Further, that there is not a simple health versus 
non-health gap or tension (as discussed in Lorenc et al.’s 2014 systematic review) 
which could be solved by simple mechanisms to ‘bridge’ or ‘translate’ health 
messages for non-health actors.  
 
Together with the results from the systematic review, these findings for this research 
question may have implications for public health policy researchers. It is apparent 
that health actors who provide evidence in alcohol policy implementation spaces 
need to have a better awareness and understanding of different cultures of evidence 
and of related implications  for local implementers’ evidence needs and use. 
Additionally, my findings suggest that public health researchers should not assume 
evidence that is considered to be credible and valuable in their own contexts will 
necessarily translate well into those operating within other culture of evidence. At its 
starkest, my data suggest that the evidence public health researchers are currently 
producing is not considered useful or persuasive to local implementers. Public 
health evidence that foregrounds contextual and locally-specific issues, which 
combines quantitative evidence with meaningful narratives, and which is cognisant 
of resource-constraints may fare better. Future work could be usefully informed by 
contemporary evidence and policy literature which recognises the importance of 
institutional, political, and other contextual influences on organisational-level 
evidence use (Flitcroft et al., 2014; Hawkins and Parkhurst, 2016; Willis et al., 2017). 
 
8.3 Role of context and resources in local implementation of 
Scotland’s 2009 alcohol strategy 
Resources and context have long been identified as critical considerations for 
effective policy implementation (Exworthy and Powell, 2004; Hill and Hupe, 2014; 
Howlett, 2018; O’Toole, 2004). Within each results chapter, I highlighted key 
findings regarding how context and resources were influencing alcohol policy 
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implementers’ experiences of accountability (Chapters 5 and 6) and cultures of 
evidence (Chapter 7). Those sections helped this thesis make an empirical 
contribution to explaining how context and resources shape, challenge, or otherwise 
facilitate Scottish alcohol policy implementation in the three local areas included in 
this research.  
 
With regards to ADPs (Chapter 5), my results suggest that the funding structures 
and governance approach to supporting ADPs are currently presenting a challenge 
to their partnership working and accountability, and thus their overall implementation 
work. The ‘catastrophic’ budget cuts faced by ADPs during this research were 
evidently strongly influencing their implementation decision-making. Given the 
severity of these cuts, ADP interviewees reported it was profoundly problematic that 
they were still expected to deliver on alcohol policy activities at pre-cut levels. 
Additionally, constrained budgets appeared to challenge ADPs’ partnership working, 
by appearing to foster competition between partners, potentially damaging their 
ability to collaborate effectively. Further, variable engagement from partners and 
different understandings of the role of ADPs were evident, as were imbalances in 
authority between statutory and non-statutory organisations on ADPs, creating 
challenges for horizontal accountability.  
 
Crucially, ADPs’ status as a non-statutory partnership (without the ability to hold 
financial resources), and the structures within the ADP which did not appear to allow 
(or encourage), in a straightforward way, the pooling of resources among partners, 
contributed to these partnerships’ financial challenges. Additionally, in terms of their 
collective uses of evidence, ADPs are not regularly treated as partnerships by their 
licensing colleagues, because only statutory organisations are able to regularly 
submit evidence to LBs. In particular, differences in financing among statutory and 
non-statutory members and the overall constraints on resources presented 
challenges for how the partnership worked (including who was held accountable for 
achieving policy goals, and how this occurred) and what it was able to accomplish in 
an already-financially constrained local policy context. 
  
It is clear that concern with the local economic and financial context was a persistent 
influence on LB decision-making and their accountability regime (Chapter 6). This 
was evident in LB members’ concern with the economy and, in relation to resources, 
293 
 
their fear of the financial (and potentially political) cost of appeals in court. The latter 
was particularly problematic, with appeals having been identified as the only formal 
accountability mechanism for LBs; such fear may lead LBs to grant licenses almost 
by default, significantly impairing the effectiveness of the public health objective. In 
terms of informal accountability, my data indicated a concern among LBs of not 
wanting to contradict or impede the actions of another committee, suggesting they 
were influenced to a certain extent by their local political context. In LA1, this was 
framed in terms of perceptions that the Planning Committee wanted to bring 
‘prosperity’ (a positive framing) and the local LB not wanting to make a decision 
which would go against prosperity (see page 221). 
 
The findings in Chapter 7 showed that the contexts of LBs and ADPs helped to 
characterise their different cultures of evidence. My analysis suggested ADPs work 
in a policy and partnership-working context which influenced how they assessed and 
used evidence as individuals or in combination with each other. ADPs’ policy context 
also required them to use evidence to persuade others or justify their decision-
making in the context of alcohol policy implementation (an issue linked to their 
accountability regime). This suggested that the way ADP members use evidence is 
influenced by how credible they think their audiences will find it, and identifies an 
important evidence ‘translation’ role for these local implementers. In contrast to 
ADPs, the findings in Chapter 7 suggested that LBs remain influenced by their 
concern with the local economic and political contexts, which in turn shaped their 
own culture of evidence. A potential consequence of this was that LB members 
often did not consider public health evidence to be particularly relevant to their 
licensing decisions (as noted in the analysis for Research Question 2). These 
findings suggest these elements of LBs’ context presented consistent challenges to 
alcohol policy implementation across the themes of LB accountability and uses of 
evidence.  
 
8.4 Governance Challenges of Multi-Sectoral Collaboration: Policy 
Coherence, and Partnership  
The principal findings can be usefully explored with reference to key governance-
related themes that cut across my findings from the systematic review (Chapter 2), 
accountability chapters (Chapters 5 and 6), and evidence chapter (Chapter 7). In 
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particular, the principal findings point to key challenges of multi-sectoral 
collaboration, specifically in relation to partnership working and policy coherence.  
 
My analysis suggests that key challenges facing local alcohol policy implementers 
can be considered as intrinsic to multi-sector collaboration. Policy and legislative 
efforts to reduce alcohol-related harm are clearly not the sole responsibility of health 
actors – it is known that the contributions of other policy areas (e.g. criminal justice, 
economy, employment, education, etc.) are required to make effective change 
(World Health Organization, 2010). How these different sectors collaborate 
effectively is a central challenge to public health (Delobelle, 2019; 
Tangcharoensathien et al., 2017; WHO Europe, 2018), and remains a key issue in 
alcohol policy implementation (Institute of Alcohol Studies, 2019). While the data 
suggested that ADP members from diverse backgrounds generally agreed that 
alcohol-related harm needed to be reduced, they did tend to express different day-
to-day key concerns or identify priorities in terms of alcohol policy implementation. 
This is aligned with broader literature which notes that weak collaboration and failure 
to find common ground among different stakeholders “remains one of the key 
reasons for subsequent implementation difficulties” (Hudson et al., 2019, p. 4). 
 
Overall, while this thesis does not challenge the idea that multi-sectoral collaboration 
is a potentially positive, perhaps even necessary, approach for trying to address 
complex policy challenges, it does suggest that further work is required to enable 
such approaches to function well. While providing suggestions about what such 
work might involve is beyond the scope of this thesis, key challenges related to 
multi-sectoral collaboration were particularly acute and evident in my data. The 
following sections explore these challenges with specific reference to partnership 
working (as one particular, politically privileged form of multi-sectoral working) and 
policy coherence.  
 
8.4.1 Partnership Working 
Within UK public health policy there are longstanding assumptions that partnership 
working is a panacea to addressing complex challenges, however there is limited 
evidence of the effectiveness of partnership working for addressing these 
challenges (Dowling et al., 2004; Durand et al., 2015; Evans and Forbes, 2009; 
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Smith et al., 2009). These assumptions appear to exist in contemporary public 
health policy thinking (e.g. in Scotland’s ‘refreshed’ alcohol and drug policy (Scottish 
Government, 2018b, 2018a)), despite a longstanding recognition of its potential 
pitfalls and how challenging partnership working is to do effectively (e.g. Audit 
Commission, 1998; Dowling et al., 2004; Markwell et al., 2003). In contemporary UK 
alcohol policy, these assumptions seem to have been embraced by alcohol policy 
stakeholders, with partnerships being the go-to structure for local alcohol policy 
governance (Foster et al., 2007; Lloyd et al., 2014; Martineau et al., 2014; Parkes et 
al., 2011; Thom et al., 2011). 
 
Importantly, there has been an additional high-level assumption in policy practice 
that simply by mandating local actors work in partnership, effective multi-sectoral 
partnership working will naturally (even somewhat magically) follow (Evans and 
Forbes, 2009; Smith et al., 2009). Thus, thinking about both the process and 
outcomes of partnership working is often underpinned by ambitious, positive 
assumptions which lack substantive empirical support. While my findings do not 
seek to challenge the potential role of partnership in seeking to address complex 
policy challenges, they do suggest that effective governance structures to support 
this type of working may be lacking, and that there is a need for additional thinking 
and resources in order to function well. Within local alcohol policy implementation in 
Scotland, my findings suggest governance mechanisms have not been developed to 
allow or empower ADPs to truly work as partnerships, and this has impacted on their 
work to implement the 2009 alcohol strategy. 
 
Specifically, the data in this research suggest there has been a failure to ensure that 
these partnerships are structured, resourced, and provided with guidance in such a 
way as to help institutionalise norms, practices and rules which would allow them to 
address fundamental partnership working challenges. Amongst ADPs, the data 
suggest that issues such as resources, accountabilities, and sharing/using evidence 
will be particularly important. These findings are consistent with alcohol policy 
research from the English context, in which issues such as limited funding and 
resources, managing size and complexity (with implications for accountability), and 
poor communication and information sharing have been identified as key barriers to 




My findings also suggested that ADP partnership working was complicated by 
ADPs’ sometimes confusing accountability relationship with Scottish Government. 
As previously noted, the data suggested Government was perceived to be providing 
mixed messages about their role as a source of ‘support’ and as a top-down 
accountability forum. Further, frustration was expressed among ADP members 
about being held collectively accountable for implementation activities they did not 
have organisational or financial control over. This is aligned with observations from 
accountability scholars such as Thomas (2012) and Romzek (2011) who note that 
shifts to more collective approaches to accountability require mechanisms which can 
account for collaborative/partnership arrangements. It is also known from existing 
literature that striking a balance between central steering and local flexibility remains 
an important challenge for local partnership working (Markwell et al., 2003; Martin 
and Guarneros-Meza, 2013). In light of the above, my findings suggest further 
research into how Scottish alcohol policy implementation partnerships may be 
effectively structured and governed could make a meaningful contribution to 
knowledge to inform policy and practice.   
 
8.4.2 Policy Coherence 
My findings suggest that a contest of norms and goals is playing out in Scottish 
alcohol policy implementation at local level, particularly between public health and 
economic concerns. Key amongst this was the observation that, despite Scotland’s 
national alcohol strategy explicitly prioritising public health concerns, economic 
considerations continue to be a dominant part of local decision-making (particularly 
in licensing contexts), and local implementers are struggling with this. This was most 
obvious with regards to the public health objective in licensing, where my data 
aligned with existing literature which notes some of the challenges Scottish policy 
actors have had in realising this objective (Fitzgerald et al., 2017; MacNaughton and 
Gillan, 2011; Nicholls, 2015).  
 
In light of this, my research findings can be usefully examined through ‘policy 
coherence’. This concept describes the extent to which conflicts between policy 
agendas (of different policy communities) are minimized, and synergies maximized 
(Blouin, 2007). In the context of policy implementation, inconsistencies across policy 
areas have been a target of blame for implementation gaps (Goggin et al., 1990), 
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while increased policy coherence provides a basis for better policy implementation 
(May et al., 2006). Three types of policy coherence, identified by Siitonen (2016) can 
be seen as useful here: horizontal (between policy areas, such as health and 
licensing); vertical (between policies of governments at different levels of 
governance, such as the Scottish Government and local Councils); and inter-
organisational (between state and non-state actors).  
 
In terms of horizontal coherence operating across policy spheres, this thesis has 
highlighted two sets of tensions. First, the section above (8.3.2) has outlined 
challenges ADP members face working horizontally together in partnerships. 
Second, the findings highlighted the tension between public health goals of the 
alcohol strategy (in this thesis, most often pursued by ADP members) and a 
consistent frustration of these goals arising from other actors’ (certain LB members’) 
concerns with economic aspects of policy. Achieving coherence would see these 
“different policy fields actively work together to achieve common overarching goals” 
(Stroß, 2017, p. 335). Instead, my findings suggest that while the national strategy’s 
central goal is to reduce alcohol-related harm, and names reduced availability as a 
key contributor, LBs have the freedom to pursue different priorities from other local 
implementation actors. My analysis indicated this lack of horizontal coherence at 
local level was to some extent explained by LBs’ lack of accountability (Chapter 6) 
and their ‘culture of evidence’, in which evidence was often considered against 
perceived local economic concerns. I reflect, however, that effective horizontal 
coherence may require public health actors to work to coordinate and integrate 
health concerns with other actors’ social or economic goals, challenging potential 
assumptions among public health that health concerns should trump other types of 
concerns (Cejudo and Michel, 2017).  
 
Second, examining vertical coherence between Scottish Government-level and local 
imperatives suggests there is still a need for mechanisms that can promote greater 
hierarchical synergy in Scottish alcohol policy implementation. This issue harks back 
to issues identified in early policy implementation scholarship, in which researchers 
stated ‘hierarchical integration’ was needed for effective implementation (e.g. 
Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1979). As discussed in the results chapters and above, 
there appears to be coherence between the Scottish Government and ADPs in 
terms of wanting to reduce alcohol-related harm. However, the ambiguity and 
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miscommunication between these actors (Chapter 5) led ADP members to report 
confusion and implementation challenges (so, shared goals but confusion about the 
governance processes to reach them). Then, while documentary analysis suggested 
the Scottish Government considers LBs to be important implementers of Scottish 
alcohol policy, Chapter 6 suggested LB members did not always agree about this 
aspect of their role, and the accountability regime of LBs did not ensure they 
contributed to the Government’s public health goals for the strategy. The 
incongruence between Scottish Government and each of these local organisations 
has consequences for alcohol policy implementation, which can be usefully 
elucidated with reference to Matland (1995). Matland emphasises the importance of 
relationships across the policy implementation process, specifically noting that a 
given policy’s level of ambiguity and conflict influence implementation decision-
making. Together, the levels of ambiguity and conflict determine the character of a 
policy implementation process, with high levels of ambiguity and conflict directly 
challenging implementation. In my findings, this was evident in the complexity and 
confusion of ADPs’ regime of multiple accountabilities, and the lack of accountability 
acting on LBs to ensure they contributed to the public health goals of the alcohol 
strategy.  
 
Third, my analysis goes some way to suggest inter-organisational coherence is 
lacking between state and non-state actors in Scottish alcohol policy 
implementation. In Chapter 6, the findings showed that the accountability system for 
LBs unintentionally privileges the alcohol industry through concerns with how 
alcohol production and sales are related to jobs and local economies. This is despite 
the fact that employment is not a goal of the strategy (although there is 
acknowledgement of industry’s role in the national economy) and that there is not an 
economy-related licensing objective. In comparison to industry, health actors’ are 
necessarily disadvantaged in the licensing system (despite arguably having goals 
which are more coherent with the objectives of the alcohol strategy), because they 
do not have the same appeals’ process available to them to challenge licensing 
decisions. This thesis’ findings already help question whether having public health 
as a licensing objective has really been an innovative, progressive change for those 
seeking public health gains (Chapter 1). However, here I consider that, as long as 
there are insufficient governance instruments, guidance, or other mechanisms to 
ensure the prioritisation of public health over (or at least in combination with) 
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economic considerations, an unintended consequence is that local actors may 
default to the usual privileging of core local economic needs over public health. In 
light of this, it appears there has been an insufficiency of existing governance in 
order to flesh out what the public health objective means in that context, which sits 
alongside the de facto privileging of industry interests in other ways as well. 
 
To help provide added analytical value of my research this section has discussed 
multi-sectoral collaboration, in particular in terms challenges generated from my 
data regarding partnership working and policy coherence. Ultimately, my findings 
are aligned with the observation that effectively overcoming challenges “may require 
new forms of alcohol policy governance architecture to ensure policy coherence and 
joined up actions between different sectors” (Anderson and Gual, 2011, p. 69). 
Indeed, this thesis provides more evidence that simply stating in policy documents 
that local policy work should prioritise public health, or establishing partnerships in 
hopes that such an approach will sufficiently address the complex policy tasks 
surrounding implementation, are neither currently working to ensure effective local 
implementation of the strategy’s public health priorities, nor likely to succeed in 
future. Rather, the findings suggest that different governance mechanisms are 
needed to allow the local system to better balance a concern with public health 
against or alongside economic consideration(s). What these forms of governance 
‘architecture’ look like for Scottish alcohol policy implementation is an important 
topic for future research. 
 
8.5 Revisiting the 2007 ‘Stocktake’ 
As discussed in Chapter 2, a 2007 Stocktake of Alcohol and Drug Action Teams 
(Cameron, 2007) provided a series of recommendations which the Scottish 
Government took forward in local reforms in 2008/2009. A decade later, my 
research provides the opportunity to revisit their recommendations in the context of 
ADPs, which replaced ADATs in 2009. Certain recommendations appear to have 
been embedded within ADP structures and operations, for example ADPs now 
develop Annual Delivery Plans, there is a range of representation on the 
partnership, and a Chair is chosen by the members. However, my findings suggest 
certain critiques of ADATs persist for ADPs, suggesting that Stocktake 




Key among these critiques was that “for [ADPs] to be more effective, there must be 
greater clarity about what is expected of them and by whom” (Cameron, 2007). The 
authors additionally reported concerns among ADATs that Scottish Executive 
expectations of them were unrealistic. While the New Framework for Partnerships 
on Alcohol and Drugs was subsequently published by Scottish Government (2009c), 
helping to respond to the Stocktake, my findings demonstrated that confusion and 
ambiguity about expectations for ADPs persist. Furthermore, the findings showed 
variation remained within and across ADPs about what the partnership’s role and 
responsibilities were, and that ADP members felt expectations of them were 
impossible (especially given budget cuts).   
 
Linked to both accountability and evidence use, the Stocktake recommended 
ADAT/ADPs should “improve the involvement of service users and put in place 
mechanisms to capture and act on their views.” (p. 8). My findings indicated an 
intrinsic motivation among many ADP members to respond to service user needs. 
The development of local needs assessments help them to do this, however these 
were not updated regularly, and there remained challenges in ensuring all ADP 
members were committed to using and acting upon experiential service user 
evidence. The most successful example (of the limited examples available) of 
involving service users and capturing their views was in LA2, where the ADP 
supported and facilitated peer research among service users. Finally, linked to 
evidence use and resources, Cameron (2007) recommends ADAT/ADP partners 
“should use existing resources to develop joint working in the sharing and analysis 
of local information…” (p. 9). My findings suggest sharing and combining information 
between partners is occurring to a certain extent. However, this appears largely 
dependent on individuals’ initiative, as opposed to having an institutionalised, 
structural process which facilitates and encourages it.  
 
The key conclusion from the Stocktake was that partnership and coordinated / 
joined-up working were essential components of effectively addressing alcohol and 
drugs problems in Scotland. Overall, it appears that some steps have been made 
towards the recommendations of the 2007 Stocktake to improve the operation of 
these partnerships and their alcohol policy implementation work. Importantly, 
however, this thesis demonstrates that key challenges persist across the themes of 
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accountability, evidence use and resources. My research suggests a need for more 
careful consideration of the governance of alcohol policy implementation that takes 
into account complex local ‘realities’.  While Scotland has been heralded for 
developing a progressive alcohol strategy, my findings suggest that progress 
towards public health goals will remain limited while there continues to be a paucity 
of governance structures to support implementation locally. 
 
8.6 Strengths and Limitations 
In addition to methodological limitations discussed in Chapter 4, there are a number 
of strengths and limitations of the work which presented over the course of this 
research project. In relation to strengths, from a public health policy perspective, this 
research remained grounded in an important health policy problem (alcohol) which 
is related to a high burden of harms and cost within Scotland, and contributed to 
addressing a gap in knowledge about how and whether policy responses to this 
problem were being realised. I also conducted this research at a time when (i) the 
current strategy was well-established, leading my interviewees to be able to speak 
in-depth about their experiences of implementing the strategy, and (ii) in the lead-up 
to the publication of a ‘refreshed’ strategy, which would be implemented in a similar 
policy and legislative context, thus making my research timely and relevant for 
learning to be taken forward.  
 
Methodologically, a strength of this thesis was how I accessed three local areas for 
my embedded case study, which provided the opportunity to investigate my 
research questions in different contexts across Scotland. Another strength was 
undertaking a high number of in-depth interviews with relevant stakeholders, who 
had different perspectives, backgrounds, and were situated at different levels of 
governance.  This enhanced my ability to speak to a range of themes and their 
interconnections. An example of this was the ability to consider and explain how 
accountability and evidence use were both inevitably influenced by the partnership 
working context of ADPs. 
 
A number of limitations are also evident within this research. From a methods 
perspective, I was able to interview relatively few LB members compared with ADP 
stakeholders, potentially creating an imbalance in the depth and variation of 
302 
 
perspectives available. To address this, I supplemented my analysis with accounts 
of interactions with LBs from ADP members.  
 
As with any empirical research, my approach or analysis could have been 
conducted differently. First reflecting on the types of individuals and organisations 
with whom I generated data, the results of Chapter 5 could have been enriched by a 
more in-depth discussion of ADPs’ relationships with their local governance 
institutions such as the Community Planning Partnership or new Integrated 
Authorities. The relative lack of data available on this was possibly a result of my 
research focus on Scotland’s national alcohol strategy, and how my interview 
questions tended to focus more on how ADP members perceived their relationship 
with the Scottish Government. Thus, these additional, local governance 
relationships may be an area for future research. 
 
Further, my approach to recruitment did not lead me to formally interview any 
Licensing Forum members, because my engagement with policy documents and my 
snowballing from interviews did not suggest Forum members were involved in local 
implementation decision-making. For informational purposes, I did attend a Forum 
meeting and had an informal discussion with a Forum chair, which helped confirm 
this. However, having gone on an analytical journey that led me to develop a greater 
focus on LB accountability, I now recognise that interviews with Forum members 
may have positively contributed to my understanding of this potential accountability 
relationship.  
 
Additionally, while I interviewed members of the third sector in their capacity as 
representatives on each ADP, I acknowledge that this small number of interviews 
would not have captured the diversity of third sector organisations working at local 
level to deliver alcohol services. This reflected my decision to maintain focus on the 
strategic, policy-focused, decision-making level of local governance evident at the 
level ADPs were working within. I perceived that it would not be feasible (given time 
and resources) nor warranted (given my research focus), to pursue interviews with 
third sector service delivery organisations individually. I did, however, interact on an 
ongoing basis with AFS (a key, national-level third sector organisation) to discuss 
aspects of my findings (especially my understanding captured in Chapter 2). As with 
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all research, these decisions were informed by time and resource capacity, and 
while not possible for this thesis, offer directions for future research. 
 
Ideally, I would also have been able to capture in more depth aspects of the broader 
policy and legislative context which were influencing the working structure of ADPs, 
particularly what was happening as a result of ‘health and social care integration’ 
(see Public Bodies (Joint Working) (Scotland) Act 2014 in Chapter 2). However, the 
novelty of the legislation during my interviewing period meant key changes were still 
in flux at that time, making the data I generated about this contextual change mostly 
characterised by a sense of uncertainty.  
 
8.7 Directions for Future Research 
The findings in this thesis point to multiple avenues for future research. In terms of 
methods and approach, it has been noted that making more effort to include other 
relevant stakeholders, such as third sector organisations, who contribute to local 
policy decision-making in future research on Scottish alcohol policy implementation 
may provide access to important perspectives. Further, while there were built-in 
comparison elements in the analysis, I did not take an explicitly comparative 
approach to studying the three local areas. This followed my decision to take an 
embedded case study approach, in which I wanted to synthesise the data I had from 
across the three areas in order to speak to their accountability regimes and 
evidence cultures, and have time and capacity to also consider the role of LBs. In 
future, an explicitly comparative approach may provide the opportunity to tease out 
differences and diversity across local areas. This would be important for forming 
recommendations that were conducive to policy implementation while also 
acknowledging differences across context and place.  
 
In policy terms, I have generated findings about accountability, evidence use, and 
context and resources within Scottish alcohol policy implementation. Future 
research could seek to investigate, for example, whether such implementation 
challenges are similarly evident across other health policy spaces in Scotland like 
physical activity, smoking, or nutrition policy. These policy areas may be of interest 
due to (possible) similarities in issues related to the complexity of behaviour change, 
and the impact of social, economic, and political contexts. This future work may be 
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of particular interest in health policy spaces where cross-sectoral, local partnerships 
have been established to implement these types of health policy, and where policy 
coordination, coherence, and integration have been established/are needed to 
address complex health problems.   
 
Results which showed public health evidence often did not fit well with either ADPs 
or LBs needs for locally contextualised evidence may wish to be critically considered 
by public health researchers who aim to influence policy and practice. This was 
particularly evident in terms of how the drive for decontextualized, generalisable 
research results within public health contravened the need for locally relevant, 
contextualised learning expressed by interviewees. Learning from existing evidence 
and policy scholarship which recognises, for example, the inherently political nature 
of policy and legal contexts in which research is only one consideration during 
decision-making may usefully inform future work to reconcile these different 
evidence cultures (e.g. Zane and Welsh, 2018). Following on from this, work which 
provides lessons for how to institutionalise evidence use, or develop systems for the 
‘good governance’ of evidence (Hawkins and Parkhurst, 2016; Liverani et al., 2013) 
may also be useful.   
 
Considering this research in the context of wider themes such as community 
engagement, recent qualitative research on ‘publics’ in alcohol and other drug policy 
(in Australia and the UK) has demonstrated the importance of examining more 
closely these public(s) and understanding their relationships to alcohol and drug 
policy (Fraser et al., 2018). My findings support this, and my research was the first 
time (to my knowledge) that research has explicitly considered whether and how 
ADPs are/should be accountable to the public. However, more detailed 
examinations of how and whether the recent Community Empowerment legislation 
has become more influential in alcohol policy implementation locally remains an 
important avenue for future research. For example, Part 10 of the Community 
Empowerment Act 2015 seeks to enable people “to have their say in decisions that 
affect them” (Scottish Government, 2017j, p. 7). This may lead to greater support for 
members of the public making representation at LB meetings. However, it remains 
unclear whether the Act will stimulate greater weight being given to public 
representations, and whether LBs will be required to more firmly base their 




Finally, implementation of the Scottish Government’s ‘refreshed’ alcohol strategy 
(Scottish Government, 2018a, 2018b) in late 2018 provides opportunities to explore 
how and whether the learning from this thesis could be useful in the current alcohol 
policy context. Future research could again be meaningfully informed by Cejudo and 
Michel's (2017) framework which discusses policy coherence, with a view to 
assessing whether coordination, coherence, and integration of policies and practices 








Alcohol use is a major risk factor for ill-health and a contributor to health inequalities. 
Scottish alcohol-related mortality rates are the highest in the UK, with the greatest 
burden of alcohol-related harm falling on people from the most deprived areas. This 
thesis provided an investigation of local implementation of the 2009 Scottish alcohol 
strategy which was designed to address this.  
 
Chapter 1 introduced the topic area and highlighted that the Scottish Government 
has been ambitious in their policy and legislative efforts to addressing the problem, 
but that alcohol-related harm and demand for services remain high (as do the costs 
of each) (Audit Scotland, 2019; Giles and Robinson, 2019). Further, while significant 
money and effort have been expended researching national-level overviews of 
Scotland’s alcohol strategy and implementing MUP, much less is known about how 
the strategy as a whole was being implemented at local level. Given the persistently 
high rates of alcohol-related harm and the relative paucity of research examining 
local implementation of the strategy, this chapter outlined how the thesis aimed to 
contribute understanding about how implementation occurred and elucidate 
challenges facing the local policy actors tasked with this work.    
 
To contextualise the analysis in this thesis, Chapter 2 mapped the multi-level policy, 
legislative, and institutional landscape which surrounded its development and 
implementation. Next, Chapter 3 presented a systematic review of existing literature 
on alcohol policy implementation in high-income contexts. This was done in order to 
provide a focused account and critical engagement with the literature in which this 
thesis is situated (and is the first known review of this literature), and inform the 
development of my research questions. A key finding from the review was the 
identification of factors which can be facilitators or barriers to alcohol policy 
implementation: performance measurement, partnership working, public 
involvement, resources, and evidence use. Synthesising these factors further, the 
review identified important research gaps particularly related to: (i) how 
accountability relationships are situated in the context of multiple other, overlapping 
accountability relationships; and (ii) how evidence is perceived and used at 
organisational-level and in partnership contexts. These gaps informed the 
development of the thesis’ two research questions. Additionally, issues related to 
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context and resources appeared in the review as being intertwined with other 
aspects of implementation. Therefore, those factors were taken forward as a cross-
cutting theme across the thesis. 
 
The methods for the thesis were discussed in Chapter 4. To undertake data 
generation and analysis, this research took an interpretive, qualitative, embedded 
case study approach with three purposely selected local areas across Scotland. 
Within this approach, 63 semi-structured interviews (at national and local level) and 
documentary analysis of 16 documents were utilised to generate data. The data 
corpus was analysed thematically, and the empirical chapters were written to focus 
on the themes identified in the systematic review.  
 
The first research question was addressed in Chapters 5 and 6, explaining how 
implementation of Scotland’s 2009 alcohol strategy was influenced by formal and 
informal accountability mechanisms in the contexts of ADPs and LBs, respectively. 
Both chapters used Hupe and Hill’s (2007) accountability typology to organise the 
data. Chapter 5 usefully adapted the typology to the Scottish alcohol policy 
implementation context by adding ‘partnership’ to the typology’s conceptualisation of 
‘professional accountability’, in order to better fit with ADPs’ structure.  
 
Chapter 5 first demonstrated that ADP members’ perceived their accountability 
regime to be characterised by confusion, complexity and miscommunication. The 
chapter showed this was a consequence of members’ perceptions that their 
accountabilities are often overlapping and sometimes in conflict with one another. 
Further, that ADP members perceived they were accountable for activities for which 
they did not have commensurate resources or authority, and that communication 
from the Scottish Government about their accountability-related responsibilities often 
lacked clarity or consistency.  
 
Chapter 6 presented analysis which has been published in the peer-reviewed 
literature (Wright, 2019), showing that LBs operate within an accountability system 
that is distinct from, and sometimes in tension with, the system for ADPs. Consistent 
with existing literature (Fitzgerald et al., 2017) LB members reported greater 
prioritisation of economic concerns over public health ones, which had implications 
for their licensing decisions, and consequently, for local alcohol availability. This 
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chapter provided new explanation and understanding about why this prioritisation 
occurs. It found that legal accountability is the sole formal accountability mechanism 
acting upon LBs, and argued that, consequently, LBs’ accountability regime did not 
sufficiently ensure LBs contribute to the public health goals of the Scottish alcohol 
strategy. Together, Chapters 5 and 6 provided the first known in-depth analysis of 
the accountability regimes of ADPs and LBs. They demonstrated that analysis of 
these regimes can help to identify and explain key challenges in for Scottish alcohol 
policy implementation.  
 
The second research question was addressed in Chapter 7, regarding the role of 
evidence in implementing Scotland’s 2009 alcohol strategy. The chapter directly 
built upon a suggestion by Fitzgerald and colleagues (2017) that there may be 
‘cultures of evidence’ among local alcohol policy implementers. The findings 
demonstrated evidence does play an important role in local decisions among both 
ADP and LB members and confirmed that distinct ‘cultures of evidence’ (Lorenc et 
al., 2014) among these organisations could be observed. My analysis therefore 
provided a focused examination of why there has historically been ‘epistemological 
discord’ (Nicholls, 2015) between these types of actors, ultimately interpreting and 
explaining that ADP and LB cultures of evidence had key similarities and 
differences. It was posited that these findings help explain why interactions between 
these two organisations, particularly with respect to public health evidence and 
policy goals, remain challenging. It also suggested that public health researchers 
who wish to influence Scottish alcohol policy implementation may benefit from doing 
more to understand local organisations’ respective cultures of evidence (and their 
implications for local implementers’ evidence needs).  
 
The thesis also considered how contextual factors and resources appear to shape 
the local implementation of Scotland’s 2009 alcohol strategy, discussing these 
throughout Chapters 5-7.  The findings suggested the funding structures (and 
significant budget cuts) and governance approach to supporting ADPs are currently 
influencing and presenting challenges for their partnership working, accountability, 
and evidence use. It was also clear that LBs’ concern with the local economic and 
financial context influenced their own decision-making. These findings help to 
confirm understanding from existing alcohol-focused and broader public policy 
implementation literature about the importance of context and resources (Chalmers 
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et al., 2016; Fitzgerald et al., 2015; Hill and Hupe, 2014; Howlett, 2018; Parkes et 
al., 2011), but add understanding about how this may influence their accountability 
regimes and cultures of evidence, with consequences for their implementation work. 
 
The Discussion, presented in Chapter 8, brought together the key findings to 
articulate challenges related to multi-sectoral collaboration, in particular through 
discussion of partnership working and policy coherence. It was emphasised that 
effectively overcoming implementation challenges observed in Scottish alcohol 
policy implementation may require rethinking about alcohol policy governance 
‘architecture’; what this may look like is an important topic for future inquiry. These 
findings, and those from the thesis overall, help demonstrate the utility of drawing on 
broader literatures such as policy implementation, accountability, evidence and 
policy, and partnership, for the purposes of analysing alcohol policy implementation.  
 
Having made the above contributions to knowledge about alcohol policy 
implementation, this thesis has provided important learning for the practice of 
alcohol policy implementation in Scotland. Indeed, this thesis shows that while 
Scotland has been ambitious in trying to give primacy to public health concerns in 
their overall strategy, the reality of how it has been implemented reveals a multitude 
of challenges. The identification and analysis of these challenges may be useful for 
policy actors from other UK contexts to consider. For example, should UK policy 
actors (e.g. in England/Wales) respond to calls from certain local and public health 
groups for a public health objective (e.g. see Foster, 2016, p. 196; and Martineau et 
al., 2014), these findings suggest it would be naïve to assume that simply adopting 
this objective will impact on decisions. Rather, any such change ought to be 
accompanied by efforts to consider what might enable effective implementation. 
With consideration of accountability, evidence use, and context and resources, this 
thesis has shown that even progressive, evidence-informed alcohol policy needs to 
be underpinned by well-considered governance approaches that support local 
implementation. 
 
A final reflection: since September 2019 I have been working as a civil servant with 
the Scottish Government, having taken on a role in which balancing, considering, 
and making sense of complex cross-sectoral policy issues are critical to my own 
day-to-day policy work. At time of submission of this thesis, I am working in the 
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Private Office of Scotland’s Chief Medical Officer during the Covid-19 outbreak. In 
this role I must continually and rapidly reflect on the interface between research and 
policy – especially in terms of how this interaction is realised in highly-pressured 
policy practice. The skills I gained in the course of doing this research are helping 
me to operate in this new role, including how to navigate complex networks of 
research and policy professionals, gain access to key spaces and stakeholders, 
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Proposed Actions from the ‘Framework for Action’ 
 
The policy document ‘Changing Scotland’s Relationship with Alcohol: A Framework for Action’  has been discussed throughout this thesis. The 
table below depicts the range of specific proposals for action contained within that policy document, and an assessment of whether they are 
expected to be implemented at UK, Scottish, local level, in multiple levels, or whether it is unclear from the document’s representation of the 
proposal for action.  
 
Framework for Action: Proposed Actions and Indicated Level of Implementation 




1. Regulations should be made under Licensing (Scotland) Act 
2005 to put end to multi-buy deals and preventing sale of 
alcohol as a loss leader  
National  
2. Introduce minimum retail pricing National  
3. Support introduction of legislation to require licensed 
premises to offer measures of 125ml of wine and 25ml 
measures of spirits 
National and UK Government will regulate to make it a condition of 
premises licenses that wine be available in 125ml 
measure. Spirit measures are governed by UK 
legislation, Government states it will push UK 
legislative change. 
Supporting Families and Communities 
4. Youth Commission will explore the issues faced by young 
people in relation to misuse of alcohol beginning this spring 
and will report back with advice on actions which might be 
taken to address the issues they identify. 
Unclear Young Scot asked to establish Youth Commission 
to explore issues faced by young people in 
relation to misuse of alcohol. Unclear from policy 
whether this is national, regional, or local initiative.  
5. Review current advice for parents and carers around alcohol 
and associated issues 
Unclear While review itself may be at national level, 
responsibility for the integration of advice to 
parents with Government’s early years framework, 
and enactment of this programme of work, is 
unclear.  
6. Legislate to: 
x Place duty on Licensing Boards to consider raising minimum 
age for off-sales purchases within their area to 21 
x Enable Licensing Boards to apply such a condition without 
requiring a hearing in respect of every premise concerned 
x Give the Chief Constable and the Local Licensing Forum 
powers to request that the Licensing Board consider the 
matter of an age restriction at any time 
National and 
local 
Government will legislate to place the relevant 
duty on Licensing Boards, however other related 
actions, and the enactment of this legislation will 
be local, by virtue of it placing duties on Licensing 
Boards. 
7. Establish legislative power to apply a Social Responsibility 
Fee 
National  
8. Survey of incidence of Fetal Alcohol Syndrome in Scotland Unclear Policy states this review was occurring in 
collaboration with range of stakeholders. Unclear 
who is responsible for completing survey or acting 
upon findings.  
9. Work with our partners at national and local level to improve 
substance misuse education in schools. A workplan has been 
developed with tasks designed to lead to better partnership 
working, improved support for those delivering teaching, and 
better awareness of the available teaching resources, to be 




10. Support third sector organisations to provide youth work 
and/or diversionary activities 
Local Although this proposal included statements of 
investment made by Government, the delivery of 
these initiatives will be local.  
11. ‘Promoting Citizenship through Football - A Government and 
Football Partnership’ to identify and take forward 




Established working group in partnership with 
other national-level public and private sector 
organisations. Work of this partnership appears to 
be national-level, given it comprises the Scottish 
Government, sportscotland, the Scottish Football 
Association, and others who work at national level. 
12. A Project Board has been convened to drive forward work on 
improving identification and assessment of those affected by 
parental substance misuse and sharing of appropriate 
information amongst agencies; and building capacity, 
availability and quality of support services. 
National and 
local 
Government identifies that its own officials will 
‘drive forward progress on this agenda’. However, 
identification and assessment of those affected by 
parental substance misuse, and enhancement of 
support services, will necessarily have to occur at 
local level. 
13. Will continue to work through the Scottish Government-led 
Scottish Age-restricted Products Enforcement Working 
Group, which has representatives from all key interests 
including the licensed trade and hospitality sector, ACPOS, 
and the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service, to 
identify any further steps which might be taken to ensure 




14. We will undertake a review of how test-purchasing has been 
implemented in order to identify any lessons which can be 
learned and shared. 
Unclear Although the policy says ‘we’, indicating the 
authors of the policy, it is unclear where 
responsibility lies for the learning and sharing of 
lessons. 
15. Work with Young Scot to further promote the Young Scot 
National Entitlement Card and to bolster its use and 
recognition as a proof of age card. 
National  
16. Increase our funding for the Best Bar None scheme, to 
enable this to be extended more widely across Scotland. 
Local Although Government is identified as increasing 
funding for this initiative, responsibility for the 
extension across Scotland must be located at 
local level. 
17. Working with local partners in Fife to pilot and evaluate a 
package of interventions in different locales, drawing on the 
experience of other partnerships, as well as social norms 
approaches. We hope that, in due course, the experience and 
lessons from the Fife pilot will be able to be drawn upon by 
other areas and adapted for their local circumstances. 
Local  
18. Discussions are on-going about the scope for trading 
standards officers to be given a role, alongside the police, in 
enforcing licensing law in relation to off-sales and, 
specifically, in programmes. 
Local  
19. Develop sustained and tough enforcement measures such as 
the Safer Streets initiative, where we have provided over £2 
million to Community Safety Partnerships to deliver extra 
initiatives to tackle alcohol related violence and disorder over 
the festive period. We will also continue to support education 
initiatives such as Medics Against Violence, which involves a 
number of senior clinicians working with the Violence 
Local Responsibility for curbing alcohol-related violence 
located with Community Safety Partnerships. 
Reduction Unit to raise awareness amongst young people of 
the dangers of carrying a knife. 
20. Focus on early intervention through the Community Initiative 
to Reduce Violence (CIRV), the ground-breaking gang’s 
initiative to tackle collective violence in the East End of 
Glasgow. 
Local  
21. Publish a research report, which will set out a range of 
approaches that could be used across Scotland to support 
drunk and incapable adults. We will arrange an event for 
stakeholders to disseminate the findings and encourage the 
assessment of needs and development of appropriate 
approaches at a local level. 
National and 
Local 
Publication will occur in public domain, and event 
at national level planned, however resultant 
actions seem to be required at local level. 
22. Reduction in the drink driving limit and the introduction of new 
police powers for random breath testing. 
National  
Positive Attitudes, Positive Choices 
23. Bring forward regulations that will restrict display of marketing 
material relating to alcohol 
National  
24. Consider there is considerable scope for producers and 
retailers to develop, as part of a co-regulatory approach, a 
code of practice for promotional activity. 
Unclear It is unclear at what level of governance industry 
codes of practice would be decided and enacted 
(e.g. national chains in collaboration with 
Government, or local retailers, in collaboration 
with local Council).  
25. Have decided, for the time being, not to introduce alcohol 
only checkouts, however we may revisit this issue if retailers 
do not comply with the spirit of our other actions on off sales. 
Given this decision, the question as to whether those 
operating such checkouts should be at least 18 years old 
does not apply. 
N/A  
26. Continue to work with health and industry partners, where 
appropriate, on the promotion messages to help people 
change their behaviour, and on joint initiatives such as 
Alcohol Awareness Week. 
National and 
local 
Suggests that although led by national 
government level, that the actual dissemination of 
information may be at local level.  
27. Continue to work with partners to develop and promote 
workplace alcohol policies, noting that the workplace can be a 
key point of connection. We will seek to apply more proactive 
Unclear Although led by Government, unclear where 
responsibility lies for pursuing this action. 
management-led workplace programmes management-led 
workplace programmes on tackling alcohol misuse, starting 
from Government, with a view to rolling out action across the 
public sector and encouraging similar action in the private 
sector. 
28. Alcohol product labelling could be significantly improved and 
we are discussing with the UK Government how this could be 
taken forward. 
UK  
29. We urge the UK Government to develop a UK approach to 
advertising which unequivocally protects children from 
exposure to alcohol advertising, whether on television, on 
line, or in the cinema. 
UK  
30. We would welcome the development of a co-regulatory 
approach to online alcohol advertising - working with industry, 
the UK Government and advertising regulatory bodies, which 
could address this issue effectively. Could also extend to 
billboard advertising. 
UK  
31. Monitor the implementation of the Scottish Government and 
Alcohol Industry Partnership Sponsorship Guidelines and 
consider whether further action is required 
Unclear Unclear who is responsible for monitoring 
implementation (whether it will occur at national 
level, or occur locally and be reported to national 
level). Additionally, the implementation itself may 
be more local. 
Improved Support and Treatment 
32. Record investment towards tackling alcohol misuse in our 
2008/09 budget, totalling £120 million over the next three 
years. This represents an increase of over £85 million to 
previous allocations. 
This is in recognition of the need for greater effort on 
prevention, in particular the delivery of screening and brief 
interventions. Our aim is to make such screening and early 
intervention part of the routine services offered by NHS 
Scotland 
Local This point is framed more as a statement than an 
action. However, the ‘action’ is interpreted as 
enhancing the delivery of screening and brief 
interventions, which occurs at local level.  
33. Establish a working group to update core services or alcohol 
treatment and support. This will re-visit the principles 




identify and update effective interventions; and set out 
guidance on development of integrated care pathways which 
take into consideration multiple and complex needs. 
34. Support the evaluation of brief interventions pilots in other 
settings or which can contribute in other ways to the evidence 
base. Initially pilots already being taken forward are in NHS 
24 and the area of criminal justice. 
Local  
35. We have set up a national Delivery Support Team to provide 
leadership to NHS Boards on the delivery of the target and to 
co-ordinate key support functions. This Team will work to 
support NHS Boards providing help, advice and guidance as 
necessary. 
 
x We have begun a programme of visits to NHS Boards to hear 
feedback first hand on progress, identify good practice and 
offer further individualised support where appropriate. We will 
hold a conference for NHS Boards in 2009 to demonstrate 
distance travelled and share good practice. 
National and 
local 
While framed in terms of national government 
actions, this speaks to service delivery by local 
(regional) NHS Boards.  
36. To support NHS Boards in achieving the new target for brief 
interventions we have commissioned NHS Health Scotland to 
develop and coordinate a 3-year national training programme 
to ensure that frontline staff across the country are competent 
and confident in the delivery of brief interventions. Thereafter 
we will ensure that training on brief interventions is 





37. Scottish Government is currently considering the Delivery 
Reform Group’s (a subgroup of the Scottish Ministerial 
Advisory Committee on Alcohol Problems) proposals on 
reform of Alcohol and Drug Partnerships with a view to 




38. We have commissioned NHS Health Scotland to drive 
forward a piece of work to create a national training and 
development strategy to support a competent, confident, 
valued and flexible workforce. 
National  
39. Forthcoming Action Plan for population mental health 
improvement, Towards a Mentally Flourishing Scotland, to be 
published in Spring 2009, will recognise the relationship 
between alcohol and mental health. Where appropriate this 
relationship will be a key feature of related actions and 
commitments. 
Unclear Development of the Action Plan itself is at national 
level, however enactment of components of the 
Action Plan will be dependent on each 
component. 
40. Explore the opportunities for developing psychological 
therapies as a generic form of behavioural change 
intervention which can lead to positive outcomes not only for 
those with mental health issues but also for those with co-
morbidities arising from alcohol and drugs misuse. 
Unclear Unclear who is intended to ‘explore’ these 
opportunities.  
41. In 2009, we will conduct a review of current plans and 
practice for the identification and treatment of offenders with 
alcohol problems in criminal justice settings and identify good 
practice.  
 
x We will also convene a stakeholder event to disseminate the 
findings of this review and agree action on how best to 
ensure development and implementation of integrated care 
pathways for offenders with alcohol problems. 
National and 
local 
Actions are framed in terms of what Government 
will do to support aspects of developing an 
integrated care pathway for offenders. However, 
description in policy notes that Community Justice 
Authorities have key part to play, in partnership 
with the Scottish Prison Service and those who 
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The below table lists the names, organizations and roles of people with whom informal 
scoping interviews were held during the research design phase of my PhD research project.  
 
Name Organization Role 
Amanda Adams Scottish Government Alcohol Policy Team 
Clare Beeston MESAS Head of MESAS 
Biba Brand Scottish Government Alcohol Policy Team 
Pippa Coutts Alliance for Useful 
Evidence 
Scottish Lead 
Gemma Crompton Alcohol Focus Scotland Policy and Development Coordinator 
Jennifer Curran Alcohol Focus Scotland Acting Chief Executive of AFS 
Phil Eaglesham NHS Health Scotland Health Improvement Programme 
Manager, Alcohol and Drugs 
Louise Feenie Scottish Government Alcohol Policy Team Leader 
Vittal Katikireddi NHS Lothian & 
University of Glasgow 
Researcher 
Kirsty MacDonald Scottish Government Alcohol Policy Team 
Iain McAllister Scottish Government Principal Research Officer (Public 
Health), Health Analytical Services 
Division 
Gerry McCartney MESAS Data analyst 
Hilary Scott Scottish Government Alcohol Policy Team 
Jim Sherval NHS Lothian Consultant in Public Health; Chair, 
Edinburgh ADP Joint Commissioning 
Group 
Nicholas Smith Edinburgh Council ADP Manager 
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Executive Summary
Effective implementation is critical to the success of health policies and legislation. Even
when a policy or piece of legislation is of a high-quality, incomplete implementation may
lead to policy failure, resulting in unintended population health consequences and
ineffective uses of public resources.
Planning for effective implementation is therefore an important consideration during the
development, review, and scrutiny of policy and legislation. Based on the evidence in this
briefing, a number of questions could be raised during scrutiny. These questions are
broadly aligned with the themes discussed in this review.
PLANNING FOR EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION: KEY QUESTIONS TO ASK
DURING POLICY SCRUTINY
• What ongoing administrative and leadership support will be committed for the
implementation of this policy?
• Is it clear from the policy (and/or associated guidance) which individuals or
organisations are accountable for its activities, interventions, and intended policy
outcomes? (i.e. who are the policy implementers?)
◦ Do the individuals, organisations, or partnerships identified have the
authority, legitimacy, and resources to carry out this work?
• Are there clear and transparent funding mechanisms in place? Is the funding
provided sufficient/sustainable for the period of time required?
• What other resources beyond funding will be provided to support
implementation? (e.g. training, recruitment and retention of qualified personnel)
• To what extent have all or some stakeholders been meaningfully involved in
formulating the policy and policy implementation plan?
◦ Is there buy-in from these stakeholders?
◦ Is there a plan to continuously engage with stakeholders during all aspects of
policy implementation, review, and reform?
• Is there a plan in place to evaluate the process and outcomes of this policy? If
so, are there sufficient resources allocated to this? (Including systems to collect,
collate, and use good quality monitoring data)
◦ Is there a plan (and resources) for resulting data to be used to inform
improvements?
• Have (a) potential threats to sustainable implementation, and (b) potential
unintended consequences of the policy been identified, and have plans been
developed to mitigate these before they occur?
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I. Introduction
The implementation of a policy is an integral part of the policy process. 1 2 Once a policy
has been developed, or a policy decision has been made, it must be enacted if it is to have
any impact on the intended population. Even good, evidence-informed policies cannot
have their intended effect if not implemented properly.
It is well known that there are a number of challenges when implementing national health
policies. Evidence demonstrates that these challenges often lead policies to be enacted in
such a way that they are are only implemented partially or diverge from the original aims of
the policy. This can result in an ‘implementation gap’ between the policy goals and
outcomes or even lead to policy failure.
In an effort to understand how policy implementation occurs and how it can be improved, a
great deal of research has studied this topic. This evidence provides suggestions for policy
decision-makers at national and local levels to close the implementation gap. This briefing
will discuss key concepts for effective health policy implementation, with alcohol policy in
Scotland presented as a key case study. Although health and alcohol policy are the focus,
lessons from this review will be applicable to a wider range of health and public policy
areas.
Why is health policy implementation important?
• If policy implementation is ignored during policy formulation and scrutiny, stated
goals and intentions of a policy, including positive population health changes, will
not be achieved
• Incomplete policy implementation, or policy failure, may result in unintended
population health consequences and ineffective use of public resources
About this evidence review
This review has been developed in a specific effort to be useful and applicable to the work
of MSPs and other stakeholders who are engaged in the task of analysing and scrutinising
government policy during policy development, review, and reformulation.
This briefing is a review of evidence regarding health policy implementation. It draws on
peer-reviewed journal articles and grey literature on a variety of health policy topics,
including health and social care, health inequalities, disability rights, indigenous health,
mental health, physical activity, obesity, and tobacco control. There is a specific focus on
alcohol policy in Scotland.
What is policy implementation?
“ Policy implementation is what develops between the establishment of an
apparent intention on the part of government to do something, or to stop
something, and the ultimate impact in the world of action. 3 ”
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The above is a useful definition of policy implementation. However, as a complex concept,
policy implementation has been defined differently by different researchers. When defining
policy implementation, researchers often focus on particular aspects of the concept, for
example: 4 5
• whether implementation occurred and if it is considered to be complete;
• what was the process of implementation, and how could it be improved; and/or
• whether the policy outcomes match expectations.
Some basic questions to ask when reviewing and scrutinising the implementation of
a particular health policy may include:
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II. Evidence on Health Policy
Implementation
The sections below discuss key topics from existing health policy research that can act as
barriers or facilitators to policy implementation.
1. Planning for Policy Implementation
Existing research confirms that planning for policy implementation is best conducted
during the stage of policy formulation and scrutiny – to a certain extent, the success
of implementation is a function of how the original policy or legislation is developed. 6 7
For example, an Audit Scotland report on the integration of Health and Social Care found
that although integration was expected to be operational by 1 April 2016, implementation
challenges in the planning stages put this deadline at risk. Challenges such as
disagreements over budgets and uncertainty over funding delayed the development of
local strategic plans. 8
Poor planning may lead to issues such as insufficient numbers of trained staff or resources
to handle the burden of managing a new policy. 9 A lack of planning may also increase the
risks of unintended consequences. 10 For example, a study of disability rights legislation in
Sweden found that the legislation was interpreted narrowly at local level during
implementation, leading to the exclusion of people with mental health problems, and
government clarification about this issue was never provided. 11
In terms of planning for implementation, many health policy topic areas are complex and
require a multi-sectoral approach. In Scotland, the response to this has been a
commitment to partnership working. 12 During planning for how policy implementation will
occur in partnership settings, it is advisable to consider utilising pre-existing organisational
expertise. Research indicates that organisations which already conduct work on a given
health topic (e.g. ‘health equity’) may be better positioned to more easily implement new
initiatives on that same topic. 13
In addition, the context of a local area will specifically shape how a given policy is
implemented in that area – this interaction will influence policy outcomes. 14 It is self-
evident that one-size will not fit all. Existing evidence suggests that certain contexts can be
more receptive to certain policies and approaches to implementation than others. 15
Opportunities for further planning also exist during impact assessments, when the impact
of policy or legislation on issues such as finances or equality are assessed.
KEY POINT: Insufficient planning for health policy implementation may lead to
otherwise avoidable challenges to a policy being operationalised.
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Brief example: Planning
In a study which reviewed a number of health policy initiatives in the city of Chicago in
the United States, researchers found approximately 70% of initiatives had limited or
no progress towards implementation. These researchers found that certain aspects of
policy design acted as barriers to implementation, including: the provision of limited
information on the policy problem; providing broad recommendations for
implementation without specific direction; and variations in public consultation or
involvement. 16
2. Resources
A clear message from existing evidence is that policy implementation requires a variety of
resources to support the process. 17 18 19 20 These include, but are not limited to financial
resources, human resources, leadership, and infrastructure. A lack of necessary resources
may result in incomplete policy implementation or policy failure. 17
2.1 Financial Resources
The issue of financial resources is directly linked to the other themes in this briefing. For
example, human resources, conducting consultations, maintaining infrastructure, and
sustaining performance measurement and evaluation require financial support.
Evidence shows that a lack of, or uncertainty about, financial resources is a critical barrier
to policy implementation and, vice versa, successful policy implementation relies on
appropriate monetary support. 21 8 22 23 For example, policy implementation can be put at
risk if no extra resources are made available when a new, additional policy is required to
be implemented. 24 Further challenges arise when policy implementers are unable to
reallocate existing funding or to source new funding. 16 For example, researchers
investigating the implementation of a care programme for people with a dual diagnosis in
England found that implementing organisations were significantly constrained in
undertaking this work because of financial pressures and budget cuts. 25
In light of this, there is consensus within existing literature that sufficient, dedicated,
sustainable funding greatly facilitates policy implementation. 26 27 28 29
KEY POINT: Health policy implementation must be adequately and sustainably
financed.
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2.2 Human Resources and Training
The availability of skilled, knowledgeable staff is important for policy implementation. 30 10
13 Ensuring sufficient numbers of staff and the right skills require additional recruitment
and training for policy implementation and managing staff turnover.
A key human resource challenge is staff turnover and position instability, which can result
in the loss of institutional memory and valuable experience. 13 25 Ways to retain staff may
therefore need to be prioritised, for example by supporting policy implementers (including
managers and service providers) by providing resources to advise and assist them with
specific policy, legal, and regulatory processes. 31
The lack of time that existing staff have to allocate to implementing a new or refreshed
policy is frequently cited as a problem. 22 Given that staff are often trying to cope with
competing priorities at local level 17 , it is likely that direction and support must be given
about how they should prioritise any new initiative.
There is a consensus about the need for training to equip policy implementers, particularly
at early stages of policy implementation and then in an ongoing capacity. 32 19 7 23 28 13 31
Investments in training may be required for newly created roles, for example a new
category of public health professional 13 or new interventions, such as the use of new
naloxone kits to be used in the event of drug overdose. 19
A lack of adequate training and staff capacity building is a barrier to policy implementation.
22 23 33 For example, researchers examining the implementation of a care programme in
the UK found that certain social service staff were unable to access training, and that this
was a challenge to the implementation process. 25 In another example, local implementers
of a health service in Australia felt that Indigenous health workers were not provided with
adequate training (or authority) to influence decision-making in the policy implementation
process. 33 Taken together, this suggests that different types of training may be required in
policy implementation, including a) technical content to deliver policy activities, and b)
training in engaging with the policy process for broader stakeholders.
KEY POINT: The availability of skilled, knowledgeable staff who are offered
ongoing training is important for health policy implementation.
Staff turnover (with associated loss of institutional memory) and position
instability can be key challenges to this.
Brief Example: Training
In an analysis of the implementation of the Licensing (Scotland) Act 2005, 34
researchers noted the consensus among interviewees that training had increased the
knowledge and standards of practice among multiple stakeholders in the Scottish
alcohol licensing system. These authors also note, however, that where training is
required to facilitate policy implementation, it is helpful for it to be both mandatory and
monitored to ensure it is complied with.
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2.3 Leadership, Commitment, and Ideology
In addition to having sufficient human resources, it is important to consider aspects of
leadership, levels of commitment, and ideologies that may influence how stakeholders
undertake policy implementation.
Effective policy implementation requires ongoing support from national and regional
governments and organisations, as well as relevant individuals. 28 13 Since a lack of
leadership can be a barrier to implementation, existing evidence suggests identifying and
supporting local and regional leaders (or “champions”) to drive implementation processes.
22 35 25 31 These leaders can provide guidance on what policy activities are valued and
can influence the general culture towards a policy topic (e.g. beliefs surrounding domestic
violence). 7
Buy-in from local or 'front-line' policy implementers, target populations (and their
representatives), and commitments from third sector organisations are also important. 7 20
For example, if local staff believe a given policy initiative is too broad, their implementation
efforts to enact it may be lessened. 13 In a study of community nursing policy in Scotland,
researchers found nurses did not feel ownership over the policy or the changes that were
being implemented – this manifested as resistance to the policy. 20
Getting sufficient levels of commitment and buy-in for policy implementation may require
incentives to get staff to engage in the process. 25 It can also be enhanced by engaging
with staff and stakeholders from the beginning of policy development, as discussed below.
It will also be important to consider the ideologies of those who will need to implement the
policy. Maycraft Kall (2014) 11 discusses the role of government and key organisations in
shaping the ideology surrounding policy and legislation – that it is not just the ‘letter of the
law’ that matters, but also the ‘spirit’ of it, something that is signalled by the national
government.
For example, ideologies of practitioners who ultimately deliver a policy will influence how
that policy is represented to the public who access the policy's associated services. An
example of this is highlighted by O’Sullivan (2015), 36 who discusses the work of
practitioners who deliver health services to Indigenous Australians. The authors observe
that practitioners exercise discretion in service delivery, and make choices about the care
that is made available to particular client groups. These choices are influenced by personal
political values, such as perceptions of their client groups, and can have a significant
impact on how that service is experienced by service users.
KEY POINT: Health policy implementation requires commitment from people in
leadership positions, buy-in from all relevant stakeholders, and consideration of
the values and ideologies of those who will implement the policy.
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Brief Example: Leadership
Researchers examined Primary Stroke Care policy implementation in four US States
(Florida, Massachusetts, New Mexico, and New York). 31 Over 100 interviews were
conducted with policy stakeholders, and in all States interviewees talked about the
importance of ‘champions’ for successful policy implementation.
The researchers state: “These champions often have varying backgrounds with
experience in areas, including politics, public administration, and clinical expertise; the
champions all possess knowledge of policy processes and knowledge regarding ways
to influence widespread support for improved stroke care.” (p. 564)
In this case study, it was argued that policy implementation was facilitated by the
ability of these champions to motivate and focus stakeholders on key issues,
coordinate several public health agencies, and take into account health care
regulation issues.
2.4 Infrastructure
Infrastructure for policy implementation can include specific equipment such as IT systems
or organisational structures such as partnerships.
In terms of the role of IT infrastructure, the ability to collect and share data is an important
facilitator to policy implementation and ongoing learning. Vice versa, a lack of fit-for-
purpose IT systems can hamper implementation efforts. 25 It is therefore important to
establish systems that support the collection, synthesis, and utilisation of data. For
example, in a study on primary stroke care, researchers found that policies may be more
readily implemented if data can be accessed and shared among all appropriate
organisations and service providers, and that the ability to share patient data when
required enhanced staff collaboration across the continuum of care. 31 The importance of
the use of data, monitoring, and evaluation in policy implementation is discussed in more
detail below in the section on evaluation.
Appropriate IT systems can also support communication and coordination across the wide
range of organisations and stakeholders involved in a given policy’s implementation. 31
This may include communicating within and across systems of multi-sectoral partnerships
which are a key delivery structure for delivering health policy. 37
If partnership working is an important aspect of a policy's delivery infrastructure,
developing positive personal relationships within and across partnerships can enhance
policy implementation. However, in addition to personal relationships, formal partnership
agreements are also useful tools to support effective partnership working. 30 In relation to
variables mentioned above, strong leadership, sufficient resources, and highly committed
and competent staff also facilitate health policy implementation through partnerships. 30 37
As a final note in this section, a potential benefit of partnerships developed between
health/non-health organisations and other policy stakeholders is that they have the
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potential to assist local policy implementers to be responsive to local contexts and needs.
13
KEY POINT: It is critical that the implementation process of a health policy has
the infrastructure to support:
(a) the collection, synthesis, and utilisation of data; and
(b) communication and coordination within and between organisations.
3. Stakeholder Engagement
Evidence suggests that relevant populations should be included in policymaking processes
at legislative and regional levels to help reduce policy implementation gaps. 31 38 13
However, it appears that brief, one-off consultation of target populations does not
guarantee more effective policy implementation. It is suggested that interactions with the
target population and other key stakeholders should cover the entire policy process, from
the time a policy problem is identified to policy implementation. 39 Stakeholder
engagement can help develop a shared understanding of policy goals and the kinds of
solutions that can progress towards achieving them. 40
In terms of best practice, the literature suggests that policymakers engage in meaningful
involvement and discussions with other policy stakeholders. 39 During this, specific policy
measures should be elaborated in detail so that the target population has an opportunity to
consider them, and co-produced agreements about specific recommendations can be
developed. 39
As examples from existing evidence, a study of Indigenous health policy in Australia
highlighted the need for the target population to be involved at the policy formulation stage
at all levels of government. 29 The authors advocated for increased participation of health
organisations controlled by Indigenous communities in the policymaking process. 29
Similarly, another study examined a large federal nutrition programme in the United States,
highlighting the importance of public health practitioners and policymakers engaging with
the target client group, in order to learn from one another during the policy process. 41
As a final example, researchers studying the implementation of a new policy to provide
take-home naloxone kits in the United States found there was limited implementation of
the initiative. They found that a key barrier to implementing the new policy was the lack of
input from frontline health-care staff to the policy development process - it was perceived
that the people who developed the policy did not understand the unique challenges faced
by those who would be implementing it. 19
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KEY POINT: Meaningful involvement of relevant stakeholders and target
populations in the entire policy process can help reduce policy implementation
challenges.
4. Implementation Guidance and Ongoing
Communication
Identification of, and communication with, responsible parties are important tasks in policy
implementation. A lack of clear guidance about implementation expectations and
responsibilities for policy actions can present a significant challenge from the start of
implementation. 7 34 13
In acknowledgement of the complexity of the policy implementation process, there is a
need to balance the decisiveness of implementation guidance with flexibility given to local
implementers. For example, certain specific public health interventions must be delivered
by trained professionals. However, allowing local policy implementers the flexibility to
decide how to make this happen and to render services appropriate for local needs, may
be a facilitator to implementation. 31
Poor communication can hamper policy implementation. There is a risk of poor
communication when, for example, policy implementation requires transmission and
interpretation of nuanced ideas across different levels of governance or during integrated
working among numerous organisations. 42 For example, a study on community nursing
services in Scotland found that a barrier to shifting care out of hospitals into the community
was poor communication between the hospital and community settings. 20 Supporting
local implementers to communicate and share practices is also noted as a facilitator of
implementation. 43 As discussed previously, infrastructure such as IT services may
facilitate communication.
KEY POINT: Health policy implementation can be facilitated by the development
of clear guidance about expectations and the distribution of responsibilities for
policy actions.
This guidance will be enhanced by also building in certain flexibilities for local
policy implementers to adapt to local needs.
Brief Example: Guidance and Communication
Forbes et al. (2010) conducted a comparative study of health and social care policy
implementation in England and Scotland. The researchers observed that in England,
guidance published late led to challenges in governance and accountability, while in
Scotland, existing guidance was criticised for its lack of a clearly articulated role for
Councils within Health and Social Care Partnerships. 26
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5. Organisational Culture
Organisational culture is important for policy implementation because implementing
agencies have significant amounts of autonomy, and are not entirely under administrative
control. 1 In addition, organisations are increasingly expected to work effectively in
partnerships with other organisations that may have different values, priorities, and
perspectives from their own. 1 These factors influence how organisations will interpret and
undertake policy implementation. For example, organisational resistance to change,
lengthy decision-making processes, risk avoidance, and lack of coordination among
service providers can be barriers to implementation. 16
When an organisation has been identified as the one responsible for implementing a
health policy, it may be beneficial to develop or adjust organisational structures (e.g.
working groups or steering committees), so that the health policy will be prioritised and
given legitimacy within that organisation. 13
To support policy implementation, international literature suggests that breaking down
organisational silos can facilitate cross-organisational networking, and that planning for
this should occur during policy development. 13 This may be a key lesson for the Scottish
context in which partnership working is prevalent. In this context, it is also worthwhile to
consider how best to facilitate the building of strong organisational relationships and trust
between partners. 26
KEY POINT: Planning for health policy implementation can be improved by
considering the organisational culture(s) of the organisation(s) who will be
involved in the implementation process.
Brief Example: Organisational Culture
A study examined a Canadian public health initiative which created new nursing roles.
These new roles were focused on ‘health equity’ and were located in regional Public
Health Units across a Canadian province.
Within each Unit, senior leadership made decisions about the early development of
this new nursing role, including the scope of these nurses’ new remit and where the
role would be placed in the organisational structure of the Unit. As a result, a key
issue arose: a lack of consistency in how the new nursing role was positioned across
Public Health Units. This in turn affected key elements of the overall initiative’s
implementation, including the decision-making power of these new nurses, their level
of independence, and how accepted they were by public health colleagues.
However, the same study found that a benefit of this flexible and adaptive approach
was that the Units could learn and adapt to changing needs. 13
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6. Accountability
Accountability for enacting policy was found to be an important aspect of policy
implementation quality and effectiveness. 22 7
A key barrier to policy implementation is a lack of clear understanding among both policy-
makers and policy implementers about the distribution of responsibilities. This issue is
made more complex when policies are intended to be implemented through local
partnership arrangements. In an Audit Scotland report on health and social care
integration, a key recommendation of the authors was to:
A remedy for this issue, as suggested in this quote and the above section on guidance, is
the development of clear, complete regulations that are disseminated and explained in
advance of policy implementation. If clear guidance exists, accountability measures and
enforcement mechanisms that are well-defined and formally agreed can help ensure
further clarity on roles and responsibilities 13 , and therefore may enhance progress
towards implementation goals. In addition, similarly to the section on guidance, building a
certain amount of flexibility into these agreements may help policy implementers take
account of learning and, as a result, adapt implementation to changing local needs. 13
Accountability agreements are likely to be more effective if, within them, explicit links are
drawn between government goals/mandates and actions planned for local implementation.
13 Meanwhile, a lack of incentives encouraging compliance or a lack of sanctions for non-
compliance, and voluntary uptake of a policy, may be barriers to implementation. 44 11
Enforcement of accountability may overlap with the monitoring and evaluation of policy
implementation, discussed below (e.g. Allison et al. 2016 17 ).
Another barrier to policy implementation can emerge when a new policy conflicts with
other existing regulations and responsibilities. 31 For example, a study of health and social
care policies in England and Scotland found that implementation was hampered by
implementers’ difficulties in combining local and national performance measurement
targets. 26
Finally, those tasked with policy implementation and held accountable for it must be
provided with adequate political support and authority to undertake this work. 10
KEY POINT: Accountability mechanisms surrounding a policy's implementation
can be improved by:
(a) co-producing (with relevant policy stakeholders) clear agreements about
responsibilities for implementation activities; and
(b) aligning responsibilities for the new policy with existing responsibilities.
“ set out clearly how governance arrangements will work in practice, particularly when
disagreements arise. This is because there are potentially confusing lines of
accountability and potential conflicts of interests for board members and staff. 8 ”
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7. Monitoring and Evaluation
It is important to measure and analyse the progress of policy implementation in order to
know to what extent it has occurred, what successes or challenges have been
experienced, and to learn from these experiences. The implementation factors discussed
above can be considered and incorporated into policy planning and formulation, however it
will be impossible to anticipate or completely control all aspects of implementation. 45
Therefore, a process of learning, and the capacity to continuously monitor and evaluate
policy implementation, is necessary. Monitoring and evaluation is linked with the factors
discussed above. For example, resources, staff capacity, and IT infrastructure must exist in
order to reliably collect, synthesise, learn from, and use monitoring data and knowledge. In
addition, it is recommended that planning for evaluation of implementation should be built
into a policy during its development, and any core data set(s) for monitoring are agreed
upon prior to policy implementation.
In Scotland, the commissioning of the Monitoring and Evaluating Scotland’s Alcohol
Strategy (MESAS) programme (discussed further below) is an example of a large portfolio
of work dedicated to this task.
There is a consensus in the literature about the need for monitoring and evaluation. As an
example, in a US-based study on school wellness policies, researchers found that a
barrier to implementation was inadequate capacity and tools to conduct monitoring of the
policy. 22 Further, a study of children’s continuing-care in England demonstrated the
usefulness of local practitioners being able to learn from the monitoring of their
programme, and then deploy their capacity to adapt it. 46 Similarly, a key conclusion from a
Canadian study regarding palliative care was that policy implementation needed to be
monitored and continuously fine-tuned. 27
KEY POINT: Monitoring and evaluating a health policy's implementation is a
critical, ongoing process which is necessary to measure progress and provide
important learning for improvement.
Key Points on Health Policy Implementation
• Planning for policy implementation should occur during policy
development and scrutiny, and can support progress towards policy goals.
• Planning should include consideration of: resources, training, stakeholder
engagement, organisational culture, and accountability.
• Policy implementation cannot be entirely controlled, so it is important to
engage in continuous monitoring and evaluation throughout the policy
implementation lifespan.
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III. Case Study: Alcohol Policy
Implementation
The process of health policy implementation is often studied using a case study of a
specific health policy or programme. Alcohol policy was selected as the focus of this
briefing, given the impact of alcohol-related harm in Scotland and its importance in
Scottish health policy. This section first provides a review of international research
surrounding alcohol policy implementation. A discussion of alcohol policy implementation
in Scotland is then presented. Many of the themes from Section II of this review can be
seen to emerge in this section.
What is known about alcohol policy implementation
from international research?
"Successful implementation of national action requires sustained political commitment,
effective coordination, sustainable funding and appropriate engagement of
subnational governments as well as of civil society and economic operators. Many
relevant decision-making authorities should be involved in the formulation and
implementation of alcohol policies, such as the Ministry of Health and other relevant
ministries, transportation authorities or taxation agencies." (WHO, Global status report
on alcohol and health 2014, p. 24) 47
As the examples below demonstrate, the international literature discusses a range of
alcohol policies and programmes in terms of their implementation.
In a study of Irish alcohol policy, Butler (2009) 48 highlights a number of challenges to
policy implementation. The author argues that the political culture of Ireland prevented
imposing strict alcohol control policies in the country. Further, it is argued that when the
Irish government did create an alcohol policy based on a public health perspective, the
policy’s action plan lacked the joined-up infrastructure necessary to implement this
type of policy. It was also observed that there may have been a lack of political will to
strongly advocate for the enactment of this policy.
In a systematic review, Johnson and colleagues (2011) 49 synthesised international
qualitative evidence on implementing alcohol brief interventions (ABI). Most articles
included in this study examined ABI implementation in primary care settings. The findings
from this study reflect the key themes discussed in the earlier section of this review:
implementation challenges included a lack of resources, support from management, and
the high workload of ABI implementers, while facilitators to implementation included
access to staff training, staff involvement from policy planning stages.
D’Abbs (2004) 50 describes the implementation of an alcohol programme in the Northern
Territory of Australia. In the author's view, early implementation of the programme was
successful because of factors similar to those discussed earlier in this review: the
parliamentary authority given to the programme; the political commitments made to the
programme by Chief Minister; the establishment of a Trust Fund to provide sustainable
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funding; establishment of intersectoral administrative capacity; and alignment of
programme goals with particular interests of local alcohol industry. However, it was
observed that when environments and alignments changed a few years later, support for
the policy diminished and the programme dissipated.
In research from Sweden, Geidne and colleagues (2013) 51 examined an alcohol policy
project in football clubs. The authors found that a mix of community level factors,
football club characteristics, organisational capacity, and training and technical assistance
factors influenced whether clubs implemented this initiative. For example, clubs’ concern
with social responsibility and engagement enhanced their participation, and meetings
organised where clubs could share experiences were perceived as valuable.
In the United States, Jones-Webb and colleagues (2014) 52 undertook a case study of US
cities that adopted policies to restrict high-alcohol malt liquor sales. The authors observed
that at every stage of the alcohol policy process, the external social, political, and
economic context can influence policy actors and actions. In addition, it was observed that
the following activities are important for alcohol policy implementation: building
public awareness and educating stakeholders; monitoring and enforcing compliance;
evaluating process and outcomes; and institutionalising the policy.
Also in the United States, Nelson and colleagues (2015) 53 conducted a longitudinal
analysis of alcohol policy implementation in all 50 states (and the District of Columbia)
between 1999-2011. They sought to explore whether the feasibility and acceptability of
different alcohol policies to the public and policymakers would be a barrier to the
implementation of these policies. The authors found that, indeed, alcohol policies which
were more “politically palatable” (e.g. policies targeting youth or drink driving)
increased during this time period. In contrast, policies which were deemed to be the most
effective for reducing adult alcohol consumption based on existing evidence (e.g. alcohol
taxes, price restrictions, or outlet density restrictions), were less likely to be implemented
during this time period.
Alcohol Policy Implementation in Scotland
The issue of alcohol misuse in Scotland has been recognised across political parties. In
June 2015 a Parliamentary debate heard a motion to both recognise the progress made
thus far on tackling alcohol misuse and to push for further preventative action and
additional measures to reduce the harmful use of alcohol. 54 In this debate, Members of
the Scottish Parliament consistently noted the continued individual and societal costs of
alcohol-related harms in Scotland and the health inequalities that result. 54
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Key Facts About Alcohol-Related Harm in Scotland
• Relatively high consumption in Scotland has led to a correspondingly high rate of alcohol-related harms and costs
55
• Monitoring trends in alcohol consumption shows that population consumption has declined in recent years,
although that decline may now be flattening 56
• In 2015/16 almost 35,000 people were admitted as inpatients to hospital for an alcohol-related reason, which was
similar to the previous year 57
• In 2015, there were 1,150 alcohol-related deaths, similar to the previous year 57
• There continues to be an inequality gap for alcohol-related admissions between those living in the most and least
deprived parts of Scotland 57
http://www.healthscotland.scot/media/1458/alcohol-related-harm-in-scotland-2016_english.pdf
Relevant Scottish Policy and Legislation
In 2009 the Scottish Government published Changing Scotland’s Relationship with
Alcohol: A Framework for Action . 58 This policy provides the core of the overall Alcohol
Strategy, and has therefore been a key source of guidance for alcohol policy
implementation. A refresh of the Framework for Action is expected to be published by the
Scottish Government in late 2017.
During policy planning of the Framework for Action, the Scottish Government published a
discussion paper on their intended strategic approach, and their subsequent consultation
received 472 responses. 59 This discussion paper, and the resulting policy, contained
some guidance for how the policy would be implemented. For example, certain aspects of
Scotland’s Alcohol Strategy are intended to be implemented locally, including those related
to service provision, education, and health promotion. 58 Examples include alcohol brief
interventions and services for children and families. Other components of the strategy (e.g.
reduction in the drink driving limit) have been implemented at national level. 60
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In addition to the Framework for Action, three pieces of enacted legislation contribute to
the overarching Strategy: the Licensing (Scotland) Act (2005), the Alcohol etc. (Scotland)
Act (2010), and the Air Weapons and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2015 (Box 1). A fourth
component, the Alcohol Minimum Pricing Act (2012) is being challenged in the courts and
has not yet been implemented.
Implemented Components of Scotland's Alcohol Strategy
Licensing Act (Scotland) 2005
Contains five licensing objectives, including ‘protecting and improving public health’
(this public health objective distinguishes Scotland from the UK and other countries
globally 61 )
Changing Scotland’s Relationship with Alcohol: A Framework for Action (2009)
• Takes a ‘whole-population’ with targeting approach
• Four action areas:
1. Reduced consumption
2. Supporting families and communities
3. Positive attitudes and positive choices
4. Improved support and treatment
Alcohol etc. (Scotland) Act 2010
Makes provision for regulating sale of alcohol and licensing of premises.
Air Weapons and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2015
Amends legislation regarding alcohol licensing.
Stakeholders and Infrastructure
Human resources and commitment for alcohol policy implementation in Scotland comes
from a range of national and local individuals, organisations, and institutions.
National stakeholders in alcohol policy and legislation include the Scottish Government,
responsible for developing and delivering alcohol policy, and the Scottish Parliament,
responsible for scrutinising policy.
At local level, bodies such as Local Authorities, Community Planning Partnerships (CPPs),
and Health and Social Care Partnerships are relevant to the Strategy’s implementation,
and each have their own organisational cultures. Local Authorities are responsible for
providing services such as education, social care, and cultural services to their
constituency. 62 They are governed by a local Council which runs autonomously from
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central government. 62 Local Authorities are represented nationally by the Convention of
Scottish Local Authorities (COSLA) and the Scottish Local Government Partnership
(SLGP), which lobby the Scottish Government on their behalf.
The Local Government in Scotland Act 2003 established the statutory framework for
Community Planning. The Act established 32 Community Planning Partnerships (CPPs),
which service the same area as their respective Local Authorities, and are intended to
ensure that local services are delivered in partnership between service providers. In
addition to CPPs, the Public Bodies (Joint Working) (Scotland) Act 2014 established a
mandate for local authorities and Health Boards to integrate their health and social care
services (also see SPICe briefing on this topic ). This included a requirement to pursue
either an Integrated Joint Board (IJB) (Body Corporate) Model or a Lead Agency Model of
integration. Only Highland Partnership has used the lead agency model, which requires
the NHS board and local authority to establish a 'joint monitoring committee'. 63 IJBs have
been delegated a variety of local functions, including health and social care service
delivery – a function relevant to alcohol-related services.
Within this local governance structure, the delivery of local alcohol-related policy and
services is the responsibility of Scotland’s Alcohol and Drug Partnerships (ADPs). 64
Partners on ADPs include, but are not limited to, representatives from health and social
care, criminal justice, education, and the third sector.
Guidance for how ADPs are intended to support alcohol policy implementation is
contained in documents such as The Quality Principles (2014) and Updated Guidance for
Alcohol & Drug Partnerships (ADPs) on Planning & Reporting Arrangements (2015).
ADPs and their local partners are expected to commission evidence-based and recovery-
oriented treatment and support services for their population. They are accountable for
reporting back to their local area’s CPP and Integration Authority, as well as to the Scottish
Government on Ministerial priorities and targets. Core outcomes that ADPs are
accountable for include those related to improving health, enhancing community safety,
and supporting health-promoting local environments. A list of ADP core outcomes and
core indicators can be found here .
Financial resources for ADPs are provided by the Scottish Government, via their
respective local Health Boards. There was concern in the 2016/17 financial year about the
implementation of 22.25% budget cuts to Alcohol and Drug Partnerships , which was
expected to be covered by local Health Board budgets. 65 The budget for ADPs is
unchanged from 2016/17 levels for 2017/2018. 66 67
Licensing Boards are independent regulatory bodies located in each local authority area,
and are responsible for local decision-making about alcohol licensing. The relevant
legislation for alcohol licensing and the actions of Licensing Boards is the Licensing
(Scotland) Act 2005 .
There are a range of other stakeholders involved in alcohol policy in Scotland. These
include organisations such as the British Medical Association Scotland, Alcohol Focus
Scotland, and the Scottish Health Action on Alcohol Problems (SHAAP), as well as the
alcohol industry.
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Alcohol Policy Stakeholders in Scotland
Links to Other Policy
Alcohol-related harm is linked with a wide range of societal issues, and is therefore linked
to other Scottish policies and legislation. This includes, for example, health policies and
reports such as the Scottish Government's national drugs strategy, The Road to Recovery
(2008) and Equally Well (2008, 2010) , the report of the Ministerial Task Force on Health
Inequalities. As broader public policy examples, the National Performance Framework
indicates important linkages that can and should be made across Scotland’s public service
sector in order to achieve identified goals for Scotland 68 , including health and economic
considerations. Other examples include, but are not limited to, the Commission on the
Future Delivery of Public Services (2011) ("Christie Commission"), The Early Years
Framework (2009) , Justice in Scotland: Vision and Priorities (2017) and The Strategy for
Justice in Scotland (2012) .
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Evaluating Alcohol Policy in Scotland
Monitoring and Evaluating Scotland's Alcohol Strategy (MESAS)
In 2010 the Scottish Government tasked NHS Health Scotland with monitoring and
evaluating Scotland’s alcohol strategy in order to attain evidence on the strategy’s
outcomes. Along with the NHS National Services Scotland Information Services
Division (ISD), NHS Health Scotland established a taskforce called Monitoring and
Evaluating Scotland’s Alcohol Strategy (MESAS) to carry out this work. The MESAS
work portfolio was composed of eight separate studies, which considered how the
strategy might be implemented differently to improve effectiveness, how people and
businesses were affected, and to what extent the alcohol strategy contributed to a
reduction in alcohol-related harm. MESAS published multiple annual reports
describing the progress and results of these studies, and a final report in March 2016.
In this report, MESAS recommends that: "Effort is made to improve implementation of
existing components of the strategy, particularly those with the potential to reduce the
availability of alcohol and to incorporate the learning on implementation facilitators
when developing new interventions."(p.7) 56 Certain monitoring work by MESAS is
ongoing and their 2017 report can be found here .
Alcohol Policy Implementation Research
Scottish Research
In a study that was part of the MESAS portfolio of work, MacGregor et al. (2013) 34
analysed the implementation of the Licensing (Scotland) Act 2005. Their study reported
that overall, the Licensing Act can be seen to have had a positive impact. As a specific
example, the creation of Licensing Standards Officers (LSOs) has been perceived as
successful in terms of how they have contributed to improved relations between Licensing
Boards and licensed premises.
The study does, however, note challenges and facilitators for effectively implementing
licensing legislation in Scotland.
Challenges include:
• A lack of updated national guidance for implementing legislation;
• Reported problems in interpreting the legislation; and
• National and local data were not being collected/collated consistently or in a manner
which allowed meaningful comparison.
Regarding the public health objective of the Licensing Act specifically, implementation has
been hampered by: the lack of an adequate definition; lack of understanding about what
data sources should be used or how the objective would be monitored; the ‘population-
based approach’ of the objective was difficult to relate to individual alcohol outlets; and
concern that legal decisions would be overturned by Sheriffs and thus decisions were
made cautiously.
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Facilitators of implementing licensing legislation included:
• Where training was required, it was helpful for it to be both mandatory and monitored;
and
• Establishment of LSOs led to the perception that trade were now more likely to
comply with the Act, with fewer reviews being sent to Licensing Board level.
The study also makes a number of recommendations for more effective implementation of
licensing (an annotated list is provided here, please find the complete list in MacGregor et
al. 2013, p xii-xiii) 34 :
• More guidance and support be given nationally in relation to:
◦ the public health objective
◦ capacity and over-provision
◦ the role and function of Licensing Forums
◦ Any new, relevant legislation that his implemented
• Consideration given to role of Licensing Standards Officers, with respect to their
number, training, legal support, and capacity to collect and collate data;
• Require Licensing Boards to give further consideration to the public health objective,
carry out assessments of capacity and overprovision, share best practices with other
Boards, and improve data collection;
• Ensure licensed trade continues to undergo mandatory and ongoing training,
maintains good links with LSOs, and consider measures to address public harms that
result from alcohol misuse.
• Consistent collection and collating by Boards and LSOs of agreed data.
In another study from the MESAS portfolio, Parkes, Atherton, Evans et al. (2011) 69
specifically evaluated the process of implementing ABIs, with a focus on their
mainstreaming into primary care. The authors found that the original HEAT target (now
called a Local Delivery Plan [LDP] Standard ), which sought to embed ABIs into regular
NHS practice, was achieved in March 2011, and the authors’ assessment is that the
implementation of this component of Scotland’s alcohol strategy was carried out in line
with government guidance.
However, one of the authors' most significant findings was that the practical
implementation of ABIs was hugely varied across Scotland. 69 They particularly highlight
the different payment structures for ABIs in primary care, and the ways that Health Boards
contextualised the ABI programme to fit their local needs. In addition, geographical gaps in
implementation remained at the time of the report’s publication, particularly in rural and
remote areas. This study observed that there was buy-in among healthcare staff about the
value of ABIs and the use of resources to deliver them. The authors also found that it was
very important for universal systems and standards for recording to be developed for the
purposes of data collection and monitoring.
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It was noted that a one-year extension of specific funding and infrastructure support to
continue the ABI programme was a welcome source of support, however the authors
suggested that these supports will likely need to be maintained longer if ABIs are to be
fully implemented into regular practice. 69
In research in the broader academic literature, Fitzgerald and colleagues (2017) 61
examined how the public health objective has been enacted within the context of alcohol
licensing in Scotland. These researchers specifically explored how public health
practitioners (including representatives from the NHS, Alcohol and Drug Partnerships, and
national or third sector organisations) navigated this system since the objective was
introduced as part of the Licensing (Scotland) Act 2005 .
This study found that a challenge public health practitioners faced in attempting to support
the enactment of the public health objective was the perception that although they were
working from a ‘whole-population approach’, that this approach had not always been
adopted by other licensing stakeholders. For example, interviewees in this study perceived
widespread disagreement among licensing stakeholders about whether current alcohol
consumption and related harms pose significant problems to Scottish society. In addition,
interviewees suggested that there was a lack of consensus about whether “addressing
public health was a legitimate role of licensing” (p.7). On a related note, it was reported
that Licensing Boards tended to prioritise economic considerations over public health
ones. 61
Interviewees in this study also reported that health evidence they provided to licensing
stakeholders was often not persuasive to these audiences. For example, they reported
that statistical data was not perceived as trustworthy by certain Licensing Board members.
However, it was noted that there may be an important role for the public in providing
anecdotal and experiential evidence related to public health to communicate to actors
across the licensing system. 61
Finally, it was reported that building positive relationships between public health
practitioners and licensing stakeholders would help with progress towards enacting the
public health objective. 61
In another study by Fitzgerald and colleagues (2015) 70 , the authors examine the
implementation of ABIs. This study explored experiences of implementing ABIs in
antenatal, accident, and emergency health care settings, and found that five strategies
were helpful for implementing ABIs in any setting (quoted from Fitzgerald et al 2015):
1. Having a high-profile target for the number of ABIs delivered in a specific time period
with clarity about whose responsibility it was to implement the target;
2. Gaining support from senior staff from the start;
3. Adapting the intervention, using a pragmatic, collaborative approach, to fit with current
practice;
4. Establishing practical and robust recording, monitoring and reporting systems for
intervention delivery, prior to widespread implementation; and
5. Establishing close working relationships with frontline staff including flexible
approaches to training and readily available support.
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UK Research
Two research papers from elsewhere in the UK discussed the issue of alcohol policy
implementation, and their findings are relevant for consideration.
Martineau and colleagues (2013) 71 , writing about alcohol licensing from a public health
perspective, argue that the lack of a ‘public health objective’ in England and Wales
constrains local actors’ ability to address alcohol-related health harms. The researchers
note that, despite this, public health advocates can still seek to influence licensing
decisions, for example by providing evidence that links alcohol outlet density to drinking
behaviour (and how this relates to issues like crime and anti-social behaviour). This work
can be supported by national level actors through the development of resources such as
evidence reviews, evaluation tools, and case studies of best practice. 71 Although
Scotland does have a public health objective for licensing, evidence suggests it is not
currently being implemented sufficiently, 61 therefore these types of supports would likely
still be useful in the Scottish context.
In another UK-based study, Thom and colleagues (2011) 37 provide an overview of
partnership working in England with respect to alcohol policy implementation. This study
found a clear shift to using partnership approaches to delivering alcohol policy, which was
perceived as both positive and necessary by the study participants. The authors also
found that ‘buy-in’ and commitment from those in leadership positions, as well as alcohol
‘champions’, were key factors in the success of these partnerships to conduct alcohol
policy implementation. A number of challenges were noted however, including (annotated
from Thom et al. 2011, p.60-61):
• the need to manage cuts in resources, often in the face of increasing demands and
existing tensions around prioritising aims and targeting resources;
• Difficulties establishing shared priorities and goals among partners, which was
influenced by the level of trust between partners, and the quality of communication
and information sharing;
• The need for commitments from ‘top people’ to ensuring alcohol was part of local
planning agendas;
• The need to change professional behaviour to move away from ‘siloed’ working;
• Managing the size and complexity of the partnerships, and their relationships to the
rest of the local system; and
• The need to respond to local needs, especially in rural areas.
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Summary Points
• Effective implementation is critical to the success of health policies. If policies are not
implemented, then policy goals and outcomes cannot be achieved
• Planning for effective implementation is therefore an important consideration during
policy development and scrutiny
• A number of facilitators exist which can enhance the policy implementation process,
and if absent, policy implementation can face critical challenges. These include, but
are not limited to:
◦ Considerable commitment and leadership
◦ Meaningful involvement of local policy stakeholders, members of the target
population, and other stakeholders in policy planning and development
◦ Adequate, sustainable resources
◦ Consideration of factors such as competing strategic/governmental priorities (e.g.
public health versus economic growth) to mitigate unanticipated consequences
◦ Appropriate accountability mechanisms
◦ Ongoing monitoring and evaluation of policy implementation, and the application
of this learning
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APPENDIX 4 – PRISMA Checklist 
  
Appendix 4: PRISMA 2009 Checklist 
Use of the PRISMA checklist assists authors to ensure they transparently and completely report their systematic review (Liberati et al., 2009). 
This checklist (Moher et al., 2009) and its’ explanation document (Liberati et al., 2009) helped guide the development of the systematic review 
in Chapter 3. Note, however, that elements of the checklist needed to be interpreted in light of my systematic review’s focus on public health 
policy (as opposed to, for example, a clinical or behavioural intervention). This type of modification is states as acceptable to the PRISMA 
authors, who note, “some modifications of the checklist items or flow diagram will be necessary in particular circumstances.” (Moher et al., 
2009, pg 5). 
 
Section/topic  # Checklist item  Reported in Section #  
TITLE   
Title  1 Identify the report as a systematic review, meta-analysis, or 
both.  
Chapter title identifies this review as a 
systematic review. 
ABSTRACT   
Structured summary  2 Provide a structured summary including, as applicable: 
background; objectives; data sources; study eligibility 
criteria, participants, and interventions; study appraisal and 
synthesis methods; results; limitations; conclusions and 
implications of key findings; systematic review registration 
number.  
Systematic review is contained within a 
broader doctoral thesis, so summary is 
provided within thesis abstract.  
Systematic review registration number 
provided in Section 3.2. 
INTRODUCTION   
Rationale  3 Describe the rationale for the review in the context of what is 
already known.  
Provided in Chapter 1 of thesis and 
Section 3.1 of review chapter 
Objectives  4 Provide an explicit statement of questions being addressed 
with reference to participants, interventions, comparisons, 




Explicit questions presented in Section 
3.1, however PICOS relevant to review 
aim. 
 
METHODS   
Protocol and registration  5 Indicate if a review protocol exists, if and where it can be 
accessed (e.g., Web address), and, if available, provide 
registration information including registration number.  
Registered with PROSPERO in March 
2019, number CRD42019124477.  
Eligibility criteria  6 Specify study characteristics (e.g., PICOS, length of follow-
up) and report characteristics (e.g., years considered, 
language, publication status) used as criteria for eligibility, 
giving rationale.  
Inclusion and exclusion criteria 
provided in Section 3.2.2.  
Information sources  7 Describe all information sources (e.g., databases with dates 
of coverage, contact with study authors to identify additional 
studies) in the search and date last searched.  
Provided in Section 3.2.1 and 3.2.3. 
Search  8 Present full electronic search strategy for at least one 
database, including any limits used, such that it could be 
repeated.  
Provided in Section 3.2.1.  
Study selection  9 State the process for selecting studies (i.e., screening, 
eligibility, included in systematic review, and, if applicable, 
included in the meta-analysis).  
Provided in Section 3.2.3. 
Data collection process  10 Describe method of data extraction from reports (e.g., piloted 
forms, independently, in duplicate) and any processes for 
obtaining and confirming data from investigators.  
Provided in Section 3.2.4, and 
limitations to this approach (given 
review undertaken by a sole 
researcher) are provided in Section 
3.4.5. 
Data items  11 List and define all variables for which data were sought (e.g., 
PICOS, funding sources) and any assumptions and 
simplifications made.  
Provided in Section 3.2.4. 
Risk of bias in individual 
studies  
12 Describe methods used for assessing risk of bias of 
individual studies (including specification of whether this was 
done at the study or outcome level), and how this 
information is to be used in any data synthesis.  
Approach to appraising included 
studies for quality provided in Section 
3.2.4. 
Summary measures  13 State the principal summary measures (e.g., risk ratio, 
difference in means).  
This approach does not apply to this 
review, as results were reported for a 
series of categories in a narrative way 
(see Section 3.2 for Results, in 
particular Section 3.3.2) 
Synthesis of results  14 Describe the methods of handling data and combining 
results of studies, if done, including measures of consistency 
(e.g., I2) for each meta-analysis.  
Methods of handling the data are 
provided in Section 3.2.4. ‘Measures of 
consistency’ were not applicable. 
Risk of bias across 
studies  
15 Specify any assessment of risk of bias that may affect the 
cumulative evidence (e.g., publication bias, selective 
reporting within studies).  
While a quality assessment of each 
study was undertaken, the ‘risk of bias’ 
was not applicable to this review, 
because the majority of studies were 
qualitative and the researcher brought 
an interpretive lens to her analysis of 
them. This lens considers research to 
be inherently contextual. 
Additional analyses  16 Describe methods of additional analyses (e.g., sensitivity or 
subgroup analyses, meta-regression), if done, indicating 
which were pre-specified.  
Not applicable. 
RESULTS  
Study selection  17 Give numbers of studies screened, assessed for eligibility, 
and included in the review, with reasons for exclusions at 
each stage, ideally with a flow diagram.  
Provided in Section 3.3.1. 
Study characteristics  18 For each study, present characteristics for which data were 
extracted (e.g., study size, PICOS, follow-up period) and 
provide the citations.  
Provided in Section 3.3.1, particularly 
Tables 3.2 and 3.3. 
Risk of bias within studies  19 Present data on risk of bias of each study and, if available, 
any outcome level assessment (see item 12).  
Approach to appraising included 
studies for quality provided in Section 
3.2.4. This review was concerned with 
how implementation occurred, 
excluding studies which focus on 
measuring outcomes, therefore no 
outcome level assessments were 
conducted. 
Results of individual 
studies  
20 For all outcomes considered (benefits or harms), present, for 
each study: (a) simple summary data for each intervention 
group (b) effect estimates and confidence intervals, ideally 
Key findings of each included study 
provided in Table 3.3. 
with a forest plot.  
Synthesis of results  21 Present results of each meta-analysis done, including 
confidence intervals and measures of consistency.  
Results of data synthesis were reported 
under category headings in Section 
3.3.2, in a narrative manner.  
Risk of bias across 
studies  
22 Present results of any assessment of risk of bias across 
studies (see Item 15).  
See answer to Item 15.  
Additional analysis  23 Give results of additional analyses, if done (e.g., sensitivity 
or subgroup analyses, meta-regression [see Item 16]).  
Not applicable. 
DISCUSSION  
Summary of evidence  24 Summarize the main findings including the strength of 
evidence for each main outcome; consider their relevance to 
key groups (e.g., healthcare providers, users, and policy 
makers).  
Provided in Section 3.4. 
Limitations  25 Discuss limitations at study and outcome level (e.g., risk of 
bias), and at review-level (e.g., incomplete retrieval of 
identified research, reporting bias).  
Provided in Section 3.4.5. 
Conclusions  26 Provide a general interpretation of the results in the context 
of other evidence, and implications for future research.  
Provided in Section 3.4 and 3.5 
FUNDING  
Funding  27 Describe sources of funding for the systematic review and 
other support (e.g., supply of data); role of funders for the 
systematic review.  
Funding for the overarching PhD 
research has been reported in the front 




APPENDIX 5 – Round 1 and 2 Search Strings  
 
  
Systematic Review, Round 1 and 2 Search Strings in Full 
Round 1 Search Strings 
Database Search String 
IBSS 
(ProQuest) 
ab(alcohol) AND (policy OR policies OR legislat* OR regulat*) AND 
(implementation OR governance)  




ab(alcohol) AND (policy OR policies OR legislat* OR regulat*) AND 
(implementation OR governance)  
Above is limited to English, and scholarly journal articles.  
PsycInfo 
(Ovid) 
(alcohol.ti. and (policy or policies or regulat* or legislat*).af. and 
(implementation or governance).ab.) not (medicine or oncology or 
pharmacolog* or biotechnology* or forensic* or transplant* or diagnostic 
or genetic* or dental or dentist* or infection or agricultur* or neurolog* or 
surgery or pediatric* or pharmaceut* or laboratory).ab. not (medicine or 
oncology or cancer or pharmacology or biotechnology or forensic or 
transplant* or diagnostic or genetic* or dental or dentist* or infection or 
agricultur* or neurolog* or surgery or pediatric* or pharmaceut* or 
laboratory).ti. 
Above is limited to research with humans and English language 
PubMed (((((alcohol[Title/Abstract]) AND (policy[Title/Abstract] OR 
policies[Title/Abstract] OR regulat*[Title/Abstract] OR 
legislat*[Title/Abstract])) AND (implementation OR governance)) AND 
Humans[Mesh])) NOT (medicine[Title] OR oncology[Title] OR 
cancer[Title] OR pharmacology[Title] OR biotechnology[Title] OR 
forensic[Title] OR transplant*[Title] OR diagnostic[Title] OR 
genetic*[Title] OR dental[Title] OR dentist*[Title] OR infection[Title] OR 
agricultur*[Title] OR neurolog*[Title] OR surgery[Title] OR pediatric*[Title] 
OR pharmaceut*[Title] OR laboratory[Title]) 
ScienceDirect Title, abstract, keywords: alcohol AND (policy OR policies OR legislation 
OR regulation OR regulations) AND (implementation OR governance) 
Scopus ( TITLE- ABS-
KEY ( alcohol  AND  ( policy  OR  policies  OR  regulat*  OR  legislat* )  
AND  ( implementation  OR  governance ) )  AND NOT  TITLE-ABS-
KEY ( pharmaceut*  OR  medicine  OR  oncology  OR  cancer  OR  phar
maco*  OR  biotechnology  OR  forensic  OR  transplant*  OR  diagnostic
  OR  genetic*  OR  dental  OR  dentist*  OR  infection  OR  agricultur*  O
R  neurolog*  OR  surgery  OR  pediatric*  OR  laboratory )  AND 
NOT  TITLE-ABS-
KEY ( hiv  OR  diabetes  OR  methanol  OR  ethanol  OR  "in the 
workplace"  OR  cocaine  OR  cannabis  OR  marijuana  OR  opioid  OR 
 naloxone  OR  naltrexone  OR  "sport clubs"  OR  "sports 
clubs"  OR  poison*  OR  cigarette*  OR  e-cigarette*  OR  "electronic 
cigarette*"  OR  butanol ) )  AND (LIMIT-TO (LANGUAGE, “English” ) ) 
Web of 
Science 
(TS=(alcohol) AND TS=(policy OR legislat* OR regulat*) AND 
TS=(implementation OR governance)) AND LANGUAGE: (English)  
Indexes=SSCI, A&HCI Timespan=All years 
 (* indicates a truncation of the word to include all forms of that word) 
 
Round 2 Search Strings 
Database Search String 
IBSS 
(ProQuest) 
ab(alcohol) AND ab(availability OR licens* OR marketing OR price OR 
affordability) AND (implementing OR implementation) AND policy 




 ab(alcohol) AND ab(availability OR licens* OR marketing OR price OR 
affordability) AND (implementing OR implementation) AND policy 
Results limited to scholarly journals and English language 
PsycInfo (Ovid) (alcohol.ti. and (availability or licens* or marketing or price or 
affordability).af. and (implementing or implementation).ab.) not 
(medicine or oncology or pharmacolog* or biotechnology* or forensic* 
or transplant* or diagnostic or genetic* or dental or dentist* or infection 
or agricultur* or neurolog* or surgery or pediatric* or pharmaceut* or 
laboratory).ab. not (medicine or oncology or cancer or pharmacology or 
biotechnology or forensic or transplant* or diagnostic or genetic* or 
dental or dentist* or infection or agricultur* or neurolog* or surgery or 
pediatric* or pharmaceut* or laboratory).ti. 
PubMed (((((((alcohol[Title/Abstract]) AND (availability[Title/Abstract] OR 
licens*[Title/Abstract] OR marketing[Title/Abstract] OR 
price[Title/Abstract] OR affordability[Title/Abstract]) AND 
(implementing[All Fields] OR implementation[All Fields]) NOT 
(medicine[Title] OR oncology[Title] OR cancer[Title] OR 
pharmacology[Title] OR biotechnology[Title] OR forensic[Title] OR 
transplant*[Title] OR diagnostic[Title] OR genetic*[Title] OR dental[Title] 
OR dentist*[Title] OR infection[Title] OR agricultur*[Title] OR 
neurolog*[Title] OR surgery[Title] OR pediatric*[Title] OR 
pharmaceut*[Title] OR laboratory[Title])) AND Humans[Mesh])))  
ScienceDirect Advanced search: 
Title, abstract or keywords: alcohol AND (implementing OR 
implementation) AND (availability OR licensing OR licensed OR 
marketing OR price OR affordability)  
Title: NOT (medicine OR oncology OR cancer OR pharmacology OR 
biotechnology OR forensic OR transplant OR diagnostic OR genetic 
OR dental OR dentist OR infection OR agricultur OR neurologic OR 
surgery OR pediatric OR pharmaceut OR laboratory) 
Scopus (TITLE-ABS-KEY ( alcohol AND (implementing OR implementation ) 
AND policy) AND TITLE-ABS-KEY (availability OR licens* OR 
marketing OR price OR affordability ) ) AND ( LIMIT-
TO ( LANGUAGE ,  "English" ) )  
Web of Science (TI=(alcohol) AND TS=(availability or licens* or marketing or price or 
affordability) AND TS=(implementing or 
implementation))AND LANGUAGE: (English) 





APPENDIX 6 – Quality Assessment of Studies in 
Systematic Review 
  
Author Abstract and title Introduction and aims Method and data Sampling Data Analysis Ethics and bias Results Transferability or generalizability Implications and usefulness Score: 
Berends et al Good (4) Fair (3) Fair (3) Poor (2) Fair (3) Poor (2) Fair (3) Fair (3) Good (4) 27 (Intermediate)
Casswell et al Fair (3) Poor (2) Poor (2) Fair (3) Poor (2) Poor (2) Good (4) Good (4) Good (4) 26 (Intermediate)
Chalmers et al Good (4) Fair (3) Good (4) Good (4) Very poor (1) Poor (2) Good (4) Poor (2) Good (4) 26 (Intermediate)
Fitzgerald et al (2015) Good (4) Good (4) Good (4) Fair (3) Good (4)
Good (4) - discuss ethics 
approval; Good (4) Fair (3)
Fair (3) - missing recommendations for future 
research 33 (High quality)
Fitzgerald et al (2017) Good (4) Good (4) Good (4) Good (4) Good (4) Fair (3) - didn't reflect on bias Good (4) Fair (3) Good (4) 34 (High)
Fitzgerald et al (2018) Good (4) Good (4) Good (4) Fair (3) Fair (3) Good (4) Good (4) Good (4) Good (4) 35 (High quality)
Foster et al (2007) Good (4) Good (4) Fair (3) Good (4) Fair (3) Very poor (1) - no mention Fair (3) Fair (3) Good (4) 29 (Medium quality)
Foster (2016) Good (4) Good (4) Good (4) Poor (2) Poor (2) Good (4) Good (4) Good (4) Good (4) 32 (High quality)
Grace et al Fair (3) Fair (3) Fair (3) Good (4) Fair (3) Very poor (1) Good (4) Poor (2) Good (4) 27 (Medium Quality)
Hadfield et al Fair (3) Good (4) Fair (3)
Good (4) (in 
Appendix) Very Poor (1)
Very Poor (1)
Funded in part by 
organisation funded by 
alcohol industry, only brief 
nod to COI statement
Fair- Study 2 described how 
tried to address observer 
bias in data collection
Average: Poor (2)




Fair (3) (missing contributing something 
new/different - given literature 
demonstrating CSR is not effective in 
regulating industry) 26 (Medium Quality)
Hadfield et al 2011 Fair (3) Fair (3) Fair (3) Poor (2) Very Poor (1) Poor (2)   Fair (3) Fair (3)
Poor (2) - doesn't provide areas for future 
research or implications for policy/practice 22 (low quality)
Haggard et al Good (4) Good (4) Good (4) Fair (3) Fair (3) Good (4) Good (4) Good (4)
Fair (3) (missing recommendations for future 
research) 33 (High quality)
Hawkins et al Fair (3) Good (4) Good (4) Fair (3) Poor (2) Very Poor (1) Good (4) Good (4)
Fair (3) (missing recommendations for future 
research) 26 (Intermediate)
Herring et al Good (4) Fair (3) Fair (3) Fair (3) Poor (2) Very poor (1) Good (4) Fair (3) Good (4) 27 (Intermediate)
Humphreys et al Fair (3) Good (4) Fair (3) Poor (2) Good (4) Very poor (1) Good (4) Fair (3) Good (4) 28 (Intermediate)
Lloyd et al Fair (3) Good (4) Good (4) Poor (2) Poor (2) Very poor (1) Good (4) Fair (3)
Fair (3) (missing recommendations for future 
research) 26 (Intermediate)
MacGregor et al Good (4) Good (4) Good (4) Fair (3) Poor (2) Very poor (1) Good (4) Good (4) Good (4) 30 (High quality)
Martineau et al Good (4) Fair (3) Fair (3) Poor (2) Poor (2) Very poor (1) Good (4) Fair (3)
Fair (3) (missing recommendations for future 
research) 25 (Intermediate)
Mooney et al Good (4) Fair (3) Good (4) Good (4) Good (4) Good (4) Good (4) Fair (3) Good (4) 34 (High)
Muhunthan et al Good (4) Fair (3) Fair (3) Very poor (1) Good (4)
Ethics N/A - secondary 
analysis of legal cases
Very poor (1) - no mention of 
bias in terms of 
interpretation Good (4) Fair (3) Fair (3) 26 (Intermediate)
Parkes et al (2011) Good (4) Good (4) Good (4) Fair (3) Fair (3) 
Fair (3) - didn't reflect on 
bias, but noted where ethics 
sourced from Good (4) Fair (3) Good (4) 32 (High quality)
Randerson et al (2018) Good (4) Good (4) Good (4) Fair (3) Poor (2) Very poor (1) Good (4) Fair (3)
Fair (3) (missing recommendations for future 
research) 28 (Intermediate)
Rieckmann et al Good (4) Poor (2) Good (4) Good (4) Good (4)
Poor (2) - while state the 
project was approved, do not 
justify why informed consent 
was not required for in-
depth interviews Fair (3) Fair (3) Good (4) 30 (High quality)
Rod et al Good (4) Fair (3) Good (4) Fair (3) Fair (3) Very poor (1) Good (4) Fair (3)
Fair (3) missing recommendations for future 
research 28 (Intermediate)
Thom et al (2013) Eval of AIP Fair (3) Good (4) Fair (3) Fair (3) Fair (3)
Fair(3) some reflection on 
bias within results and stated 
ethical approval source
Fair (3) - would 
have liked more 
example 
quotations from 
data Good (4) Good (4) 29 (intermediate quality)
Thom et al Good (4) Good (4) Good (4) Fair (3) Very poor (1) Very poor (1) Good (4) Fair (3) Good (4) 28 (Medium Quality)
Thompson et al Good (4) Fair (3) Good (4) Fair (3) Fair (3)
Ethics N/A - secondary 
analysis of legal cases
Poor (2) - minimal discussion 
of how results may be 
limited /biased Good (4) Good (4) Good (4) 31 (High quality)
Toner et al Fair (3) Fair (3) Fair (3) Poor (2) Fair (3) Very poor (1) Fair (3)
Fair (3) (didn't receive Fair or 
higher under sampling, but this is 
perceived as not problematic 
given methods of study, in terms 
of awarding 'Fair' under 
transferability)
Poor (2) - only provides new insight into 
evidence in alcohol policy; doesn't provide 
areas for future research or implications for 
policy 25 (Medium Quality)
Zahnow et al (2018) Fair (3) Good (4) Fair (3) Fair (3) Good (4) Fair (3) Good (4) Fair (3) Good (4) 31 (High quality)
Quality Assessment of Studies Included in Systematic Review, using Hawker et al (2002)
342 
 


















































































































Use of Cards in Interviews to Explore Evidence Use 
 
As discussed within the text, near the end of each interview I conducted a card exercise. As 
also noted, the cards drew directly from existing literature: on each card was a known barrier 
to using evidence in policy and practice (Oliver et al. 2014), and interviewees were asked 
whether any of the barriers resonated with their own experiences, and about whether and 
how they had tried to overcome those barriers.  
 
The cards included: 
x Accessibility of evidence 
x “Actionability” of evidence 
x Availability of evidence 
x Credibility of evidence 
x Financial resources 
x “Gulf” between researchers and policymakers 
x Limited time 
x Presentation of evidence 
x Staff capacity (to be aware of, gather, and interpret evidence) 
x Timeliness of evidence 
Photo of selected cards used to explore barriers to evidence use 
 
 
Although this exercise introduced a more standardised approach to the interviews than the 
semi-structured format of other sections, the ways participants engaged with, and responded 
to, the cards suggested a range of interpretations of the cards’ content. For example, some 
participants spoke about the cards as if they named barriers to carrying out their alcohol 
policy work generally, not necessarily as barriers to using evidence within that work. To try to 
mitigate this tendency, I began introducing this exercise with some version of the statement, 
“Now, I’m going to ask you to put your ‘evidence’ hat on again”. I would mime putting on a 
hat, asking the interviewee to adopt this frame of mind when interacting with the cards. This 
approach had some success in getting interviewees to focus on these barriers in terms of 
evidence-use specifically.  
 
One benefit of the cards was that they offered a structure that often kept the interviewee 
more focused on the topic during that period in the interview. For example, some people 
approached the exercise in a task-oriented manner - once an interviewee had reflected on 
the content of one card, they would remain focused on the ‘task’ and move on to another 
card, as opposed to transitioning into another topic or reflection (a tendency many 
interviewees showed when answering other, earlier questions). As another example, 
interviewees would physically touch and arrange each of the cards into groups based on 
those which resonated with their own experiences and those which did not. Having all the 
cards laid on the table at once, instead of revealing them one-by-one, seemed to facilitate 
interviewee engagement with the exercise. In order to capture the physical gestures, I took 
more detailed written notes during this exercise, to supplement the interview transcripts. I 
would also often adopt a ‘confirmation strategy’ (Crilly et al., 2006, p. 360) in which I would 
respond to interviewees’ gestures and comments by verbally naming the card they were 
talking about. For example: 
AW: ...do any of these [cards] resonate with you?   
Interviewee:  I suppose both of those.   
AW:  Okay staff capacity, credibility, availability okay, do you want to 
elaborate a little bit on that?   
 
I perceived that this card exercise had two additional benefits, given that it came near the 
end of the interview. First, although interviewees may have seemed fatigued near the end of 
the interview, when I presented the exercise with colourful cards, interviewees often seemed 
to visually ‘perk up’, leaning forward in their seat and demonstrating renewed enthusiasm for 
the discussion. Second, the task-orientation of the interview was useful logistically. I was 
often conscious of having limited time remaining with my interviewee at this stage of the 
interview, and thus using an exercise to keep the discussion succinct and focused seemed 




APPENDIX 9 – List of Meetings Observed 
 
  












Members of the Scottish 
Parliament  
Discussion of Motion 13358 (in name of 
Shona Robinson) which recognised the 
progress of the Government’s 2009 
alcohol policy, and called for further 
preventative action to tackle alcohol use 
and asks for views on additional measures 






Good introduction to wide variety of 







Deborah Shipton (NHS 
Health Scotland) 






Range of alcohol licensing 
stakeholders, including 
representatives from 
ADPs, Councils, Health 
and Social Care 
Partnerships, Licensing 
Clerks, an industry 
representative, and 
Licensing Board Members 
Gained broad overview of successes and 
challenges in licensing in different Local 
Authority areas. Observed the way the 
participation of an industry representative 






Range of alcohol licensing 
stakeholders, including 
representatives from 
ADPs, Councils, Health 
and Social Care 
Partnerships, Licensing 
Clerks, and Licensing 
Board Members 
Gained broad overview of successes and 
challenges in licensing in different Local 
Authority areas. Met a Licensing Board 
member who I then successfully 






Representatives of local 
public and third sector 
organisations 
Observed discussion of how local 
organisations wish to engage with 
academia, including their perspectives on 
best practices for the production and use 
of evidence. Informed my thinking for how 
to incorporate the theme of evidence use 





Members of LA1 
Executive Committee 
Was introduced by ADP Coordinator to the 
other members, and was able to give brief 




Members of LA1 
Executive Committee 





Members of LA1 
Licensing Forum 
Observed the priorities and concerns of 
the Licensing Forum, and was later able to 
follow up with the Convenor in an informal 
discussion, providing further context for my 








First time observing the licensing process 
in real time, including the discussions of 
Councillors while debating whether to 





Members of LA2 Strategic 
Management Team 
 
Was introduced by ADP Coordinator to the 
other members, and was able to give brief 





Members of LA2 Strategic 
Management Team 
 
Presented findings from research. 
LA2 Learning 
Event (2016) 
Members of LA2 Strategic 
Management Team 
People in recovery 
Local Councillors 
Event highlighted the key priorities and 
guiding principles of this ADP’s work, 
some notable achievements, and 
demonstrated the role people in recovery 








Observed dynamics and decision-making 
of Local Councillors on the Licensing 
Board. Observed that nearly all licenses 
were granted despite being in an area with 





Members of LA3 Strategic 
Management Team 
Was introduced by ADP Coordinator to the 
other members, and was able to give brief 





Members of LA3 Strategic 
Management Team 
Presented findings from research. 
a All meetings and events were attended in person except my observation of an online 












Sent: 29 April 2015 13:52
To: HUNTER Lindsay; WRIGHT Alex; HELLOWELL Mark
Subject: Fwd: Alex Wright - ethics application
Attachments: Wright_Ethics Level_2-3_Form (1).doc; ATT00001.htm; Wright_Ethics_PhD Research 
Proposal (1).docx; ATT00002.htm
Thanks Mark. I have reviewed the form and Alex has successfully addressed all reasonable foreseeable 
ethical issues and may go ahead 




Begin forwarded message: 
 
From: HELLOWELL Mark <Mark.Hellowell@ed.ac.uk> 
Subject: Alex Wright - ethics application 
Date: 29 April 2015 10:54:48 CEST 




Please find attached an ethics application regarding Alex Wright's PhD project. I believe Alex 
has spoken to you about this. 
 
The application needs very urgent attention in that the student wishes to interview an 
individual that is at an advanced stage of terminal cancer. The interview is crucial to the 
project.  
 
I'm putting this application in at level 2 - I hope it can be turned around very quickly - but 














From: Nicholas Smith <Nicholas.Smith@edinburgh.gov.uk>
Sent: 29 September 2015 11:56
To: WRIGHT Alex; Health & Social Care Research & Information
Subject: RE: Application for PhD Research Access






Alex – it might be worth just checking out the list of ADP members has it may need updating. 
 
 
Nick Smith | EADP manager  
4 East Market Street, Edinburgh EH8 8BG | Tel 0131 529 2117 | 07818 454549 




From: WRIGHT Alex [mailto:alex.wright@ed.ac.uk]  
Sent: 25 September 2015 14:27 
To: Health & Social Care Research & Information 
Cc: Nicholas Smith 










From: Yvonne Gannon [mailto:Yvonne.Gannon@edinburgh.gov.uk] On Behalf Of Health & Social Care Research & 
Information 
Sent: 25 September 2015 14:24 
To: WRIGHT Alex <alex.wright@ed.ac.uk>; Health & Social Care Research & Information 
<HSC.Research@edinburgh.gov.uk> 
Cc: Nicholas Smith <Nicholas.Smith@edinburgh.gov.uk> 




Thanks for sharing your methods. 
 
I’ve copied Nicholas Smith into these emails.  Unless he has any concerns (he’s out of the office until Monday 28th), 







Yvonne Gannon | Research and Information Officer | The Department of Health and Social Care | The City of 
Edinburgh Council | Level 1:7 | Waverley Court | 4 East Market Street | Edinburgh | EH8 8BG |  0131 553 8334 | 
 Yvonne.Gannon@edinburgh.gov.uk 
 
From: WRIGHT Alex [mailto:alex.wright@ed.ac.uk]  
Sent: 25 September 2015 14:17 
To: Health & Social Care Research & Information 




Thank you very much for your email, this is excellent news.  
 
With regards to recruiting participants, I am planning to initially contact the members of the Edinburgh ADP, as 
listed on their website. This initial contact will likely be made by email, to which I will attach a short summary of my 
research and will emphasize that their participation would be entirely voluntary. From there, I will ask the EADP 
members about other relevant stakeholders/potential interviewees who have been involved in implementing the 
Alcohol Strategy within Edinburgh Council. 
 
I would welcome any comments about this plan from your office.  
 
To confirm, does your below email constitute my official permission to proceed with this research? Please let me 
know if any further paperwork or official procedure is required. 
 
Thank you very much again for your consideration, I look forward to conducting this project and to working with 







Alexandra Wright, MSc 
PhD Candidate (International Public Health Policy) 
 
What Works Scotland 
http://whatworksscotland.ac.uk/    
School of Social and Political Science 
University of Edinburgh 









From: Yvonne Gannon [mailto:Yvonne.Gannon@edinburgh.gov.uk] On Behalf Of Health & Social Care Research & 
Information 
Sent: 25 September 2015 14:01 
3
To: WRIGHT Alex <alex.wright@ed.ac.uk> 
Cc: Catherine Stewart <Catherine.Stewart@edinburgh.gov.uk>; Nicholas Smith <Nicholas.Smith@edinburgh.gov.uk> 




Thank you for submitting your Research Access Form and supporting documentation.  This sounds like a very 
interesting piece of work and your supporting documentation appears to cover all areas.   
 
As Nicholas Smith has expressed his support with this, we are happy for you to progress.  Do you know how you are 







Yvonne Gannon | Research and Information Officer | The Department of Health and Social Care | The City of 
Edinburgh Council | Level 1:7 | Waverley Court | 4 East Market Street | Edinburgh | EH8 8BG |  0131 553 8334 | 
 Yvonne.Gannon@edinburgh.gov.uk 
 
From: WRIGHT Alex [mailto:alex.wright@ed.ac.uk]  
Sent: 20 September 2015 18:05 
To: Health & Social Care Research & Information 
Subject: Application for PhD Research Access 
 
Dear Research Access Requests Team, 
 
My name is Alexandra Wright and I'm a PhD student in  International Public Health Policy at the University of Edinburgh. I'm writing to 
apply for Research Access to the City of Edinburgh Council for the purposes of carrying out a portion of my PhD research. 
 
As outlined in my application, my PhD aims to inform health policy implementation by generating knowledge on the case of 
implementing Scotland's Alcohol Strategy at Local Authority level. I am therefore requesting permission to interview managerial-level 
staff within the Council who have been involved in the process of implementing Scotland's Alcohol Strategy in Edinburgh. My 
application follows multiple conversations I have had with Mr Nicholas Smith, manager of Edinburgh Alcohol and Drug Partnership, 
who has expressed support for this project. 
 
Please find attached all supporting documentation for this application, including the Research Access Questionnaire, ethics 
documentation, and proposed interview questionnaire.  
 
Please do not hesitate to contact me with any questions or concerns, as I'm happy to provide any further information required about 








Alexandra Wright, MSc 
PhD Candidate (International Public Health Policy) 
  
What Works Scotland 
http://whatworksscotland.ac.uk/   
School of Social and Political Science 
University of Edinburgh 






This email and files transmitted with it are confidential and are intended for the sole use of the individual or 
organisation to whom they are addressed. 
If you have received this eMail in error please notify the sender immediately and delete it without using, 
copying, storing, forwarding or disclosing its contents to any other person. 
The Council has endeavoured to scan this eMail message and attachments for computer viruses and will not 
be liable for any losses incurred by the recipient. 
********************************************************************** 
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WRIGHT Alex
From: Hill Rachel (NHS HIGHLAND) <rachel.hill1@nhs.net>
Sent: 28 July 2016 10:46
To: WRIGHT Alex
Cc: Bell Michael (NHS HIGHLAND); Hunter-Rowe Carolyn (NHS HIGHLAND)
Subject: RE: PhD Student - Ethics Query
Hello Alex 
 
Thanks for completing your form.  This all looks in order and I note that you have agreement from local managers to 








Clinical Governance Manager 
NHS Highland 
Larch House 









From: WRIGHT Alex [mailto:alex.wright@ed.ac.uk] 
Sent: 28 July 2016 09:47 
To: Hill Rachel (NHS HIGHLAND) 
Cc: Bell Michael (NHS HIGHLAND); Hunter-Rowe Carolyn (NHS HIGHLAND) 




Thank you for your email and the form for registering a project. Please find the completed form attached, for my 
PhD project: “The use of evidence in local policy implementation: a case study of Scotland’s Alcohol Strategy”. 
 
Is anything further I need to do in order to attain approval for conducting this work in Highland? 
 
Please also don’t hesitate to let me know if you have any further questions. 
 











>Please see attached the form we ask people to complete to register  
>their project 
> 
>Please let me know if you require any further information 
> 








>Clinical Governance Manager 
>NHS Highland 
>Larch House 









>From: WRIGHT Alex [mailto:alex.wright@ed.ac.uk] 
>Sent: 20 July 2016 17:34 
>To: Hines Frances (NHS HIGHLAND); Hill Rachel (NHS HIGHLAND) 
>Subject: Re: PhD Student - Ethics Query 
> 
>Dear Frances and Rachel, 
> 
>Frances, many thanks for your quick reply. 
> 
>Rachel, please let me know if you require any further information beyond the documents being forwarded to you - 
I’m happy to answer any questions about the study. I look forward to hearing from you when you’ve had a chance to 
consider my proposed work in Highland. 
> 










>>As I said in my previous email, if you are doing a service evaluation it does not need REC or R&D approval and this 
would be the same across Scotland. You would need to log it for NHSH with Rachel Hill (copied in) but it would not 








>>Research, Development & Innovation Manager NHS Highland Research,  
>>Development & Innovation Department Centre for Health Science Old  
>>Perth Road Inverness 
>>IV2 3JH 
>>T: 01463 255822 
>>________________________________________ 
>>From: WRIGHT Alex [alex.wright@ed.ac.uk] 
>>Sent: 20 July 2016 17:23 
>>To: Hines Frances (NHS HIGHLAND) 




>>My name is Alexandra Wright and I’m a PhD Student at the University of Edinburgh. Carolyn has kindly forwarded 
me your below response regarding attaining ethical approval to carry out PhD-related work in Highland. 
>> 
>>I wanted to be in touch directly to ensure I carry out the proper procedure for this. For your reference, I have 
attached my ethics application for the University of Edinburgh, for which I was granted approval by the University’s 
School of Social and Political Science in late April 2015 (email chain of approval granted also attached). I have also 
provided an updated Participant Information Sheet and Consent Form, as these have been revised slightly since my 
application (e.g. The name of one of my supervisors has changed). 
>> 
>>I have also attached the documentation from having used the NHS “HRA-Decision Tools” to determine whether 
my PhD counts as a service evaluation or research. These decision tools have determined that my PhD counts as a 
‘service evaluation’. When working with a previous Local Authority on this project, I simply received an evaluation 
letter from their Health Board to carry out my work in that Local Authority. Would it be the same process in 
Highland? 
>> 
>>Thank you very much in advance for any further information you can provide about how I can attain approval for 
conducting this work. Please don’t hesitate to let me know of any questions or concerns you may have. I am also 







>>Alexandra Wright, MSc 
>>PhD Candidate (International Public Health Policy) What Works Scotland  










>>Please see below initial response to your query about ethical approval.  I'd suggest you contact Frances directly in 




>>Rachel Hill is Clinical Governance Manager for NHS Highland, 01463 







>>Research and Intelligence Specialist 
>>Highland Alcohol & Drugs Partnership 
>>Assynt House 
>>Beechwood Park 








>>From: Hines Frances (NHS HIGHLAND) 
>>Sent: 20 July 2016 16:25 
>>To: Hunter-Rowe Carolyn (NHS HIGHLAND) 
>>Cc: Hill Rachel (NHS HIGHLAND) 




>>If it is a service evaluation regardless of whether patients are  
>>involved it does not require NHS Research Ethics or R&D Management  
>>Approval. If it is research i.e. is asking a research question(s) and  
>>involves patients (identified as patients through one route or 
>>another) it either has to go for Proportionate Review with NHS  
>>Research Ethics and for R&D management approval (this is where  
>>participants would be involved in interviews focus gps or the like) or  
>>for Full Review with the NHS Research Ethics and for R&D Management  
>>Approval (this is where participants would be involved by having some  
>>form of intervention or action either physical or other therapy). This  
>>would be the same across Scotland..if service evaluation then every  
>>R&D office should say the same. In Highland SEs are logged by Rachel  




>>Research, Development & Innovation Manager NHS Highland Research,  
>>Development & Innovation Department Centre for Health Science Old  
>>Perth Road Inverness 
>>IV2 3JH 
>>T: 01463 255822 
>>________________________________________ 
>>From: Hunter-Rowe Carolyn (NHS HIGHLAND) 
>>Sent: 20 July 2016 14:13 
>>To: Hines Frances (NHS HIGHLAND) 





>>I am wondering if you can help.  The Highland Alcohol & Drugs Partnership has been contacted by a PhD student 
undertaking some research into the implementation of Scotland's Alcohol Strategy, and we are keen to be involved 
to highlight rural issues.    The researcher has asked the following: 
>>I would like to confirm what ethical approval I will need from Highland Council or Highland NHS to conduct this 
research. I already have ethical approval for this project from the University of Edinburgh, the paperwork for which I 
have attached to this email. For my first ADP I required ethical approval from the local Council, while in my second 
ADP I required a letter from NHS ethics (for which my project counts as a 'service evaluation', not a full research 
project, because of the types of people I'm interviewing). Do you have a sense of what ethics approval I may need to 
attain for Highland, or who I should ask about this? 






>>Research and Intelligence Specialist 
>>Highland Alcohol & Drugs Partnership 
>>Assynt House 
>>Beechwood Park 














>>This message may contain confidential information. If you are not the  
>>intended recipient please inform the sender that you have received the message in error before deleting it. 
>>Please do not disclose, copy or distribute information in this e-mail or take any action in reliance on its contents: 
>>to do so is strictly prohibited and may be unlawful. 
>> 
>>Thank you for your co-operation. 
>> 
>>NHSmail is the secure email and directory service available for all  
>>NHS staff in England and Scotland NHSmail is approved for exchanging  
>>patient data and other sensitive information with NHSmail and GSi  
>>recipients NHSmail provides an email address for your career in the  
>>NHS and can be accessed anywhere For more information and to find out  
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APPENDIX 12 – Project Ethics Package 
 
  
ORIGINAL CONSENT FORM 
 
What Works Scotland funded PhD 





School of Social and Political Science 
University of Edinburgh 
Edinburgh, EH8 9LD 
 
 Please initial box 
 
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet for 




2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I  
 am free to withdraw at any time, without giving reason. 
 
 





 Please tick box 
   Yes            No 
 
4. I agree to the interview consultation being 
audio recorded and transcribed 
 
   
5. I agree to the use of anonymised quotes in 
publications, in which I may be identifiable 
OR 
  
6. I agree to the use of anonymised quotes in 
publications only if I am unidentifiable 
 
  
7. I agree to the use of anonymised data in 




8. I agree to the use of anonymised data in 






























PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET 
 
“Local implementation of national health policy: a case study of Scottish alcohol policy” 
 
Please take time to read the following information and discuss it with others if you wish. It is up to you 
to decide whether or not to take part. If you decide to take part you will be given this information sheet 
to keep. You will also be asked to sign a consent form. You can change your mind at any time and 
withdraw from the study without explanation and without penalty. 
 
INVITATION 
You are being asked to take part in a research study to examine uses of evidence within the process of 
implementing Scottish alcohol policy in selected Local Authorities. We would like to interview you to ask 
you about your opinions on how the Alcohol Strategy was implemented at local level and the use of 
information or evidence by local actors in this process. You have been chosen because you are a key 
stakeholder in the process of alcohol policy development and/or implementation. The overarching aim 
of this research is to generate knowledge on national policy implementation processes at local level. 
 
This research is part of a PhD project at the University of Edinburgh. The Principal Investigator on the 
project is Alexandra Wright. The research is being supervised by Dr Katherine Smith, Reader in Global 
Health Policy at the University of Edinburgh, and Dr Sarah Morton, Co-Director (Knowledge Exchange) at 
the Centre for Research on Families and Relationships at the University of Edinburgh. The research is 
being funded by What Works Scotland (www.whatworksscotland.ac.uk), an initiative to improve the 
way local areas in Scotland use evidence to make decisions about public service development and 
reform. What Works Scotland is funded by the Scottish Government and the Economic and Social 
Research Council.  
 
This project has been approved by the Ethics Committee of the School of Social and Political Science at 
the University of Edinburgh. 
 
WHAT WILL HAPPEN 
In this study, you will be asked to participate in a semi-structured interview with Alexandra Wright 
regarding your opinions about the implementation of alcohol policy in Scotland and the uses of 
information and evidence in this process. If you consent to participate, Alexandra Wright will meet with 
you at a time and place convenient for you.  
 
The audio from the interview will be recorded and then transcribed onto a computer. The audio 
recordings and transcriptions will be anonymised and kept on a computer that is protected from 
intrusion with username and password. The audio recordings will be destroyed at the end of the study. 
Your responses will be treated with full confidentiality. Anyone who takes part in the research will be 
identified only by their generic professional role (e.g. “researcher”).  
 
You can request a copy of the interview transcript if you wish. The interviews will be analysed by 
Alexandra Wright using a qualitative data software package. 
 
TIME COMMITMENT 
The interview will take approximately one hour and will likely be conducted during one session. It will be 
possible to take a break or stop at any point during the interview. Follow-up sessions will be conducted 
only as needed, for example if you feel you have more you would like to say. 
 
PARTICIPANTS’ RIGHTS 
You may decide to stop being a part of the research study at any time without explanation. You have the 
right to ask that any data you have supplied to that point be withdrawn or destroyed. You have the right 
to omit or refuse to answer or respond to any question that is asked of you without penalty.  
 
You have the right to have your questions about the research answered (unless answering these 
questions would interfere with the study’s outcome). If you have any questions as a result of reading 
this information sheet, please ask Alexandra Wright or one of her supervisors before the study begins. 
 
BENEFITS AND RISKS 
There are no known benefits or risks for you in this study. 
 
COST, REIMBURSEMENT AND COMPENSATION 
Your participation in this study is voluntary.  
 
CONFIDENTIALITY/ANONYMITY 
The data we collect do not contain any personal information about you except the professional role that 
you wish to be identified by, as written on your consent form. The data collected and analysed by 
Alexandra Wright will be written up for inclusion within her PhD Thesis, the results of which may be 
published academic venues such as peer reviewed journals and conference presentations. The results of 
the research may also lead onto further studies. No individual research participant will be identifiable 
from any publications. 
 
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION 
Alexandra Wright, Dr. Katherine Smith, or Dr. Sarah Morton will be glad to answer your questions about 
this study at any time. Please find their individual contact information below. If you have any concerns 
about any aspect of the research or the conduct of the researcher, please contact Dr Smith or Dr 
Morton.  
 
Alexandra Wright 07582151540 alex.wright@ed.ac.uk 
Dr Katherine Smith 0131 651 1323 Katherine.smith@ed.ac.uk  
Dr Sarah Morton 0131 651 1832 S.Morton@ed.ac.uk  
 
If you want to find out about the final results of this study, please contact Alexandra Wright at the above 
email address. Thank you for taking the time to read this information sheet. 
 
Full Contact Details: 
Alexandra Wright, MSc 
PhD Candidate, International Public Health Policy 
Global Public Health Unit, School of Social and Political Science 
University of Edinburgh 
Edinburgh, UK, EH8 9YL 
Phone: +44 (0) 7582 151 540 






Working title: Local implementation of national health policy: a case study of Scottish alcohol policy 
 
 
A) Participation Details  Please tick box            
  Yes 
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet for the 
above study and have had the opportunity to ask questions. 
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Abstract: Scotland has been ambitious in its policy and legislative e↵orts to tackle alcohol-related harm,
e↵orts which include the innovative feature of a ‘public health objective’ within local alcohol licensing.
However, the persistence of alcohol-related harms and inequalities requires further examination of
both the overarching Scottish alcohol strategy and its specific implementation. A qualitative case
study was undertaken to explore how alcohol policy is implemented locally in Scotland, with data
generated from (i) documentary analysis of 12 relevant policies, legislation, and guidance documents;
and (ii) a thematic analysis of semi-structured interviews with 54 alcohol policy implementers in three
Scottish localities and nine national-level stakeholders. The data suggest there is a tension between
the intentions of licensing legislation and the way it is enacted in practice, and that accountability
emerges as an important factor for understanding why this occurs. In particular, there are a lack
of accountability mechanisms acting upon Scottish Licensing Boards to ensure they contribute to
the public health goals of the Scottish alcohol strategy. From a public health perspective, this has
perpetuated a system in which Licensing Boards continue to act with autonomy from the rest of the
alcohol policy implementation system, creating a challenge to the achievement of public health goals.
Alcohol policy in Scotland is likely to fall short of intended goals as long as the tension between
licensing legislation and enacted licensing practices remains.
Keywords: alcohol policy; licensing; accountability; policy implementation; Scotland
1. Introduction
This study examines the ‘how and why’ of Scottish alcohol policy implementation. A key
finding which emerged from the study was the importance of accountability, particularly within the
context of Scotland’s alcohol licensing regime. This article focuses on explaining how accountability
mechanisms within Scotland’s licensing regime can present challenges to the e↵ective implementation
of alcohol policy. This is important because limited empirical research has examined how processes
of accountability within alcohol licensing influence Scottish alcohol policy implementation and the
related pursuit of public health goals. This study investigates this problem by undertaking a qualitative
case study, using documentary analysis of national policy, legislation and guidance, and interview
data with national and local alcohol policy implementation stakeholders.
In Scotland, alcohol misuse is an important public health policy problem; high levels of alcohol
consumption have contributed to patterns of health inequalities and led to correspondingly high rates
of alcohol-related harms and costs [1]. To address these issues, the Scottish Government developed
policy and legislation to prevent and address alcohol-related harms. The government’s central policy,
Changing Scotland’s Relationship with Alcohol: A Framework for Action, was published in 2009 [2]. It outlines
a ‘whole population approach’ as a key feature [1] and has been lauded as being ‘evidence-informed’ [3].
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An additional innovative feature of the government’s overall approach has been the inclusion of
a ‘public health objective’ within licensing legislation, namely the Licensing (Scotland) Act 2005.
Extensive evaluations of population health outcomes have also been undertaken in relation to
Scottish alcohol policy [4]. These have demonstrated, for example, that while alcohol-related death
rates in Scotland peaked in the mid-2000s and then began to fall, this trend has stalled and, since 2012,
rates have been increasing again [5,6]. Additionally, while inequalities in alcohol-related deaths in
Scotland have narrowed over time, alcohol-related mortality rates remain more than eight times higher
in the most deprived areas compared with least deprived areas [5]. It is apparent that while some
progress has been made in tackling alcohol-related harm, there is a continued need for the e↵ective
implementation of the evidence-informed measures embedded in Scottish alcohol policy.
In light of this, there is a need to understand the challenges and facilitators of Scottish alcohol policy
implementation—a contribution this article seeks to make, with a specific focus on alcohol licensing and
the emergent theme of accountability. This article is timely given recent policy developments within
Scottish Government which will need to be implemented e↵ectively. This includes the publication in
late 2018 of new Scottish alcohol policy [7,8] to improve health through the prevention of alcohol- and
drug-related harm and a revised draft of the Guidance for Licensing Boards which, at time of writing,
is out for consultation [9].
Scottish Alcohol Licensing: Policy Context, Existing Research and Accountability
While the current Scottish approach to alcohol policy has been led by a Scottish National Party
(SNP) government, there has been notable cross-party support for an alcohol strategy generally,
providing a supportive political context for this issue. The context is complicated, however, by the
Scottish Parliament and Government’s constrained capacity to act only on elements of alcohol regulation
which have been devolved to them by the UK Government [10]. Additionally, the past few years
have seen substantive policy and political energy at a national level dedicated to the development
and enactment of legislation for minimum unit pricing (MUP) of alcohol [11]. The Scottish Parliament
passed MUP legislation in 2012, but was then forced to fight a protracted legal battle in European
and UK courts against a challenge brought by the Scotch Whisky Association [12]. The government’s
case was eventually successful, and MUP was implemented in May 2018; however, in the meantime,
other local processes of alcohol policy implementation were facing their own challenges. Within this
context, this study was concerned with the ongoing implementation of the range of other alcohol
policy measures in the Scottish alcohol strategy, including localized decision-making (e.g., licensing) by
locally elected representatives and other stakeholders such as Alcohol and Drug Partnerships (ADPs).
Alcohol licensing is a key competency devolved to the Scottish Parliament from the UK Government
in Westminster. The Licensing (Scotland) Act 2005 (referred to here as LA 2005), helps to structure the
legislative and regulatory framework for licensing and makes provisions for the regulation of the sale
of alcohol and the premises on which alcohol is sold. LA 2005 gives local Licensing Boards (LBs) the
responsibility for granting or rejecting alcohol licenses and thus helps to determine the availability of
alcohol in local areas. The membership of these LBs is constituted of locally elected councillors.
Critically, LA 2005 contains five ‘licensing objectives’, and requires LBs to be concerned with
each: (i) Preventing crime and disorder; (ii) securing public safety; (iii) preventing public nuisance;
(iv) protecting and improving public health; and (v) protecting children from harm. There are
intersections across all five objectives, and all potentially run counter to economic interests invested in
alcohol sales. Of these, however, the implementation of the ‘public health objective’ is most relevant
for this article, and it was primarily in relation to this objective and the policy context surrounding it
that accountability emerged as an explanatory factor.
In the UK, Scotland is unique for including the protection of public health as a statutory objective in
its licensing legislation [3,13]. Indeed, the Scottish alcohol strategy identifies alcohol licensing as a key
component of their ‘whole-population approach’ to combating alcohol-related harm, and it identifies
licensing stakeholders as having a key role in helping to achieve the strategy’s public health goals.
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The public health objective gives LBs a duty to assess the number and density of licensed premises
in their area—a key measure if one is concerned with the availability of alcohol. This is operationalized
in the concept of ‘overprovision’, which refers to an “assessment that there are too many licensed
premises in a particular locality either in terms of the number of premises, the capacity of premises,
the type of premises, or the size of a display area” (p. vi, [14]).By distinguishing a given area as
overprovided for, LBs have policy grounds to refuse new license applications in this area.
In Scotland, the assessment of whether overprovision exists happens during the development of
each LB’s ‘Licensing Policy Statement’ which “sets out the general approach a Licensing Board will take
to regulating the sale of alcohol and licensed premises in its area” (p. 2, [15]). Importantly, the Statement
must include a declaration of how each LB will progress towards each of the five licensing objectives,
and LBs must make their licensing decisions with consideration to their Policy Statement [15].
In terms of policy practice, alcohol licensing in Scotland occurs in local government, where local
councils and their respective elected councillors have a certain level of autonomy from the Scottish
Government. This is grounded in a Concordat signed by the Scottish Government in 2007 with
the Convention of Scottish Local Authorities (COSLA), which removed certain controls that the
government had over councils [16]. This has implications for LB members’ role in alcohol policy
implementation, since their status as councillors means they are not automatically obligated to
follow Scottish Government-identified priorities (e.g., to commit to a whole-population approach to
tackling alcohol-related harm). However, this autonomy is complicated by the government’s parallel
implementation of the National Performance Framework, an instrument first implemented in 2007
(and recently revised in 2018) which defines the government’s ‘purpose’ and overarching goals [17].
As part of the aforementioned Concordat, local governments have to identify their local priorities
through community planning and demonstrate how these contribute to the National Performance
Framework [16].
A range of organisations are stakeholders in Scottish alcohol policy enactment; these include
the Scottish Parliament and Scottish Government, national governmental organisations concerned
with health, and local entities such as local authorities, local partnerships, and local communities.
The specific focus in this article is the relationships of LBs with both the Scottish Government and local
Alcohol and Drug Partnerships (ADPs). The membership and responsibilities of each are shown in
Table 1 below.




Scottish Government Elected Ministers and unelectedcivil servants
Designated government teams are
responsible for developing national alcohol
policy and supporting its implementation.
Licensing Boards Elected Local Councillors
Boards preside over the local alcohol
licensing system, which controls alcohol
availability [18].
Alcohol and Drug Partnerships
Range of statutory (e.g., health, police,
social work, education, fire service) and
non-statutory (e.g., third sector)
representatives
These partnerships are tasked with local
alcohol policy implementation. ADPs
develop local alcohol strategies which serve
to translate and tailor the national alcohol
strategy to local needs.
Research on the interplay between local alcohol availability and health has proliferated in recent
years in the UK, and this research demonstrates both that availability is associated with population
harm [19–21] and that policies to regulate availability can have a positive impact on population
health [22]. For example, Richardson et al. (2015) have demonstrated that in Scotland, a higher alcohol
outlet density in a given neighbourhood is associated with higher alcohol-related hospitalisations
and deaths [20], while research from the broader UK context suggests stricter licensing enforcement
to regulate alcohol availability may have a positive e↵ect on alcohol-related hospitalisations [23].
Note, however, that existing research on outlet density is not definitive in providing policy
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decision-makers with density thresholds that should not be exceeded. Therefore, licensing decisions
informed by this work will remain interpretative. Further, while criticisms of this area of literature
have noted limitations in terms of methodological approaches and scope [24], as well as the currently
inability to demonstrate causality [25], existing research indicates the importance of local licensing
decision-making on population health outcomes.
In addition to the association between alcohol availability and harm, research has also studied the
licensing policy context [13,26] and di↵erent aspects of licensing processes. In the Scottish context,
an in-depth evaluation of the implementation of LA 2005, an evaluation which found a number of key
challenges that prevented e↵ective implementation of this legislation [14]. These included a lack of
updated implementation guidance and the inconsistent manner in which national and local data was
being collected [14].
An additional key issue evident in the literature has been the interplay of evidence used within
licensing processes. In particular, research has suggested that public health evidence has limited
impact on licensing decision-making, and LB members more often rely on their own values and
beliefs, or anecdotes from their constituencies, to inform their decisions [27]. Further, that while
public health interviewees in this study perceived themselves to be approaching their work with
a ‘whole-population approach,’ the same perspective was not always adopted by other licensing
stakeholders (i.e., LB members) [27]. These results have highlighted a possible tension between the
perspectives, goals, and priorities among di↵erent licensing stakeholders.
While the above research contributes to an understanding of licensing processes, there remains
a limited body of empirical research in the UK and Scottish contexts reporting exactly how key
stakeholders are being held accountable for their role in e↵ectively implementing licensing policy
or how the accountability regime(s) surrounding licensing influence alcohol policy implementation.
Indeed, recent work by Fitzgerald and colleagues [28] is unique in its explicit inclusion of accountability
as a theme in their analysis of Scottish licensing. Their research reported (i) a lack of mechanisms
available to influence the councillors who were members of local LBs and (ii) that LB convenors and
licensing clerks had the power to shape a given LB’s attitude towards public health. Further, that the
latter situation sometimes resulted in challenges to local public health progress and variations across
local areas in terms of how the public health objective was perceived and implemented. As will
be shown in the results and discussion sections, this article helps to rea rm and build upon those
authors’ work.
Overall, however, specific in-depth inquiries into accountability in alcohol policy implementation,
remain limited, and findings are not linked to existing accountability literature, a substantive area
of research from which theoretical and empirical lessons may be drawn. While literature on alcohol
policy implementation studies have sometimes discussed accountability-related issues (e.g., in relation
to power in licensing processes [28], the importance of clearly establishing responsibility for particular
interventions [29], or policy stakeholders’ compliance with and navigation of relevant alcohol
legislation [14,30]), a notable gap in published research exists which draws explicitly upon lessons from
accountability scholarship to empirically examine alcohol policy implementation processes. Given the
emergence in this research of accountability as an explanatory factor influencing implementation of
Scottish licensing policy, this article seeks to contribute understanding to this gap.
Indeed, the issue of accountability, a concept used extensively (albeit often somewhat opaquely) in
public discourse, is somewhat rarely empirically examined within broader health policy implementation
research. In a literature review of empirical health policy implementation studies conducted for the
Scottish Parliament’s Information Centre [31], only a small number of empirical articles explicitly
linked accountability and health policy implementation processes (e.g., Kelly et al. [32] and O’Toole
et al. [33]). This is despite authors within public policy and implementation literature identifying
accountability as being fundamental to policy implementation. For example, Jan-Erik Lane [34] has
written that the implementation gap between policy expectations and outcomes is inherently related
to accountability.
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The current paper is situated in the context of the existing regulatory and accountability framework
for licensing stakeholders—LBs in particular. Table 2 outlines the relevant provisions regarding
accountability of LBs as stated in existing legislation.
Table 2. Legislative provisions regarding Licensing Board accountability.
Legislation Relevant Provisions Regarding Accountability of Licensing Boards
Licensing (Scotland) Act 2005
• Mandates that the Board produce a Licensing Policy Statement
once every three years, which provides a locally-specific legal basis
for their decision-making.
• Mandates that the Licensing Statement include statement on
whether local areas are overprovided for (enacted 2009).
• Outlines the five licensing objectives, including protecting and
improving public health.
Alcohol etc. (Scotland) Act 2010
• Makes modifications to mandatory conditions of premises and
occasional licences which were in the 2005 Act.
• Sets out actions Licensing Board must undertake before and after it
makes a variation to premises licence conditions. It also states that
a variation to licence conditions may be made only where the
Board is satisfied that the variation is necessary or expedient for
the purposes of any of the licensing objectives.
• Amends the 2005 Act to add the relevant Health Board to the
bodies that the Licensing Board is required to consult when
developing their Licensing Policy Statement, a Health Board which
must also be notified of any premises licence applications.
Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010
• Makes modifications to the 2005 Act regarding application
notification requirements, occasional licenses, hours, etc.
Air Weapons and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2014
• Mandates Licensing Boards submit annual reports of functions to
the Scottish Government, which must include a statement
explaining how the Board has had regard to the licensing
objectives and their Licensing Policy Statement when carrying out
its functions.
In relation to this legal framework and the policy context described above, this article seeks to
address the existing knowledge gap at the intersection of Scottish alcohol policy implementation,
licensing, and accountability. It asks whether the ways LBs are held accountable function to support
implementation processes and corresponding public health goals in the context of Scotland’s national
alcohol strategy. Towards this aim, this article examines how LBs, as administrative and quasi-judicial
entities that exist beyond the traditional health arena, can have important impacts on implementation
processes and subsequent health policy outcomes.
2. Methods
This research was conducted as part of a doctoral research project which aimed to generate
understanding about how and why Scotland’s national alcohol strategy was implemented in local
areas. This overarching study aim lent itself to using a qualitative case study approach to attain a rich,
‘thick’ description of processes within Scottish alcohol policy implementation. Ethical approval for this
study was granted by the School of Social and Political Science at the University of Edinburgh.
Three purposely selected local authority areas (referred to here as ‘local areas’) across Scotland
served as the study sites in order to explore similarities and di↵erences in alcohol policy implementation
across di↵erent settings. The three local areas were selected using an established sampling framework
from Miles and Huberman [35], which incorporates theoretical and pragmatic considerations such
as whether the sample plan is feasible, ethical, and has the potential to generate rich information.
Within the framework, a researcher also has the flexibility to account for other relevant considerations;
for example, in this study, sites were selected to attain a diversity of urban and rural locations.
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Ultimately, one urban (LA1), one mixed urban-rural (LA2), and one rural (LA3) site agreed to
participate in this study, and ethical approval was attained from the relevant authority in each prior to
data collection.
Data were generated from the analysis of policy documents and semi-structured interviews.
The approach to documentary analysis followed Mason in viewing the content of key policy documents
as constructed representations of a formal decision (or set of decisions) taken by those with authority
in the Scottish alcohol policy system [36], as well as providing insights into the values underlying these
policy decisions [37]. These insights were needed to help to understand the representations of policy
implementation in the documents (in terms of both process and outcomes) and whether they contained
information about the policy context and about the roles and expectations of alcohol policy implementers
(i.e., LBs or ADPs). In contrast, the use of interviews allowed an understanding of the perceptions
of alcohol policy implementers themselves regarding how they undertook policy implementation
practice. These data were generated from semi-structured interviews with national-level alcohol policy
stakeholders and local alcohol policy implementers.
Overall, a documentary analysis of 12 relevant national policies, legislation, and reports was
undertaken. The analysis was guided by Walt and Gilson’s [38] Triangle Framework for health
policy analysis, which focuses on actors, context, process, and content. While local policy documents
(e.g., LBs’ Statement of Licensing Policy) were read by the author, they were not formally reported on
within the study to preserve the anonymity of each participating local area.
For the interviews, national interviewees (n = 9) were recruited if they were currently involved
in the development and delivery of alcohol policy and/or legislation in Scotland or if they had been
involved in the development of the 2009 Framework for Action. This included a range of representations
across public and third sector organisations. Local interviewees were recruited from the three selected
local areas’ respective LBs (n = 8) and ADPs (n = 46) (Table 3).
Table 3. Number of local- and national-level interviewees.
Sector
Number of Interviewees by Local Area and Nationally
LA1 LA2 LA3
Licensing Board Members 4 1 3
Other local alcohol policy implementers (e.g., ADP members) 13 15 18
National Level Alcohol Policy Stakeholders 9
ADPs are local, multi-sectoral partnerships tasked by the Scottish Government with carrying out
alcohol policy implementation; their membership includes, for example, representatives from the local
health board, police, community justice, social work, education, and the third sector [39]. There is
a total of 30 ADPs across Scotland, which are usually matched geographically with the boundaries
of their respective local authority area. ADPs do not have a formal relationship with LBs; however,
certain ADP members (specifically police and health) are ‘statutory consultees’ to the LB, meaning
they have the right to be informed when a license application is submitted and to lodge an objection to
that application if they wish. They do not, however, have a role in the decision about whether to grant
a licence. Further, ADPs and their members work within a context of ‘community planning’—mandated
collaborative working of public services and communities to design and deliver services—established
in Scotland in 2003 [40,41]. In each local area, a ‘Community Planning Partnership’ (CPP) is responsible
for determining local policy priorities—organizations such as ADPs report to the CPP, while LBs
do not.
All interviewees were recruited directly via email, and interviewing took place between
December 2015–January 2017. Interviews ranged from 40 minutes to two hours in length, and each
was audio recorded with the interviewee’s consent. The interview schedule was developed on
the basis of literature on alcohol policy and policy implementation. Interviews were analysed
thematically [42] in NVivo 10 [43] using a combination of deductive and inductive approaches [44,45].
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For the deductive coding, provisional codes were created based on the study’s research questions,
the author’s understandings of relevant policy implementation literature, and recollection of the
interviews themselves. For the inductive coding, new codes were generated a posteriori from the data
as new themes, topics, or concepts were identified within the transcripts. Analysis of interviews and
documents occurred in parallel.
Data generated around the theme of accountability provided rich, meaningful information about
the actions of alcohol policy implementers. While multiple types of formal and informal accountability
emerged from the data, this article reports on the ‘public-administrative’ accountability of licensing
decision-makers, a type of accountability which examines vertical or hierarchical accountability
relationships—with regards to political or legal interactions, for example [46]. Thus, the analysis
investigated accountability mechanisms and arrangements in which one organisation is held
accountable by another who is ‘higher’ in the formal governance hierarchy.
The combination of documentary data and interview data provided both o cial government
documentation of stated intentions with regards to the alcohol strategy and first-hand accounts of
alcohol policy implementation practice, respectively. The multiple sources of data were integrated
to find where there was alignment or tensions between formally written or stated expectations of
alcohol policy implementation and what was enacted in practice. As noted, following the emergence
of accountability as an important theme in the broader research project, this article is concerned with
potential di↵erences between expectations and practice through the lens of accountability within
alcohol licensing. In particular, the focus here is whether the licensing accountability regime as
structured and enacted presents challenges or enables Scottish alcohol policy implementation.
3. Results
3.1. Perspectives on the Licensing Objectives and Importance of Accountability
Within interviews, LB members and other licensing stakeholders discussed the licensing objectives,
contrasting the public health objective with the priority a↵orded to the other objectives. In particular,
it was reported that the public health objective had not yet led to major changes in how licensing
stakeholders operated in relation to public health concerns:
“I think [the public health objective] has always been the poor cousin of the five licensing objectives.
It’s a di cult one for the Board to deal with, because an application where there are issues of disorder,
or public nuisance, noise, whatever, in an immediate area, that’s quite clear . . . and the police might
provide evidence to that e↵ect . . . they can tie in a refusal with the kind of disorder and public nuisance
licensing objectives. Public health has always been more of a di cult one for the Board . . . the Board
doesn’t really see favour with overprovision as a concept”
(LA1, job title withheld)
One of the key explanations for these challenges associated with implementing the public
health objective was the accountability arrangements surrounding LBs. For example, one ADP
member reported on frustrations being raised across organisations involved in local alcohol policy
implementation, in relation to the lack of accountability surrounding LBs:
“[We were] . . . working with the police and the NHS, to try to influence the Licensing Board, nothing
really happening, and then that frustration coming back at the Community Planning Partnership
level because they can’t influence it either. So yeah, Licensing Boards, because of legislation, are sitting
out here doing as they please without any accountability.”
(LA1, ADP Member)
3.2. Legal Accountability of Licensing Boards
Legal accountability is a type of accountability in which expectations are based on legal norms and
rules and are enforced by legal bodies (e.g., courts) [47]. As previously noted in Table 2, multiple pieces
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of legislation determine the legal obligations of LBs. However, while this legislation provides the
legal accountability framework for LBs, the data suggest LBs have certain flexibility in enacting this
framework, which has implications for how they contribute to the public health-related aspects of the
legislation and Scotland’s whole-population approach overall.
An example of this is in their development of overprovision statements. LA 2005 has the
accompanying Guidance for Licensing Boards and Local Authorities, which notes the duty of LBs to assess
overprovision in their area; it also notes that LBs were meant to make an “accurate assessment of
overprovision” [48]. However, the Guidance does not specify what an ‘accurate’ assessment was
to entail. The only existing legal stipulation is that LBs must demonstrate they have considered
the number and capacity of licensed premises in the area and have conducted certain mandatory
consultations with, for example, statutory services and the public. However, the number and capacity
at which an area should be designated as overprovided is determined by the Board itself—there
is not a uniform threshold against which areas are measured, nor is there a national ‘example’ or
template overprovision statement from which LBs can draw [49]. Accordingly, LBs act autonomously
to interpret availability-related evidence and establish local thresholds for overprovision as they see fit.
For example, ADP members reported their frustration in attempting to inform LB decisions
regarding their Policy Statement and overprovision:
“You can put all the evidence and science in front of them that you like showing that link doing all you
know, setting out the particular concerns you’ve got for parts of [LA1], chances are they’re not going
to take it on board.”
(LA1, ADP Member)
This ADP member described working with other local licensing stakeholders to provide an
evidence-informed report to the LB, which recommended certain local areas be labelled ‘overprovided,’
noting that this was unsuccessful given the autonomy LB members had to make the final decision.
The existence of LB decision-making autonomy is supported by evidence of the variation in Licensing
Policy Statements across Scotland [15].
The interview data also illustrated that LBs recognised and consciously used their existing
discretion within the legislative framework. The quotation below is an example which illustrates how
Board members spoke about their consideration of the relevant legislation, in which an element of
discretion is also evident:
“The licensing laws . . . they keep everybody tight on what way we should be going or what we can do
or can’t do or if we’ve got leeway in a certain place.”
(LA3, LB Member)
This statement was made in the context of explaining how the LB had made a decision to
change a local policy about licensed premise curfews. S/he explained that these types of decisions
must be seen by the LB’s legal team to ensure that local decisions are aligned with, or ‘tight on,’
national legislation, but that in this instance, the LB had the discretion, or ‘leeway,’ to make a decision
regarding curfews. This demonstrates that interpretation and flexibility is present in the process
of implementing the legislation. Evidence shows there are also specific personnel who help LBs
to navigate the licensing legislation—legally qualified clerks which are mentioned throughout LA
2005 [50]. A similar, institutional support mechanism does not exist for other aspects of the Boards’
public-administrative accountability, further indicating the dominance of legal accountability in the
LB’s accountability arrangements.
The flexibility within the licensing legislative framework seems to have been intentional on the
part of the government. For example, in the cover letter of the associated Guidance for Licensing Boards,
Gary Cox, Head of the Licensing Team states:
“I would like to stress that Boards will have the flexibility to operate and take decisions in light of
their particular circumstances . . . That is a fundamental principle of the [Licensing] Act, and it is
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important to maintain it. The guidance does not seek to instruct Boards exactly how to make the
Act work.”
Guidance for Licensing Boards (2007) [48]
This purposeful flexibility gives LBs a significant amount of autonomy to interpret and implement
the legislation. The findings from this research suggest that this flexibility has contributed to the limited
implementation of the public health objective. For example, as will be discussed below, LB members
often choose to prioritize local economic concerns (which are not enshrined in a licensing objective),
presenting a potential challenge to the pursuit of public health goals.
When asked what sanctions would be applied if LBs were to diverge from their legal responsibilities,
interview responses suggested that the primary fear was licensing decisions being appealed in court
by the licence applicant, and that the cost of this would be significant.
“Well the Board’s accountable. I mean, it’s accountable by the reason that if it makes the wrong
decisions, it ends up in court . . . and costs the council, you know, £50,000, £70,000, £100,000 in the
court case.”
(LA3, LB Member)
By ‘wrong decision’, this interviewee is referring to a decision which can be legally challenged
because it appears to be in error of the law or against the LB’s Policy Statement. This legal challenge is
the clearest mechanism of LB accountability (i.e., an LB may face consequences for their decisions) that
was generated from the research findings. In this instance, a licence applicant (e.g., supermarket chain,
or restaurant) or a licence holder (whose licence has been varied, suspended, or revoked) can appeal to
the Sheri↵ Court, a civil court in Scotland [51]. In this system, LBs are held to account by the court as
an organisation. This type of legal accountability is an important accountability mechanism which can
prevent the abuse of public powers and which operates independently from the political process [52].
If a licence applicant or holder wishes to trigger an appeal of an LB decision, they can do so within
21 days [51]. In contrast, ‘objectors’ to an application (who may, for example, be a statutory consultee
like the police/NHS or members of the public) are not able to appeal a decision [53]. Therefore, the same
routes for triggering legal accountability mechanisms do not exist for objectors. There is therefore
an inbuilt imbalance between the powers of licence applicants and alcohol policy implementers.
Additionally, given the costs associated with mounting legal challenges, this system favours those
with greater financial resources, and it seemed evident, from the interview data, that this informed
members sense of where challenges were likely to originate from (and where not). For example:
“I think the Board . . . has a lot of responsibility and a lot of authority that’s pretty much unchallenged
unless you can a↵ord to go to a Sheri↵ to overturn a decision. I mean if . . . we refuse alcohol in a BP
[formerly ‘British Petroleum Company’] service station, BP will take us to court . . . But, small retailers
won’t, it’s just not worth it”
(LA1, LB Member)
3.3. Flexibility Permits Licensing Board Prioritisation of Economic Considerations Over Public Health
The flexibility of LBs to interpret legislation discussed above was also evident in interview data
which discussed local economic concerns. The way economic considerations and public health can
come into conflict within Scottish alcohol policy has been noted in existing peer-reviewed literature [27],
which this research complements by approaching the issue from an accountability perspective.
Multiple LB members discussed the need for licensed premises to contribute to employment
and the economy, despite the absence of the economy being a consideration in the LA 2005 licensing
objectives. For example:
“A lot of places . . . they need their licensing outlets . . . it’s job provision. It’s like having a factory,
you know . . . so that’s the way you’ve got to look at it”
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These types of responses indicate that Board members’ interpretations of the licensing legislation
and objectives is flexible enough that they can take into consideration the (local) economy, even if this
leads them to make decisions that go against the licensing objectives and increases the availability
of alcohol in a given area. Other Board member interviewees displayed similar concerns: That the
anticipated money and jobs that licensed premises might provide were considerations when they
decided on a licensing application. However, LBs have a formal, legislative-determined responsibility
for progress towards the public health objective and no formal responsibility for being concerned with
the economy, and yet their concerns typically seem to be much more focused on the latter.
The tension between LB prioritisation of the economy over public health was explicitly discussed
by one LB member. However, this was a minority voice among LB interviewees.
“I’m aware that other Board members have conversations about the economic impact of their decisions.
Now obviously under the [Licensing] Act they’re not supposed to take that into account at all, and I
certainly try not to when I’m making decisions, but I know that other Board members do, and I’ve
been told, for example, in the members’ lounge, ‘well, if that supermarket wasn’t going to setup there
then it would just be another empty unit for years to come and they’re providing jobs anyway, so
why on earth are you standing in their way?’ I think that’s a somewhat short-sighted approach and
doesn’t take into account a fair bit of evidence that suggests that adding another o↵-licence in an area
that’s already over provided for is just likely to make problems with alcohol and over consumption of
alcohol worse.”
(LA1, LB Member)
Recognition of this was also evident in national level interviews:
“[Licensing Boards] sit outside that local accountability. And I suppose the tension between the
licensing objectives and what they see as their economic objective now licensing doesn’t have an
economic objective that it has for five licensing objectives, but they still see themselves as having an
economic objective, and that probably provides quite a lot of tension.”
(National Level 3)
This quotation suggests that some LB members have adopted a sense of accountability for pursuing
economic objectives relating to perceived local needs and that this is felt more strongly than their
obligation towards the licensing objectives, despite the legal framework attached to the objectives.
It also suggests that this approach will be maintained as long as LBs are excluded from other local
accountability structures (e.g., reporting to the local council). The problem with this tension is that,
from the perspective of other local implementers, it challenges local alcohol policy implementation:
“Unfortunately a lot of our objections haven’t met with much success, and the Board have granted
applications that we’ve objected to . . . sometimes [licence applicants’] lawyers quote economic reasons,
employment, and all of those reasons, whilst it might be a factor in the decision-making, it shouldn’t
really be because they should be basing decisions on the licensing objectives and the legislation.”
(LA1, Police Representative)
The police are a statutory consultee on every license application and thus can file formal objections
to any application. (Note, both police and a local area’s Health Board are individual statutory
consultees to the LB and, in this capacity, are permitted to lodge objections to applications). In the
above, a police representative suggests that LB members have made licensing decisions based on
information surrounding the economy or employment. These are not only unsupported legal grounds
for licensing decision-making but may also come into direct tension with the licensing objectives
and legislation (and existing public health research). Further, this person seems to suggest that these
economic reasons are used by the LB to overrule local statutory objections to applications. This means
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that economic considerations may be a threat to this mechanism by which local statutory actors can
attempt to influence the restriction of alcohol licences. This is despite the existing Guidance for Licensing
Boards stating,
“Commercial considerations are irrelevant to a policy which is designed to protect the wider public
interest”
Guidance for Licensing Boards (2007) [48]
While formal guidance for policy action separates commercial considerations and public interest,
it appears that the level of flexibility allowed to LBs within their legal accountability arrangements has
created space for economic considerations to push aside public health concerns.
3.4. Lack of Accountability to Scottish Government
Data from both documents and interviews generated an understanding regarding LB accountability
in relation to the Scottish Government. In the government’s Framework for Action, LBs are mentioned
multiple times as contributors to reducing alcohol-related harm in Scotland, even more frequently than
ADPs [2]. However, the language around holding LBs to account for these contributions is restrained.
For example, the Framework states, “we will encourage local Licensing Boards to develop local solutions
to address local problems.” (p. 14, [2], emphasis added). This inscribed language suggests that
the government recognizes and perpetuates the autonomy of LBs, indicating in its communications
that it must request, not demand, their cooperation in the whole-population approach to reducing
alcohol-related harm. National level interview data also suggested the government was clear that LBs
were not accountable to them:
“Licensing Boards aren’t accountable to Scottish Government. So we were not performance managing
this across the whole system.”
(National Level 4)
This perception seems to have been clearly communicated to local level—nearly all LB members
interviewed indicated they were not accountable to the Scottish Government. Further, LB interviewees
reported that they did not perceive the Scottish Government to be actively monitoring their decisions
or actions.
What is notable here is the tension between the Scottish Government’s role in defining Scotland’s
approach to tackling alcohol related harm and the inability to hold a key set of organisations to account
for contributing to this e↵ort. If the Scottish Government is providing the mandate to pursue public
health goals through the implementation of their alcohol strategy but cannot hold LBs to account
for their role in this, then LBs will continue to be relatively free to prioritise other concerns. As an
example, the quotation below highlights that the purpose of a national policy is nullified if LBs can
simply ignore it.
“You can have a national policy up here, but if the Board’s just ignoring it, I’m not suggesting the
Board is ignoring it, but we might sometimes ignore it, what will you do about it? You know I don’t
think there’s any accountability to the Scottish Government to say, ‘So you can sit and make a big
document to sit on the shelf all you want, but we’ll just ignore it.’ And what are you going to do
about it. So, I’m not sure there’s any point in having a national policy document if Licensing Boards
can just make their own minds up.”
(LA1, LB Member)
Again, the tension between LB members’ roles as Board members and as local councillors is evident.
The Scottish Government has implemented legislation which places councillors on quasi-judicial,
administrative boards but has not developed a corresponding system to hold them accountable for
their actions on it. Further, it will be di cult for the Scottish Government to enact accountability over
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councillors because it risks undermining local democracy. These results demonstrate that this particular
gap in LB accountability constitutes a barrier to full alcohol policy implementation because it means LBs’
responsibility for contributing to public health goals are not enforced by existing governance structures.
Additionally, this lack of LB accountability to the Scottish Government further distinguishes LBs
from other alcohol policy implementers such as ADPs. For example, the Framework for Action uses
stronger language surrounding the responsibilities of ADPs, including phrases such as “we expect
decisions . . . ” [2] (emphasis added) when discussing the roles of ADPs. This suggests the Scottish
Government feels di↵erently (and less strongly) about the accountability of LBs to the government
in comparison with ADPs. Additional interview data (beyond the scope of this article and will be
reported separately) also demonstrated that ADPs perceive themselves to be accountable to the Scottish
Government. Overall, it appears there are important di↵erences between LBs and other alcohol policy
implementers (i.e., ADPs) in terms of their accountability relationships with the Scottish Government,
and that these di↵erences seem to be led by national level. This is important because it reveals the
variation in accountability arrangements across di↵erent alcohol policy implementation stakeholders,
which may have implications for implementation processes.
3.5. Critique of Licensing Board Accountability
Within the interview data, critiques of the current licensing accountability regime were evident.
Of greatest interest was that certain LB members were critical of their own accountability arrangements
and advocated for greater consideration of public health outcomes by the LB. For example, two LB
members from LA1 were particularly critical of current LB governance and accountability throughout
their interviews. The quotation below discusses an LB member’s issues with how their Policy Statement
was developed:
“[The Licensing Board]’s not very accountable and it’s not very transparent . . . // . . . I have no great
problem with people making decisions that I disagree with, but I do think they should be accountable
for those decisions and at the moment they aren’t entirely”
(LA1, LB Member)
This quotation speaks to the issue of LB governance and transparency as it relates to accountability.
It also raises the issue that if an individual or organisation wanted to hold the LB to account for the
final content it puts in its Policy Statement, it would be di cult for one to do so. The quotation below
demonstrates this:
“We pretty much make our own minds up, and that’s final. I mean [licence applicants] can appeal the
decision in the Sheri↵ court, but, other than that, there’s no way to appeal to, to anyone . . . //. . . . So,
not to sound big-headed in any way, but I don’t think there is a huge feeling of accountability from
Board Members to anyone in particular.”
(LA1, LB Member)
This quotation also illustrates the relative lack of checks and balances that influence LBs (with the
exception of appeals when these are launched by applicants). In their interview, the LB member quoted
above was critical of this situation, perceiving that the LB can simply ignore national policy and makes
decisions about the development of their Policy Statement unchecked.
3.6. Lack of Public-Administrative Accountability to Local Governance Hierarchy
Transitioning to an analysis of LBs’ public-administrative accountability within local-level
governance, findings demonstrate Boards sit beyond local accountability regimes and lack
local-level accountability.
“[The Board] has nothing to do with the other council structures. It’s a body on its own. It’s not
accountable to anybody else in the council.”
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(LA2, LB Member)
The above quotation is indicative of the consensus among interviewees that, at the
organisation-level of public-administrative accountability, the LB is not accountable to the local
council—it sits independently from the usual local accountability regime for local council committees.
Local and national level alcohol policy interviewees were critical of the lack of accountability of LBs
to local governance bodies. In particular, there was recognition and frustration surrounding the inability
of local public sector actors to hold LBs to account for work which a↵ected other local organisations.
“Lots of activity at my level . . . working with the police and the [National Health Service], to try to
influence the Licensing Board, nothing really happening, and then that frustration coming back at
the Community Planning Partnership level because they can’t influence it either. So yeah, Licensing
Boards, because of legislation, are sitting out here doing as they please without any accountability.”
(LA1, ADP Member)
Frustration was also expressed from national level stakeholders:
“Health is now one of the objectives of the licensing system, and health partners are statutory
consultees. But that’s quite tricky . . . you’ve got locally elected members who sit on Licensing Boards,
but the Licensing Board isn’t part of community planning . . . so you can have a Community Planning
Partnership that say, alcohol’s a priority for us, and then you’ve got a local Licensing Board that
basically says, who cares? You know, nothing to do with us, guv . . . so you’re ignoring the whole
evidence base and there’s no accountability.”
(National Level 1)
This lack of accountability creates a barrier for e↵ective achievement of alcohol policy goals,
specifically the reduction of alcohol-related harm through the restriction of availability. The above
quotation shows LBs can essentially ignore the goals and priorities of other local government entities,
even when these priorities are directly related to LB decision-making (e.g., health as a licensing objective
and alcohol problems as a local strategic priority). It also further shows LBs are able to make their
own interpretations of existing public health evidence and have the autonomy to ignore it if they wish.
This is problematic because it can create a tension between the LB and the broader policy context in
which the national alcohol strategy and related local strategy planning have subscribed to this evidence.
3.7. Recent Changes to Licensing Board Accountability: Continued Need for Accountability Considerations
More recent legislation makes amendments to the existing regulatory regime surrounding LBs,
which may have implications for their accountability. Specifically, relevant components of the Air
Weapons and Licensing Act 2015 (herein AWLA 2015) were developed following a 2012 consultation
surrounding two main themes: Strengthening the powers of LBs and Police Scotland; and improving
the e↵ectiveness of the licensing regime [54]. It also introduced a mandate for LBs to report annually
to the Scottish Government. Therefore, one might expect that accountability of LBs to the Scottish
Government may change with more comprehensive enactment of the AWLA 2015.
A key component of the AWLA 2015 is the requirement of LBs to submit annual reports of their
‘functions,’ including a summary of decisions made by the LB, and a statement explaining how the LB
has had regard to the licensing objectives [55]. In interviews, a Deputy Clerk for one LB was optimistic
that this would enhance their accountability:
“You can have several months’ worth of [Licensing Board] business going by without much awareness,
outside of what’s going on. And I think annual reporting, with specific information about the financial,
you know, details of the annual fees coming in, details of what the fees are being used for, details of the
numbers of applications, all of that. I mean, I don’t know, I think we’ll find out in due course, by way
of regulation, what those annual reports will have to contain. But I think it’s a good thing.”
(Deputy Clerk)
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The AWLA 2015 requires that the report must include statements regarding how the LB has
had regard to the licensing objectives and their Policy Statement, as well as a summary about their
decisions and the number of licenses in their area [55] (s.56 (2) (2)). However, although this section
of the legislation was commenced in 2017, meaning the first reports were submitted in June 2018,
the format and specific content of LB annual reports has not yet been published by the government [56].
Additionally, language in the legislation suggests that these requirements will have the same
flexibilities as observed with other licensing legislation. For example, the AWLA 2015 states:
“A report under this section may include such other information about the exercise of the Licensing
Board’s functions under this Act as the Board considers appropriate.”
(s.56 (2) (3), emphasis added)
This type of language suggests LBs will again be given significant autonomy in how they
participate in this accountability reporting exercise, even regarding the type of information they wish
to submit for scrutiny. Following Mark Bovens’ definition of accountability from the accountability
literature [52,57], this type of statement, in which the potential ‘actor’ may use discretion to select
what information they provide to the potential ‘forum’ (and thus what they have to explain/justify),
undermines the possibility of establishing a robust accountability relationship between LBs and the
Scottish Government.
Though the deputy clerk above was positive about this anticipated change, it was not always clear
from interviews whether LB members were actually aware of this upcoming obligation. This indicates
that the introduction of the annual reports was not communicated well to LBs, has not been prioritized
by stakeholders in the licensing system, or both. This could further suggest that the stakeholders in
the licensing system may not perceive the reports to be an important activity. For example, in LA3,
multiple LB interviewees stated that they either had not studied the 2015 legislation yet or had only
heard of it recently in a brief meeting discussion (despite these interviews having been conducted in
late 2016). Overall, interviews with LB members indicated that the legislative changes were not yet
implemented at the time of the interviews and did not suggest that there was any urgency to do so.
4. Discussion
The public health objective makes Scotland unique in its approach to licensing.
However, the empirical results in this article suggested that LB members are not held su ciently
accountable for pursuing and protecting public health; a finding which emerged from analysis of the
data. In particular, it was demonstrated that accountability mechanisms surrounding licensing do
not currently allow for the objective to take its full e↵ect. In starker terms, what has been observed
is a tension between that which is written and suggested in the existing legal and policy framework
surrounding alcohol licensing and that which is enacted in ongoing alcohol policy implementation
practice, in terms of accountability mechanisms. The absence of a regular mechanism to ensure LBs
are fulfilling their public health-related obligations means their decisions often present a challenge to
alcohol policy implementation and the achievement of alcohol policy goals related to alcohol availability.
The concept of accountability was important here because it underpins how implementation occurs
and is understood, as well as, importantly, who is (and how they are) responsible for undertaking
implementation. The component parts of accountability processes—who is held responsible for
policy implementation, how their actions are measured and judged, and how consequences are
distributed—also provide insight into how governments perceive a given policy problem and its
potential solutions. This article was concerned with the actions of public actors (i.e., those working in
the public sector) who are often responsible for activities related to policy implementation [58]. What is
known about accountability, and about the interplay of accountability with policy implementation
processes, assisted the examination of how progress in Scottish alcohol policy implementation has
been challenged or facilitated.
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Thus, while the results presented in this article are aligned with existing research suggesting
the public health objective has been di cult to implement [14,27], they also suggest that the lens of
accountability is an important component of explaining why implementation has been challenging thus
far. They lend support to an analysis which is focused on the accountability mechanisms surrounding
licensing decision-making and its relationship with alcohol policy implementation.
4.1. Legislative and Legal Tensions
While a legal accountability system exists to regulate LBs, the arrangements are not conducive to
protecting public health interests. As they stand, these arrangements do not adequately support the
implementation of the public health objective (despite it being a component of the legal framework),
creating a missed opportunity for supporting the implementation of the overall Scottish alcohol strategy.
To analyse this further, the data showed that public-administrative accountability of LBs
relies on legal accountability arrangements; beyond legal accountability, there is a lack of other
public-administrative mechanisms for holding LBs to account. This creates challenges for alcohol
policy implementation and the pursuit of public health goals in this process, because any gaps or
failures within legal accountability processes to support alcohol policy implementation cannot be
mitigated by other public-administrative mechanisms. Indeed, while LB accountability is reliant on
legal mechanisms, the practical arrangements of this are characterised by substantive flexibility and an
imbalance towards wealthy industry stakeholders.
This leads to two observations. First, LBs’ flexibility to interpret legislation may allow them to
contextualise the legislation (‘in light of their particular circumstances’); however, this also leaves them
free to interpret the licensing objectives more flexibly than intended or to even ignore the ‘spirit’ of the
legislation which seeks from LB members an understanding and concern about public health impacts of
availability. This finding is aligned with results from a review of LB Policy Statements by Alcohol Focus
Scotland, which showed that overprovision statements were varied in their breadth and strength [15],
suggesting interpretative flexibility of availability-related evidence. This analysis also rea rms research
which finds that discretion among LBs can lead to inconsistent policy implementation [28].
Second, the observed imbalance towards wealthy licence applicants suggests LBs are only held
to account by applicants who have the financial resources to challenge their decision-making on
a legal basis. While the court case regarding MUP positioned the alcohol industry as an adversary
of the government and its public health goals [59], the accountability structures and practices
surrounding alcohol licensing continue to favour large industry retailers and largely exclude public
health stakeholders. If this is the only mechanism that is e↵ective for holding LBs to account,
this excludes (a) alcohol policy implementers such as ADPs and their member organisations from
holding LBs to account, because they cannot engage in the system in this manner, and (b) less financially
secure licence applicants. The imbalance in this power distribution favours economic actors which
also control significant financial power and resources, namely large industry producers and retailers.
This creates a system in which powerful industry actors are also the actors who are most empowered
to challenge the system that exists to regulate them. These findings are aligned with existing research
in which public health actors perceive licensing processes as unfair, disempowering, and favouring
of well-resources licensing actors [28]. Further, it is unlikely that this accountability mechanism will
lead to the prioritisation of public health goals—it is located in the justice, not health, portfolio, and its
imbalance towards large industry stakeholders means that the key interests of these stakeholders are
also likely to be in conflict with public health objectives (i.e., industry is unlikely to trigger an appeal in
pursuit of better public health-related outcomes). These findings are also aligned with a discussion of
legal accountability in the broader public policy literature by Hill and Varone, where they highlight that
the “law may be comparatively impotent in the face of complex issues of administrative discretion,”
and that these concerns about the limits of legal control “stimulates a search for other models of
accountability” (p. 344, [60]).
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Thus, there is a tension in that, while licensing is meant to regulate alcohol retailing and availability,
in practice the system still privileges large retailers. This problem is possibly perpetuated by the way
the licensing system is currently meant to traverse multiple policy systems, i.e., justice/legal and public
health, which have di↵erent approaches and priorities. This suggests that there is a need to e↵ectively
utilise systems of accountability to mitigate di↵erences between these sectors, whereas, currently,
they may be serving to perpetuate them.
Ultimately, the reliance on legal accountability of LBs and the characteristics of the enacted
processes contribute to the tension between what is formally included in relevant alcohol licensing
legislation and policy and what is observed in practice.
4.2. Democracy, Accountability, and Public Health in Scottish Alcohol Licensing
This analysis also highlights contextual and situational factors which further contribute to the
identified tension. This included characteristics of local democracy, in particular in the roles of locally
elected councillors and in the relationship between Scottish and local governments. The first example
relates to the interplay of local democracy, accountability, and the economy. The data suggested
that while LBs have a formal responsibility regarding the public health objective and no formal
responsibility for being concerned with the economy, they often exhibited more concern for the latter.
This could be a function of their simultaneous status as elected councillors and as LB members.
As councillors, they have a responsibility for the economic wellbeing of their local area because
they have been elected by their local community, and because the Scottish Government’s National
Performance Framework demands that local government have regard to the government’s Purpose of
economic growth (note, an updated 2018 version of the National Performance Framework states both
‘increased wellbeing’ and ‘economic growth’ as the foundational components of the government’s
Purpose [17]). However, LB members legally have responsibility for public health, not economic
concerns—the document guiding their decision-making states that commercial considerations are
irrelevant to a policy which is designed to protect the wider public interest. Therefore, it is observed
that their simultaneous roles of elected councillor and LB member seem to be in conflict, and that their
democratic accountability and legal accountability are also in tension.
It is important to note that concerns regarding employment and the economy are relevant for
health policy, particularly through a social determinants of health perspective [61,62]. It would be
unwise to dismiss these concerns as irrelevant in this context—existing research has demonstrated,
for example, that factors related to employment are associated with general health and mental health
outcomes [63]. Interestingly, however, LB members did not frame their economic considerations in
this way in interviews, even though this may have provided justification for their otherwise informal
concerns. Instead they portrayed their concerns with employment and the economy as standalone
and self-explanatory.
A second component of the analysis related to local democracy observes the di↵erences between
elected and non-elected alcohol policy implementation stakeholders. It was observed that councillors
will experience democratic accountability which local, non-elected policy implementers (such as
members of ADPs) will not. In light of this local political context there is a tension in how alcohol policy
implementation is governed. Elected councillors are not part of the same systems of accountability as
non-elected local government actors. However, the National Performance Framework identifies health
as a Scottish priority, and LBs have a direct influence in contributing towards the alcohol-harm-related
goals of the National Performance Framework because they control the availability of alcohol. It appears
that their role as a LB member is again in tension with this councillor role, because being a LB member
is a policy-led, administrative position which is explicitly intended to contribute to central government
goals around alcohol-related harm [49], and one would presume that they should, as such, be held
accountable for this policy work. Yet, this research identified no obvious mechanism through
which LB members were held to account for this work. In light of these local contextual tensions
and factors, local politics and councillors’ democratic accountability need to be acknowledged as
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important considerations underpinning LB accountability processes, with implications for alcohol
policy implementation. This is a topic on which Fitzgerald and colleagues [28] have also made
an important contribution, and this article complements that work by including non-public health
interviewees (including LB members themselves) in a smaller number of local areas, allowing for an
in-depth analysis specifically regarding public-administrative accountability surrounding LBs.
Third, LBs have a di↵erent arrangement of formal public-administrative accountabilities than
other alcohol policy implementers, who are subject to more explicit accountability and reporting
mechanisms within local and national governance systems. These di↵erences are important because,
as a consequence, LBs have greater discretionary powers and are subject to less oversight than other local
policy implementers (e.g., ADPs). For example, LBs are quasi-judicial bodies which sit independently
from the established accountability regime for other local council committees [64]. Thus, although LBs
make decisions which influence the local populace and may impact local government progress towards
their own strategic priorities, they sit beyond the accountability arrangements which could monitor
them. This is potentially problematic because, if their actions present a barrier to the achievement of
local strategies, local actors do not have any recourse to hold them to account for this. This demonstrates
a key aspect of the LB accountability problem for alcohol policy implementation: While LBs sit beyond
the system of public-administrative accountability applied to other alcohol policy implementers,
they will continue to present a key challenge to achieving availability-related alcohol policy goals.
If di↵erent stakeholders, who are meant to be allied and working towards shared policy goals, are not
subject to similar accountability mechanisms, then there is a risk their actions diverge from one another,
and possible come into conflict.
To illustrate this further, local authority areas have Local Development Plans which outline their
visions and strategic priorities for their local communities [65]. These often include priorities around
health and wellbeing. As a clear example of this, one region in Scotland, Aberdeenshire, has recently
named ‘Changing Aberdeenshire’s Relationship with Alcohol’ as one of three local priorities for
2017-2027 [66]. In this context, implementation of a local strategy and the achievement of its intended
alcohol-related outcomes will be challenged if the local LB acts with relative impunity to increase
alcohol availability.
Finally, the data suggested that the Scottish Government is noticeably absent as an accountability
forum for LBs, a situation of which many interviewees were critical. This current lack of accountability
to the Scottish Government is problematic—if LBs are perceived as contributors to Scotland’s alcohol
strategy, there must be a mechanism to ensure they act in this capacity, and the government is well-placed
and legitimate to do this. However, it was noted that this would be complicated by the di↵erent
levels of democracy at play, which influence LB members’ actions and have implications for whether
the Scottish Government can hold them to account for their role in alcohol policy implementation.
Despite this, the Scottish Government may be a well-positioned and legitimate organisation to shoulder
both monitoring and accountability of LBs if this was arranged to be coherent with local autonomy
and democratic accountability. Given the critique of the current situation by national and local alcohol
policy stakeholders (including LB members) from a public health perspective, it will be important (and
possibly timely) to push for system change.
4.3. Implications for Research and Policy
In light of the findings reported here and the knowledge gaps that remain, it is recommended
that future research examine other aspects of accountability experienced by policy implementers.
For example, this may include examining horizontal accountability(ies) to professional colleagues or
a more nuanced analysis of perceptions of accountability to the public. Additionally, empirical analyses
of how accountability regimes are aligned or conflict with other aspects of alcohol policy implementation
processes will be needed if comprehensive understandings of implementation are to be attained.
Further, while existing alcohol policy implementation literature has included di↵erent
considerations of accountability, there is a dearth of literature about alcohol policy which examines
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how, why, and in which circumstances di↵erent accountability mechanisms may be most e↵ective.
In terms of both research and policy implications, there therefore appears to be a need both to explore
with stakeholders what alternative approaches to LB accountability may be e↵ective and to develop
a research agenda which investigates them empirically. As a first step, the findings reported here
suggest introducing a monitoring system of LB licensing decisions (including whether objections
were lodged by statutory consultees), which may provide useful data to inform future research
and decision-making.
4.4. Strengths and Limitations
The combination in this study of interviews and document analysis permitted a timely, in-depth
analysis of the interplay between accountability mechanisms and alcohol policy implementation
in the context of Scottish alcohol licensing. However, local interviewees in this research were
drawn from a subset of three local authority areas in Scotland; therefore, it is not possible to
make broad generalisations nationally or internationally. Further, space did not permit discussion
of other types of accountability which arose in the data as possibly impacting alcohol policy
implementation—accountability within the LB itself or in relation to public involvement in licensing,
for example.
5. Conclusions
In the context of limited empirical alcohol policy research which examines the interplay between
alcohol policy implementation and accountability, this article makes a contribution to understanding
how accountability processes influence the e↵ectiveness of alcohol policy implementation in Scotland.
In the case of Scottish alcohol licensing and the ‘public health objective,’ it was argued that there
is a tension between the intentions of licensing legislation and the way it is enacted in practice.
In particular, it suggests that there are a lack of accountability mechanisms acting upon Scottish LBs to
ensure they contribute to the public health goals of the Scottish alcohol strategy. From a public health
perspective, this has perpetuated a system in which LBs continue to act with problematic levels of
flexibility and autonomy from the rest of the alcohol policy implementation system.
This article does not claim that Scotland’s alcohol strategy or, within licensing, public health
objective itself has failed. Instead, it suggests that the implementation of these policies is su↵ering from
challenges that are well-known in the wider policy implementation and governance literature: That it
is insu cient to develop public health policy or legislation and expect that the implementation of this
will straightforwardly follow from this top-down decision. In this case, this problem is particularly
acute given the complex interplay of public health, economic, democratic, and governance concerns
which influence the decisions and actions of alcohol policy implementation stakeholders. The key
message, however, is that national alcohol policy in Scotland will fall short of intended goals as long as
the tension between licensing legislation and enacted licensing practice remains.
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